State of New Jersey v. Luis A. Santiago, Jr.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: June 2, 2026
• Docket: A-0009-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0009-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LUIS A. SANTIAGO, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted January 28, 2026 – Decided June 2, 2026

Before Judges Currier and Smith.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 08-06-1812.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen A. Pogany, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant appeals from the order denying his petition for post-conviction

relief (PCR). We affirm.

Defendant was convicted of numerous offenses arising out of the

kidnapping and sexual assault of S.P. The court sentenced him to an aggregate

term of thirty-eight and one-half years of incarceration, subject to an 85% period

of parole ineligibility under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

On appeal, we vacated five of the convictions. State v. Santiago, Jr., No.

A-2776-12 (App. Div. Jan. 28, 2015) (slip op. at 26). In addressing the sentence,

the panel noted the trial court did not present any explanation, "except for a

general reference to Yarbough,1 regarding his decision to impose consecutive

sentences on the kidnapping and aggravated sexual assaults during the

commission of a kidnapping." Id. at 24.

The panel stated: "The judge explained that the two sexual contact counts

merited consecutive sentences because they occurred hours earlier, well before

the kidnapping and aggravated sexual assaults, and were separate offenses.

Those findings were adequately supported by the record and justify a

consecutive sentence." Id. at 25.

The panel continued:

1 State v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627 (1985). A-0009-24 2 However, before imposing the balance of his sentence, the judge said in the most general terms that the crimes were "predominantly independent of each other," involved "separate acts of violence, or threats of violence" and "occurred at much different times," rather than being "so closely committed in time." Some of these findings are clearly contradicted by the record. For example, all of the remaining crimes were in fact committed in a short period of time and can hardly be deemed "predominantly independent of each other."

[Id. at 25-26.]

We remanded for a new sentencing hearing in which the court would

consider "factors that both support and mitigate against consecutive sentences."

Id. at 26.

The court resentenced defendant on September 7, 2016. The court found

several aggravating factors and one mitigating factor and concluded the

aggravating factors substantially outweighed the single mitigating factor. The

court then extensively considered and analyzed the Yarbough factors, and

concluded there were separate assaults against the victim that occurred hours

apart and therefore imposed a consecutive sentence on those counts.

Defendant appealed from the sentence. However, the appeal was later

withdrawn, and the court dismissed the appeal in 2017.

Subsequently, defendant filed several petitions for PCR that were

dismissed without prejudice due to pending competency evaluations. In 2024,

A-0009-24 3 defendant filed an amended PCR petition, and counsel submitted a supplemental

brief.

On July 18, 2024, the court entered an order and accompanying written

decision denying PCR. The court considered and rejected defendant's argument

that counsel improperly withdrew the appeal of his sentence. The court noted

on remand that the trial court resentenced defendant to essentially the same

sentence, but in accordance with this court's mandate to make the requisite

Yarbough findings. Therefore, the withdrawal of the appeal was proper.

In addressing defendant's contention that trial counsel failed to elicit

certain testimony from him regarding evidence that was obtained prior to trial,

the court found the allegation "preposterous and unsubstantiated." The court

found defendant could have raised the issue at trial, during his own testimony

and cross-examination of the State's witnesses. Moreover, the court stated it

was highly unlikely the jury would have exonerated defendant because of this

information.

On appeal, defendant renews his arguments and presents the following

points for our consideration:

DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE HE ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

A-0009-24 4 (A) APPELLATE COUNSEL IMPROPERLY WITHDREW THE APPEAL, OR COMPELLED HIM TO WITHDRAW THE APPEAL, OF HIS RE- SENTENCING.

(B) TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO ELICIT TESTIMONY FROM DEFENDANT ON DIRECT EXAMINATION REGARDING EVIDENCE THAT A CORRECTIONS OFFICER APPLIED MAKEUP TO HIS NECK IN ORDER TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT HE HAD SCRATCHES PURPORTEDLY INFLICTED BY THE VICTIM AS DEFENSIVE WOUNDS.

(C) TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBTAIN EVIDENCE LEFT ON THE BEDROOM FLOOR; DEFENDANT OFFERED A THEORY THAT THE VICTIM THREW HER COSMETICS AND FIVE EMPTY SHAMPOO BOTTLES INTO A HOLE UNDER HIS BED WITH THE PURPOSE TO IMPLICATE HIM.

The standard for determining whether counsel's performance was

ineffective under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was

formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and adopted by

our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (l987). To prevail on a claim

of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must meet the two-prong test of

establishing that: (l) counsel's performance was deficient and he or she made

errors that were so egregious that counsel was not functioning effectively as

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment; and (2) the defect in performance

A-0009-24 5 prejudiced defendant's right to a fair trial such that there exists a "reasonable

probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the

proceeding would have been different." Id. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694).

To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must present legally competent evidence rather than "bald assertions."

See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Defendant

has not met that standard.

We are satisfied from our review of the record that defendant failed to

make a prima facie showing ineffectiveness of trial counsel within the

Strickland-Fritz test. Accordingly, the PCR court correctly concluded that an

evidentiary hearing was not warranted. See State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-

63 (1992). As the PCR court noted, the trial court on remand complied with this

court's instructions and provided extensive reasons for its imposition of

consecutive sentences after analyzing the Yarbough factors. Although the

reason for the withdrawal of the appeal is unknown, consideration of the appeal

would not have changed the outcome. A court will not grant relief based upon

ineffective assistance of counsel if the alleged error was harmless. See State v.

Reyes, 140 N.J. 344, 365 (1995).

A-0009-24 6 We find insufficient merit in defendant's remaining arguments to warrant

discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-0009-24 7