NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4549-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JULIO CAMACHO,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted May 16, 2022 – Decided July 27, 2022
Before Judges Accurso and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 17-06-0589.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Marc A. Festa, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Julio Camacho appeals from the dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief, contending he established a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel requiring an evidentiary hearing. Because the
trial judge correctly determined the evidence insufficient to sustain defendant's
burden, we affirm.
On one day in March 2017, defendant robbed a liquor store with a BB
gun, and shortly thereafter approached two young men on the street,
brandishing the gun and demanding money, their cell phones and a key fob.
The liquor store robbery was captured on video, and after defendant left the
young men and went in search of their car, they ran home to report they'd been
robbed. Defendant was subsequently accosted by the father and uncle of one
of the victims, demanding defendant return the stolen property. A police
officer arrived, disarmed defendant and arrested him. A rapid drug screen
performed at the hospital following defendant's arrest noted the presence of
PCP and cannabinoid in his urine. An emergency room nurse noted defendant
"appears to be hallucinating."
Prior to indictment, the State offered to allow defendant to plead guilty
to two counts of first-degree robbery and one count of first-degree carjacking
in exchange for a recommended twelve-year sentence subject to the periods of
A-4549-19 2 parole ineligibility and supervision required by the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant declined the offer, and he was
subsequently indicted on those charges and eight others, including a certain
persons offense. Defendant's prior record made him extended-term eligible.
Following defendant's indictment, the State's plea offer stood at a
seventeen-year NERA term until the final pre-trial conference when the State
agreed to recommend a thirteen-year NERA term in exchange for defendant's
plea to two counts of armed robbery and carjacking. Defendant turned down
the offer, despite the urging of his lawyer and his family. The week before
trial, the court held a competency hearing for defendant after he submitted a
pre-trial memo in his own behalf with bizarre references to the judge,
prosecutor and defense counsel. A psychologist at Ann Klein Forensic Center
testified defendant was feigning his symptoms, understood the charges against
him and could participate in his defense.
The judge declared defendant competent to stand trial and the jury was
assembled when defendant decided he wanted to accept the State's plea offer,
which entailed defendant pleading to the same counts of the indictment as
counsel had negotiated previously in exchange for a recommended sixteen-
year NERA term.
A-4549-19 3 After the trial judge obtained the presiding judge's consent to the late
plea, defendant engaged in an extended plea colloquy in which he was
questioned by the court, defense counsel and the prosecutor. Defendant
acknowledged the extensive negotiations surrounding the plea, his exposure,
including the potential for an extended term, and expressed his understanding
that "a BB gun when used in the course of a robbery" is the same as "a 'real
gun'" qualifying for first-degree treatment. Defendant expressed satisfaction
with the services of his counsel, assured the judge he was pleading guilty
because he was guilty, and that no one had pressured him to enter the plea.
After defendant answered detailed questions as to the facts of the offenses, the
judge accepted defendant's guilty plea to two counts of first-degree robbery
and first-degree carjacking in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the
remaining eight counts of the indictment, waive an extended term and
recommend a sixteen-year NERA sentence.
Three weeks after entering his plea, defendant sent a letter to the court
and his counsel that he wished to withdraw it. The judge heard the motion at
the scheduled sentencing hearing two weeks later. Defendant explained the
hospital records from the time of his arrest, which he only recently received
despite having asked his counsel to secure them previously, "says . . . [he] was
A-4549-19 4 under the influence of PCP and [he] was hallucinating." Asked by the judge
why he didn't raise that when he entered his plea, defendant explained he was
pressured by his counsel "telling [him] he was going to lose at trial. Who
wouldn't want to cop out, you know." The prosecutor countered that the plea
was negotiated over a lengthy period, and that defendant's counsel had advised
the prosecutor "early on" about defendant being under the influence when he
committed the offenses, making clear this was not new information.
The judge denied the motion and sentenced defendant to an aggregate
sixteen-year NERA term in accordance with his plea. Defendant appealed, and
we affirmed both his sentence and the denial of his Slater1 motion on a
sentencing calendar. State v. Camacho, No. A-3847-17 (App. Div. Sept. 25,
2018).
