State of New Jersey v. Kanem Williamson

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: December 8, 2025
• Docket: A-1376-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1376-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

KANEM WILLIAMSON,

Defendant-Appellant. ________________________

Submitted November 13, 2025 – Decided December 8, 2025

Before Judges Mayer and Jacobs.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 15-08-1937.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shep A. Gerszberg, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Kanem Williamson appeals from a November 30, 2023 order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary

hearing. We affirm.

The facts leading to defendant's convictions and sentence are set forth in

State v. Williamson, No. A-2501-17 (App. Div. Jan. 9, 2020). We summarize

the facts relevant to this appeal.

In 2015, defendant was indicted for first-degree murder, second-degree

unlawful possession of weapons, and second-degree possession of weapons for

an unlawful purpose. Defendant was eighteen years old when he committed

these offenses.

The matter was tried before a jury in 2017. Toward the end of the trial,

defense counsel argued the first-degree murder charge should be reduced to

"agg[ravated] man[slaughter]" or "perhaps provocation manslaughter" due to

defendant's erratic behavior and intoxication at the time of the incident.

The judge prepared draft jury charges for counsels' review. The proposed

jury charges included aggravated manslaughter and reckless manslaughter as

lesser included offenses to murder. Because the prosecutor objected to the

inclusion of reckless manslaughter, the judge agreed to remove that jury

A-1376-23 2 instruction. Defense counsel did not object to deleting reckless manslaughter

from the proposed charge.

At a subsequent conference discussing the proposed jury instructions,

defense counsel "equivocat[ed] about whether to ask for any lesser[] included[]

at all" and told the judge she would discuss the matter with defendant. Defense

counsel explained defendant "want[ed] [her] to just ask for murder or nothing."

However, as his attorney, defense counsel said "she need[ed] to do what [she]

th[ought] [wa]s right. And [she] th[ought] the right thing to do, notwithstanding

what [defendant was] thinking . . . [wa]s to ask for the agg[ravated]

man[slaughter]." After considering defense counsel's position, the judge

included the aggravated manslaughter charge "in an abundance of caution" and

"upon the defense's request" despite "not believ[ing] . . . [a]ggravated

[m]anslaughter was in the case."

On October 13, 2017, the jury acquitted defendant of first-degree murder

but convicted him of aggravated manslaughter and weapons charges. After

merging the second-degree possession of weapons for an unlawful purpose with

aggravated manslaughter, the judge sentenced defendant to twenty-five years in

prison with an eighty-five percent period of parole ineligibility. On the unlawful

weapon possession conviction, the judge sentenced defendant to an eight-year

A-1376-23 3 prison term concurrent to his sentence for aggravated manslaughter. At

sentencing defendant, the judge noted he "repeatedly committed various

offenses[] or w[as] charged with various offenses" from sixteen years of age to

nineteen years of age. The judge explained the sentence reflected a need "to

deter [defendant] and others from violating the law."

Defendant appealed his convictions and sentence. We affirmed. State v.

Williamson, No. A-2501-17 (App. Div. Jan. 9, 2020). The New Jersey Supreme

Court granted defendant's petition for certification, State v. Williamson, 241

N.J. 185 (2020), and affirmed this court's opinion. State v. Williamson, 246 N.J.

185 (2021).

On December 5, 2022, five years and four days after he was sentenced,

defendant filed a PCR petition. In his petition, defendant asked the PCR judge

to relax the five-year time limit under Rule 3:22-12, arguing excusable neglect.

On the merits, defendant contended he received ineffective assistance of counsel

because his trial attorney requested a jury charge on the lesser-included offense

of aggravated manslaughter despite his objection.

The PCR judge, who presided at defendant's trial and sentencing, heard

arguments on defendant's PCR application. In an oral decision, the judge, citing

the COVID-19 pandemic, found defendant demonstrated excusable neglect in

A-1376-23 4 filing his PCR petition, noting the delay was "a mere four days" after the five-

year deadline.

