NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2087-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH M. CRILLEY,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Argued September 9, 2025 – Decided September 29, 2025
Before Judges Gilson, Firko and Perez Friscia.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Sussex County, Indictment No. 19-12-0335.
Rachel Glanz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Rachel Glanz, of counsel and on the briefs.)
Thomas M. Caroccia, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Thomas M. Caroccia, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Joseph M. Crilley appeals from a January 25, 2023 order
denying his motion to suppress evidence of wax folds discovered by law
enforcement during a warrantless search of his tow truck following a fatal
accident and biofluid samples—blood and urine—obtained after issuance of a
telephonic search warrant. He also challenges his two consecutive five-year
prison sentences subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2,
following his plea to two reckless vehicular homicide and assault by auto counts.
After carefully reviewing the record in light of the arguments of the parties
and the applicable law, we conclude the wax folds would have inevitably been
properly seized, and the telephonic search warrant for defendant's blood and
urine was supported by probable cause. Therefore, we affirm.
I.
We summarize the facts from the two-day motion to suppress hearing, at
which New Jersey State Police (NJSP) Trooper James Celi and Detective Daniel
Rodriguez of the NJSP Fatal Accident Investigation Unit testified. The trial
court also reviewed body worn camera (BWC) videos taken from Celi, State
Trooper Julio Rodriguez, Sparta Township Police Officer Lynott,1 Sergeant
1 Officer Lynott's first name is not contained in the record.
A-2087-23 2 David Fritsch, and Officer Joseph Liguori,2 which were played at the hearing,
the telephonic search warrant for blood and urine samples, the search warrant,
the NMS Labs toxicology report, crime scene photographs, and the New Jersey
State Police Drinking Driving Report.
In the late evening of August 5, 2019, defendant was driving a 2012 Isuzu
tow truck carrying two vehicles on Route 94 South in Lafayette Township. One
vehicle was on the flatbed of the tow truck, and the other vehicle was being
towed from the tailgate with its two front wheels raised off the surface of the
road. According to eyewitnesses and the accident reconstruction report,
defendant was speeding, crossed the double yellow lines onto incoming traffic
on Route 94 North, and crashed into a Honda Civic with significant force.
The front seat passenger was ejected onto the roadway with "extensive
injuries and bleeding." The accident trapped the driver of the Honda Civic,
killing him in the crash. The rear and front seat passengers were seriously
injured and transported to the hospital. The rear seat passenger died several
weeks later from his injuries, and the front seat passenger lost one eye and
suffered other significant injuries.
2 This court also reviewed the BWC videos. A-2087-23 3 State Troopers responded to the crash scene at approximately 10:41 p.m.
Celi spoke to defendant, who was seated on nearby grass. The tow truck and
Honda Civic came to rest approximately fifty feet away from the point of impact.
The tow truck had partially pinned the Honda Civic into the ground. Celi
testified he did not observe any visible injuries on defendant, but defendant
complained of head and leg pain. Defendant advised Celi that when the accident
occurred, he was returning from cleaning up an accident in Sparta.
Celi investigated the crash site. He observed "extensive damage" to the
Honda Civic, specifically to the front driver's side of the vehicle, with objects
and broken glass spread "all over the place." The tow truck sustained heavy
damage to the driver's side. Both vehicles that had been towed by defendant's
truck were also damaged. Celi explained his role was to get treatment for the
injured parties, ensure the safety of the accident scene for other vehicles using
the road, and coordinate efforts with other agencies to identify the individuals
involved.
Celi testified that numerous witnesses and agencies responded due to "the
seriousness of the accident." He described how the fire department assisted with
the extraction, emergency medical services assisted with injuries, the New
Jersey Department of Transportation helped with road closures, and a Sparta
A-2087-23 4 police officer was also at the scene. Celi explained that the Fatal Accident
Investigation Unit was primarily concerned with how the crash occurred and
crash reconstruction and was assisted by the Crime Scene Unit.
Celi testified that defendant walked over from the grassy area to the crash
scene and was "kind of staggering a little bit." According to Celi, defendant told
him that the tow truck did not have an anti-lock braking system, which caused
too much weight on the lift. Defendant claimed the front wheels raised because
of the rear vehicle weight, and he hit the brakes, which caused the tow truck to
"skid[]" into the Honda Civic. Defendant advised Celi that he begged his boss
to fix the brakes. Celi testified that defendant also explained he was driving
down a hill, the brakes locked, he was unable to stop the tow truck in time, and
he drove into the nearby woods before the crash.