Defendant filed a timely petition for PCR, contending plea counsel
failed to investigate and obtain medical records demonstrating he was under
the influence of PCP at the time of his offenses, failed to secure a lower plea
offer and did not meaningfully argue his Slater motion. The judge, who had
presided over defendant's competency hearing, taken his plea and sentenced
him to prison, denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
1 State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). A-4549-19 5 As to the hospital record of the drug screen defendant proffered and his
Slater motion, the judge noted review of the record made clear the drug test
was a screening test only. The document states it was to be used solely "for
medical purposes," and "[i]f confirmation of the positive results needed," the
lab had to be notified within fourteen days — well before defendant's counsel
had been appointed — to allow further testing by gas chromatography. The
judge found that even had defendant's counsel possessed the screening test
results defendant proffered "on the day he became counsel of record,
conclusive tests could not have been ordered."
The judge credited defense counsel with having brought attention early
to defendant being under the influence at the time of his offenses, noting the
"numerous references" in the record of defense counsel's efforts to use it to
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4549-19
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JULIO CAMACHO,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted May 16, 2022 – Decided July 27, 2022
Before Judges Accurso and Enright.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 17-06-0589.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Camelia M. Valdes, Passaic County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Marc A. Festa, Chief Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Julio Camacho appeals from the dismissal of his petition for
post-conviction relief, contending he established a prima facie case of
ineffective assistance of counsel requiring an evidentiary hearing. Because the
trial judge correctly determined the evidence insufficient to sustain defendant's
burden, we affirm.
On one day in March 2017, defendant robbed a liquor store with a BB
gun, and shortly thereafter approached two young men on the street,
brandishing the gun and demanding money, their cell phones and a key fob.
The liquor store robbery was captured on video, and after defendant left the
young men and went in search of their car, they ran home to report they'd been
robbed. Defendant was subsequently accosted by the father and uncle of one
of the victims, demanding defendant return the stolen property. A police
officer arrived, disarmed defendant and arrested him. A rapid drug screen
performed at the hospital following defendant's arrest noted the presence of
PCP and cannabinoid in his urine. An emergency room nurse noted defendant
"appears to be hallucinating."
Prior to indictment, the State offered to allow defendant to plead guilty
to two counts of first-degree robbery and one count of first-degree carjacking
in exchange for a recommended twelve-year sentence subject to the periods of
A-4549-19 2 parole ineligibility and supervision required by the No Early Release Act
(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. Defendant declined the offer, and he was
subsequently indicted on those charges and eight others, including a certain
persons offense. Defendant's prior record made him extended-term eligible.
Following defendant's indictment, the State's plea offer stood at a
seventeen-year NERA term until the final pre-trial conference when the State
agreed to recommend a thirteen-year NERA term in exchange for defendant's
plea to two counts of armed robbery and carjacking. Defendant turned down
the offer, despite the urging of his lawyer and his family. The week before
trial, the court held a competency hearing for defendant after he submitted a
pre-trial memo in his own behalf with bizarre references to the judge,
prosecutor and defense counsel. A psychologist at Ann Klein Forensic Center
testified defendant was feigning his symptoms, understood the charges against
him and could participate in his defense.
The judge declared defendant competent to stand trial and the jury was
assembled when defendant decided he wanted to accept the State's plea offer,
which entailed defendant pleading to the same counts of the indictment as
counsel had negotiated previously in exchange for a recommended sixteen-
year NERA term.
A-4549-19 3 After the trial judge obtained the presiding judge's consent to the late
plea, defendant engaged in an extended plea colloquy in which he was
questioned by the court, defense counsel and the prosecutor. Defendant
acknowledged the extensive negotiations surrounding the plea, his exposure,
including the potential for an extended term, and expressed his understanding
that "a BB gun when used in the course of a robbery" is the same as "a 'real
gun'" qualifying for first-degree treatment. Defendant expressed satisfaction
with the services of his counsel, assured the judge he was pleading guilty
because he was guilty, and that no one had pressured him to enter the plea.
