NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3780-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JONATHAN E. LIGHTSEY,
Defendant-Respondent.
Argued January 14, 2025 – Decided April 8, 2025
Before Judges Sumners and Bergman.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 23-12-0850.
Michele C. Buckley, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (William A. Daniel, Union County Prosecutor, attorney; Michele C. Buckley, of counsel and on the brief).
Scott M. Welfel, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Scott M. Welfel of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
On leave granted, the State appeals from an order suppressing controlled
dangerous substances (CDS) seized by law enforcement following a stop and
warrantless search of defendant Jonathan E. Lightsey's automobile. After our
review of the record and applicable legal principals, we conclude, based on the
totality of the circumstances, that the State satisfied its burden by a
preponderance of the evidence that the automobile exception for the warrantless
search applied. Therefore, we reverse.
I.
On December 6, 2023, a Union County Grand Jury returned an indictment
charging defendant with second-degree possession of CDS, cocaine, with the
intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1); third-degree possession of CDS,
cocaine, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); third-degree possession of CDS, fentanyl,
N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10a(1); third-degree possession of CDS, fentanyl, with the intent
to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5a(1) and N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5b(3) and fourth-degree
possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:36-3.
Defendant moved to suppress the CDS which was seized. At the
suppression hearing, the State presented Elizabeth Police Officer Liam Kiniery
as its sole witness. At the time of the incident, he had worked in the Narcotics
A-3780-23 2 Division for over a year and was involved in multiple narcotics investigations
and arrests. He testified that on September 13, 2023, he was conducting
narcotics patrol in an unmarked police vehicle with Officers Matthew Fonseca
and Emmanuel Maglione in the area of Spring Street in Elizabeth, specifically
in and around the parking lot of a convenience store which was located there. He
stated during his patrol of the parking lot he observed a silver Infiniti with a
Giants sunshade covering the front windshield parked between two box trucks.
He believed the driver was "trying to disguise [the vehicle]" based on its location
and due to "the way it was backed in between [the] two box trucks." He testified
as he was circling the convenience store parking lot he noticed a female, known
to the police as a narcotics user, engaging in a conversation with the driver of
the vehicle.
Kiniery testified once the vehicle was parked, they observed a female
handing the driver an unknown amount of currency in exchange for a small item
suspected to be a hand-to-hand narcotics transaction. When asked why he did
not stop the purchaser, he stated "we didn't want to jump the gun yet. We wanted
to wait and observe more so we believe we had a good position, and we stayed
within our non-descript vehicle." He also testified they "didn't have any backup
A-3780-23 3 at that point. There weren't any narcotics detectives in the area." The only
officers on scene at this time were himself, Fonseca, and Maglione.
Kiniery and the other officers continued to surveil the vehicle. He
testified that approximately thirty minutes following observation of the first
transaction, he witnessed another female exchanging currency with the driver of
the vehicle in exchange for a small package. After this transaction, he ran the
vehicle's license plate which revealed it was registered to defendant. Kiniery
testified he "kn[e]w of [defendant]" based on a prior investigation where a
search warrant had been issued and when they attempted to execute the search
warrant, defendant "fled in his vehicle which caused several motor vehicle
accidents." Kiniery decided not to "move in while [] defendant was inside the
vehicle because we wanted to avoid a pursuit or putting any of the public in
danger because that parking lot is very busy."
Kiniery said after observing the second transaction, it raised "a little
suspicion" as to narcotics being located in the car and he called for backup. He
testified "we had no backup" because the "office was a little short that day."
About ten minutes later backup arrived and surveillance continued for
approximately forty more minutes at which time a third female approached the
vehicle, engaged in a transaction, and left the area in a maroon Jaguar sedan. He
A-3780-23 4 testified law enforcement's attempts to stop the Jaguar were unsuccessful due to
heavy traffic. Kiniery testified about one hour and ten minutes had passed since
he first arrived at the convenience store and his observation of the third
transaction.