Defendant appeared "sweaty" to Celi due to the weather. Celi instructed
defendant to wait for medical assistance and asked if he had his driver's license,
registration, and proof of insurance. Celi testified that defendant gave him
permission to retrieve his driver's license from his wallet and vehicle paperwork
located inside the tow truck. This search was not challenged at the motion to
suppress hearing.
A-2087-23 5 Upon entering the tow truck through the passenger-side door, Celi noticed
"[i]tems scattered throughout the vehicle[,] . . . the passenger[-]side floor and
all over the center console area." Celi testified that he saw a bottle of
prescription pills and a wallet in "plain view." Celi stated that the "color of [the
bottle] and [bottle] label[]" caught his attention. Celi testified the bottle
contained Sertraline pills—commonly known by the brand name Zoloft—which
he placed back on the passenger seat. After finding the Sertraline, Celi spoke
with defendant, who confirmed it was a generic form of Zoloft that had been
prescribed to him. Celi retrieved the tow truck's registration and insurance
information, but defendant's driver's license was not found in his wallet.
While defendant was on a stretcher in an ambulance about to be
transported to the hospital, Celi testified he asked him about the license.
Defendant responded the license was in another wallet inside the tow truck. Celi
stated he re-entered the tow truck but was unable to locate defendant's other
wallet.
Later that evening, at approximately 11:10 p.m., Rodriguez arrived on the
accident scene to assist Celi with "all technical aspects" of the investigation and
to investigate the cause of the accident. Rodriguez testified that he has expertise
in the field of commercial vehicle crash investigation. Rodriguez evaluated the
A-2087-23 6 accident scene and inspected the roadway for tire tracks, the vehicles' "airbags,
[seatbelts,] occupant placement," and "gross vehicle weight." Celi informed
Rodriguez about the Sertraline pills found inside the tow truck.
Rodriguez observed a single set of skid marks on the road exiting the
southbound lane, which he pointed out to Celi. The audio portion of the BWC
recorded the officers' observations that defendant's tow truck "clearly had
brakes" due to the "rubber on asphalt," but noted the tow truck's rear brakes
could have malfunctioned because there was only a single visible set of tire
tracks. The tow truck had dual rear wheels on each side of the rear axle, which
meant that only the front brakes were in use at the time of impact. Rodriguez
testified that the tow truck had traveled "approximately 217 feet" from the start
of braking to the point of impact.
Based on the serious nature of the accident, Rodriguez testified that non -
law enforcement personnel was needed "to get the [two] vehicles apart." To
accomplish this, Rodriguez suggested the brakes might have to be disengaged
or the steering wheel would have to be moved in different directions. As part
of standard operating procedures for major crash investigations, Rodriguez
testified observations had to be made and documented for his report before
A-2087-23 7 relocation preparation occurred, and the tow truck's interior had to be
undisturbed and free of debris before being removed from the roadway.
Rodriguez testified that as part of his duties, he would need to obtain the
gross weight of the tow truck by opening the passenger side door and looking at
the vehicle identification number placard, which is usually located on the
driver's side door. Rodriguez explained that gross vehicle weight is required for
completing NJSP crash reporting forms and information on airbag deployment.
In addition, Rodriguez testified that gross weight helps determine if a vehicle is
"overweight for the roadway or overweight for its own capacity." In that regard,
Rodriguez also explained that gross weight is useful in determining whether a
vehicle is overweight, which could impact its operation and ability to stop.
As to this accident, however, the driver's side door of the tow truck could
not be opened due to damage from the crash. Accordingly, Rodriguez explained
that he opened the passenger door of the tow truck, evaluated the seatbelts to
ascertain if they were in use at the time of the crash, and found there was no
airbag, but stopped short of documenting the tow truck's weight. He also
explained the accident scene had to be documented "prior to moving and cutting
the vehicles to get the [Honda Civic] driver out."
A-2087-23 8 Rodriguez stated that he and Detective Sergeant Van Lenten, 3 who was
assigned to photograph the accident scene, had entered the passenger side
footwell of the tow truck to photograph the seatbelts and lack of an airbag.
