NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NOS. A-2960-23 A-2961-23 A-2967-23 A-3632-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JUSTIN RODWELL, a/k/a JUSTIN DUDDY,
Defendant-Appellant. _________________________
JAYKIL A. RODWELL,
Plaintiff-Respondent, v.
JASPER D. SPIVEY, a/k/a DANNY RODWELL,
BRANDEN K. RODWELL,
Argued October 16, 2025 – Decided October 27, 2025
Before Judges Mawla and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 21-09-1649.
Colin Sheehan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant Justin Rodwell in A- 2960-23 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Colin Sheehan, of counsel and on the briefs).
Nadine Kronis, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant Jaykil A. Rodwell in A- 2961-23 (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Nadine Kronis, of counsel and on the briefs).
A-2960-23 2 Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant Jasper D. Spivey in A-2967-23 (John P. Flynn, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant Branden K. Rodwell in A-3632-23 (Margaret McLane, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Shep A. Gerszberg, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney; Shep A. Gerszberg, of counsel and on the briefs).
PER CURIAM
In these four back-to-back appeals, defendants Justin Rodwell, Jaykil A.
Rodwell, Jasper D. Spivey, and Branden K. Rodwell appeal from their May 2,
2024 judgments of conviction for obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). We affirm.
On June 1, 2021, Newark Police Detectives Michael DaSilva and
Christopher Serrano, and Essex County Prosecutor's Office Lieutenant Paul
Ranges drove to a residence on Cypress Street in Newark around 1:30 p.m. The
officers wore plain clothes and were in unmarked vehicles. Detective Serrano
drove a black Ford sedan with Detective DaSilva as the passenger and behind
them, Lieutenant Ranges drove a black Dodge sedan.
The officers were assigned to the area because of a recent rise in criminal
activity. Detective DaSilva testified his duties in the Criminal Intelligence
A-2960-23 3 Section required him to "respond to various locations" experiencing "a spike in
violent crimes." He and Detective Serrano received their location assignments
every shift during roll call. Detective DaSilva testified they went to Cypress
Street because there were two shootings in the "immediate area" in the preceding
weeks, on May 17 and 24. Detective Serrano testified the officers were in the
area because of complaints narcotics were being bought and sold there.
According to Detective DaSilva, he and Detective Serrano were about two
car lengths away when he "saw a group of males," including Jaykil, 1 Justin, and
Spivey. However, his "attention was drawn to Jaykil." Detective DaSilva had
a body worn camera (BWC) but did not turn it on before exiting his vehicle.
Detective Serrano activated his BWC, but footage was lost after the camera was
destroyed.
Detectives DaSilva and Serrano both testified Jaykil took a few "steps
back" and seemed "startled" by their presence. Jaykil appeared to be looking
around for a way to escape. The BWC did not capture this aspect of the officers'
observations. Detective DaSilva admitted on cross-examination Jaykil did not
attempt to leave as the vehicles approached. However, Spivey stepped away
1 Because several defendants share the same surname we refer to them by their first names. We intend no disrespect. A-2960-23 4 from the group when they approached, which Detective DaSilva believed was a
ploy to "deflect attention" from the rest of the group.
Detective DaSilva observed Jaykil acting suspiciously as he maneuvered
a fanny pack he was wearing over his shoulder, away from the officer's vantage
point. The BWC footage only showed the bag once, briefly, after the officers
got out of their vehicles. Lieutenant Ranges testified he was unsure why the
officers stopped at this location.
Detective DaSilva testified that "based on [Jaykil's] behavior when he saw
[the officers'] presence," he and Detective Serrano exited the vehicle "to further
investigate" the situation. Both detectives testified they identified themselves
as police when they exited their vehicle.
As Detective DaSilva approached the group, Jaykil put his body between
the detective and the fanny pack. Detective DaSilva testified Jaykil and Spivey's
behaviors led him to believe the bag contained a firearm and, based on a fear
Jaykil could quickly retrieve the firearm, he thought it safer not to ask for the
bag, and instead, reached for the bag to maintain "a little element of surprise."