Shortly after the third transaction, defendant exited the vehicle. At this
point, defendant was identified as the occupant. After exiting the vehicle, the
officers observed a female approach and utter something to him and "they both
looked in our direction and at our [] vehicle." Kiniery testified he "believe[ed]
that our surveillance location was compromised." Defendant then walked across
the parking lot and entered the rear entrance to the convenience store.
Kiniery stated upon defendant exiting the convenience store, officers
moved in so to avoid defendant "entering the vehicle which, [sic] giving him an
option to flee." Officers detained defendant approximately ten to fifteen feet
from his car, handcuffed and placed him in the rear of a patrol vehicle. Kiniery
testified that he and the other officers, then approached the vehicle, but were
"unable to see if there were any other occupants." Based on his observations
over the "prior hour and one-half or so," he believed narcotics were in the
vehicle. He therefore opened the driver's side door of the vehicle where he
observed suspected crack cocaine residue scattered on the front driver 's seat.
A-3780-23 5 Kiniery testified that he and the other officers recovered "about $660 in U.S.
currency only, low denominations, consistent with street level narcotics dealing"
from a search of defendant's person. They also recovered twenty-five grams of
alleged crack cocaine and sixty glassine envelopes allegedly containing heroin
from defendant's vehicle.
On cross-examination, Kiniery testified that the report he prepared
concerning the incident showed he was on the scene for approximately two
hours. He also admitted he ran the license plate of defendant's vehicle after he
observed the first exchange, not the second.
The trial court rendered an oral decision granting defendant's motion to
suppress the evidence seized from the search. The court found "Officer Kiniery
to be very credible." Yet, the court determined probable cause to search
defendant's vehicle did not arise from "unforeseen and spontaneous
circumstances" because the officers "surveilled the vehicle for over two hours"
and "witnessed three separate transactions." The court found the officers ran a
license plate check and called for backup during this two-hour period. The court
stated:
Like in State v. Smart 1, the search of [] [defendant's] vehicle was not justified by the automobile exception
1 253 N.J. 156 (2023) A-3780-23 6 because it was not unforeseeable or spontaneous. The officers went to that specific location because it was known as an open[-]air drug market. They had got[ten] information that they believed that [defendant] was the occupant or the driver of that car from somebody that they knew to be a drug addict, and they went to that area with the expectation that there may be drug activity taking place.
....
Moreover, what's more concerning to the court is that the officers sat there for two or more hours, or almost two hours and watched the defendant allegedly engage in three separate hand-to-hand transactions over a two- hour period, despite the fact that there were numerous officers on scene. Had the officers approached the vehicle when they first observed the hand[-]to[-]hand transaction, it could have been considered unforeseen and spontaneous. However, the time in which the first transaction occurred until the time [] defendant was arrested could have used to secure a warrant for the vehicle. And further, the officers had the option to impound the vehicle once [] defendant was detained and to seek a warrant later. So, based on the above stated reasons, defendant's motion to suppress the evidence is granted.
The court entered an order reflecting its decision.
On appeal the State asserts the following point:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY SUPPRESSED THE EVIDENCE FOUND INDEFENDANTS VEHICLE INCORRECTLY FINDING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE WAS NOT
A-3780-23 7 SPONTANEOUS AND UNFORESEEABLE, THUS, THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE DEMANDS THE STATE'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL BE GRANTED.
The State relies on our Supreme Court's decision in State v. Witt, 223 N.J.
409, 447 (2015), arguing the decision permits warrantless vehicle searches after
investigative stops when probable cause arises from unforeseeable and
spontaneous circumstances. The State argues the trial court's reliance on Smart
was error because the facts there are distinguishable, and the trial court
misinterpreted the law, resulting in an erroneous suppression of critical
evidence.
The State further argues the trial court's finding that the circumstances
forming probable cause to search was not spontaneous or unforeseeable was
incorrect and the record clearly shows otherwise. The State asserts Kiniery's
credible testimony reveals that officers encountered defendant's vehicle during
routine patrol, without prior information about defendant's location, vehicle, or
activities. The State contends the observations of suspected hand-to-hand drug
transactions in a known drug area formed the basis for probable cause, which
developed spontaneously as events unfolded. The State further asserts that the
trial court's comparison to Smart is flawed, as the officers did not act on long-
held information or conduct prolonged surveillance before engaging. Instead,
A-3780-23 8 the circumstances leading to probable cause were reactive and unanticipated,
aligning with the requirements for the automobile exception as outlined in Witt.
