State of New Jersey v. Lashawn Jones

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 23, 2025
• Docket: A-1314-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1314-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LASHAWN JONES, a/k/a LESHAWN JONES,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Argued March 31, 2025 – Decided April 23, 2025

Before Judges Gummer and Berdote Byrne.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 16-05- 0864.

Steven E. Braun, Designated Counsel, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Steven E. Braun, on the brief).

Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney; Nancy A. Hulett, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

Defendant Lashawn Jones appeals from an August 31, 2023 order denying

his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), arguing the PCR court erred in

finding he had not established a prima facie claim for relief and in failing to

provide him with an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

On September 18, 2015, officers from the Perth Amboy Police

Department responded to a report about an unresponsive man found on the

ground. Initially believing the man had overdosed, officers administered Narcan

at the scene and transported him to a nearby hospital, where it was revealed he

had suffered a fractured skull and brain hemorrhage. The man succumbed to his

injuries days later.

Investigators obtained surveillance footage of the scene, which showed

defendant approaching the victim from behind and striking him with a closed

fist. Defendant thereafter searched the victim's pockets and left the scene on

foot. Officers found defendant, still wearing the clothes depicted in the video,

and arrested him on an open warrant for absconding from parole. A search

incident to his arrest revealed defendant had the victim's cell phone in his

possession.

A-1314-23 2 A grand jury indicted defendant with: first-degree murder, N.J.S.A.

2C:11-3(a)(3) ("Count I"); first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1) ("Count

II"); first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1) ("Count

III"); and third-degree endangering an injured victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a)

("Count IV"). Defendant entered into a plea agreement with the State wherein

he pleaded guilty to first-degree aggravated manslaughter, which carried a

maximum term of thirty years in prison, for the State's recommendation of a

fifteen-year term of imprisonment, subject to eighty-five percent without parole

pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant was

sentenced in accordance with his negotiated plea agreement to a term of fifteen

years.

Defendant filed a direct appeal challenging his sentence, which we

affirmed, concluding defendant's sentence was "not manifestly excessive or

unduly punitive and [did] not constitute an abuse of discretion." State v. Jones,

No. A-1008-18 (App. Div. May 7, 2019). Defendant subsequently sought

review but was denied certification. State v. Jones, 240 N.J. 17 (2019).

Defendant filed this PCR petition, which the trial court denied without an

evidentiary hearing, finding defendant "ha[d] not made a prima facie showing

that his trial counsel's performance was substandard, []or that but for his

A-1314-23 3 attorney's substandard performance his plea or trial ultimately would have

produced a different result." This appeal followed.

II.

Defendant argues the PCR court erred in concluding he had failed to

demonstrate a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and in doing

so without an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, defendant argues he was denied

effective assistance of counsel because: 1) both his trial and appellate counsel

failed to argue he should receive jail credit he alleges he was entitled to ; 2) his

trial counsel failed to file a pre-sentencing motion to vacate his guilty plea after

being denied jail credit; 3) his trial counsel failed to file a motion to suppress

his statements to police and failed to move to suppress the victim's cell phone

found on defendant's person; and 4) his trial counsel failed to consult a forensic

pathologist to review the ultimate cause of the victim's death. Defendant also

asserts his guilty plea should be vacated because it was not entered knowingly,

voluntarily, or intelligently, claiming he would not have entered a guilty plea

had he known he would not receive jail credit for time he was incarcerated in

connection with an unadjudicated parole violation.

We review the denial of defendant's petition de novo because there was

no PCR evidentiary hearing. State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 (App.

A-1314-23 4 Div. 2014). However, a PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary

hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super.

387, 401 (App. Div. 2013).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

satisfy the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687 (1984).

He must demonstrate: (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment"

and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. see also State

v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-prong test in New

Jersey).

A defendant who entered a guilty plea satisfies the first Strickland prong

if he demonstrates counsel's representation fell short of the prevailing norms of

the legal community. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010). The

defendant proves the second prong of Strickland by establishing "a reasonable

probability" the defendant "would not have [pleaded] guilty" but for counsel's

errors. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (quoting State v. Nun͂ ez-

Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)). Moreover, "[a] sentence imposed pursuant

to a plea agreement is presumed to be reasonable because a defendant

voluntarily '[waived] . . . his right to a trial in return for the reduction or

A-1314-23 5 dismissal of certain charges, recommendations as to sentences and the like.'"

State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 71-72 (2014) (second alteration in original)

(omission in original) (quoting State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 140 (App.