Seven seconds elapsed between Detective DaSilva exiting the vehicle and when
he grabbed the bag.
A-2960-23 5 Detective DaSilva testified when he grabbed the bag, he "felt the presence
of a firearm inside." Without telling him he was being detained, Detective
DaSilva grabbed Jaykil's left arm "to place him under arrest." Detective Serrano
and Lieutenant Ranges testified Detective DaSilva said there was a firearm. The
BWC footage does not reflect this statement.
Detective DaSilva testified Jaykil then pushed him and "started to . . . run
towards Detective Serrano and Lieutenant Ranges." Detective Serrano grabbed
Jaykil, whose momentum forced the detective out of the road and onto the
sidewalk. Detective DaSilva testified he had no further interaction with Jaykil
after Detective Serrano and Lieutenant Ranges got ahold of him. At this point,
Justin and Spivey began "pushing and tussling" the officers as they tried to arrest
Jaykil. Detective DaSilva got hold of the fanny pack, but Justin started pushing
the detective towards a parked van with an open sliding door. As Justin pushed
him, Detective DaSilva turned on his BWC and repeatedly yelled, "stop," in an
attempt "to de[-]escalate the situation."
Spivey approached Detective DaSilva and tried to wrestle the fanny pack
away from him. According to Detective DaSilva, Spivey punched him in the
chest, knocking his BWC to the ground. Spivey and the detective fell, and as
Detective DaSilva lay on top of the fanny pack, he could feel a handgun in the
A-2960-23 6 bag pressing against his chest. Spivey placed the detective in a chokehold, so
Detective Serrano punched Spivey in the face causing him to release Detective
DaSilva.
After Detective Serrano punched Spivey, Branden "tackled" Detective
Serrano, and he fell to the ground. There was a "big pile up on the ground" and
Spivey grabbed the fanny pack. Detective Serrano grabbed Spivey's waist to
prevent him from escaping with the bag but was "forced to let him go" after what
"felt like a kick in the head." Detective DaSilva testified "Spivey just took off"
with the bag.
Lieutenant Ranges testified he was holding onto Jaykil when Spivey ran
"off across the street." The lieutenant let go of Jaykil, lifted Branden off
Detective Serrano, and restrained him in a "bear hug." According to Lieutenant
Ranges, Jaykil got away at some point after he let him go.
After Spivey and Jaykil left, Detective DaSilva retrieved his BWC. Justin
then approached Detective DaSilva and began "[r]esisting [his] control . . .
trying to push [Detective DaSilva] off." Detective DaSilva testified Justin
"struck [his] chest," causing his BWC to fall off a second time.
A-2960-23 7 Detective Serrano testified he ran into the street to find Spivey and the
bag after the other officers pulled Branden off him. He could not determine
where Spivey went, so he returned to help Lieutenant Ranges arrest Branden.
Detective Darren Sinclair and his partner Officer Gabriel Gonzalez
arrived at the scene around 1:45 p.m. Detective Sinclair commanded Branden
to put his hands behind his back, and when he did not comply, ordered the other
officers to "take him to the ground."
Detective Sinclair was wearing a BWC, but it became dislodged and there
was no footage of the incident on it. Detective DaSilva's BWC footage showed
Branden stating he would not run away and repeatedly asking the officers to cuff
his hands in front of his body, rather than behind, before placing him in the
police car. The footage showed officers take Branden to the ground and pull his
arms behind his back before handcuffing him.
A grand jury indicted defendants on several offenses, which were later
downgraded. Ultimately, defendants were charged with the disorderly persons
offenses of: simple assault on Detective DaSilva, Detective Serrano, and
Lieutenant Ranges, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(a); obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a); and
resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(1). Prior to trial, Jaykil filed notice he
intended to raise self-defense, N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4, as an affirmative defense.
