NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4010-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
MAHDI A. WRIGHT,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Argued May 28, 2026 – Decided June 15, 2026
Before Judges Mawla and Marczyk.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 22-08-1913.
Alexandra Marek, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Alexandra Marek, of counsel and on the briefs).
Margaret Myaskovskaya, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Margaret Myaskovskaya, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Mahdi A. Wright appeals from his conviction and sentence for
the murder of James Shaw, Jr. We affirm defendant's convictions but remand
his sentence for reconsideration after the trial court adjudicates his request for
new counsel.
On February 16, 2022, Newark police responded to a shooting at the
intersection of Mapes Place and Shephard Avenue. Police found Shaw bleeding
from a gunshot wound to the back of his head. Two nine-millimeter shell
casings were recovered from the scene. Shaw later succumbed to his injuries.
There were no eyewitnesses to the shooting. However, video surveillance
footage showed a person wearing all black walk up behind Shaw before the
shooting and then run down the street toward Mapes Avenue and get into a black
Chevy Impala. The front of the vehicle was distinctive; it was damaged and had
no license plate. The shooter entered the vehicle's passenger side. Various video
cameras captured the Impala leaving the area of the crime and recorded its travel
to Elizabeth, where a passenger, wearing all black, exited the vehicle and entered
a home on Port Avenue. Police later determined the vehicle was registered to
Ashad Garat.
A Ring doorbell camera at the Port Avenue home captured the face of the
person entering the home. Defendant and his family lived on the home's second
A-4010-23 2 floor. Several minutes after entering the home, a person resembling defendant
exited and drove away in the Impala.
On February 19, 2022, police located the Impala on Mapes Avenue, being
operated by a woman. Lead investigator, Essex County Prosecutor's Office
(ECPO) Detective Al-Jerome Burnett-Crawford, interviewed the woman. A
search warrant for the vehicle was executed on or about February 20, 2022. The
ECPO recovered a backpack, six rounds of ammunition, and a Ruger gun box
from the Impala.
On March 15, 2022, defendant's mother identified him from still
photographs taken from the Ring camera footage. A search warrant for the Port
Avenue home was executed the same day. The clothing observed being worn
the day of the shooting was recovered, as well as footage from the Ring camera.
Police also recovered a video from a grocery store, showing Garat appearing to
describe a shooting to another individual. Defendant was not seen in the clip.
Police arrested defendant on May 10, 2022. He was indicted on: first-
degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count one); second-degree unlawful
possession of weapon(s), N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count two); and second-
degree possession of weapon(s) for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -4(a)(1)
(count three).
A-4010-23 3 The State's case was entirely circumstantial. It presented testimony from
seventeen witnesses, including several experts, video and photo evidence, and
additional physical evidence.
Newark Police Officer Emilio Santiago testified he was the first on the
scene of the shooting, having been flagged down by an individual. After
securing the scene, officers canvassed the area for gun shell casings and possible
witnesses. Officer Santiago spoke with Gewayne Blake, who had heard the
shooting and saw the aftermath.
Defendant's mother testified she identified defendant from several still
photographs taken from the video recovered by police. Defendant's landlord
also identified him from the Ring camera footage.
Janaisha Greene testified she was sitting in the passenger seat, driving
around with her friend, Destiny Baker, delivering food. There was also a five-
year-old child in the car. At the time of the shooting, Greene was stopped at the
corner of Mapes Place and Shephard Avenue because she was calling Shaw to
see where he was. Shaw approached Greene's car and then stepped away after
they conversed. After Shaw stepped away, he was shot. Greene did not see the
shooter's face but saw them turn towards Shaw and heard shots ring out. She
noticed a person wearing all black.
A-4010-23 4 Blake testified he was in his home on Shepard Avenue, when he heard gun
shots. He saw someone running to a car and get in it, before the car made a U-
turn and drove away. The person wore all black, but Blake could not see what
they looked like. He described the car as a black Chevy Impala.
At the time of the shooting, Detective Matthew Schneiderman worked for
the ECPO Crime Scene Unit. He collected evidence and obtained a search
warrant for defendant's home. Detective Schneiderman collected and
photographed a gray hoodie. A red sweatshirt was also taken from the home.
ECPO Detective Kevin Lalicon testified he executed a search warrant on
Garat's Impala. He discussed the evidence recovered from it, including a black-
hooded sweatshirt and the Ruger gun box.
