State of New Jersey v. Jose Flores

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: November 24, 2025
• Docket: A-3647-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3647-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOSE FLORES,

Defendant-Appellant.

Argued November 10, 2025 – Decided November 24, 2025

Before Judges Sabatino and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 23-03- 0339.

Jeffrey S. Farmer argued the cause for appellant (Mazraani & Liguori, LLP, attorneys; Joseph M. Mazraani, of counsel; Jeffrey S. Farmer, of counsel and on the brief).

John J. Santoliquido, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; William Stevens, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

In this narcotics case, defendant Jose Flores seeks reversal of the trial

court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence derived from a warrantless

search of his motor vehicle. We affirm.

The pertinent facts are as follows. On June 15, 2022, Police Officers

Anthony Colon and Benjamin Batista of the Perth Amboy Police Department

were driving on patrol. The officers observed Gerald Toomer, a known narcotics

user, pacing back and forth. They then saw Toomer enter a GMC Terrain that

had stopped at a red light.

After following the GMC down several side streets, the officers saw the

GMC pull into a residential driveway. Toomer got out of the GMC and walked

up to a Toyota Highlander that was double-parked in the middle of the street.

The Highlander was driven by defendant. The officers then observed what they

reasonably suspected to be a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction between

Toomer and defendant, in which Toomer handed defendant paper currency in

exchange for a white substance wrapped in a plastic bag.

The police activated their squad car's emergency lights. Officer Colon got

out and approached the Highlander while Batista proceeded towards Toomer.

As the police came nearer, the officers saw Toomer toss a bag that was found to

A-3647-23 2 contain cocaine onto the ground. Additionally, the officers observed defendant

clutching a handful of currency ($400), which defendant later claimed Toomer

had given him for gas.

The police then arrested defendant and Toomer and proceeded to conduct

a search of the Highlander. The search was video recorded on Batista's body-

worn camera; the video has been supplied to us on appeal.

After the officers searched the vehicle's interior, Officer Batista leaned

over from the back passenger seat to the rear cargo area. Batista opened an

unlocked cover to a compartment below the cargo area that holds a spare tire

and related tools. He retrieved from this compartment two plastic bags

containing 94 grams of cocaine, 350 decks of heroin, 295 Alprazolam pills, $582

in currency, and five boxes of sandwich baggies commonly used to package

narcotics.

Defendant was charged with various drug offenses, and he moved to

suppress the seized contraband. The sole witness at the suppression hearing was

Officer Colon, whom the judge found credible. The judge was also supplied

with the bodycam footage and the police report of the incident (Exhibit S -1).

Counsel submitted the report to us at our request in a Supplemental Appendix.

A-3647-23 3 Defendant argued to the trial court that the motor vehicle search was

invalid because it was not "spontaneous and unforeseeable" under the criteria of

State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 450 (2015), as amplified in State v. Smart, 253 N.J.

156, 173-74 (2023). The judge rejected that argument in a written statement of

reasons.

Defendant then moved for reconsideration and to supplement the record,

arguing the search of the spare-tire compartment was beyond the scope of any

asserted probable cause. The judge denied that motion and issued an amended

statement of reasons.

Preserving his right to appeal the suppression denial under Rule 3:5-7,

defendant pled guilty to one count of third-degree possession of controlled

dangerous substances ("CDS"), with the intent to distribute them. N.J.S.A.

2C:35-5(b)(2).

The court sentenced defendant to a four-year prison term. Defendant has

not appealed that sentence, but rather solely appeals the suppression denial. He

argues that: (1) the vehicle search was not spontaneous and unforeseeable; and

(2) the scope of the search should not have extended to the compartment beneath

the cargo area.

Specifically, defendant presents these points in his brief:

A-3647-23 4 POINT I

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO SUPPRESS EVIDENCE SEIZED WITHOUT A WARRANT BECAUSE THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO PROBABLE CAUSE WERE NOT SPONTANEOUS OR UNFORESEEABLE.

POINT II

THERE WAS NO BASIS IN THE TESTIMONY WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE OFFICERS TO EXPAND THE SCOPE OF THE SEARCH TO THE TRUNK OF THE VEHICLE.

Having considered these arguments in light of the record and the

applicable law, we sustain the trial court's denial of the suppression motion.

Our appellate function in this search-and-seizure context is well

established. "The 'standard of review on a motion to suppress is deferential.'"

State v. Amang, 481 N.J. Super. 355, 374 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting State v.

Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 526 (2022)). In general, appellate courts must "'uphold

the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as those findings

are "supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record."'" Nyema, 249 N.J.

at 526 (quoting State v. Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021) (quoting State v.

Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 243 (2007))). "[F]indings should be disturbed only if they

are so clearly mistaken 'that the interests of justice demand intervention and

A-3647-23 5 correction.'" Elders, 192 N.J. at244 (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 162

(1964)). That said, although factual findings are reviewed deferentially, the trial

court's application of the law and "consequences that flow from established

facts" are subject to de novo review. State v. Hubbard, 222 N.J. 249, 263 (2015).

The substantive principles of search-and-seizure law are also well settled.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I,

Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution guarantee the right of people to be

secure against unreasonable searches by requiring warrants issued upon

probable cause. Nyema, 249 N.J. at 527. Under both constitutions, searches

and seizures conducted without warrants issued upon probable cause are

presumptively unreasonable and therefore invalid. State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J.

384, 398 (2022) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 246). To overcome this

presumption in New Jersey, the State must show by a preponderance of the

evidence that the search falls within one of the well-recognized exceptions to

the warrant requirement. Smart, 253 N.J. at 165 (citing State v. Manning, 240

N.J. 308, 329 (2020)).

The relevant warrant exception relied upon by the State in this case is the

automobile exception, which was first articulated by the United States Supreme

Court in Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132 (1925). The controlling

A-3647-23 6 precedent in this State construing the automobile exception under our State

Constitution is State v. Witt, 223 N.J. at 447-50. The Court instructed in Witt

that any "searches on the roadway based on probable cause arising from

unforeseeable and spontaneous circumstances are permissible." Witt, 223 N.J.

at 450. The circumstances giving rise to probable cause must not exist "well in

advance of" the search. Smart, 253 N.J. at 174.

The Court elaborated upon the spontaneity and unforeseeability

requirements of Witt in Smart, 253 N.J. at 173-74. In Smart, an officer with

specialized drug training noticed a car while conducting surveillance in an area

known for its narcotics transactions. Smart, 253 N.J. at 160. One month earlier,

a confidential informant had given the officer a photograph of a similar car and

reported that drugs were being trafficked out of it. Ibid. The officer surveilled

the car for thirty minutes, watched a man, woman, and child enter the car,

followed them while they got fast food and went to the bank, and then followed

them "to a residence where he saw activity consistent with a drug transaction."

Id. at 161. Another officer was following the vehicle, and this other officer

knew that a concerned citizen had recently reported suspicious activity at that

residence. Ibid. After seeing further comings and goings from the car to the

residence, the two officers decided they had reasonable, articulable suspicion to

A-3647-23 7 perform an investigative stop. Id. at 162. After the driver declined consent to

search the vehicle, the officers called for a canine unit. The canine performed

an "exterior sniff," resulting in a "hit" which established probable cause. Ibid.

The Court ruled in Smart that the combined circumstances giving rise to

probable cause could "hardly be characterized as unforeseeable" and "were

anything but spontaneous." Id. at 172-73. In arriving at its decision, the Court

cited the involvement of five officers, the almost two hours of surveillance and

investigation, and the fact that the police had the tip from the confidential

informant at least one month prior to the incident. Ibid.

As the trial court correctly recognized, the factual circumstances here are

markedly distinguishable from those in Smart. Although Officer Colon was on

narcotics patrol and ended up following Toomer, a person known for narcotics

use, the officer was not acting on any prior tip or information that would have

been actionable before spotting Toomer.

After Officer Colon recognized Toomer, he watched him for only a few

minutes before witnessing him get into the Highlander being driven by

defendant. Colon then spontaneously followed the Highlander for less than two

miles, and almost immediately observed an apparent hand-to-hand drug

transaction when the Highlander reached its destination. Probable cause arose

A-3647-23 8 at the moment of that transaction; the officers did not "sit" on it. Id. at 163. As

such, the trial court correctly found that the criteria of spontaneity and

unforeseeability required by Witt and Smart had clearly been met.

In addition, it is uncontested the police had probable cause that a CDS

offense had just been committed once they observed the apparent hand-to-hand

transaction. They also had probable cause to believe incriminating evidence

would be found in the vehicle involved in that transaction. The core element of

probable cause "is a well-grounded suspicion that a crime has been or is being

committed." State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 515 (2003) (quoting State v.

Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 211 (2001)). "Probable cause exists where, given the

totality of the circumstances, '"there is a fair probability that contraband or

evidence of a crime will be found in a particular place."'" State v. Wilson, 478

N.J. Super. 564, 577-78 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting State v. Moore, 181 N.J. 40,

46 (2004) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983))).