A-2960-23 8 Following a two-day bench trial, in which the State presented testimony
from five witnesses, including Detectives DaSilva, Serrano, and Sinclair, and
Lieutenant Ranges, the trial judge issued a written opinion on April 23, 2024.
The judge acquitted defendants of simple assault and resisting arrest but
convicted them of obstruction. Each defendant was sentenced to pay fines and
fees.
The trial judge found the officers acted in good faith and under the color
of law by investigating Jaykil because "they believed that a gun was in the fanny
pack." She rejected defendants' arguments that the interaction was random or
arbitrary, noting "the officers' demeanor and immediate commands to
defendants made it abundantly clear . . . defendants knew . . . Detective[s]
DaSilva and . . . Serrano were law enforcement officers . . . attempting to
investigate Jaykil." Although the "officers never stated explicitly . . . [Jaykil]
was under arrest[,] . . . the totality of the circumstances presented indicate [the]
officers were in fact attempting to" arrest him. However, "the interference of
the other co-defendants prevented . . . [the] officers from having an opportunity
to place [Jaykil] under arrest," and he "couldn't comply even if he wanted to
because he was being pulled in multiple ways [by] both officers and co-
defendants."
A-2960-23 9 The judge found Spivey, Justin, and Branden guilty of obstruction because
they "w[ere] fully aware [the] officers were attempting to investigate" Jaykil,
yet they acted to prevent his arrest. Spivey and Branden "began pushing and
shoving officers[,] . . . preventing them from successfully" arresting Jaykil.
Branden refused to be handcuffed from behind. His "refusal to comply created
the scenario for which he was taken down by several officers." Justin "jumped
in the confusion long enough to allow Jaykil[] . . . to leave the immediate scene
with the fanny pack." The judge found Detective DaSilva's BWC footage
depicted Justin and Spivey "intentionally disrupting officers from placing Jaykil
. . . in handcuffs by pulling Jaykil . . . [away] from the officers, placing
themselves in between the officers, and attempting to gain possession of [the]
fanny pack." Crediting Detective DaSilva's testimony that he felt a gun in the
fanny pack while he was pinned down, the judge concluded Spivey's
"affirmative actions interfered with[,] and ultimately prevented[,] law
enforcement officers from performing their official duties."
Like his co-defendants, Jaykil was found guilty of obstruction. The judge
reasoned Detective DaSilva "clearly expressed that the main focus of his
investigation" was Jaykil and the bag in his possession. Jaykil interfered with
the investigation because he was "seen [on the BWC footage] throwing the fanny
A-2960-23 10 pack" to Justin and Spivey, "as officers engage in a melee with the co-
defendants." The judge also credited Lieutenant Ranges's testimony Jaykil fled
the scene with Spivey and "the fanny pack that was briefly recovered by
Det[ective] DaSilva." Therefore, Jaykil was guilty by "throwing the fanny pack,
followed by flight with the object in the midst of an ongoing investigation by
law enforcement."
I.
In A-2960-23, A-2961-23, and A-3632-23, Justin, Jaykil, and Branden
each raise the following point for our consideration:
THE OBSTRUCTION CONVICTION MUST BE VACATED AND A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL ENTERED BECAUSE THE POLICE DID NOT ACT IN GOOD FAITH WHEN THEY WHOLLY ARBITRARILY PHYSICALLY ACCOSTED A GROUP OF MEN STANDING OUTSIDE THEIR HOME.
In A-2967-23, Spivey raises the following points on appeal:
POINT I
REGARDLESS OF THE STANDARD OF REVIEW, THIS COURT MUST REVERSE THE OBSTRUCTION CONVICTION AND ENTER A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL BECAUSE THE STATE DID NOT PROVE THAT THE OFFICERS WERE OBJECTIVELY ACTING IN GOOD FAITH AND UNDER THE COLOR OF LAW.
A-2960-23 11 POINT II
THE OFFICERS' FLAGRANT, ARBITRARY, AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL ACTIONS REFLECT IMPLICIT BIAS AND CANNOT OBJECTIVELY BE CONSIDERED TO BE IN GOOD FAITH.