In reviewing defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim regarding

the inclusion of a jury instruction on the lesser-included offense of aggravated

manslaughter over defendant's objection, the judge applied Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), as incorporated in New Jersey by State v.

Fritz, 105 N.J. 42 (1987). The judge explained defendant was required to

demonstrate "allege[d] errors by his [trial] counsel, that but for those errors by

counsel, there would have been a different result."

Regarding defense counsel's decision to request a jury instruction on

aggravated manslaughter, the judge explained she "struggled" with the decision.

However, the judge ultimately found defense counsel "did what . . . was

appropriate as a defense attorney" in arguing defendant's behavior was "chaotic"

rather than "purposeful and deliberate" in requesting a jury charge on aggravated

manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder.

At oral argument on defendant's PCR petition, the judge specifically

remembered discussing the charge following the trial testimony. The judge

recalled,

[a] request was made for the aggravated [manslaughter]. I thought about it. I saw that there was

A-1376-23 5 a rational basis. If it wouldn't have come to me, I would have just, quite frankly, left it at murder. However, the request was made by defense counsel. And I thought through it, it seemed, yes there is an appropriate reason for charging this matter. And that is why, in fact, I charged it.

The PCR judge concluded an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary

because defendant failed to provide a "rational basis . . . as to what additional

information c[ould] be solicited from the defense attorney." The judge did "not

believe that if [aggravated manslaughter] had not been charged, that there would

have been a different result in this case." According to the judge: "The only

different result I would believe that would have happened in this case is that

[defendant] would have faced many more years as a mandatory sentence for

murder, as opposed to [] aggravated [manslaughter]."

On November 30, 2023, the judge entered an order denying defendant's

PCR petition, concluding defendant failed "to meet the requirements to make a

prima facie case for ineffective assistance of counsel."

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

POINT ONE

[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING OR RELIEF ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY ASKING FOR A JURY CHARGE ON

A-1376-23 6 AGGRAVATED MANSLAUGHTER, THE LESSER[-] INCLUDED OFFENSE OF MURDER.

POINT TWO

DEFENDANT'S SENTENCE, WHICH WAS IMPOSED WITHOUT CONSIDERATION THAT HE WAS AN ADOLESCENT AT THE AGE OF [EIGHTEEN] AT THE TIME OF THE OFFENSES, IS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT. THE WELL-ESTABLISHED SCIENCE SHOWS THAT THE LAW'S HEIGHTENED PROTECTIONS WHEN SENTENCING JUVENILES WHO COMMIT CRIMES SHOULD APPLY TO PERSONS AGED 18 TO 20. THEREFORE, THERE MUST BE A RESENTENCING IN ACCORDANCE WITH MILLER v. ALABAMA, 567 U.S. 460 (2012).

I.

We first consider defendant's ineffective assistance of counsel claim and

entitlement to an evidentiary hearing. "We review the legal conclusions of a

PCR court de novo." State v. Walker, 478 N.J. Super. 553, 560 (App. Div. 2024)

(citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004)). "The de novo standard

additionally applies to mixed questions of law and fact." Ibid. (citing Harris,

181 N.J. at 420). The de novo standard of review also applies when a PCR court

declines to conduct an evidentiary hearing. Ibid.

Defendant argues his trial counsel was ineffective in requesting "a jury

charge on aggravated manslaughter as a lesser included offense of murder

A-1376-23 7 because, as a result, the jury acquitted him of murder but convicted him of

aggravated manslaughter when he otherwise would have only been acquitted of

the homicide." He further contends the PCR judge erred in finding he failed to

establish a "prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel" and the judge

should have held an evidentiary hearing because "his overall claim is dependent

on evidence outside of the record."

A request for a PCR evidentiary hearing is governed by Rule 3:22-10(b).

The Rule states:

A defendant shall be entitled to an evidentiary hearing only upon the establishment of a prima facie case in support of [PCR.] . . . To establish a prima facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.

