NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1619-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN L. SYLVESTER, a/k/a BJ SYLVESTER, JOHN SYLVESTER, JONATHAN J. SYLVESTER, JOHNATHAN L. SYLVESTER, and JOHNATHAN L. SYLVESTERJR.,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted February 4, 2026 – Decided February 20, 2026
Before Judges Gummer and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 15-01-0001.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Appellant filed a supplemental brief on appellant's behalf.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jonathan L. Sylvester appeals an order denying post-conviction
relief (PCR) after an evidentiary hearing addressing one of several claims in his
petition. Perceiving no abuse of discretion in Judge Candido Rodriguez, Jr.'s
decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all of defendant's claims
except one and no error in his finding that defendant failed to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) after a hearing on the remaining claim,
we affirm.
In January 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b); and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). A judge sentenced him to life in prison with an eighty-five
percent period of parole ineligibility, in accordance with the No Early Release
Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and to a concurrent ten-year term with a five-year
period of parole ineligibility. On direct appeal, we affirmed the conviction.
State v. Sylvester, No. A-0899-17 (App. Div. Oct. 16, 2019). The Supreme
Court denied his petition for certification. State v. Sylvester, 241 N.J. 71 (2020).
A-1619-23 2 In July 2020, defendant petitioned for PCR, raising claims of IAC
predicated in part on counsel's failure to call several witnesses and to object to
alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the State's summation, and counsel's
decision to ask at trial a question that invited the introduction of allegedly
prejudicial evidence of an earlier shooting. Judge Rodriguez held an evidentiary
hearing at which defendant and his trial counsel testified on defendant's claim
that counsel erred in raising the prior shooting. The judge denied all of
defendant's PCR claims in an order and thorough written opinion, finding
defendant had failed to establish prima facie claims of IAC except for the single
claim addressed at the hearing. The judge rejected the claim that counsel was
ineffective for raising the prior shooting based on the hearing record.
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I. [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIMS THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CALL WITNESSES AND FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING SUMMATION.
POINT II. [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF ON HIS CLAIM THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR INTRODUCING PREJUDICIAL AND IRRELEVANT OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE.
A-1619-23 3 In defendant's supplemental self-represented brief, he argues the judge
erred in relying on legal precedent he contends was contrary to prevailing law.
He also asserts there is no basis in the record for the judge's finding that the jury
was presented with testimony demonstrating defendant was not implicated in
the earlier shooting.
On those claims for which the judge did not grant an evidentiary hearing,
we review his legal and factual determinations de novo. State v. Hernandez-
Peralta, 261 N.J. 231, 246 (2025). On the claim for which the judge granted an
evidentiary hearing, our review of the court's factual findings is "necessarily
deferential." Ibid. (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013)).
When a defendant claims IAC as the basis for relief, he must satisfy the
two-pronged test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984), which was adopted by our Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient . . . .
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Bare assertions are "insufficient to
support a prima facie case of ineffectiveness." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super.
285, 299 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154,
171 (App. Div. 1999)).
A-1619-23 4 "The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an
evidentiary hearing." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div.
2023). "We review the PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary
hearing for abuse of discretion." State v. Balbosa, 481 N.J. Super. 497, 519
(App. Div. 2025). A hearing is required only when "the defendant [has]
establishe[d] a prima facie case in support of PCR," the record reveals "disputed
issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing
record," and "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims asserted."
Ibid. (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013)); see also R. 3:22-10(b).
A defendant establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating "'a reasonable
likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most
favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Porter, 216
N.J. at 355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).
We affirm the order denying defendant's PCR petition substantially for
the reasons set forth in Judge Rodriguez's comprehensive written decision.
Defendant argues the judge erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing
regarding his trial counsel's failure to call several witnesses whose testimony
would have been exculpatory. Decisions regarding which witnesses to call and
how to present testimony are matters of trial strategy entitled to substantial
A-1619-23 5 deference. State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 321 (2005). Trial counsel's decision
not to call certain witnesses was not deficient—Mellony Sylvester's testimony
would have been cumulative, Jaylinne Diaz-Gomez's testimony would have
been unreliable, and Radora McCollum and Alicia Martin's testimony would
have been ineffective, given the State's trial proofs.