We review a decision following bench trial for "sufficient credible
evidence in the record to support the judge's determination." State ex rel. R.V.,
280 N.J. Super. 118, 121 (App. Div. 1995). A trial judge sitting without a jury
must "state clearly [their] factual findings and correlate them with the relevant
legal conclusions." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999) (quoting Curtis
v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 570 (1980)). "When the reviewing court is satisfied
that the findings and result meet this criterion, its task is complete and it should
not disturb the result . . . ." Id. at 471 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146,
162 (1964)). We reverse only if the trial court's findings and legal conclusions
were "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant
and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Rova
Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974).
II.
All four defendants argue we should reverse the obstruction convictions
because the State did not prove the officers were acting in good faith or under
A-2960-23 12 color of law. They claim the trial judge's finding otherwise is not supported by
the evidence in the record.
A person is guilty of obstruction
if [they] purposely obstruct[], impair[,] or pervert[] the administration of law or other governmental function or prevent[] or attempt[] to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act. This section does not apply to failure to perform a legal duty other than an official duty, or any other means of avoiding compliance with law without affirmative interference with governmental functions.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a).]
Under the statute, "lawfully performing an official function" means the
officer acted in "objective good faith, under color of law in the execution of
[their] duties." State v. Crawley, 187 N.J. 440, 460-61 (2006); cf. State v.
Lashinsky, 81 N.J. 1, 11 (1979) (concluding individuals have a duty to obey an
officer's "obviously reasonable instructions"). Crawley construed "good faith"
to mean "honesty in belief or purpose" and "faithfulness to one's duty or
obligation." 187 N.J. at 461 n.8. An "officer who[,] without any basis[,]
arbitrarily detains a person on the street[,] would not be acting in good faith."
Ibid. However, an investigatory stop later found to be unconstitutional, does
A-2960-23 13 not necessarily mean officers acted arbitrarily, or "take[ the] case outside of the
purview of the obstruction statute." State v. Williams, 192 N.J. 1, 13 (2007).
The trial judge found all the State's witnesses credible, including the
officers who testified as fact witnesses. She concluded the officers were acting
in good faith and under color of law in investigating Jaykil and the fanny pack.
The officers were patrolling "due to recent criminal activity in the area," and
commenced the interaction with defendants after observing Jaykil's suspicious
"movements[ and] behavior," out of concern there was a firearm in the fanny
pack he was holding. The judge credited the officers' belief the fanny pack
contained a firearm, based on their experience making "many arrests involving
guns" and observation "guns were often discovered in fanny packs."
We can discern no error in these findings. The evidence in the record
supports the judge's finding the officers were acting in good faith and under
color of law. The record does not support defendants' contentions the officer set
upon them arbitrarily or on a whim.
Defendants point us to a 2014 Department of Justice (DOJ) report
regarding the Newark Police Department, which concluded most police stops
analyzed by the DOJ between 2009 and 2012, were unconstitutional. They
allege this supports their contentions the officers in their case were not acting in
A-2960-23 14 good faith. Setting aside whether data more than a decade old is relevant, and
that defendants did not raise the issue at trial, we are unconvinced there was
error because the trial judge correctly found under Crawley the officers could
have been acting in good faith notwithstanding the constitutionality of the initial
stop. "A defendant may be convicted of obstruction under N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1 . . .
despite a later finding that the police action was unconstitutional." Crawley,
187 N.J. at 460.
The judge's findings the State proved obstruction were sound. The statute
defines obstruction as "flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical
interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act."
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a). "[A] defendant commits the crime of obstruction if [they]
disobey[] a police command and flee[] from an investigatory stop." Williams,
192 N.J. at 4 (citing Crawley, 187 N.J. at 460).
The trial judge correctly found defendants acted purposely because they
"w[ere] fully aware that officers were attempting to investigate" Jaykil and the
fanny pack and tried to prevent his arrest. She also made detailed findings as to
why defendants could not have mistaken the officers for anything other than law
enforcement. Indeed, she observed during the melee Detective DaSilva yelled
"stop," attempted to deescalate the situation, and called for backup on his radio.