Rodriguez also testified that upon opening the door and stepping onto a footwell
on the side of the vehicle, "we observed [in] plain view suspected folds of
heroin" on the driver's seat and driver-side floor of the tow truck. Van Lenten
told Rodriguez that from the footwell, he saw the prescription bottle on the
passenger seat and three wax folds containing suspected heroin on the driver's
seat and driver-side floorboard in "plain view." Rodriguez "looked" and
confirmed Van Lenten's observations. The suspected heroin was then removed,
but no further search of the tow truck was conducted.
Rodriguez explained he exited the tow truck without completing the
inspection because the fatal crash investigation "morphed" into a criminal
investigation with "possible driver impairment." Rodriguez testified that he
would not have entered the tow truck if he knew there was a criminal
investigation in progress. Rodriguez stated he was able to gather information
on whether the tow truck's seatbelts were used and if there were no airbags, but
he was unable to document the gross weight because the inspection was
3 Detective Sergeant Van Lenten's first name is not contained in the record. A-2087-23 9 terminated "due to the plain view [of controlled dangerous substances] (CDS)."
Law enforcement proceeded to secure the tow truck until a search warrant could
be obtained to search the remainder of the vehicle. Rodriguez testified that the
tow truck was impounded because it was disabled and due to the criminal
investigation. The Honda Civic was also impounded.
At this point, a criminal investigation was underway, and a telephonic
search warrant was applied for to obtain defendant's blood and urine samples.
The telephonic search warrant was granted on August 6, 2019, while defendant
was still at the hospital.
A hospital employee drew defendant's blood, and he provided the urine
sample himself. Defendant's blood and urine samples were taken by Detective
Kyle Phlegar of the Sussex County Prosecutor's Office to NMS Labs in
Horsham, Pennsylvania for testing. Defendant's blood and urine samples tested
positive for "numerous psychoactive drugs," such as fentanyl, acetyl fentanyl,
morphine, clonazepam (Klonopin), and alprazolam (Xanax). Other illegal
substances "indicative" of heroin use were found in defendant's urine. On
August 9, 2019, a judge approved a search warrant to search defendant's cell
phone and truck.
A-2087-23 10 Rodriguez testified that vehicles involved in crashes are routinely
searched for an inventory of property to document personal belongings within
the vehicle. After a search warrant for a mechanical inspection of the tow truck
and defendant's cell phone was issued, Rodriguez testified he performed another
interior and exterior inspection, as well as a mechanical inspection, to "rule out
any mechanical factors [ ] causing the crash." Rodriguez testified that at the
time of the accident, his unit had not been issued BWCs, and the footage of him
entering the tow truck was captured from the BWC of another officer. During
this subsequent search of the tow truck, other objects were discovered, including
a glass smoking pipe. Following his discharge from the hospital, defendant was
interviewed at the NJSP Sussex Station and agreed to provide a recorded
statement.
On December 12, 2019, a Sussex County grand jury charged defendant
with two counts of second-degree reckless vehicular homicide, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
5(a) (counts one and two); fourth-degree assault-by-auto, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-
1(c)(1) (count three); third-degree possession of heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1)
(count four); third-degree possession of cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count
five); and third-degree possession of fentanyl, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1) (count
six).
A-2087-23 11 On October 23, 2020, defendant moved to suppress physical evidence
seized from the tow truck. On February 28, 2022, defendant supplemented his
motion to suppress to include the suppression of the blood and urine test results
obtained in accordance with the telephonic search warrant. Defendant
contended the wax folds found in the tow truck were the product of an unlawful
search by Rodriguez. Defendant argued the laboratory test results of his blood
and urine should also be suppressed because they are "fruit of the poisonous
tree." At the conclusion of the suppression hearing, defendant made an oral
request for a Franks4 hearing based on Celi's testimony.
Defendant maintained the search warrant for his blood and urine should
be invalidated because Celi "acted with reckless disregard for the truth during
the telephonic application by providing [the] [c]ourt with false statements and
omitting relevant information." The trial court gave defendant the opportunity
to file a formal Franks motion, requested written summations on the motion to
suppress, and reserved decision.