After defendant answered detailed questions as to the facts of the offenses, the
judge accepted defendant's guilty plea to two counts of first-degree robbery
and first-degree carjacking in exchange for the State's agreement to dismiss the
remaining eight counts of the indictment, waive an extended term and
recommend a sixteen-year NERA sentence.
Three weeks after entering his plea, defendant sent a letter to the court
and his counsel that he wished to withdraw it. The judge heard the motion at
the scheduled sentencing hearing two weeks later. Defendant explained the
hospital records from the time of his arrest, which he only recently received
despite having asked his counsel to secure them previously, "says . . . [he] was
A-4549-19 4 under the influence of PCP and [he] was hallucinating." Asked by the judge
why he didn't raise that when he entered his plea, defendant explained he was
pressured by his counsel "telling [him] he was going to lose at trial. Who
wouldn't want to cop out, you know." The prosecutor countered that the plea
was negotiated over a lengthy period, and that defendant's counsel had advised
the prosecutor "early on" about defendant being under the influence when he
committed the offenses, making clear this was not new information.
The judge denied the motion and sentenced defendant to an aggregate
sixteen-year NERA term in accordance with his plea. Defendant appealed, and
we affirmed both his sentence and the denial of his Slater1 motion on a
sentencing calendar. State v. Camacho, No. A-3847-17 (App. Div. Sept. 25,
2018).
Defendant filed a timely petition for PCR, contending plea counsel
failed to investigate and obtain medical records demonstrating he was under
the influence of PCP at the time of his offenses, failed to secure a lower plea
offer and did not meaningfully argue his Slater motion. The judge, who had
presided over defendant's competency hearing, taken his plea and sentenced
him to prison, denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing.
1 State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145 (2009). A-4549-19 5 As to the hospital record of the drug screen defendant proffered and his
Slater motion, the judge noted review of the record made clear the drug test
was a screening test only. The document states it was to be used solely "for
medical purposes," and "[i]f confirmation of the positive results needed," the
lab had to be notified within fourteen days — well before defendant's counsel
had been appointed — to allow further testing by gas chromatography. The
judge found that even had defendant's counsel possessed the screening test
results defendant proffered "on the day he became counsel of record,
conclusive tests could not have been ordered."
The judge credited defense counsel with having brought attention early
to defendant being under the influence at the time of his offenses, noting the
"numerous references" in the record of defense counsel's efforts to use it to
defendant's advantage in the plea negotiations with the prosecutor. Because
the record was of no avail on the Slater motion, however, a more vigorous
argument on defense counsel's part would not have changed the result. As for
defendant's criticism of counsel for his failure to secure a more favorable plea,
the record makes abundantly clear counsel had secured two more favorable
pleas, both of which defendant rejected.
A-4549-19 6 Defendant appeals, reprising the arguments he made in the trial court.
To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must establish,
first, that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness" and, second, that "there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
been different." Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88, 694 (1984).
When a defendant's conviction rests on a guilty plea, the focus of the prejudice
prong is "whether counsel's constitutionally ineffective performance affected
the outcome of the plea process." Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985).
To obtain relief, a defendant "must convince the court that a decision to reject
the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v.
Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
As is clear from the record, the State had a strong case. Defendant's
robbery of the liquor store was captured on video, and he was apprehended
with the BB gun. Because the two young men defendant robbed and carjacked
had enlisted their relatives to get back their belongings, several people were
prepared to identify defendant at trial. Defendant was also extended-term
eligible and conviction at trial could have resulted in him serving decades in
prison on consecutive sentences for these three first-degree offenses.
A-4549-19 7 Defendant put forth nothing to show any realistic hope of succeeding on
an intoxication defense. See State v. Cameron, 104 N.J. 42, 56 (1986)
(discussing factors "pertinent to the determination of intoxication sufficient to
satisfy the test of 'prostration of faculties'"). Having reviewed the record, we
agree with the trial judge that defendant failed to show any incompetence on
his counsel's part or that a decision to reject the plea bargain the State offered
on the trial date would have been a rational decision under the circumstances.
State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009). His failure to establish a
prima facie case made an evidentiary hearing unnecessary. See State v. Porter,
216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013).
Affirmed.
A-4549-19 8