Defendant next argues the judge erred in not conducting an evidentiary
hearing regarding his trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct
in the State's summation. We collaterally addressed this claim in defendant's
direct appeal, where we concluded any alleged misconduct did not affect the
jury's verdict. Thus, this claim is barred by Rule 3:22-5, which precludes the
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1619-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN L. SYLVESTER, a/k/a BJ SYLVESTER, JOHN SYLVESTER, JONATHAN J. SYLVESTER, JOHNATHAN L. SYLVESTER, and JOHNATHAN L. SYLVESTERJR.,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted February 4, 2026 – Decided February 20, 2026
Before Judges Gummer and Vanek.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 15-01-0001.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Meredith L. Balo, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). Appellant filed a supplemental brief on appellant's behalf.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Jonathan L. Sylvester appeals an order denying post-conviction
relief (PCR) after an evidentiary hearing addressing one of several claims in his
petition. Perceiving no abuse of discretion in Judge Candido Rodriguez, Jr.'s
decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all of defendant's claims
except one and no error in his finding that defendant failed to establish
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) after a hearing on the remaining claim,
we affirm.
In January 2015, a jury found defendant guilty of first-degree murder,
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a); second-degree unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b); and second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a). A judge sentenced him to life in prison with an eighty-five
percent period of parole ineligibility, in accordance with the No Early Release
Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and to a concurrent ten-year term with a five-year
period of parole ineligibility. On direct appeal, we affirmed the conviction.
State v. Sylvester, No. A-0899-17 (App. Div. Oct. 16, 2019). The Supreme
Court denied his petition for certification. State v. Sylvester, 241 N.J. 71 (2020).
A-1619-23 2 In July 2020, defendant petitioned for PCR, raising claims of IAC
predicated in part on counsel's failure to call several witnesses and to object to
alleged prosecutorial misconduct in the State's summation, and counsel's
decision to ask at trial a question that invited the introduction of allegedly
prejudicial evidence of an earlier shooting. Judge Rodriguez held an evidentiary
hearing at which defendant and his trial counsel testified on defendant's claim
that counsel erred in raising the prior shooting. The judge denied all of
defendant's PCR claims in an order and thorough written opinion, finding
defendant had failed to establish prima facie claims of IAC except for the single
claim addressed at the hearing. The judge rejected the claim that counsel was
ineffective for raising the prior shooting based on the hearing record.
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:
POINT I. [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIMS THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO CALL WITNESSES AND FAILING TO OBJECT TO PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT DURING SUMMATION.
POINT II. [DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF ON HIS CLAIM THAT COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR INTRODUCING PREJUDICIAL AND IRRELEVANT OTHER CRIMES EVIDENCE.
A-1619-23 3 In defendant's supplemental self-represented brief, he argues the judge
erred in relying on legal precedent he contends was contrary to prevailing law.
He also asserts there is no basis in the record for the judge's finding that the jury
was presented with testimony demonstrating defendant was not implicated in
the earlier shooting.
On those claims for which the judge did not grant an evidentiary hearing,
we review his legal and factual determinations de novo. State v. Hernandez-
Peralta, 261 N.J. 231, 246 (2025). On the claim for which the judge granted an
evidentiary hearing, our review of the court's factual findings is "necessarily
deferential." Ibid. (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013)).
When a defendant claims IAC as the basis for relief, he must satisfy the
two-pronged test formulated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984), which was adopted by our Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient . . . .
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Bare assertions are "insufficient to
support a prima facie case of ineffectiveness." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super.
285, 299 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154,
171 (App. Div. 1999)).
A-1619-23 4 "The mere raising of a claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an
evidentiary hearing." State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App. Div.
2023). "We review the PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary
hearing for abuse of discretion." State v. Balbosa, 481 N.J. Super. 497, 519
(App. Div. 2025). A hearing is required only when "the defendant [has]
establishe[d] a prima facie case in support of PCR," the record reveals "disputed
issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the existing
record," and "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims asserted."
Ibid. (citing State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013)); see also R. 3:22-10(b).
A defendant establishes a prima facie case by demonstrating "'a reasonable
likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most
favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" Porter, 216
N.J. at 355 (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)).
