State of New Jersey v. Laciana E. Tinsley

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 22, 2025
• Docket: A-2338-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2338-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

LACIANA E. TINSLEY, a/k/a LACIANA WARD, LACIANA MORELAND, LACIANA SILAS, and LACIANA E. SEARS,

Defendant-Appellant. __________________________

Submitted April 29, 2025 – Decided July 22, 2025

Before Judges Sumners and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 17-04-0385.

Laciana E. Tinsley, appellant pro se.

LaChia L. Bradshaw, Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Alexis R. Agre, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

Defendant Laciana E. Tinsley appeals the post-conviction relief (PCR)

judge's order denying her second PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing.

We agree with the judge that the petition is procedurally barred and add that it

is without merit.

On April 30, 2018, defendant pled guilty to an amended charge of first-

degree aggravated manslaughter of her husband by repeatedly hitting him in the

head with a fire extinguisher. Per the plea agreement, defendant argued for a

lesser sentence, but the trial court followed the State's recommendation and

sentenced her to a twenty-four-year prison term subject to the No Early Release

Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.

Defendant appealed her sentence, which we heard on our Sentencing Oral

Argument calendar. See Rule 2:9-11. We ordered resentencing because "the

trial court failed to properly consider [her] mental health history and improperly

considered municipal court charges that were dismissed." (Da12). At

resentencing on May 29, 2019, the trial court reduced defendant's NERA

sentence to twenty-two years by considering for the first time mitigating factor

nine, the character and attitude of defendant indicate that she is unlikely to

commit another offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:44-l(b)(9). Defendant did not appeal the

sentence.

A-2338-23 2 On February 11, 2020, defendant filed a self-represented PCR petition

alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant was later assigned

counsel, and argued trial counsel was ineffective for not getting her sentence

further reduced because he failed to: (1) retain an expert psychological

examination in the field of childhood sexual abuse; (2) consult a "clinical brain

science expert" due to a fractured skull she suffered from being physically

abused when she was nine months old; and (3) utilize medical reports to prove

her diminished capacity to commit aggravated manslaughter. At the conclusion

of argument on June 11, 2021, the PCR judge entered an order denying

defendant relief without an evidentiary hearing, setting forth his reasons on the

record. Defendant appealed and this court affirmed the PCR court's decision.

State v. Tinsley, No. A-3373-20 (App. Div. Mar. 14, 2023), certif. denied 255

N.J. 480 (2023).

On January 20, 2024, defendant filed a second PCR petition. This time

she proceeded without counsel, alleging: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to investigate her mental health records before pleading guilty; (2) the

trial court abused its discretion by not giving more weight to mitigating factor

four, "substantial grounds tending to excuse or justify the defendant's conduct ,"

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(b)(4), at her initial sentencing as well as at her re-sentencing;

(3) both trial and appellate counsel failed to investigate her history of being

A-2338-23 3 subjected to domestic abuse; and (4) appellate counsel failed to argue she should

have been sentenced to a lesser-degree crime.

A month later, a different PCR judge reviewed her petition and entered an

order dismissing defendant's petition. Explaining his reasons in a brief letter

decision, the judge determined the petition was procedurally deficient. He found

defendant's petition did not satisfy Rule 3:22-4(a)(2)(A), (B), or (C), because

her claims: (1) raised "no new rule of constitutional law [that] applies and was

made retroactive to the allegations set forth in [her] second PCR"; (2) made

allegations known to her and raised in her first PCR petition; and (3) did not

allege a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel by her first PCR

counsel. Moreover, the judge noted that this court, upon reviewing defendant's

first PCR petition, concluded that trial counsel argued the mental health claims

defendant repeats in her second PCR petition. Upon finding that no "new

controversy exists between this PCR submission and [defendant's] previous

submission," the PCR judge declined to address her petition's merits.

Before us, defendant argues:

POINT I

THE [PCR JUDGE] ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR SECOND POST- CONVICTION RELIEF WITHOUT AFFORDING HER AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING TO FULLY ADDRESS HER CONTENTION THAT SHE FAILED

A-2338-23 4 TO RECEIVE ADEQUATE LEGAL REPRESENTATION AT THE SENTENCING AND FIRST POST-CONVICTION RELIEF LEVEL DUE TO RULE 3:22-4(a)(2), (A), (B), (C).

A. THE PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, EVIDENTIARY HEARINGS, AND PETITIONS FOR POST- CONVICTION RELIEF.

POINT II

THE [PCR JUDGE] ERRED IN DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S PETITION ON PROCEDURAL GROUNDS PURSUANT TO RULE 3:22-4 AND 3:22- 12.

POINT III

[DEFENDANT'S] CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL PRE-PLEA AND ON APPEAL ARE PROPERLY COGNIZABLE IN A POST-CONVICTION RELIEF PROCEEDING.

POINT IV

[DEFENDANT'S] CLAIMS ARE NOT PROCEDURALLY BARRED UNDER COURT RULE 3:22-5.

POINT V

GIVEN THE NATURE OF THE COGNIZABLE CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL, [] DEFENDANT IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

A-2338-23 5 POINT VI

THE FAILURE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL TO RECOGNIZE THAT THERE WAS LEGALLY INSUFFICIENT FACTUAL BASIS FOR THE [DEFENDANT'S] GUILTY PLEA TO FIRST- DEGREE AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER AND TO ARGUE THAT THE CONVICTION SHOULD THEREFORE BE REVERSED AND VACATED CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHICH OTHERWISE RESULTED IN AN AFFIRMANCE OF THE [DEFENDANT'S] CONVICTION BY THE APPELLATE COURT.

POINT VII

TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO ARGUE THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IMPOSING SENTENCE BY IMPROPERLY WEIGHING THE MITIGATING AND AGGRAVATING FACTORS.