In determining whether a defendant presented a prima facie case for

ineffective assistance of counsel, PCR courts apply the two-pronged standard

formulated in Strickland and adopted by our Supreme Court in Fritz. State v.

Konecny, 250 N.J. 321, 342 (2022).

Under the first Strickland prong, "the defendant must show that counsel's

performance was deficient." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687). Specifically, "[w]hen a convicted defendant complains of the

A-1376-23 8 ineffectiveness of counsel's assistance, the defendant must show that counsel's

representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687-88. "[C]lient loyalty, adequate consultation, and legal

proficiency are relevant in determining whether assistance was effective." Fritz,

105 N.J. at 52.

Under the second Strickland prong, "the defendant must show that the

deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 687). "Specifically, a defendant alleging actual ineffectiveness must

show that there is 'a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Ibid. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

At the PCR motion hearing, the judge rejected defendant's argument that

the facts adduced at trial failed to support a jury instruction on aggravated

manslaughter as a lesser-included offense of murder. As the judge explained,

defendant's father testified at trial that defendant confessed to killing the victim.

Additionally, there was a dying declaration by the victim, identifying defendant

as the person who shot at her eleven times. The judge further noted the firing

of eleven shots, with five shots striking the victim, indicating the shooter acted

in complete disregard for human life. Because the victim lived for eleven

A-1376-23 9 months after the shooting, the judge explained the shooter's action was

"reckless." Based on these facts, the judge stated there was a rational basis to

charge aggravated manslaughter. The judge explained she elected to include

that charge in her role as "the gatekeeper as to what should and should not go

[to] the jury."

The PCR judge also explained defendant could have received a lengthy

sentence for murder if his trial counsel had not requested a jury instruction on

the lesser-included offense of aggravated manslaughter. The judge concluded

defense trial counsel, an experienced attorney with the Office of the Public

Defender, made a strategic decision and exercised her informed judgment in

requesting a jury charge on the lesser-included offense to provide the jury with

an alternative to convicting defendant of first-degree murder.

Further, the PCR judge could not "concede that the jury would have found

anything" to acquit defendant of his conduct based on the facts presented at trial.

Based on "the amount of evidence in this case," the judge stated defendant was

"never going to get to the [']but for['] in this case" to satisfy the second prong

under Strickland.

In rejecting defendant's request for an evidentiary hearing, the PCR judge

explained she had to determine "what additional information [could] be solicited

A-1376-23 10 from the defense attorney" at such a hearing. The judge concluded she "d[id]n't

know what else [defense counsel could] add" because the reason for defense

counsel's request to charge the lesser-included offense "was clear . . . within the

transcript." The judge determined an evidentiary hearing would not elicit any

additional information beyond the information in the transcript from the charge

conference.

This case, unlike many cases involving a decision to charge a lesser-

included offense, involved a decision by an experienced defense attorney.

Defense counsel told the judge the reasons for requesting an aggravated

manslaughter charge as a lesser-included offense to murder despite her client's

objection. Defense counsel also cited the trial evidence to support the request

to charge aggravated manslaughter in addition to murder.

The decision whether to charge manslaughter as a lesser-included offense

of murder "rests primarily with the trial judge who must determine whether such

a manslaughter instruction is appropriate in light of the facts of a particular

case." State v. Bishop, 225 N.J. Super. 596, 602 (App. Div. 1988). A trial judge

has an independent, non-delegable duty "to instruct on lesser-included charges

when the facts adduced at trial clearly indict that a jury could convict on the

lesser while acquitting on the greater offense." State v. Jenkins, 178 N.J. 347,

A-1376-23 11 361 (2004) (citing State v. Garron, 177 N.J. 147, 180 (2003)). "Where the

evidence clearly raises an issue justifying a finding [to charge a lesser-included

offense] it must be charged even absent a request." Bishop, 225 N.J. Super. at

602-03 (emphasis omitted).