The State further argues that unlike in Smart, where police received
extensive prior information connecting the defendant to drug activity and
conducted prolonged surveillance before initiating a stop, the officers here
encountered defendant's vehicle during a routine patrol without any prior
knowledge concerning defendant or his activities. The officers observed the
vehicle parked in a suspicious manner and, through their surveillance, witnessed
what appeared to be hand-to-hand drug transactions. The circumstances that
gave rise to probable cause to search in this case developed spontaneously and
were unforeseeable, as the officers had no way of predicting that this particular
defendant would engage in criminal conduct based on any previous information.
Thus, the State argues that the officers' discovery of probable cause unfolded
naturally over the course of their observations, unlike the premeditated and
protracted investigation in Smart.
Furthermore, the State asserts the trial court's reasoning unduly
constrained the investigatory demands of law enforcement, contrary to the
principles articulated in Witt and Smart. The State asserts the court's conclusion
that the officers continued surveillance to confirm its suspicions after viewing
A-3780-23 9 the first transaction was not spontaneous nor unforeseeable was improper. The
State argues this disregards Kiniery's testimony that the officers refrained from
acting immediately to ensure their belief in the driver's involvement in narcotics
distribution and to ensure the public safety was well-founded. Therefore, the
State asserts the officers prudently waited for additional transactions and backup
before taking action, given the potential dangers to the officers, defendant and
the public based on defendant's prior history of fleeing and the logistical
challenges posed by the lack of immediate support.
The State contends requiring officers to "jump the gun" after observing a
single transaction would impose unreasonable limitations on effective policing
and contradict the rationale underlying the automobile exception. In State's
view, the trial court's approach, if applied broadly, risks eliminating the
exception altogether by mandating premature stops before probable cause is
fully developed.
In response, defendant argues
the trial court correctly reasoned that probable cause was not spontaneous and unforeseeable where multiple narcotics officers went to the parking lot specifically to look for narcotics activity, they surveilled [him] over the course of two hours after recognizing he was the registered owner of the suspect vehicle—known to police from a previous search warrant, and they conducted a stop of [him] on foot ten to fifteen feet
A-3780-23 10 away from his vehicle. Thus, the trial court's order suppressing the evidence should be affirmed.
II.
"Generally, on appellate review, a trial court's factual findings in support
of granting or denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. A.M., 237
N.J. 384, 395 (2019) (quoting State v. S.S., 229 N.J. 360, 374 (2017)). Factual
findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless they are "so clearly mistaken
'that the interests of justice demand intervention and correction.'" State v.
Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 425, 95 A.3d 188 (2014) (quoting State v. Elders, 192
N.J. 224, 244 (2007)). However, legal conclusions drawn from those facts are
reviewed de novo. State v. Radel, 249 N.J. 469, 493 (2022); see also S.S., 229
N.J. at 380.
"'The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey Constitution, in almost identical language,
protect against unreasonable searches and seizures.'" Smart, 253 N.J. at 164
(quoting State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022)). Warrantless searches are
presumptively invalid because they are contrary to the United States and the
New Jersey Constitutions, State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2009), and "[t]he
A-3780-23 11 warrant requirement . . . may be dispensed with in only a few narrowly
circumscribed exceptions," State v. Patino, 83 N.J. 1, 7 (1980).
"To justify a warrantless search or seizure, 'the State bears the burden of
proving by a preponderance of the evidence that [the] warrantless search or
seizure falls within one of the few well-delineated exceptions to the warrant
requirement.'" State v. Vanderee, 476 N.J. Super. 214, 230 (App. Div. 2023)
(quoting State v. Chisum, 236 N.J. 530, 546 (2019)). Each exception to the
warrant requirement has its own essential elements that must be satisfied to
justify a warrantless search. State v. Johnson, 476 N.J. Super. 1, 20 (App. Div.