A-2960-23 15 The judge broke down each defendant's obstructive behavior. Spivey and
Justin pushed and shoved officers, "preventing them from successfully
performing the arrest," and Branden joined in the melee and refused police
orders to be handcuffed from behind. Justin "pushed . . . [Detective] DaSilva
into a nearby van," and "jumped in the confusion long enough to allow Jaykil []
. . . to leave the immediate scene." When Detective Serrano and Lieutenant
Ranges "were attempting to detain Jaykil," Justin and Spivey "interfere[d] by
pulling Jaykil . . . away from the officers." Spivey wrestled the fanny pack away
from Detective DaSilva before he fled the scene with it, and after Lieutenant
Ranges let go of Jaykil, he fled the scene as well. The BWC footage and the
officers' testimony support these findings.
Jaykil argues his conviction cannot stand because the trial judge
erroneously found he threw the fanny pack to Justin and Spivey, yet there is no
evidence to support such a finding. He claims the judge failed to address the
fact he was fleeing the scene for his personal safety because it was not obvious
the officers were attempting to arrest or engage in other official police duties.
The judge also did not address his affirmative defense. We reject these
contentions.
A-2960-23 16 The purpose of the obstruction statute is "to prohibit a broad range of
behavior designed to impede or defeat the lawful operation of government."
Final Rep. of the N.J. Crim. L. Revision Comm'n, Vol. II, § 2C:29-1
Commentary, at 280 (1971); State v. Camillo, 382 N.J. Super. 113, 116-17 (App.
Div. 2005). Police officers are public servants. State v. Bullock, 136 N.J. 149,
153 (1994). Their official functions include patrols and investigatory stops. See
Crawley, 187 N.J. at 461-62; Williams, 192 N.J. at 10.
A defendant does not have a right to "obstruct the police, or escape 'in
response to an unconstitutional stop or detention.'" State v. Herrerra, 211 N.J.
308, 334-35 (2012) (quoting Crawley, 187 N.J. at 455). The defendant's actions
must be assessed "in light of [a]ll the surrounding circumstances[,] the activity
giving rise to a police[ officer]'s order, the reasonableness of that order itself[,]
and the defendant's reaction to it." Lashinsky, 81 N.J. at 10. When an officer's
statements and commands are "reasonable, in furtherance of [their] duties, an
individual toward whom such instructions are directed has a correlative duty to
obey." Id. at 11.
Although the trial judge erred when she found Jaykil threw the fanny pack
to Justin and Spivey, the obstruction offense was based on more, namely, Jaykil
fleeing the scene where officers were trying to arrest him. The record does not
A-2960-23 17 support Jaykil's claim he left for safety reasons. Moreover, the contention he
was fleeing for self-preservation purposes is predicated on the claim police were
not operating in good faith and under color of law, which we and the trial judge
have rejected.
The affirmative defense of self-defense exists when a person "reasonably
believes . . . such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
[themself] against the use of unlawful force by . . . other person[s]." N.J.S.A.
2C:3-4. Such force is limited and may be unjustified when used "[t]o resist an
arrest which the actor knows is being made by a peace officer in the performance
of [their] duties." N.J.S.A. 2C:3-4(b)(1)(a). If a person knows "that if [they]
desist[] from [their] physically defensive measures and submit[] to arrest[,] the
officer's unlawfully excessive force would cease, the arrestee must desist or lose
[their] privilege of self-defense." State v. Mulvihill, 57 N.J. 151, 157 (1970).
Self-defense was inapplicable in Jaykil's case. The trial judge found: no
evidence the officers used unlawful force on Jaykil; it was clear they were police
officers; he was under investigation; and therefore, he was subject to their
reasonable commands.
A-2960-23 18 To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised in these appeals,
it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed in A-2960-23, A-2961-23, A-2967-23, and A-3632-23.
A-2960-23 19