Here, the trial judge, in her role as the gatekeeper, considered the evidence

presented to the jury. Based on the facts in this case, the judge concluded there

was a rational basis for charging aggravated manslaughter as a lesser-included

offense of murder. The judge explained defense trial counsel "saved this

defendant's life. He could have been [facing thirty] years to life, but for asking

for a lesser[-]included offense for the jury to consider." The judge expressly

rejected defendant's supposition that the jury would have acquitted him of

murder, finding the argument was based on "flawed logic."

On this record, we are satisfied there was a rational basis for the trial judge

to charge defendant with aggravated manslaughter as a lesser-included offense

of murder for the reasons expressed by the judge. Consistent with well-settled

case law, the trial judge appropriately exercised her independent duty to include

such a charge even if defense trial counsel had not made the request.

Moreover, defendant's dissatisfaction with his attorney's exercise of her

judgment and trial strategy in requesting a jury instruction on aggravated

A-1376-23 12 manslaughter does not warrant PCR under these facts. See State v. Castagna,

187 N.J. 293, 314-15 (2006) ("As a general rule, strategic miscalculations or

trial mistakes are insufficient to warrant reversal except in those rare instances

where they are of such magnitude as to thwart the fundamental guarantee of a

fair trial."). Defendant faced a lengthy prison sentence had the jury convicted

him of murder. Defense counsel's decision to offer the jury an alternative to

murder under the circumstances did not deprive defendant of his right to a fair

trial.

Because defendant failed to satisfy either of the Strickland prongs, the

PCR judge properly denied defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary

hearing.

II.

We next consider defendant's argument that he is entitled to resentencing

based on his age at the time he committed these offenses. Defendant contends

the sentence constituted cruel and unusual punishment based on "well-

established science" that he was entitled to heightened protection at the time of

sentencing because he was eighteen years old when he committed these offenses.

We disagree.

A-1376-23 13 Defendant relies on Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012), in support

of his argument. In Miller, the United States Supreme Court stated inherent

juvenile characteristics, such as "transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and

inability to assess consequences," lessened the "moral culpability" of juvenile

offenders and thus a juvenile's youth is a "central consideration" to the

sentencing process. Id. at 472-74 (quoting Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 68

(2010)). Defendant asserts recent scientific evidence demonstrates "late

adolescents" share the same pertinent characteristics as juveniles and therefore

Miller should be extended to young adult offenders between the ages of eighteen

and twenty.

New Jersey courts have adopted the United States Supreme Court's

reasoning in Miller. In State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 429 (2017), our Supreme

Court noted "'children are different' when it comes to sentencing, and 'youth and

its attendant characteristics' must be considered at the time a juvenile is

sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole." (quoting

Miller, 567 U.S. at 465). However, the Court explicitly declined to "extend

Miller's protections to defendants sentenced for crimes committed when those

defendants were over the age of eighteen." State v. Ryan, 249 N.J. 581, 596

(2022).

A-1376-23 14 Most recently, in State v. Jones, 478 N.J. Super. 532 (App. Div.), certif.

denied, 259 N.J. 304 (2024), the defendants, who committed their offenses as

"late adolescents," requested resentencing on similar scientific grounds as those

raised by defendant here. In that case, we explained: "'The Legislature has

chosen eighteen as the threshold age for adulthood in criminal sentencing.

Although this choice may seem arbitrary, a line must be drawn,' and '[t]he age

of [eighteen] is the point where society draws the line for many purposes

between childhood and adulthood.'" Id. at 550-51 (quoting Ryan, 249 N.J. at

600 n.10). Because defendant was eighteen at the time of these offenses, he was

ineligible for resentencing under Miller.

Even if defendant had been eligible for resentencing under Miller, the

judge considered his age at the sentencing hearing. The judge specifically noted

defendant committed or been charged with numerous offenses between ages

sixteen and nineteen. The sentencing judge mentioned defendant's age at the

time of his offenses multiple times during the hearing and clearly knew

defendant's status as a late adolescent when imposing the sentence.

Affirmed.

A-1376-23 15