Detective Burnett-Crawford described the evidence gathered and the
witnesses he interviewed. He explained a search of Shaw's home disclosed
nothing of evidentiary value. However, after canvassing the scene, he recovered
video evidence tracing the car's movement.
Detective Burnett-Crawford's testimony explained the photo and video
evidence for the jury, including: the vehicle; its color; direction of travel; and
the lack of a front license plate. He also explained other videos, which showed
a person in dark clothing and the direction they traveled, walking to the scene
A-4010-23 5 and then running from it. Detective Burnett-Crawford noted the individual wore
dark clothing with white-trimmed shoes. He testified an image appeared to show
the individual holding an object in their left hand, which the detective circled
for the jury. The detective circled another image, showing a person extending
their arm. He described the video footage showing Greene, Baker, and Shaw
talking, and Shaw standing where he was shot.
Detective Burnett-Crawford then discussed the footage tracking the dark-
colored vehicle, which he identified as a Chevy Impala, as it drove from the
crime scene towards Elizabeth. He explained the vehicle's rear license plate
showed it was registered to Garat, who lived on Mapes Avenue in Newark, and
the process undertaken to recover the vehicle. The vehicle was tracked using
license-plate-reader technology and footage showing it turn onto Port Avenue
in Elizabeth.
Detective Burnett-Crawford explained one video captured an individual
exiting the vehicle, opening a rear door, and retrieving what appeared to be a
red article of clothing. A zoomed-in still photo depicted a dark-clothed
individual with white-trimmed shoes and a mask or hat on their head, holding a
red-hooded sweatshirt. Another video showed the individual later exiting the
car on Port Avenue and running towards and entering a residence on Port
A-4010-23 6 Avenue. A video and several images showed a person leaving the residence
wearing dark clothing. Video footage also showed a person wearing a red
sweatshirt entering a dark-colored Chevy Impala.
Detective Burnett-Crawford testified a search warrant was executed on an
apartment in the Port Avenue residence. The detective also testified about
search warrants executed for Garat's home, Instagram account, and mobile
phone number.
On cross-examination, the defense pointed out some of the images and
videos presented by the State depicted only Garat. Detective Burnett-Crawford
also testified he could not tell what Garat said in the video showing him
allegedly re-enact the shooting. He conceded, other than defendant being
identified on the Ring camera footage, no one had identified him at the scene.
Notably, the defense did not object to any of the video footage during the
detective's testimony. Its only objection was to the State's summary chart of the
camera locations and timing.
Before summations, the trial judge addressed the defense's concern the
identification charge did not properly address the fact no one had identified
defendant as the shooter. The judge noted identification remained an issue in
the case. So, he crafted his own charge, which read as follows:
A-4010-23 7 The burden of proving the identity of the person who committed the crimes is upon the State. For you to find this [d]efendant guilty, the State must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that this [d]efendant is the person who committed the crimes. The [d]efendant has neither the burden nor the duty to show that the crimes, if committed, were committed by someone else, or to prove the identity of that other person. You must determine, therefore, not only whether the State has proven each and every element of the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt, but also, whether the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that this [d]efendant is the person who committed them.
Defense counsel agreed to the charge.
The defense summation focused on the argument there were no
eyewitnesses and the State failed to prove defendant was the shooter. Also, none
of the physical evidence collected was connected to defendant. The defense
pointed to the fact there could have been someone else on Shephard Avenue
during the shooting, that Garat was also present, and the weapon and
ammunition were in his car. Based on the State medical examiner's testimony,
there was no evidence the person in dark clothing was the shooter because
Shaw's wounds were inconsistent with being shot at close range.
The State's summation was predicated on Baker's testimony there was no
third-party present during the shooting, the identification of defendant by his
mother, and the trail of "crumbs" defendant left from the shooting to his home,
A-4010-23 8 which could only mean he was the shooter. It led the jury through the video
evidence, tracking defendant and the Impala through the streets of Newark and
Elizabeth. The State argued the videos showed defendant, wearing a red-hooded
sweatshirt, getting into the Impala, and at some point, changing into Garat's
black-hooded sweatshirt 1 before shooting Shaw. A video showed defendant
opening the trunk of the vehicle after reaching the Port Avenue residence, and
there was no evidence anyone else accessed the trunk at the time. The State
argued defendant's claim Garat committed the crime did "not hold water"
because Garat's re-enactment of Shaw's death did not properly show how Shaw
fell. What mattered was defendant had the shooter's clothing and could have
changed in the car, regardless of who was driving.
Following the parties' summations, the trial judge instructed the jurors.
