NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2845-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LIAM P. MCATASNEY,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Submitted October 1, 2025 – Decided November 6, 2025
Before Judges Currier and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 17-04- 0560.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Melinda A. Harrigan, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Liam McAtasney appeals from a denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm substantially
for the reasons set forth in Judge Michael A. Guadagno's cogent and
comprehensive written opinion.
We will not recite the factual antecedents of this matter because they have
already been discussed by this court at length in our prior opinion affirming
defendant's conviction. See State v. Liam P. McAtasney, No. A-5006-18 (App.
Div. Feb. 3, 2023) (slip op. at 2-36).
I.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree knowing
and purposeful murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); first-degree robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); second-
degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:15-1; second-
degree disturbing or desecrating human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1(a)(1) and (2);
fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1); and third-
degree hindering apprehension of oneself, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b. Defendant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.
A-2845-23 2 Defendant appealed, and we affirmed his convictions. The Supreme Court
denied certification. State v. McAtasney, 253 N.J. 581 (2023)
In his petition for PCR before the trial court, defendant asserted claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his attorney failed to conduct proper
cross-examination of the State's witness, did not provide a "complete and
meaningful" defense because counsel was allegedly unprepared and physically
infirm, and neglected to perform adequate investigation. Additionally,
defendant argued that prosecutorial misconduct and certain "tactics" employed
by the prosecutor violated his fundamental right to due process. These
deficiencies, he contended, established a prima facie case warranting an
evidentiary hearing.
Judge Guadagno did not grant defendant's request for an evidentiary
hearing, and, in a comprehensive and well-reasoned thirty-one-page opinion,
denied defendant's PCR application. After detailing each alleged point of error,
the judge ultimately concluded "defendant has failed to establish a prima facie
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel and his claims of
prosecutorial misconduct lack merit and are procedurally barred. Because of
this failure[,] defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing." This appeal
followed.
A-2845-23 3 Here, defendant argues:
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE HE ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE EVIDENCE LAY OUTSIDE THE RECORD BELOW.
(A) TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO EFFECTIVELY CROSS-EXAMINE THE COOPERATING CO- DEFENDANT[].
(B) TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO REVIEW CRITICAL EVIDENCE BEFORE TRIAL AND WAS COMPLETELY UNPREPARED TO MEET [PROFERRED EXPERT TESTIMONY].
(C) TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INTOXICATED THROUGH THE TRIAL AFTER DRINKING ALCOHOL DURING THE LUNCH BREAKS.
(D) TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBJECT TO NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THEREBY FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR DIRECT APPEAL.
II.
On appeal, we "defer to the [PCR] court's factual findings, given its
opportunity to hear live witness testimony, and '. . . uphold the PCR court's
findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State
A-2845-23 4 v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540
(2013)). "However, where the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we
may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn
from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373
(App. Div. 2014). "When the reviewing court is satisfied that the findings and
result meet this criterion, its task is complete, and it should not disturb the result,
even [if] it has the feeling it might have reached a different conclusion were it
the trial tribunal." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964).
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1999), as adopted in New Jersey by State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,
58 (1987) by a preponderance of the evidence. "First, the defendant must show
that counsel's performance was deficient." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This
requires demonstrating that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Ibid. The United States Constitution requires "reasonably effective assistance."
Ibid. An attorney's performance will not be deemed deficient if counsel acted
"'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'"
Ibid. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). Therefore,
A-2845-23 5 "[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88.
When assessing the first Strickland prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential," and "every effort [must] be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. at 689. "Merely because a trial
strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey, 161
N.J. 233, 251 (1999). Thus, a trial court "must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound
trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Further, the court must not focus on the defendant's
dissatisfaction with counsel's "exercise of judgment during the trial . . . while
ignoring the totality of counsel's performance in the context of the State's
evidence of [the] defendant's guilt." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006)
(internal citation omitted).
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2845-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
LIAM P. MCATASNEY,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
Submitted October 1, 2025 – Decided November 6, 2025
Before Judges Currier and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 17-04- 0560.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Melinda A. Harrigan, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Liam McAtasney appeals from a denial of his petition for post-
conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm substantially
for the reasons set forth in Judge Michael A. Guadagno's cogent and
comprehensive written opinion.
We will not recite the factual antecedents of this matter because they have
already been discussed by this court at length in our prior opinion affirming
defendant's conviction. See State v. Liam P. McAtasney, No. A-5006-18 (App.
Div. Feb. 3, 2023) (slip op. at 2-36).
I.
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree knowing
and purposeful murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); first-degree robbery,
N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; first-degree felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); second-
degree conspiracy to commit robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and 2C:15-1; second-
degree disturbing or desecrating human remains, N.J.S.A. 2C:22-1(a)(1) and (2);
fourth-degree tampering with physical evidence, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-6(1); and third-
degree hindering apprehension of oneself, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3b. Defendant was
sentenced to an aggregate term of life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole.