Div. 1980)).

A defendant may argue an evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the

factual record in connection with an ineffective-assistance claim. State v.

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). However, the PCR court should grant

an evidentiary hearing only where: (1) a defendant is able to prove a prima facie

case of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) there are material issues of disputed

fact that must be resolved with evidence outside of the record, and (3) the

hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief. Id. at 462; see also R. 3:22-

10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013).

We first dispel of defendant's contention that his guilty plea was not

entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently, as that contention it is belied by

the record. Defendant not only signed a negotiated plea agreement, but he

attested to the court at his plea hearing that he had reviewed and understood the

agreement, he was aware of the charge he was pleading guilty to and its

respective potential sentence, and he understood he was forfeiting his right to a

trial by jury. Jail credits associated with defendants' incarceration for the

A-1314-23 6 violation of parole were not promised to him in his signed plea agreement. Any

argument his plea was not entered knowingly, voluntarily, or intelligently is

therefore futile.

Turning to defendant's substantive arguments, we conclude defendant

failed to establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel .

Defendant's main argument, that he was entitled to jail credits for the time he

was incarcerated for violation of parole pending trial in this matter, was raised

before the trial court during defendant's sentencing hearing, and before us on

direct appeal. That procedural history not only dispels defendant's assertion his

trial and appellate counsel failed to argue this issue, but also prohibits us from

re-adjudicating the merits of defendant's jail-credit argument in this proceeding.

R. 3:22-5. Nevertheless, we agree with the PCR court that defendant served that

time in jail for violation of parole on an unrelated matter. The trial court

properly found those jail credits could not be awarded against the sentence for

aggravated manslaughter. The hearing on the violation of probation was

deferred while this matter was pending at defendant's request, and he remained

in state prison until that sentence "timed-out." Notwithstanding, at sentencing,

trial counsel argued that because the parole violation had never been

A-1314-23 7 adjudicated, the trial court should impose a twelve-year term. The lack of

counsel's success in that argument does not render it ineffective counsel.

Defendant's argument alleging ineffective assistance of counsel for failing

to file a motion to vacate his plea once he was not awarded the jail credits is also

meritless. Defendant argues he relied on his counsel's "promise" that he would

receive jail credits for 897 days against his negotiated sentence, and he would

not have pleaded guilty but for this promise. However, defendant did not

demonstrate that a reasonable defendant would not have pled guilty to a fifteen-

year sentence—especially considering the aggravated-manslaughter charge

alone exposed him to a maximum term of thirty years—in consideration for the

dismissal of the remaining charges, because he believed he was to receive 897

less days in prison than his fifteen-year negotiated term. Considering the gravity

of defendant's potential sentence based on his indictment, and the overwhelming

video and other evidence of his guilt, trial counsel's decision to not move to

vacate does not fall short of prevailing norms. Defendant's sentence, in

accordance with his negotiated plea agreement, is presumed reasonable, and we

find no reason to disturb that presumption.

Defendant's remaining arguments are likewise futile. The use of

defendant's statements at trial is mere speculation, as defendant pleaded guilty

A-1314-23 8 and forfeited his right to a jury trial, and there is no reasonable probability

defendant would not have pleaded guilty. As to the victim's cell phone,

recovered from defendant's person, defendant had no reasonable expectation of

privacy as to property he had stolen. Cf. State v. Bohuk, 269 N.J. Super. 581,

595 (App. Div. 1994) ("[A] defendant operating an automobile known to him to

have been stolen has no reasonable expectation of privacy in its contents") .

Thus, any motion to suppress this evidence would have been futile as a matter

of law, and defendant cannot maintain a claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel on this basis. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 197 (1997).

Finally, defendant's argument the victim's death could have resulted from

repeated administrations of Narcan rather than the harm defendant confessed he

inflicted is a bald assertion, and his claim trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to consult with a forensic pathologist to prove otherwise is mere speculation

unworthy of remand, especially considering the victim's cause of death was

determined to be from a fractured skull and related brain hemorrhage.

Moreover, because defendant did not demonstrate a prima facie claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR court properly denied defendant an

evidentiary hearing. The court's findings are sound, and its legal conclusions

are correct.

A-1314-23 9 Pursuant to Strickland, defendant failed to satisfy his burden to show

defense counsel's performance was deficient or that he would not have pleaded

guilty but for counsel's alleged errors.

Affirmed.

A-1314-23 10