Relevant to the issues here, he repeated his initial instruction, explaining
comments by counsel were not considered evidence. The judge also stated
defendant argued the State had not proven he was the shooter and then read the
identification charge he had previously fashioned. Following the jury
1 The State pointed to defendant and Garat's Instagram account posts, showing them together and Garat wearing the same black hoodie. A-4010-23 9 instructions, the judge asked the parties if there was any objection to the jury
instructions. Neither objected and the jury began its deliberations.
During it deliberations, the jury asked to see: video of defendant outside
the Port Avenue residence; video of Garat in the grocery store; Blake's
testimony; and a list of the witnesses who testified. The jury found defendant
guilty on all three counts.
At the sentencing, following counsel's appearances, defendant interrupted
and said: "I will be firing my attorney on the record." The judge noted
defendant's request was made too late and proceeded with the sentencing.
Defense counsel argued the judge should apply mitigating factors seven,
nine, and fourteen. She pointed out, contrary to the pre-sentencing report,
defendant had completed his G.E.D. program. Defendant was gainfully
employed during high school and had no prior record. This was his first
indictable conviction. Counsel pointed out defendant was twenty-one years old
at sentencing and eighteen at the time of the offense. The defense also submitted
several letters attesting to defendant's character and family support. Counsel
requested the court sentence defendant to the statutory minimum of thirty-years.
After his attorney finished speaking, the judge afforded defendant the
A-4010-23 10 opportunity to make a statement. Defendant said: "I would like to fire [both of
my attorneys] and their whole law firm. . . . That's all I've got to say."
Shaw's family members spoke at length, after which the State presented
its sentencing argument. The State recounted the fact Shaw was unarmed when
defendant shot him in the back of the head. The shooting took place in front of
Greene, Baker, and a young child, which the State argued showed "complete[,]
wanton disregard for their safety, as well as . . . the intent to cause grave harm
to . . . Shaw." The video evidence "demonstrated [the] clear steps taken to show
. . . [defendant] knew exactly what he was doing on that day." The State had
proven defendant got into the car and "chang[ed] . . . into more neutral clothing,
putting a mask on to try and conceal his identity . . . . [H]e went directly from
[the crime scene] . . . back to his house, changing his clothes again in an attempt
to hide what he had done."
When the State observed defendant had shown no remorse nor taken
responsibility for his actions, defendant interjected by stating the State was
lying. The State urged the court to find aggravating factors one, two, three, and
nine, and give little weight to mitigating factor fourteen. Defendant continued
to interject and alleged the State was lying.
A-4010-23 11 The judge began by noting he was "very familiar" with defendant's case,
having presided over the trial and read "every word" of the presentencing report.
He noted defendant's age, level of education, and work history. The judge also
observed defendant had six juvenile petitions filed against him and in 2020, had
successfully completed a diversionary program related to a third-degree
aggravated assault, third-degree conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, and
third-degree endangering an injured victim offense.
Defendant was twice arrested as an adult, and the murder of Shaw
represented his first indictable conviction. In 2023, a bench warrant was issued
for him by the Law Division for a theft offense and he had an outstanding
warrant for a juvenile case involving the receipt of stolen property, obstructing
justice, and resisting arrest. Given this history, the judge declined to find
mitigating factors seven or nine applied as defendant had not led a law-abiding
life. However, mitigating factor fourteen applied because of defendant's youth.
The judge did not find aggravating factors one and two applied because
he believed the law already accounted for the heinous nature of defendant's
crimes. Aggravating factor three applied because defendant had "significant
anti-social behavior," which convinced the judge he was at risk of committing
another crime. The judge found aggravating factor nine applied because there
A-4010-23 12 was a need to deter defendant and others from violating the law. He concluded
the aggravating factors "substantially outweigh[ed]" the mitigating factor.
The trial judge also noted he gave defendant the opportunity to speak and
"[t]he only thing [he] wanted to say was, [']I want to get rid of my attorneys.[']"
The judge "didn't hear anything about being the least bit remorseful." Defendant
interrupted, stating: "So, because I didn't say nothing, I'm not remorseful[?]"
The judge continued, noting "[t]he jury spoke quite resound[ingly]. It was a . . .
relatively quick verdict. And the evidence in this case was really overwhelming.
There was little doubt about [defendant's] guilt."
The judge sentenced defendant to forty-eight years in prison, subject to
the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, on count one, and a concurrent
term of eight years on count two, with four years of parole ineligibility under
the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). Count three was merged with count one.