4 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). A defendant is entitled to a Franks hearing to challenge the veracity of a search warrant affidavit by demonstrating a "substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, and . . . the allegedly false statement is necessary to the finding of probable cause." Id. at 155-56; see also State v. Howery, 80 N.J. 563, 567-68 (1979) (adopting the Franks standard in New Jersey). A-2087-23 12 On January 25, 2023, the trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress
in an order and thirty-eight-page statement of reasons. The trial court found the
second search conducted by Rodriguez was lawful because the tow truck was
"subject to an administrative inspection." The trial court reasoned that
Rodriguez's acting as a fatal crash investigator and his observation of the wax
folds was pursuant to "an appropriate and legal administrative inspection" and
was performed "in accordance with his statutory obligation to document
information" relating to the commercial vehicle crash.
The trial court credited Rodriguez's observations made through the tow
truck's passenger side window while standing on the footwell was done in
accordance with his "obligations" to conduct a fatal crash investigation and
complete the New Jersey crash investigation form. The trial court found that
Rodriguez entered the tow truck to "inspect the airbags, seatbelts, and occupant
placement." In that regard, the trial court noted that determining seatbelt status
"is a critical function of the inspection" and must be done before the vehicle is
moved or transported.
Citing our decision in State v. Pompa, the trial court reasoned that "New
Jersey has an interest in guaranteeing the safety of drivers on its roadway and,
to that end, warrantless administrative inspections further that interest by
A-2087-23 13 ensuring that the largest vehicles on [the] roads are safe for transit and in
compliance with established regulations." 414 N.J. Super. 219, 231-33 (App.
Div. 2010). The trial court determined that the administrative search performed
was conducted under a "valid regulatory program."
The trial court found the search was limited "in time, place[,] and scope"
and upon viewing the wax folds, Rodriguez "immediately terminated the
investigation." The trial court noted that defendant, as an operator of a
commercial vehicle, "could not help but be aware that his vehicle could be
subject to these types of searches," citing State v. Hewitt, 400 N.J. Super. 376,
384 (2008). The trial court emphasized that as part of a fatal vehicular
inspection involving a commercial vehicle, Rodriguez was "required to get the
gross weight of the vehicle."
The trial court also found that the wax folds would have been inevitably
discovered because the tow truck would have been inventoried once impounded.
Given the serious nature of the crash, and the number of vehicles and parties
involved, an inventory search would have been conducted "to ensure that there
was no loss of property under normal police procedures." The trial court relied
on BWC footage, which revealed "that a number of items were being thrown
A-2087-23 14 from the vehicle and laying next to the tow truck," combined with corroborating
testimony on this issue.
With regard to the potential inevitable discovery of the wax folds through
a search warrant, the trial court determined that a search warrant for the tow
truck would have been sought even if the wax folds were not found. The trial
court grounded its decision on the seriousness of the crash, noting the two
fatalities and a passenger with "serious disfigurement," combined with
defendant's statement that he had issues with the brakes, and when he hit them,
he was unable to stop.
The trial court also reasoned the community caretaking exception to the
search warrant requirement applied because there was "an emergent need to
preserve property at the time of entry."
Additionally, the trial court found the continuation doctrine exception
applied because the NJSP worked together with other officers in a "single,
integrated, continuous" investigation. Because of the severity of the crash and
injuries, "multiple units and agencies needed to respond and coordinate efforts."
The trial court held the warrant to seize defendant's blood and urine was "already
in motion" based on sufficient factors when the heroin was discovered.
A-2087-23 15 The trial court rejected defendant's request for a Franks hearing because
defendant had not met his burden by a preponderance of the evidence that Celi
"deliberately" misled the court. This appeal followed.
II.
Defendant submits the following arguments for our consideration:
POINT I
THE WAX FOLDS MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE RODRIGUEZ'S WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF THE TOW TRUCK WAS UNLAWFUL AND CANNOT BE SHOEHORNED INTO ANY OF THE RECOGNIZED EXCEPTIONS TO THE WARRANT REQUIREMENT.
A. The Administrative Search Exception Does Not Apply.
B. The Community Caretaking Exception Does Not Apply.
C. The Reasonable Continuation Doctrine Does Not Apply.
D. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine Does Not Apply.