We now turn to defendant's second argument challenging the scope of the

Highlander search. As a general principle, "[t]he scope of a warrantless search

of an automobile is defined by the object of the search and the places where

there is probable cause to believe that it may be found." State v. Esteves, 93

N.J. 498, 508 (1983). Depending on the facts, those places may include

A-3647-23 9 containers within a motor vehicle, as it has long been recognized that the

automobile exception extends to containers in the vehicle that could be

concealing the object of the search. See Wilson, 478 N.J. at 578-79 (quoting

United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 825 (1982). ("If probable cause justifies

the search of a lawfully stopped vehicle, it justifies the search of every part of

the vehicle and its contents that may conceal the object of the search")); see also

State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 1980 (disallowing a warrantless search of a vehicle's

trunk under the distinctive facts presented).

The constitutional analysis regarding scope thus hinges upon what is "the

object of the search" as to which there is probable cause. Wilson, 478 N.J. at

572. This point was illustrated by the Court in State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308

(2023). In that case, a confidential informant had provided police officers with

two license plate numbers of cars that had purportedly been used for weapons

trafficking. Id. at 313-14. Upon seeing one of those cars, a state trooper chose

to follow it and pull the vehicle over for multiple traffic citations. Id. at 314.

The trooper testified to smelling a strong odor of raw marijuana and observing

a bit of what he suspected were marijuana crumbs on defendant's beard and shirt.

Id. at 314-15. The officer discovered no marijuana after patting down defendant

and his passenger but discovered a spent shell casing in the glove compartment.

A-3647-23 10 Id. at 315. He then opened the vehicle's hood and searched the engine

compartment, where he found guns, then moved the search to the trunk, where

he found a duffel bag containing bullets. Ibid.

Given those facts, the Court concluded in Cohen that the officer did not

have probable cause to search the engine compartment of the trunk and had thus

exceeded the scope of the automobile exception. Id. at 324. The Court

acknowledged the officer did have probable cause to search the entirety of the

passenger compartment, but once that initial search did not reveal marijuana —

the only suspected object of the search —the police "indiscriminately expanded

the search to separate areas of the vehicle . . . despite no unique facts that

indicated raw marijuana was in either the engine compartment or trunk." Ibid.

The Court found that, although the officer's initial search of the passenger

compartment was permissible, the expansion of the search was not. Ibid.

Notably, the Court clarified its holding in Cohen as follows:

This holding in no way suggests that areas within the interior of the car would require separate probable cause findings in order to conduct a warrantless search. We are not dividing up the interior of vehicles such that an officer would need to establish different or additional probable cause to search the front seat as opposed to the back seat, for example. Pursuant to the automobile exception, if an officer has probable cause to search the interior of the vehicle, that probable cause encompasses the entirety of the interior.

A-3647-23 11 We are also not suggesting that the warrantless search of a trunk or engine compartment will always require separate probable cause findings. Instead, we reiterate that a warrantless search of a car “must be reasonable in scope” and “strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible.” Patino, 83 N.J. at 10-11. However, a generalized smell of raw marijuana does not justify a search of every compartment of an automobile.

[Id. at 327-28 (emphasis added).] In her amended statement of reasons denying defendant's motion to

suppress, the trial judge applied the principles of Cohen and Patino in

concluding that the search of the Highlander's cargo area was "reasonable in

scope" and "strictly tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its

initiation possible." The cargo area is part of the passenger compartment and

may be reached from the interior of the vehicle.

The circumstances of the present case also differ from the facts in Cohen

in that, here, the police had directly witnessed a hand-to-hand narcotics

transaction a few minutes prior to conducting a search of the Highlander.

Furthermore, they had probable cause to believe that a supply of additional CDS

for distribution or other contraband would be found or hidden within the vehicle,

beyond what a marijuana smoker would possess for mere personal use, which

was not a justification discussed in the Court's opinion in Cohen. The present

A-3647-23 12 situation additionally contrasts with what occurred in Patino, in which the

conduct of the defendants failed to generate any reason to believe that a drug

cache would be located in the vehicle's trunk. See 83 N.J. at 14-15.

For these many reasons, the officers in this case did not exceed the

constitutionally permissible scope of the automobile exception. We therefore

affirm the trial court's decision.

To the extent we may not have addressed them, we reject the remainder

of defendant's arguments as lacking in merit. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-3647-23 13