POINT VIII

INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BASED ON THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS CITED ABOVE (U.S. CONST. AMEND. 6; N.J. CONST. ART. I, PAR. 10).

These arguments are without merit.

To establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show: (1) counsel's performance was deficient; and (2) the

deficiency prejudiced defendant. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687

(1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting Strickland). The mere

A-2338-23 6 raising of PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing, State v.

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999), because the court

reviewing claims of ineffective assistance has the discretion to grant an

evidentiary hearing only if the defendant makes a prima facie showing in support

of the requested relief, State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992). An

evidentiary hearing should only be conducted if there are disputed issues as to

material facts regarding entitlement to PCR that cannot be resolved based on the

existing record. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013) (citing R. 3:22-10(b)).

We review a PCR judge's legal conclusions de novo. State v. Harris, 181

N.J. 391, 419 (2004). "Where . . . the PCR [judge] has not conducted an

evidentiary hearing, we review [their] legal and factual determinations de novo."

State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super. 326, 338 (2020) (citation omitted).

A PCR claim is not a substitute for a direct appeal, R. 3:22-3, and must

hurdle some time and procedural bars. In accordance with Rule 3:22-12(a)(2),

a second PCR petition must be filed within one year of either the date that "the

constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the United States

Supreme Court or the Supreme Court of New Jersey;" or "the date on which the

factual predicate for the relief sought was discovered, if that factual predicate

could not have been discovered earlier [with] . . . reasonable diligence;" or "the

date of the denial of the first or subsequent [PCR petition] where ineffective

A-2338-23 7 assistance of counsel . . . [therein] is being alleged." While the PCR time limits

may be waived to prevent a fundamental injustice, they must be viewed in light

of their dual key purposes: to "ensure that the passage of time does not prejudice

the State's retrial of a defendant" and "to respect the need for achieving finality."

State v. DiFrisco, 187 N.J. 156, 166-67 (2006) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126

N.J. 565, 576 (1992)).

In accordance with Rule 3:22-4(b)(1), a second PCR petition is subject to

the limitations set forth in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2). A second PCR petition is

untimely if it was not filed within one year after denial of the first PCR petition

and failed to allege a prima facie case that his first or subsequent PCR counsel

was ineffective. R. 3:22-12(a)(2)(C).

Under Rule 3:22-4(b)(2), a defendant is barred from raising any issue in a

second PCR petition that could have been raised on direct appeal or in the first

PCR petition unless one of three exceptions apply. The petition must "allege[]

on its face" one of the three criteria: (1) the petition "relies on a new rule of

constitutional law . . . that was unavailable during the pendency of any prior

proceedings;" (2) "the factual predicate for the relief sought could not have been

discovered earlier through the exercise of reasonable diligence;" or (3) "the

petition alleges a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel" of prior

PCR counsel. R. 3:22-4(b)(2)(A)-(C).

A-2338-23 8 Rule 3:22-5 provides that "[a] prior adjudication upon the merits of any

ground for relief is conclusive whether made in the proceedings resulting in the

conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding . . . or in any appeal taken from

such proceedings." "[A] prior adjudication on the merits ordinarily constitutes

a procedural bar to the reassertion of the same ground as a basis for post -

conviction review." Preciose, 129 N.J. at 476 (citing R. 3:22-5). "[A] defendant

may not use a petition for [PCR] as an opportunity to relitigate a claim already

decided on the merits." State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 483 (1997) (citation

omitted).

Based on these procedural requirements, we conclude the PCR judge

appropriately determined that defendant's second PCR petition should be

dismissed because her claims were either raised in fact or should have been

raised in her first PCR petition. The judge's factual findings are supported by

the record and his application of Rule 3:22-4(a)(2)(A), (B), or (C) is correct.

Because defendant's petition was procedurally barred, there was no prima facie

PCR claim entitling her to an evidentiary hearing.

Also, defendant's second petition was untimely because it was filed

significantly beyond the one-year time limit –– almost two years and seven

months –– after the denial of her first PCR petition and the petition did not allege

the delay was due to a newly recognized constitutional rule of law, newly

A-2338-23 9 discovered facts, or ineffectiveness of prior PCR counsel. Further, defendant

has not demonstrated it would be fundamentally unjust to consider any claims

that are procedurally barred by Rule 3:22-4.

Lastly, we conclude there is no merit to defendant's claims that: (1) trial

and PCR counsel were deficient by not discovering that there was an insufficient

factual basis to support her guilty plea to aggravated manslaughter; and (2) trial

and PCR counsel were deficient by failing to advocate for the lowest possible

The record supports the trial judge's acceptance of defendant's plea

allocation to aggravated manslaughter. The record does not demonstrate

defendant could have successfully raised the defenses of diminished capacity or

intimate partner violence. Her admission that she stuck her husband on the head

with a fire extinguisher more than once while they were arguing constitutes

aggravated manslaughter by "recklessly causes death under circumstances

manifesting extreme indifference to human life." N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). There

is no logical basis for her contention that there was no factual basis showing an

"extreme indifference to human life." Nor is there a legitimate basis for her

contention that her plea allocution only satisfied a reckless manslaughter

offense. The record reveals that defendant knowingly pled guilty to aggravated

manslaughter and knew everything that was going on.

A-2338-23 10 The record also shows that trial counsel, citing defendant's mental health

history on the effect of defendant's conduct, advocated that defendant be given

a lighter sentence at resentencing. There is no showing that PCR counsel was

ineffective in not challenging defendant's reduced sentence. Moreover,

defendant fails to show that either counsel could have successfully argued for a

sentence lighter than the two-year reduced sentence given at resentencing.

To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's arguments, we

conclude they are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this opinion.

R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-2338-23 11