2023).
Under federal law, the automobile exception permits the warrantless
search of a car if it is "'readily mobile' and the officer has 'probable cause' to
believe that the vehicle contains contraband." Witt, 223 N.J. at 422 (quoting
Pennsylvania v. Labron, 518 U.S. 938, 940 (1996)). New Jersey law authorizes
the warrantless search of an automobile if the police "have probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains contraband or evidence of an offense and the
circumstances giving rise to probable cause are unforeseeable and spontaneous."
Witt, 223 N.J. at 447 (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 233 (1981)); see also
State v. Courtney, 478 N.J. Super. 81, 93 (2024). Further, that probable cause
A-3780-23 12 did not exist "well in advance" of the search. Smart, 253 N.J. at 174. In Smart,
the Court upheld the longstanding principle that the State must prove the
ripening of probable cause was both "unforeseeable and spontaneous." Id.; see
also State v. Cohen, 254 N.J. 308, 319-20 (2023) (emphasis added). This test
represents "a sharp departure from a more narrow construction of the automobile
exception previously adopted . . . ." State v. Rodriguez, 459 N.J. Super. 13, 21
(2019).
III.
Applying the facts of this matter under this legal backdrop, we conclude
the State's argument holds merit. The sole issue raised on appeal is whether the
circumstances supporting probable cause for the warrantless search of
defendant's vehicle based on the automobile exception was both unforeseeable
and spontaneous. We conclude the State met these requirements by a
preponderance of evidence when viewing the totality of the circumstances
surrounding the search.
The trial court found Kiniery to be "very credible." He testified he was
experienced in recognizing drug transactions and was first drawn to defendant's
vehicle due to the suspicious manner which it was parked by facing out between
two box trucks near an auto supply store adjacent to the convenience store
A-3780-23 13 parking lot. He testified the convenience store parking lot was known as a high
drug trafficking location. He asserted these factors prompted the lengthy
approximate hour and one-half surveillance of defendant's car. Over this time,
he witnessed three suspected drug transactions. He testified the first observation
of a drug transaction was made within minutes from the start of his surveillance;
the second was made approximately thirty minutes after the first and the third
was made approximately forty-five to fifty minutes after the second transaction.
The observation of these three suspected drug transactions formed the basis of
the stop, defendant's detention, and the ultimate search of the car.
We determine the uncontroverted testimony of Kiniery provided
undisputed evidence that the surveillance was not part of an ongoing
investigation of defendant, nor had law enforcement been provided prior
information about defendant before patrolling and parking their police vehicle
to surveil the vehicle. He testified, while on patrol, he was drawn to the
defendant's vehicle because it was parked in a suspicious manner and the
convenience store parking lot was known as a high drug crime area. Unlike
Smart, where the police were investigating the defendant based on information
received one month prior from a confidential informant and a concerned citizen
that related to narcotics dealing, see 253 N.J. at 159-160, here, law enforcement
A-3780-23 14 had not received any prior information about defendant distributing CDS from
his vehicle. Therefore, up to this point, we conclude the circumstances giving
rise to probable cause that defendant's vehicle contained CDS were unforeseen.
In support of its finding that the circumstances supporting probable cause
were not unforeseeable nor spontaneous, the court found the convenience store
parking lot was known by law enforcement as an "open-air drug market." The
court further found that law enforcement received "prior information from
somebody they knew to be a drug addict that defendant was the occupant, or the
driver of the vehicle and went there with the expectation there may be drug
activity taking place."
We find no legal support for the court's initial finding because probable
cause arose through the officers engaging in a routine patrol in the convenience
store parking lot, a high drug crime area, and therefore it was foreseeable
defendant's vehicle contained CDS. The trial court utilized these circumstances
to support its finding that the officer's had specific knowledge that defendant's
vehicle contained CDS and therefore it was not unforeseeable. Nothing in the
record supports the direct connection found by the court that because the officers
were on patrol in a high drug crime area that they were aware defendant's vehicle
contained CDS.