1. The State Did Not Establish That Police Would Have Inevitably Discovered The Wax Folds Through An Inventory Search.
2. The State Did Not Establish That Police Would Have Inevitably Discovered The Wax Folds By Applying For And
A-2087-23 16 Obtaining A Search Warrant For The Tow Truck.
3. The Rationale Behind The Exclusionary Rule Also Weighs In Favor Of Suppression.
POINT II
THE BIOFLUID SAMPLES MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE WITHOUT INFORMATION CONCERNING THE DISCOVERY OF THE WAX FOLDS, THE WARRANT AUTHORIZING COLLECTION AND TESTING OF THE SAMPLES WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE. EVEN IF THE WAX FOLDS ARE ADMISSIBLE UNDER THE INEVITABLE DISCOVERY EXCEPTION, THE SAMPLES SHOULD STILL BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEIR EVIDENTIAL VALUE IS TIME-DEPENDENT.
A. Without The Discovery Of The Wax Folds, The Warrant Authorizing A Blood And Urine Test Was Not Supported By Probable Cause.
B. Even If This Court Finds That The Wax Folds Would Have Been Inevitably Discovered And Are Therefore Admissible, The Biofluid Samples Must Be Suppressed Because Their Evidential Value Is Time-Dependent.
When reviewing a decision on a motion to suppress, appellate courts defer
to a trial court's factual findings and will uphold those findings when they are
supported by sufficient, credible evidence in the record. State v. Tiwana, 256
N.J. 33, 40 (2023) (citing State v. A.M., 237 N.J. 384, 395 (2019)). "[F]actual
A-2087-23 17 findings based on a video recording or documentary evidence" are reviewed
under the same standard. State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 381 (2017). In contrast,
appellate courts do not defer to a trial court's legal conclusions, which are
reviewed de novo. Tiwana, 256 N.J. at 40 (citing State v. Rockford, 213 N.J.
424, 440 (2013)). The determination of whether an exception to the
exclusionary rule applies is a legal conclusion to which an appellate court owes
no special deference. See State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425-26 (2014).
The United States and New Jersey Constitutions guarantee that
individuals shall be free from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const.
amend. IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. "Generally, a warrantless search or seizure is
invalid absent a showing that it 'falls within one of the few well-delineated
exceptions to the warrant requirement.'" State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 517
(2020) (quoting State v. Mann, 203 N.J. 328, 337-38 (2010)).
The scope of review of a search warrant is limited. State v. Chippero, 201
N.J. 14, 32 (2009). "[R]eviewing courts 'should pay substantial deference' to
judicial findings of probable cause in search warrant applications." State v.
Andrews, 243 N.J. 447, 464 (2020) (quoting State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110,
117 (1968)). See State v. Marshall, 123 N.J. 1, 72 (1991) ("[w]e accord
A-2087-23 18 substantial deference to the discretionary determination resulting in the issuance
of the warrant").
A review of the record establishes that it was inevitable that an application
for a warrant to obtain blood and urine samples from defendant would be made
and granted. It was also inevitable that the tow truck would be lawfully
searched, and the wax folds would be lawfully seized. Therefore, we affirm the
suppression order based on the inevitable discovery doctrine, and we do not need
to address the other grounds for the search and seizures.
A. The Inevitable Discovery Doctrine
Defendant argues the State failed to meet its burden to show it would have
inevitably discovered the wax folds through an inventory search of the tow truck
or by securing a search warrant to search the tow truck based "solely" on having
found the generic Zoloft inside.
Addressing the State's position of inevitable discovery of the wax folds '
seizure, the State must demonstrate that:
(1) proper, normal and specific investigatory procedures would have been pursued in order to complete the investigation of the case; (2) under all the surrounding relevant circumstances the pursuit of those procedures would have inevitably resulted in the discovery of the evidence; and (3) the discovery of the evidence through the use of such procedures would
A-2087-23 19 have occurred wholly independently of the discovery of such evidence by unlawful means.
[State v. Caronna, 469 N.J. Super. 462, 500 (App. Div. 2021); see also State v. Holland, 176 N.J. 344, 361-62 (2003) (enumerating the facets of the inevitable discovery doctrine).]