Defendant raises the following points on appeal:
POINT I
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE DETECTIVE IMPROPERLY NARRATED VIDEO SURVEILLANCE FOOTAGE IN VIOLATION OF [STATE V.] WATSON.[2] (Not raised below).
2 254 N.J. 558 (2023). A-4010-23 13 A. The Detective Impermissibly Provided Continuous and Running Commentary In Response to Non-Focused Questions.
B. The Detective Impermissibly Provided His Opinion About the Contents of Videos and Photographs.
C. The State's Direct Examination Elicited Opinions From the Testifying Detective that Improperly Suggested to the Jury Who the Suspected Shooter and Suspect Vehicle Were.
D. The Admission Of This Improper Narration Testimony Was Plain Error, Requiring Reversal.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT[T]ED PLAIN ERROR BY FAILING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY ON THIRD- PARTY GUILT. (Not raised below).
POINT III
IMPROPER TESTIMONY WAS ELIC[I]TED FROM OFFICERS INDICATING THE USE OF SEARCH WARRANTS IN THE INVESTIGATION[,] WHICH IMPROPERLY BOLSTERED THE STATE'S CASE AND PREJUDICED THE DEFENDANT. (Not raised below).
POINT IV
THE PROSECUTOR MADE MULTIPLE IMPROPER REMARKS DURING SUMMATION THAT AMOUNTED TO PROSECUTORIAL
A-4010-23 14 MISCONDUCT THAT DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. (Not raised below).
POINT V
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE LEGAL ERRORS DEPRIVED DEFENDANT OF A FAIR TRIAL. (Not raised below).
POINT VI
DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE MUST BE VACATED AND REMANDED FOR RESENTENCING BECAUSE DEFENDANT WAS DENIED AN OPPORTUNITY TO OBTAIN NEW COUNSEL AND BECAUSE HIS SENTENCE WAS EXCESSIVE. . . .
A. The Matter Must Be Remanded for Resentencing Because Defendant Fired His Private Attorneys On the Record At Sentencing.
B. The Court Erred in its Weighing of Aggravating and Mitigating Factors, Resulting in an Excessive Sentence.
I.
In Point I, defendant claims there was little evidence he was the shooter
and no direct evidence linking him to the shooting. Instead, the State succeeded
in using surveillance videos to link him to the crime through Detective Burnett-
Crawford's improper narration testimony.
Defendant asserts Detective Burnett-Crawford gave a "continuous" and
"running commentary" on the footage, which the jury could have evaluated on
A-4010-23 15 its own. He also offered his subjective interpretations of disputed facts even
though he was not an eyewitness. These included whether: the person wearing
all black was the shooter; the object in their hand was a gun; and the person in
the red-hooded sweatshirt was the same as the one in black. Defendant argues
the detective's testimony regarding the videos tracking the vehicle improperly
suggested each video showed the same person in the same vehicle, yet the videos
were fragmented. Defendant contends the detective's testimony was plain error
because it deprived him of a fair trial, and we must reverse his convictions.
Errors not raised at the trial level are reviewed for plain error. R. 2:10-2;
State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021). "The mere possibility of an unjust result
is not enough." State v. Funderburg, 225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016). "In the context of
a jury trial, the possibility must be 'sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to
whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'"
State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 389-90 (2020) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J.
409, 422 (1997)).
The plain error standard requires a determination of: "(1) whether there
was error; and (2) whether that error was 'clearly capable of producing an unjust
result,' R. 2:10-2; that is, whether there is 'a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether
the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have reached.'" State v.
A-4010-23 16 Dunbrack, 245 N.J. 531, 544 (2021) (omission in original) (quoting Funderburg,
225 N.J. at 79). "To determine whether an alleged error rises to the level of
plain error, it 'must be evaluated in light of the overall strength of the State 's
case.'" State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266, 287 (2022) (quoting State v. Sanchez-
Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018)) (internal quotation marks omitted). The
defendant bears the burden of proving the plain error. State v. Santamaria, 236
N.J. 390, 404-05 (2019).
"[W]hen counsel does not make a timely objection at trial, it is a sign 'that
defense counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial' when they were
made." State v. Pressley, 232 N.J. 587, 594 (2018) (quoting State v. Echols, 199
N.J. 344, 360 (2009)). "[T]rial errors that 'were induced, encouraged or
acquiesced in or consented to by defense counsel ordinarily are not a basis for
reversal on appeal. . . .'" State v. A.R., 213 N.J. 542, 561 (2013) (omission in
original) (quoting State v. Corsaro, 107 N.J. 339, 345 (1987)).