A-3780-23 15 The court's consideration of this factor to support its finding of the
officers' foreseeability was error. Although evidence concerning "the high-
crime reputation an area" is permitted to be considered as part of the "totality of
the circumstances test" in determining probable cause, see State v. Moore, 181
N.J. 40, 46 (2004), citing State v. Johnson, 171 N.J. 192, 217 (2002), the court's
finding that this general knowledge that the convenience store parking lot is a
high crime area somehow equates to specific knowledge that defendant's vehicle
contained CDS was foreseeable misapplies the established legal principles of
Witt and Smart. We conclude the automobile exception would be severely
limited if the routine patrolling of high crime areas by law enforcement satisfied
the foreseeability prong obviating probable cause to search a vehicle without a
warrant under the automobile exception.
We further determine there is no factual support in the record to sustain
the trial court's finding that "law enforcement received prior information from
somebody they knew to be a drug addict identifying defendant as the occupant
of the vehicle and went there with the expectation there may be drug activity
taking place." Kiniery testified the first female who made an exchange with the
occupant of the vehicle was a known narcotics user. The testimony was offered
as evidence that the occupant of the vehicle was selling CDS to support
A-3780-23 16 sufficient probable cause for the search, not that this information specifically
identified defendant as the occupant of the vehicle. The record shows there was
never an identification of defendant by a third-party adduced at the hearing. The
record supports that defendant was identified once he stepped out of the vehicle
and the officers obtained information from the license plate search that the
vehicle was registered to defendant. Up until this time, there was no evidence
law enforcement had sufficient probable cause or could foresee the vehicle
contained CDS. Therefore, we conclude the court's finding was not supported
by the record.
We turn now to the State's argument that, contrary to the trial court's
determination, the record clearly shows that the information obtained during the
officers' hour and one-half to almost two-hour surveillance provided probable
cause to search defendant's vehicle that arose spontaneously and was
unforeseeable and justified the warrantless search under the automobile
exception. We agree.
The record demonstrates the first indication that defendant's vehicle
contained CDS was the officers' observation of the first transaction shortly after
they parked their vehicle. The court found if the officers would have detained
and searched the vehicle after this observation it would have arisen from
A-3780-23 17 probable cause that was spontaneous and unforeseeable. The court determined
once the officers waited almost an additional two hours and observed two
additional transactions before searching the vehicle that the probable cause
supporting the search was no longer spontaneous and unforeseeable.
"In assessing whether probable cause exists, 'courts must look to the
totality of the circumstances and view those circumstances . . . from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer.'" State v. Diaz, 470 N.J.
Super. 495, 529 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277, 293
(2014)). "[C]ourts are to give weight to 'the officer's knowledge and experience'
as well as 'rational inferences that could be drawn from the facts objectively and
reasonably viewed in light of the officer's expertise.'" State v. Citarella, 154
N.J. 272, 279 (1998) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997)).
Our Court's holding in Witt addressed the automobile exception, stating:
Here, we part from the United States Supreme Court's interpretation of the automobile exception under the Fourth Amendment and return to the Alston standard, this time supported by Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State Constitution. Alston properly balances the individual's privacy and liberty interests and law enforcement's investigatory demands. Alston's requirement of "unforeseeabilty and spontaneity," id. at 233, does not place an undue burden on law enforcement. For example, if a police officer has probable cause to search a car and is looking for that car, then it is reasonable to expect the officer to secure
A-3780-23 18 a warrant if it is practicable to do so. In this way, we eliminate the concern expressed in State v. Cooke—the fear that "a car parked in the home driveway of vacationing owners would be a fair target of a warrantless search if the police had probable cause to believe the vehicle contained drugs." 163 N.J. 657, 667- 68 (2000). In the case of the parked car, if the circumstances giving rise to probable cause were foreseeable and not spontaneous, the warrant requirement applies.
[Witt, 223 N.J. at 447-448.]
We agree with the State that requiring law enforcement to engage in an
immediate stop and search of the defendant's vehicle after viewing one
suspected transaction would place undue burden on the investigatory demands
of law enforcement which Witt informs must be taken into consideration.