We affirm the order denying defendant's PCR petition substantially for
the reasons set forth in Judge Rodriguez's comprehensive written decision.
Defendant argues the judge erred in not conducting an evidentiary hearing
regarding his trial counsel's failure to call several witnesses whose testimony
would have been exculpatory. Decisions regarding which witnesses to call and
how to present testimony are matters of trial strategy entitled to substantial
A-1619-23 5 deference. State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 321 (2005). Trial counsel's decision
not to call certain witnesses was not deficient—Mellony Sylvester's testimony
would have been cumulative, Jaylinne Diaz-Gomez's testimony would have
been unreliable, and Radora McCollum and Alicia Martin's testimony would
have been ineffective, given the State's trial proofs.
Defendant next argues the judge erred in not conducting an evidentiary
hearing regarding his trial counsel's failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct
in the State's summation. We collaterally addressed this claim in defendant's
direct appeal, where we concluded any alleged misconduct did not affect the
jury's verdict. Thus, this claim is barred by Rule 3:22-5, which precludes the
raising of PCR claims conclusively disposed of on direct appeal. Even if
defendant could overcome that procedural bar, he could not establish, as he must
to prevail on his IAC claim, the verdict would have been different but for
counsel's failure to object given our holding on this issue in the direct appeal.
See Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. at 623-24.
Defendant also argues the judge erred by denying relief on his claim
regarding his counsel's reference to the prior shooting. We discern no error in
the denial because the defense was pursuing a third-party guilt defense, which
could have been furthered by the evidence. The judge found counsel at the
A-1619-23 6 evidentiary hearing had credibly testified defendant was informed of the strategy
and its potential benefits and risks. "Merely because a trial strategy fails does
not mean that counsel was ineffective." State v. DiFrisco, 174 N.J. 195, 220
(2002) (quoting State v. Bey, 161 N.J. 233, 251 (1999)). We discern no error in
Judge Rodriguez's observation that counsel's strategy was "unconventional" but
was nevertheless logical and viable. We likewise conclude defendant did not
overcome the "strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance." State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 431
(2004) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689).
Defendant raises two additional arguments in his self-represented brief,
claiming Judge Rodriguez erred by relying on State v. Bonet, 132 N.J. Super.
186 (App. Div. 1975), which was effectively overruled by Fritz, 105 N.J. 42
(1987), and in finding no prejudice from evidence of the prior shooting because
cross-examination of the ballistic expert demonstrated defendant was not
implicated in the prior shooting. Neither argument has merit.
Judge Rodriguez did not "rely" on Bonet. The case is cited twice in the
judge's opinion, in tandem with State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 579 (2015), to
underpin the conclusion that counsel's choice as to whether to call a witness is
presumptively reasonable, and counsel's strategic or tactical mistakes do not
A-1619-23 7 constitute IAC "unless, taken as a whole, the trial was a mockery of justice ."
(quoting Bonet, 132 N.J. Super. at 191). Pierre applies Strickland/Fritz, which
remains controlling law. See Pierre, 223 N.J. at 577-88. The isolated references
to Bonet do not constitute a misapplication of law or an abuse of discretion.
Jones, 219 N.J. at 311. The judge correctly applied the Strickland/Fritz standard
to defendant's claims, finding defendant had failed to show counsel's
performance was deficient or that he was prejudiced.
Defendant also argues the judge wrongfully concluded trial testimony
established defendant was not implicated in the earlier shooting. We disagree.
In analyzing defendant's IAC claim by referencing an earlier shooting, the judge
noted "the fact that [defendant] was not implicated [was] not introduced at trial."
(Emphasis added). Instead, the judge stated, "through cross-examination of the
State's ballistics expert, trial counsel elicited that the gun in this case was never
recovered and the victim in the prior incident was not able to identify the
shooter, thereby casting doubt on [defendant's] identity as the shooter." Th e
judge did not state the jury had heard testimony affirmatively exculpating
defendant of the earlier shooting.
Given that defendant failed to establish a basis for PCR under the
Strickland/Fritz framework, we discern no error in Judge Rodriguez's decision.
A-1619-23 8 Affirmed.
A-1619-23 9