Watson held an individual who did not witness an event may still testify
to an event captured on video so long as the testimony is objective. 254 N.J. at
569, 599. Narration testimony can be helpful to jurors to "better understand
video evidence and aid them in 'determining a fact in issue.'" Id. at 601 (quoting
N.J.R.E. 701(b)). This includes instances of "chaotic or confusing recorded
A-4010-23 17 events" or where jurors are tasked with tracking "individual movements from
frame to frame." Ibid. However, a narration witness may not provide
"continuous commentary during a video . . . based only on viewing the
recording," and the State must ask "focused questions designed to elicit specific,
helpful responses"; the witness may not offer opinions on the content, and only
give "objective, factual comments"; they should also avoid disputed factual
issues; and any inferences from the videos should be left to summation. Id. at
603-04. An example of proper narration testimony is "draw[ing] attention to a
distinctive shirt or a particular style of car that appear in different frames, which
a jury might otherwise overlook." Id. at 604.
A trial court's determination of such issues is subject to an abuse of
discretion review. Id. at 602. Additionally, if no objection was made during
trial, "the error will be disregarded unless a reasonable doubt has been raised
whether the jury came to a result that it otherwise might not have reached." State
v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 456 (2015).
Videos that form the basis of an officer's narration testimony on the areas
of interest from their investigation are generally permissible. State v. Allen, 254
N.J. 530, 548-49 (2023). Additionally, when a narration witness does not
identify the suspected shooter as the defendant, then reversal is not required,
A-4010-23 18 even if it is connected to testimony about a suspect's clothing being the same as
a shooter. See Singh, 245 N.J. at 17-18.
Pursuant to these principles and having considered Detective Burnett-
Crawford's testimony and the record, we conclude the narration testimony was
valid in its purpose and objective, and it did not violate Watson. At the outset,
we note, although Detective Burnett-Crawford's testimony as lead investigator
was important, the State presented several other witnesses who testified about
defendant's crimes, the crime scene, and the places investigators searched, which
also gave the jury sufficient evidence to reach a guilty verdict. The purpose of
Detective Burnett-Crawford's testimony was to explain the nature of his
investigation and how he tracked the shooter from the scene to the Port Avenue
residence by following the Impala.
The detective's testimony could hardly be characterized as a running
commentary. The State segmented the presentation by asking him to explain
what each piece of evidence, which included several parts of footage, showed
as it was introduced—without objection—for the jury's consideration. Also, the
State did not ask open-ended, unspecific questions, but instead queried the
detective to explain the evidentiary value of what he identified in the several
videos adduced into evidence.
A-4010-23 19 The detective never offered a subjective opinion to the jury. He did not
say the person seen in the video wearing black, and then red, was defendant nor
did he express defendant was in the car. Instead, he drew the jury's attention to
what the individual in the videos was wearing and how those pieces of clothing
connected to the clothing found in defendant's home. The detective testified the
person raised their hand and had an object in it but never identified the person
as defendant or said the object was a gun. Greene was the one who testified
there was a gun. The detective did not improperly identify the vehicle as the
same one in every video but instead demonstrated it was the same vehicle by
noting its front-end damage and missing license plate. In sum, the jury was left
to decide the identity of the person in the video, whether they were the shooter,
and whether defendant was the same person.
We note the parties and the trial judge were also keenly aware of the rules
set forth in Watson because the judge twice reminded the State to avoid improper
narration. The State adhered to the judge's instructions by either pivoting to a
different subject or asking the detective focused questions eliciting helpful
responses. Notably, the judge's redirection was of his own volition. The defense
never raised a concern regarding the nature of Detective Burnett-Crawford's
testimony. Our review of the testimony shows the defense did not have cause
A-4010-23 20 to object because the testimony was consistent with Watson, and where it had
the potential to stray, the judge acted preemptively to keep it in line.
For these reasons, we reject defendant's claim the detective's testimony
deprived him of a fair trial. The testimony did not constitute plain error and
defendant's arguments otherwise lack merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
II.
In Point II, defendant argues the trial judge failed to provide instructions
on the defense's theory of third-party guilt. He reminds us there were no
eyewitnesses or direct evidence tying him to the shooting. The State did not
know who drove the Impala or how many occupants were in it, and the footage
tracking the vehicle was not continuous. On the other hand, there was
substantial evidence suggesting Garat may have been the shooter, including the
items recovered from the Impala, which was registered to him, and a video of
him re-enacting the shooting.