A-2845-23 2 Defendant appealed, and we affirmed his convictions. The Supreme Court
denied certification. State v. McAtasney, 253 N.J. 581 (2023)
In his petition for PCR before the trial court, defendant asserted claims of
ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging his attorney failed to conduct proper
cross-examination of the State's witness, did not provide a "complete and
meaningful" defense because counsel was allegedly unprepared and physically
infirm, and neglected to perform adequate investigation. Additionally,
defendant argued that prosecutorial misconduct and certain "tactics" employed
by the prosecutor violated his fundamental right to due process. These
deficiencies, he contended, established a prima facie case warranting an
evidentiary hearing.
Judge Guadagno did not grant defendant's request for an evidentiary
hearing, and, in a comprehensive and well-reasoned thirty-one-page opinion,
denied defendant's PCR application. After detailing each alleged point of error,
the judge ultimately concluded "defendant has failed to establish a prima facie
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel by his trial counsel and his claims of
prosecutorial misconduct lack merit and are procedurally barred. Because of
this failure[,] defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing." This appeal
followed.
A-2845-23 3 Here, defendant argues:
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING WHERE HE ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND THE EVIDENCE LAY OUTSIDE THE RECORD BELOW.
(A) TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO EFFECTIVELY CROSS-EXAMINE THE COOPERATING CO- DEFENDANT[].
(B) TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO REVIEW CRITICAL EVIDENCE BEFORE TRIAL AND WAS COMPLETELY UNPREPARED TO MEET [PROFERRED EXPERT TESTIMONY].
(C) TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INTOXICATED THROUGH THE TRIAL AFTER DRINKING ALCOHOL DURING THE LUNCH BREAKS.
(D) TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE IN FAILING TO OBJECT TO NUMEROUS INSTANCES OF PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT AND THEREBY FAILED TO PRESERVE THE ISSUE FOR DIRECT APPEAL.
II.
On appeal, we "defer to the [PCR] court's factual findings, given its
opportunity to hear live witness testimony, and '. . . uphold the PCR court's
findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State
A-2845-23 4 v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540
(2013)). "However, where the court does not hold an evidentiary hearing, we
may exercise de novo review over the factual inferences the trial court has drawn
from the documentary record." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373
(App. Div. 2014). "When the reviewing court is satisfied that the findings and
result meet this criterion, its task is complete, and it should not disturb the result,
even [if] it has the feeling it might have reached a different conclusion were it
the trial tribunal." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162 (1964).
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant
must satisfy both prongs of the test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668, 687 (1999), as adopted in New Jersey by State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,
58 (1987) by a preponderance of the evidence. "First, the defendant must show
that counsel's performance was deficient." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. This
requires demonstrating that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Ibid. The United States Constitution requires "reasonably effective assistance."
Ibid. An attorney's performance will not be deemed deficient if counsel acted
"'within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases.'"
Ibid. (quoting McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)). Therefore,
A-2845-23 5 "[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the ineffectiveness of counsel's
assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's representation fell below an
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 687-88.
When assessing the first Strickland prong, "[j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's
performance must be highly deferential," and "every effort [must] be made to
eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight." Id. at 689. "Merely because a trial
strategy fails does not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. Bey, 161
N.J. 233, 251 (1999). Thus, a trial court "must indulge a strong presumption
that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound
trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350
U.S. 91, 101 (1955)). Further, the court must not focus on the defendant's
dissatisfaction with counsel's "exercise of judgment during the trial . . . while
ignoring the totality of counsel's performance in the context of the State's
evidence of [the] defendant's guilt." State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314 (2006)
(internal citation omitted).
Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show
"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." 466 U.S. at 687. This
A-2845-23 6 means "counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial,
a trial whose result is reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show
the errors "had some conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693. Ultimately,
"[a]n error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant
setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no effect on the
judgment." Id. at 691.
A prima facie case is established when a defendant "allege[s] facts
sufficient to demonstrate counsel's substandard performance," meaning that a
defendant "must do more than make bald assertions that he was denied the
effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170
(App. Div. 1999). Specifically, petitioner must "demonstrate a reasonable
likelihood that his or her claim will ultimately succeed on the merits." State v.
Russo, 333 N.J. Super. 119, 138 (App. Div. 2000).
We find insufficient merit in defendant's points to warrant extended
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only these brief
comments. Contrary to defendant's assertion, defense counsel did cross-
examine the co-conspirator about inconsistencies in that witness's inculpatory
statements. Defense counsel also properly, effectively, and successfully
countered the State's proffered expert testimony resulting in only factual
A-2845-23 7 evidence from its witness being presented to the jury. The allegation concerning
defense counsel's intoxication is a bald assertion unsubstantiated by any record
evidence. Finally, the State's comments made, albeit dramatically in opening
statement and closing argument, were based on the record and represented fair
comment on the evidence.
In sum, having considered defendant's contentions in light of the record
and the applicable law, we affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition
substantially for the reasons detailed at length in Judge Guadagno's opinion. We
discern no abuse of discretion in the judge's consideration of the issues nor in
his decision to deny the petition without an evidentiary hearing. We are satisfied
the performance of trial counsel was not deficient and defendant provided
nothing more than bald assertions to the contrary.
Affirmed.
A-2845-23 8