Applying the trial court's findings, law enforcement would be placed in the
unenviable position of deciding whether sufficient probable cause had been
developed based on the observation of one possible drug transaction. In this
instance, we agree with the officers' reasonable decision to not institute a stop
and search of defendant and his vehicle after the first transaction. Again, at this
juncture, when viewing these circumstances through the perspective of the
officers, their belief that probable cause was not fully developed after the
observation of one possible transaction was reasonable. In addition, at that
point, the occupant of the vehicle had not been identified and although a
A-3780-23 19 registration check revealed the vehicle was registered to defendant, no one was
able to clearly view the occupant at that point to identify him. Therefore, the
officers' concerns about potential danger to the public based on the prior
information obtained concerning defendant and the need to take more time to
potentially determine the occupant's identification was also reasonable.
It is undisputed that two additional transactions were observed by officers
during the next approximate hour and thirty minutes and prior to the vehicle
search. At that point, Kiniery believed there was some probable cause the
occupant of the vehicle was distributing CDS and called for backup. Kiniery
determined backup was necessary due to safety concerns for the onsite officers
because he learned the vehicle was registered to defendant known to have been
involved in a high-speed fleeing incident that caused several motor vehicle
accidents. The officers also decided not to engage defendant while he was still
in the vehicle due to these same concerns because it would put the public in
danger as the convenience store parking lot was very busy.
Although we determine after the officers observed the second transaction
that they had sufficient probable cause which was both spontaneous and
unforeseeable to support a search of the vehicle, their decision to not engage
defendant while he was in his vehicle was reasonable under the circumstances
A-3780-23 20 based on the knowledge they obtained concerning defendant's previous eluding
incident and the potential danger to officers and the public. After backup arrived
approximately ten minutes later, and officers continued to surveil the vehicle.
Approximately forty minutes later, another transaction was observed. This time,
after the purchase, defendant exited the vehicle, and the suspected purchaser
pointed out the unmarked police vehicle to him. At that point, because defendant
had exited his vehicle, went into the convenience store, law enforcement was
able to identify him and viewed three separate transactions, they decided to
engage defendant. Thereafter, as defendant was exiting the convenience store,
he was detained and searched, resulting in the confiscation of $660 and CDS.
Under these factual circumstances we conclude the officers again acted
reasonably in waiting to determine if defendant would exit the vehicle so to
avoid a possible eluding incident and danger to the public. We determine the
officers had sufficient probable cause which arose spontaneously and was
unforeseeable based on their observation of the second transaction. In addition,
their seizure of the $660 in small denominations was made shortly before the
search of the vehicle which we conclude was additional evidence of illegal CDS
transactions which further support the spontaneous nature of the probable cause
for the search. The passage of approximately fifty minutes caused by the
A-3780-23 21 officer's decision that backup was required and to provide a reasonable amount
of time to determine if the occupant would exit the vehicle due to safety concerns
were not unreasonable. Nor can we conclude that this passage of time, in order
to provide reasonable safety measures for the officers and public, vitiated the
spontaneous and unforeseeable nature of the second transaction which was
bolstered by the observation of a third transaction and the seizure of the $660
from defendant's person.
Defendant argues the trial court correctly found that the officers could and
should have obtained a search warrant during the approximate two-hour
surveillance. In the scenario before us, the concern that defendant would have
fled at high speed in a crowded parking lot if the officers approached his vehicle
after the second transaction was legitimate. We deem this factor is no less of a
safety concern than a vehicle being stopped on a busy highway as alluded to in
Witt. See 223 N.J. at 415. This is especially pertinent because defendant's
vehicle was readily movable, and he was seated in the driver's seat at the time
of the second transaction. Based on the totality of the circumstances, we
conclude the approximate one-hour delay between viewing the second
transaction and the search was appropriate and the decision by the officers not
A-3780-23 22 to engage defendant and search his vehicle at that time was prudent and
reasonable.
In sum, we conclude the warrantless search of defendant's vehicle was
permitted under the automobile exception and the circumstances giving rise to
probable cause for the search were both unforeseeable and spontaneous under
the undisputed facts contained in the record.
Reversed and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.
A-3780-23 23