The inevitable discovery exception applies here because the officers
satisfied all three prongs of the standard. As we explained in State v. McDaniel,
the State must establish that the police inventoried the contents of the vehicle to
fulfill one or more of the purposes identified in South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364, 368-69 (1976). 156 N.J. Super. 347, 353 (App. Div. 1978). Those
purposes are "'to protect the owner's property, to protect the police against
claims over lost or stolen property and to protect the police from 'potential
danger.'" Ibid. (quoting Opperman, 428 U.S. at 368-69).
Here, the State established that it would have inventoried the contents of
defendant's tow truck to identify and make a record of all items of value found.
Thus, the inventory would have been undertaken to protect defendant's property
and the police against claims over lost or stolen property. In doing so, the wax
folds would have inevitably been discovered. Therefore, the officers' inventory
of defendant's tow truck would have been undertaken for one of the purposes
A-2087-23 20 identified in Opperman. We therefore conclude that the wax folds would have
inevitably been constitutionally seized.
Additionally, the officers would have inevitably obtained the wax folds
by obtaining a search warrant. The inevitable discovery doctrine may be
invoked to preserve "the admissibility of evidence obtained without a warrant
or a valid exception to the warrant requirement." State v. Camey, 239 N.J. 282,
301 (2019). The inevitable discovery exception permits the admission of
illegally obtained evidence when "the evidence in question would inevitably
have been discovered without reference to the police error or misconduct,"
thereby negating any taint. State v. Sugar, 108 N.J. 151, 156 (1987) (quoting
Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 448 (1984)); accord State v. Maltese, 222 N.J.
525, 551-52 (2015).
The State need not establish with particularity "the exact circumstances of
the evidence's discovery" nor "the exclusive path leading to the discovery."
Sugar, 108 N.J. at 158. Rather, the State may demonstrate the evidence would
have eventually been discovered based on the totality of "the evidence
understood in light of ordinary experience and common sense." Id. at 163.
Here, the trial court found the inevitable discovery doctrine applied
because Celi testified the State would have requested a search warrant for
A-2087-23 21 defendant's blood and urine samples even if the wax folds were not found by
Rodriguez. The trial court stated:
This is because of the seriousness of the crash with two resulting fatalities and one person with serious disfigurement, coupled with [d]efendant's explanation of the crash. When troopers initially arrived to the scene, [d]efendant stated he had issues with his brakes and that when he hit them, he was not able to stop the vehicle. . . . . This information was included in the search warrant application for which the [c]ourt finds was enough to execute the search warrant that would lead to the inevitable discovery of the wax folds containing heroin.
Therefore, consistent with the test articulated in Sugar and Maltese, the
trial court properly concluded that the wax folds would have been discovered
after the search warrant was obtained for defendant's urine and blood. Celi and
Rodriguez testified regarding the normal and routine investigatory procedures
that the NJSP was employed as part of a fatal vehicle accident investigation.
Moreover, Celi testified that the officers applied for the search warrant because
the Sertraline bottle was found and due to the fatality and serious injuries
sustained. Saliently, the cause of the accident was unclear, and defendant gave
different explanations about what happened. Celi testified that determination
was made before the wax folds were found by Rodriguez.
A-2087-23 22 The trial court reasoned:
Celi was already in the process of preparing his application [to obtain a sample of defendant's] blood when the heroin was discovered on the passenger seat and floorboard by . . . Rodriguez. . . . In making his application for the search warrant, . . . Celi disclosed to this [c]ourt that [d]efendant told troopers that his wheels locked and that he was unable to stop his vehicle . . . and that [d]efendant did not show any outward signs of intoxication . . . . He also disclosed the presence of [a] generic form of Zoloft in the vehicle and that a second trooper observed suspected CDS.
We conclude that the trial court correctly found (1) the search warrant for
defendant's blood and urine samples would have been issued without
information about the wax folds; and (2) the wax folds would have been
inevitably discovered after the search warrant for defendant's blood and urine
sample was issued.
B. The Exclusionary Rule Does Not Weigh In Favor of Suppression.
As a general matter, it is long established under both the Fourth
Amendment and Article I, paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution that the
exclusionary rule bars the State from admitting evidence obtained from an
unconstitutional search or seizure. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
485-88 (1963); State v. Shaw, 213 N.J. 398, 412-13 (2012). However, the "fruit
of the poisonous tree" doctrine recognized in Wong Sun does not automatically
A-2087-23 23 mandate the suppression of all evidence found subsequent to an unlawful search
or seizure. 371 U.S. at 487-88.