Given the paucity of the State's evidence, the jury should have been
properly instructed on how to consider Garat's guilt and defendant's innocence.
Defendant argues the lack of a third-party guilt instruction requires us to reverse
and grant him a new trial.
A-4010-23 21 "When identification is a 'key issue,' the trial court must instruct the jury
on identification, even if a defendant does not make th[e] request." State v.
Cotto, 182 N.J. 316, 325 (2005) (quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 291
(1981)). A lack of instruction can constitute plain error. Id. at 326. This
determination depends on the strength and quality of the State's corroborative
evidence and not whether a defendant's argument is convincing. Ibid. A trial
judge must give "'specific instruction' even when [a] defendant's
misidentification argument is 'thin.'" Ibid. (quoting State v. Davis, 363 N.J.
Super. 556, 561 (App. Div. 2003)).
There was no plain error in the jury instructions here. As we recounted,
the judge instructed the jury on third-party guilt by telling them it was the State's
burden to prove the identity of the shooter and prove beyond a reasonable doubt
defendant committed the crimes. The judge squarely addressed the issue of
third-party guilt when he invited the parties to craft the jury instructions
themselves. When they could not, he crafted his own instruction, to which
neither party objected.
The jury instruction matched the quality and strength of the State's
circumstantial case and evidence. Indeed, numerous videos tracked the vehicle
carrying the shooter from Newark to defendant's home in Elizabeth. The videos
A-4010-23 22 showed the shooter wearing distinctive dark-clothing and white-trimmed shoes.
Also, defendant's mother and landlord identified him from the Ring camera
footage. The weight of this evidence was far greater than the limited facts in
evidence tying Garat to the incident.
We are satisfied the instruction given was sufficient and could permit the
jury to conclude someone other than defendant committed the crimes. Although
the defense never presented any evidence, its summation, informed by its cross-
examination, robustly argued Garat was the shooter. This is further evidenced
by the jury's questions and evidence it asked to review during deliberations. We
are unconvinced the jury was in the dark regarding the third-party guilt issue or
that it did not understand its options so as to constitute plain error.
III.
In Point III, defendant argues the State improperly bolstered its case by
implying by virtue of granting the search warrant, the judge who signed it
considered the State's case strong. Defendant also notes he was prejudiced by
the State's reference to other search warrants, which had nothing to do with him,
namely, Garat's vehicle and phone. He asserts even though the State can
reference a search warrant to show police actions were authorized, here there
were repeated references to warrants, which constituted plain error because the
A-4010-23 23 prejudice to defendant outweighed the probative value of mentioning the search
warrants.
Search warrants may be referenced in witness testimony to demonstrate
"the police had lawful authority [to] carry[] out a search to dispel any
preconceived notion that the police acted arbitrarily." State v. Cain, 224 N.J.
410, 435 (2016). But "[a] prosecutor . . . may not repeatedly mention that a
search warrant was issued by a judge if doing so creates the likelihood that a
jury may draw an impermissible inference of guilt." Ibid.
Recently, the Court revisited and reiterated Cain's principles in State v.
Butler. 263 N.J. 2, 28-29 (2026). Butler emphasized when the legality of a
warrant is uncontested, repeated references to warrants issued by a judge can
mislead juries. Id. at 28. The inquiry into the propriety of such references
focuses on "their purpose and effect," not the number. Id. at 29. Although the
State in Butler made repeated references to the defendant as the target of the
warrant over the defense's objections and failed to abide by a pre-trial agreement
to mention only "lawful searches," the Court concluded there was no plain error.
Id. at 29-30. This was because there was other evidence supporting the
defendant's conviction on drug charges and the jury had acquitted him on
A-4010-23 24 weapons charges evidencing it was not improperly influenced by the references
to the warrant. Id. at 30.
Pursuant to these principles, we discern no plain error in the State's
references to the search warrant for defendant's home. Although the defense did
not contest the validity of the warrant, the references to it did not mention
defendant as the target. Rather, they were to demonstrate the warrant as another
step in the investigation leading from the crime scene to the home in Elizabeth,
and to explain the evidence collected. The State did not unnecessarily or
repeatedly reference the warrants. The testimony regarding the warrants never
referenced the warrant judge or their role in granting the warrants and instead,
conveyed the police had lawful authority to search the residence. The testimony
did not invite an impermissible inference of defendant's guilt and did not
constitute plain error.
IV.
