STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOEL GARCIA-RAMIREZ (17-11-1582, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

CourtNew Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
DecidedAugust 24, 2022
DocketA-3414-19
StatusUnpublished

This text of STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOEL GARCIA-RAMIREZ (17-11-1582, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOEL GARCIA-RAMIREZ (17-11-1582, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOEL GARCIA-RAMIREZ (17-11-1582, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), (N.J. Ct. App. 2022).

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3414-19

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JOEL GARCIA-RAMIREZ, a/k/a JOEL GARCIA,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted January 31, 2022 – Decided August 24, 2022

Before Judges Accurso and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 17-11- 1582.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (James K. Smith, Jr., Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).

Lori Linskey, Acting Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Monica do Outeiro, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief; Janine N. DeLucia, Legal Assistant, on the brief). PER CURIAM

Following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence seized in a

warrantless search, defendant Joel Garcia-Ramirez pleaded guilty to a second-

degree certain persons offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b)(1), in accord with a

negotiated agreement and was sentenced to five years in State prison with a

five-year parole disqualifier. He appeals the denial of his motion, raising only

one issue:

POINT I

THE VAGUE DESCRIPTION OF THE MAN WITH THE GUN DID NOT GIVE THE OFFICER REASONABLE SUSPICION TO STOP DEFENDANT, ESPECIALLY CONSIDERING THAT THE OFFICER HAD PREVIOUSLY STOPPED TWO INNOCENT MEN BASED UPON THE EXACT SAME DESCRIPTION.

Because the State's evidence supports the trial judge's factual findings, and

there was no error in her application of the law to those facts, we affirm.

The only witness to testify at the suppression hearing was Long Branch

Police Department patrolman Christopher Gant, an eighteen-year veteran of

the force. He testified he was on patrol, in uniform, in a marked police car

shortly after 1:30 a.m. on July 30, 2017, when he received a radio call from

Officer Corcoran. Corcoran had been flagged down in front of a bar on

A-3414-19 2 Brighton Avenue about a man in the bar with a handgun. Several witnesses

reported the man, an Hispanic male, about mid-twenties, wearing a black t-

shirt and blue jeans, had been showing off a gun in his waistband before being

escorted out of the bar.

Gant testified he was about a mile away from the bar when he got the

call. He drove towards the bar down various side streets searching for the

suspect. When Corcoran radioed that one of the witnesses identified the

suspect as defendant Joel Garcia-Ramirez, Gant looked him up on his patrol

car's computer. The computer provided both a picture of defendant and a

nearby address. Gant drove to the address, stopping two Hispanic men in their

mid-twenties in blue jeans on the way. Explaining he was stopping "anybody

that matched somewhat the description," Gant obtained identification from the

men, and let them go on their way after ascertaining they were not defendant.

About a half-an-hour after receiving Corcoran's first radio call, Gant saw

a man emerge from an alley, about a block or so away from the bar, in blue

jeans and a black t-shirt. Believing he matched the description of the suspect

and the photograph of defendant from his computer, Gant pulled his patrol car

into a parking lot to get a better look at the man. Gant testified when the man

A-3414-19 3 saw the police car, he "immediately made a 180 and started walking in the

other direction."

Gant got out of his car with his service weapon drawn, but at his side,

and called defendant by name, saying "Joel, stop. Police." A foot chase

ensued, and Gant saw defendant toss away the gun before stopping and

submitting to arrest. Officer Gant recovered the handgun from the alley. On

cross-examination, Gant admitted he had not mentioned stopping the other two

men before arresting defendant or looking up defendant's name in his car's

computer in the police report he prepared the night of the arrest.

Having heard the testimony, Judge Torregrossa-O'Connor denied

defendant's motion to suppress the gun, rejecting defendant's argument that

Gant lacked reasonable articulable suspicion to stop defendant based on the

vague description he received from Corcoran over the radio. After reviewing

the evidence adduced at the hearing, the judge made detailed credibility

findings, concluding Gant testified in a "very straightforward and responsive"

manner, "freely admitted things . . . he could not recall" or things he failed to

"include in his report." The judge found Gant "did not hesitate in his

responses" and "appeared to be testifying honestly and responsively." In short,

the judge found the officer a trustworthy and credible witness.

A-3414-19 4 After a thorough review of the Fourth Amendment cases governing this

stop, the judge found Officer Gant had "reasonable and articulable suspicion

that the defendant may have engaged in criminal activity and was in fact the

person . . . he was looking for." Cataloging the totality of the circumstances

the officer confronted, the judge emphasized that defendant matched the

description provided by "named witnesses," not anonymous tipsters, one of

whom knew defendant and could identify him by name, which allowed Gant to

view a photograph of defendant and learn his address. Within half-an-hour of

witnesses flagging Corcoran down to report a man with a gun, "the officer

located the person" he believed to be the man in the photo, "dressed as the

witnesses described" and matching their description of an Hispanic male in his

mid-twenties.

The judge rejected defendant's reliance on State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158

(1994), where the Supreme Court held flight alone, with no other articulable

suspicion of criminal activity, will not justify a Terry1 stop, because the State

was not trying "to use the flight to establish a reasonable suspicion." The

judge found the officer already had reasonable suspicion when he approached

defendant, making the case more analogous to State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272,

1 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A-3414-19 5 281 (1998), where Justice Handler wrote that "flight adds weight to the already

existing reasonable articulable suspicion that is the measure of constitutional

reasonableness of an ensuing search and seizure," and State v. Dunbar, 434

N.J. Super. 522, 528 (App. Div. 2014), where we upheld the denial of a

suppression motion when the "defendant discarded the contraband, not as he

was being physically restrained, but as he ignored the police directive to stop

and was attempting to flee." The judge denied defendant's motion for

reconsideration.

On appeal, defendant focuses on the two men Gant stopped before he

encountered defendant. Defendant argues the "vague description" Gant was

provided was obviously insufficient to identify any particular suspect,

evidenced by the officer having stopped two other Hispanic men before he

encountered defendant. He contends Gant engaged in flagrant misconduct by

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Related

Terry v. Ohio
392 U.S. 1 (Supreme Court, 1968)
State v. Citarella
712 A.2d 1096 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1998)
State v. Johnson
199 A.2d 809 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1964)
State v. Tucker
642 A.2d 401 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 1994)
State of New Jersey v. Ramier A. Dunbar
85 A.3d 421 (New Jersey Superior Court App Division, 2014)
State v. Kevin Gamble (071234)
95 A.3d 188 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2014)
State v. Terrell Hubbard (073539)
118 A.3d 314 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2015)
State v. Lurdes Rosario (077420) (Monmouth and Statewide)
162 A.3d 249 (Supreme Court of New Jersey, 2017)

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STATE OF NEW JERSEY v. JOEL GARCIA-RAMIREZ (17-11-1582, MONMOUTH COUNTY AND STATEWIDE), Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/state-of-new-jersey-v-joel-garcia-ramirez-17-11-1582-monmouth-county-and-njsuperctappdiv-2022.