As our Supreme Court explained in State v. Smith, "[t]he exclusionary
rule is not monolithic and inexorable." 212 N.J. 365, 389 (2012). Rather,
"[c]ase law has developed certain exceptions to the exclusionary rule, in
recognition of the fact that if exclusion in a particular instance will not further
purposes of the exclusionary rule, there is no reason for the courts to apply it."
Ibid. (citing Nix, 467 U.S. at 443).
Suppression of otherwise relevant and admissible evidence does not turn
on whether the illegal search or seizure was a "but for" cause of the State
obtaining the evidence a defendant seeks to suppress. Shaw, 213 N.J. at 413.
Rather, courts hearing suppression motions must determine whether the
evidence "was a product of the 'exploitation of [the primary] illegality'—the
wrongful detention—or of 'means sufficiently distinguishable to be purged of
the primary taint.'" Ibid. (quoting Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 488).
The State is not required to show "the exact circumstances of the
evidence's discovery" or "the exclusive path leading to the discovery." Sugar,
108 N.J. at 158. "Rather, '[t]he State need only present facts or elements—
proving each such fact or element by a preponderance of the evidence—that in
A-2087-23 24 combination clearly and convincingly establish the ultimate fact and lead to the
conclusion that the evidence would be inevitably discovered.'" Camey, 239 N.J.
at 302 (quoting Sugar, 108 N.J. at 159). The State can meet its burden by
showing inevitable discovery would have occurred "in one or in several ways,"
based on the totality of "the evidence understood in light of ordinary experience
and common sense." Sugar, 108 N.J. at 159, 163.
Consistent with this line of cases, we hold there was no disregard of the
Fourth Amendment in the warrantless entry of the tow truck. The evolving
investigation—marked by defendant's unclear and conflicting account of the
accident—the discovery of Sertraline, and physical evidence, justified
Rodriguez's continued efforts. The record demonstrates that Rodriguez was
unaware of the telephonic search warrant application. Therefore, the
exclusionary rule does not bar introduction of the wax folds into evidenc e.
After defendant filed his merits brief, our Supreme Court issued a decision
in State v. Fenimore, 261 N.J. 364, 377 (2025) (declaring that the automobile
exception applies only to on-scene searches). On July 30, 2025, the same day
Fenimore was issued, defendant filed a letter pursuant to Rule 2:6-11(d), arguing
the State's contentions that the warrant exceptions that are at issue in this case
are inapplicable because the Supreme Court in Fenimore "emphasized that
A-2087-23 25 warrantless searches are 'presumptively unreasonable' and that the automobile
exception applies only in specific narrow circumstances." In response, the State
noted that the "automobile exception has no relevance" in this case and the
Supreme Court in Fenimore "explicitly limited its holding to its specific set of
facts." We agree with the State and conclude that Fenimore is inapplicable to
the facts of this case.
III.
Finally, defendant argues the trial court erred by not suppressing the
biofluid samples because the telephonic search warrant did not establish
probable cause. As a result, defendant contends the application was "tainted"
and may not be used to evaluate whether there was probable cause to believe
defendant was driving under the influence and that his blood and urine showed
evidence of a crime, citing State v. Ortense, 174 N.J. Super. 453, 454-55 (App.
Div. 1980). Defendant proffers "[w]ithout this tainted information," all that is
left is the "discovery of generic Zoloft inside the tow truck" and that "a serious
accident" occurred.
Taking a "blood sample for the purpose of alcohol-content analysis
constitutes a search" under the Fourth Amendment. State v. Zalcberg, 232 N.J.
335, 345 (2018) (citing Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 758 (1966)). A
A-2087-23 26 warrant for a search can be issued when there is probable cause to believe that
the search will produce evidence of a crime. Smith, 212 N.J. at 388 (quoting
State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 610 (2009)). Rule 3:5-3(c) permits a judge to
issue a warrant telephonically. Moreover, that Rule does not require exigent
circumstances for a telephonic warrant. Sup. Ct. of N.J., Notice to the Bar:
Telephonic Requests for Search Warrants for Blood Tests in Driving While
Intoxicated (DWI) Cases (Missouri v. McNeely) - Rule Relaxation (Nov. 25,
2013).