In Point IV, defendant argues the State's summation contained prejudicial
comments unsupported by the record, which deprived him of a fair trial.
Defendant claims the State improperly argued no one but defendant had access
to the Impala's trunk or the gun box found within it. However, the record
showed: Garat also had access since it was his car; the woman driving the
A-4010-23 25 vehicle when police executed the warrant for the car presumably had access to
the trunk; and the vehicle's driver at the time of the shooting, who was never
identified, also presumably had access to the trunk.
Defendant also claims the State argued he changed from a red hoodie to a
black hoodie in the vehicle without any factual support. There were also many
other gaps in the evidence, which the State improperly filled by supposition
during its summation, including: how many people were in the car; whether
anyone wearing a red hoodie exited the vehicle at any time; and whether the
surveillance videos captured the same Impala.
"[P]rosecutors are expected to make 'vigorous and forceful' presentations
during . . . summations." Butler, 263 N.J. at 22 (quoting State v. Williams, 244
N.J. 592, 607 (2021)). They are "afforded considerable leeway" in summations
so long as they are "reasonably related to the scope of the evidence presented."
Ibid. (quoting Williams, 244 N.J. at 607). Our role is to "weigh 'the severity of
the misconduct and its prejudicial effect on the defendant's right to a fair trial.'"
Ibid. (quoting Williams, 244 N.J. at 608). This involves considering "the nature
of the asserted error, the responses of counsel and the trial court, and any
resulting harm." Ibid. The alleged error is assessed based on the strength of the
State's evidence. Clark, 251 N.J. at 287. Reversal is required only if it
A-4010-23 26 sufficiently raises "a reasonable doubt . . . as to whether the error led the jury to
a result it otherwise might not have reached." Funderburg, 225 N.J. at 79.
Initially, we note the defense did not object to the State's summation. We
also reiterate the judge instructed the jury that counsel's arguments were not
evidence. "One of the foundations of our jury system is that the jury is presumed
to follow the trial court's instructions." State v. Burns, 192 N.J. 312, 335 (2007).
The State did not need to prove who the driver was or how many people
were in the vehicle to prove defendant was the shooter. Regardless, defendant's
issue with the State's assertions relating to his access to the trunk ignores the
context of the remark and the evidence presented linking the remark with the
evidence. The State never said defendant was the only one with access to the
trunk. Instead, it remarked there was no evidence anyone after the shooting had
access to the trunk, which showed the alleged shooter opening it. This was
reasonably within the scope of the evidence presented and related to the State's
theory defendant was the shooter, which was predicated not on the access to the
trunk alone, but the shooter's clothing and the path they followed to and from
the shooting and the route back to defendant's home.
The remark about the shooter changing from a dark-colored sweatshirt to
a red-hooded sweatshirt was not plain error because it did not provide missing
A-4010-23 27 pieces of evidence but instead connected the State's theory to the evidence
presented at trial. The remark was based on the video evidence, which the State
painstakingly walked the jury through during summation.
Defendant argues the cumulative effect of all the errors outlined above
requires reversal. We are unconvinced.
Reversal on cumulative error grounds exists when the "effect of a series
of errors is so great as to deprive a defendant of a fair trial." State v. Burney,
255 N.J. 1, 29 (2023). This does not occur by "simply . . . counting mistakes,"
but rather discerning whether "the probable effect of the cumulative error was
to render the underlying trial unfair." Ibid. (first quoting Pellicer ex rel. Pellicer
v. Saint Barnabas Hosp., 200 N.J. 22, 55 (2009); and then quoting State v.
Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 538 (2007)).
Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record, we
discern no individual prejudicial error, let alone a cumulative effect so great as
to have deprived him of the constitutional right to a fair trial. "[A] defendant is
entitled to a fair trial, [but they are] not entitled to a perfect trial, 'for there are
no perfect trials.'" United States v. Payne, 944 F.2d 1458, 1477 (9th Cir. 1991)
A-4010-23 28 (quoting Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 231-32 (1973)). Defendant
received a fair trial.
VI.
Defendant challenges his sentence in several respects. He claims the
judge improperly denied him the right to the counsel of his choice when he
announced he wanted to fire his attorneys and the judge rejected his request
without understanding the reasons why. Defendant argues the sentence, which
exceeds the statutory minimum by eighteen years, was unjust because the judge
failed to examine mitigating factors seven and nine. The judge also improperly
concluded defendant lacked remorse and punished him for maintaining his
innocence. The application of aggravating factor three was erroneous because:
the judge considered defendant's juvenile petitions, which did not result in
adjudications; the judge ignored this was defendant's only indictable conviction;
and prior dismissed charges could not be considered for sentencing purposes
where the underlying facts had not been adjudicated.