Search warrants must "describe with particularity the places subject to
search and people or things subject to seizure." Andrews, 243 N.J. at 464 (citing
U.S. Const. amend. IV and N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7). "Before issuing a warrant,
the judge must be satisfied that there is probable cause to believe that a crime
has been committed, or is being committed, at a specific location or that
evidence of a crime is at the place sought to be searched." State v. Sullivan, 169
N.J. 204, 210 (2001).
"Probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant requires a fair
probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a particular
place." State v. Gathers, 234 N.J. 208, 223 (2018) (quoting Chippero, 201 N.J.
at 28) (internal quotation marks omitted). "[T]he probable cause determination
A-2087-23 27 must be . . . based on the information contained within the four corners of the
supporting affidavit, as supplemented by sworn testimony before the issuing
judge that is recorded contemporaneously." State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 427
(2017) (alteration in original) (quoting Marshall, 199 N.J. at 611).
It is well settled that a search executed pursuant to a warrant is presumed to be valid and . . . a defendant challenging its validity has the burden to prove "that there was no probable cause supporting the issuance of the warrant or that the search was otherwise unreasonable."
[State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388 (2004)].
"[S]ubstantial deference must be paid by a reviewing court to the determination
of the judge who has made a finding of probable cause to issue a search warrant."
State v. Evers, 175 N.J. 355, 381 (2003). Any "[d]oubt as to the validity of the
warrant 'should ordinarily be resolved by sustaining the search.'" State v. Keyes,
184 N.J. 541, 554 (2005) (quoting Jones, 179 N.J. at 389). The same applies in
situations where "the adequacy of the facts offered to show probable cause . . .
appear[] to be marginal." Jones, 179 N.J. at 388-89 (quoting Kasabucki, 52 N.J.
at 116).
When reviewing the validity of a search warrant, the court must look to
"the totality of the circumstances" to ascertain if there was probable cause.
Chippero, 201 N.J. at 27. Our role is to determine whether the warrant
A-2087-23 28 application presented sufficient evidence for a finding of probable cause to
search the location for the items sought. Id. at 32. State v. Sheehan, 217 N.J.
Super. 20, 27 (App. Div. 1987) (citing United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102,
109 (1965)).
Celi's testimony in support of the telephonic search warrant delineated the
inconsistencies in defendant's statements with respect to the cause of the
accident. The lawful discovery of the Sertraline in conjunction with defendant's
inconsistent explanations regarding the cause of the accident established
probable cause to believe defendant was intoxicated or incapacitated at the time
of the accident even without discovery of the wax folds. Moreover, because we
are satisfied the wax folds would have been inevitably discovered, defendant's
motion to suppress the biofluid samples was properly denied.
Defendant contends that the biofluid samples must be suppressed because
their evidential value was time dependent. Defendant cites Rawlings v. Police
Dep't of Jersey City, 133 N.J. 182, 191 (1993) for the proposition that "[a]s the
United States Supreme Court has noted, traces of illegal drugs are continuously
eliminated from the bloodstream" and because of that fact, since the wax folds
likely would not have been discovered until well after the crash, the blood and
urine results would have come back negative for defendant.
A-2087-23 29 At the suppression hearing, the following exchange took place:
[Defendant's Counsel]: And contact was made with Assistant Prosecutor Rafuse for the purpose of starting the process of making the application for the search warrant before the heroin was found, correct?
[Celi]: Correct.
[Defendant's Counsel]: And wasn't there not concern amongst some of the investigators on the scene that maybe [there] just wasn't enough for probable cause for a blood and urine warrant based upon just Zoloft and the happening of an accident?
[Celi]: There might have been but that's where we all kind of put our heads together at some point and that's where we determined that we would go for the telephonic search warrant.
The record clearly demonstrates that the application for the urine and
blood warrant was already in progress before the wax folds were found in
defendant's tow truck. Thus, the trial court's finding of that fact is supported by
substantial credible evidence. Moreover, Rodriguez testified that he only
learned the telephone application for defendant's blood and urine samples was
already in progress after he discovered the wax folds. Regardless of when the
wax folds were found in the tow truck, the application for the telephonic search
warrant was already in progress, and therefore, defendant's argument about
timing is not supported by the record.
A-2087-23 30 Affirmed.
A-2087-23 31