A.
We review a trial judge's decision regarding a defendant's request to halt
the proceedings to retain new counsel for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Maisonet, 245 N.J. 552, 565-66 (2021). This is because "the right to retain
A-4010-23 29 counsel of one's own choice is not absolute, and 'cannot be insisted upon in a
manner that will obstruct an orderly procedure in courts of justice and deprive
such courts of the exercise of their inherent powers to control the same.'" State
v. Furguson, 198 N.J. Super. 395, 401 (App. Div. 1985) (citations omitted)
(quoting Smith v. United States, 288 F. 259, 261 (D.C. Cir. 1923)).
In considering whether to adjourn a matter for a defendant to seek new
counsel, "the trial court must strike a balance between its inherent and necessary
right to control its own calendar and the public's interest in the orderly
administration of justice, on the one hand, and the defendant's constitutional
right to obtain counsel of [their] own choice, on the other." Maisonet, 245 N.J.
at 566 (quoting State v. Hayes, 205 N.J. 522, 538 (2011)). Maisonet adopted "a
series of factors" in order "[t]o help trial judges balance the relevant interests
when a defendant seeks an adjournment to retain counsel." Ibid. We outlined
those factors in Furguson as follows:
the length of the requested delay; whether other continuances have been requested and granted; the balanced convenience or inconvenience to the litigants, witnesses, counsel, and the court; whether the requested delay is for legitimate reasons, or whether it is dilatory, purposeful, or contrived; whether the defendant contributed to the circumstance which gives rise to the request for a continuance; whether the defendant has other competent counsel prepared to try the case, including the consideration of whether the other
A-4010-23 30 counsel was retained as lead or associate counsel; whether denying the continuance will result in identifiable prejudice to defendant's case, and if so, whether this prejudice is of a material or substantial nature; the complexity of the case; and other relevant factors which may appear in the context of any particular case.
[198 N.J. Super. at 402 (quoting United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 490-91 (D.C. Cir. 1978)).]
"Trial courts have broad discretion in weighing the factors and striking
the proper balance, and their decisions are entitled to deference on appeal."
Maisonet, 245 N.J. at 566. Judges are "require[d] . . . to conduct a 'reasoned,
thoughtful analysis'" of these factors when a defendant requests an adjournment
to hire new counsel. Id. at 559 (quoting State v. Kates, 216 N.J. 393, 396-97
(2014)). "If a trial judge does not conduct the proper analysis . . . it may be
necessary to reverse a [proceeding] and start anew." Id. at 560.
"[A] court may not require the Public Defender to assign new counsel to
a defendant who was dissatisfied with the attorney assigned to represent him,
absent a showing of 'substantial cause.'" State v. Coon, 314 N.J. Super. 426,
438 (App. Div. 1998) (quoting State v. Lowery, 49 N.J. 476, 489-90 (1967)).
"[A]n irreconcilable conflict establishes good [or substantial] cause . . . ." State
v. Coclough, 459 N.J. Super. 45, 55 (App. Div. 2019).
A-4010-23 31 In Coclough, we held a defendant who merely expresses dissatisfaction
with their attorney but fails to request the attorney's discharge and to represent
themself or seek appointment of new counsel does not establish reversible error.
Id. at 54-55. We also observed defense counsel did not inform the trial judge
they were unable to proceed and concluded a dissatisfaction with counsel did
not create a conflict of interest. Id. at 55-56.
We are constrained to reverse and remand defendant's request for new
counsel for reconsideration because, other than indicating defendant's request
was made too late, the trial judge neither explored defendant's reasons for
wanting new counsel at the sentencing nor considered the Furguson factors. As
we recounted, defendant twice stated he did not want his attorneys. Although
defendant did not utter the magic words of asking the judge to appoint new
counsel or state he was retaining private counsel of his own choosing, given his
youth and modest education, we cannot ascribe this knowledge to him. For these
reasons, this issue is remanded to the judge to apply Furguson and adjudicate
defendant's request.
B.
Finally, we do not reach the substance of defendant's sentencing
arguments. This is because if defendant is granted new counsel, they may take
A-4010-23 32 a different approach at sentencing, which may in turn change the facts presented
at sentencing or the sentence itself.
Affirmed in part, and reversed and remanded in part. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
A-4010-23 33