NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3919-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JIMMY M. CORREA, a/k/a JIMMY MAURICE CORREA, and JAMES CORREA,
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
Argued March 12, 2025 – Decided July 29, 2025
Before Judges Mayer, Rose and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Indictment No. 18-12-0195.
Rachel Glanz, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Rachel Glanz, of counsel and on the briefs).
Thomas M. Caroccia, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Thomas M. Caroccia, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Following a three-month narcotics investigation by detectives assigned to
the State Police Trafficking Central Unit (TCU), defendant Jimmy Correa was
charged in an eighteen-count State indictment with Douglas Watson and
Wellington Moya. Pertinent to this appeal, defendant and Watson were charged
with conspiracy and as accomplices on related narcotics and weapons offenses
in six counts, and Watson and Moya were charged in a separate conspiracy and
as accomplices on related narcotics offenses in five counts.1 Accordingly,
defendant and Moya were not charged in the same conspiracy. Nor were they
charged as accomplices in any substantive counts.
After decisions on several pretrial motions, 2 including the denial of his
motion to suppress a handgun, heroin, and other contraband seized from his
1 Watson pled guilty to first-degree possession with the intent to distribute heroin, charged in count eleven with defendant, and second-degree possession with the intent to distribute crack-cocaine, charged only against him. Watson was sentenced to an aggregate fifteen-year prison term. Moya pled guilty to first-degree possession with intent to distribute cocaine, charged in count three with Watson. Moya was sentenced to a ten-year prison term. Watson and Moya are not parties to this appeal. 2 In a March 18, 2020 memorializing order, the judge: granted in part and denied in part defendant's motion to suppress the evidence seized from the warrantless search of his person and vehicle; granted defendant's motion to suppress his statements to police; and granted in part and denied in part
A-3919-22 2 storage unit pursuant to a search warrant, and Watson's motion to suppress
cocaine, heroin, and other contraband seized from Moya's vehicle pursuant to a
consent search, defendant pled guilty to first-degree possession with intent to
distribute heroin, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(1), and second-degree
unlawful possession of a handgun without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).3
Defendant was sentenced to a fourteen-year prison term on his narcotics
conviction, imposed concurrently to a five-year prison term with a forty-two-
month parole disqualifier, pursuant to the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), on
his firearm conviction. 4
defendant's motion to sever certain counts of the indictment. Defendant does not appeal from the denial of these motions and, as such, they are deemed abandoned. See State v. Huang, 461 N.J. Super. 119, 125 (App. Div. 2018), aff'd o.b., 240 N.J. 56 (2019); Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2025). 3 When providing the factual basis for his firearm conviction defendant stated the handgun "was solely [his]" and not Watson's. Similarly, the factual basis for defendant's drug conviction does not implicate Watson as his accomplice. 4 Although the appellate record does not contain the Supplemental Plea Form for Graves Act Offenses, the parties did not cite the Graves Act during the plea or sentencing hearings, and the Graves Act is not reflected in the judgment of conviction (JOC), defendant's sentence is consistent with the Graves Act. See N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c) (requiring a minimum prison term of "one-half of the sentence imposed by the court or 42 months, whichever is greater" for certain firearm offenses, including N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)). A-3919-22 3 On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM MOYA'S CAR MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE POLICE LACKED REASONABLE AND ARTICULABLE SUSPICION TO BELIEVE THAT MOYA WAS ENGAGING IN CRIMINAL ACTIVITY AND THEREFORE HAD NO BASIS TO EFFECTUATE A TRAFFIC STOP.
A. [Defendant] Has Standing To Challenge The Warrantless Stop Of Moya's Car Because He Has A Participatory Interest In The Narcotics Seized. [(Partially raised below)]
B. The Traffic Stop Of Moya Was Not Supported By Reasonable And Articulable Suspicion That Moya Was Engaging In Criminal Activity. [(Not raised below)]
C. Because The Narcotics Seized From Moya's Car Were Illegally Obtained, They Cannot Factor Into The Analysis Of Whether There Was Probable Cause To Issue A Search Warrant For The Storage Unit. [(Not raised below)]
POINT II
ALL EVIDENCE SEIZED FROM THE STORAGE UNIT MUST BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THE SEARCH WARRANT WAS NOT SUPPORTED BY PROBABLE CAUSE. [(Partially raised below)]
A-3919-22 4 We reject these contentions and affirm defendant's convictions. But we
sua sponte remand for the limited purposes of correcting the JOC to reflect
defendant's sentence on his firearm offense was imposed pursuant to the Graves
Act and defendant was not convicted as an accomplice on either offense.
I.
We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history from the record
provided on appeal. In June 2018, TCU detectives arrested Elvisaul Nunez
Vasquez on unrelated heroin charges. Nunez Vasquez disclosed defendant was
involved in large-scale narcotics distribution between New York and New
Jersey. Nunez Vasquez stated defendant stored large quantities of heroin in Unit
126 of a Fair Lawn storage facility and the informant delivered heroin to that
unit on multiple occasions.
Subpoenaed records from the storage facility revealed defendant and
Watson co-owned Unit 126 and the phone number defendant provided to the
storage facility matched the number Nunez Vasquez provided to police. The
facility's activity logs indicated Unit 126 was accessed approximately forty
times in one month. Surveillance footage depicted defendant driving a Honda
Odyssey and Watson driving a Range Rover. Police entered the registrations
for both vehicles into a license plate reader system.
A-3919-22 5 During August 2018, surveillance footage confirmed defendant and
Watson accessed the storage unit multiple times within the month, and
occasionally, multiple times a day. Law enforcement database searches revealed
defendant was arrested twelve times with six convictions in New Jersey, some
for narcotics violations.
During surveillance on August 23, 2018, detectives observed defendant
arrive at the storage facility in his Honda Odyssey, park, and enter Unit 126,
where he remained for "less th[a]n ten minutes." Defendant returned to the
Honda and left the facility. Police followed defendant to Paterson and saw him
park the vehicle. An unidentified male walked up to the passenger side and
"leaned into the Honda with his hands." As police circled the block to gain a
better view of the interaction, defendant departed. Based on his training and
experience, TCU Detective Taylor Bonner "firmly believe[d] a narcotics hand-
to-hand transaction took place."
On August 30, 2018, "an allied law enforcement agency" notified police
that Watson's Range Rover drove into New York City around 2:41 p.m., then
reentered New Jersey via the George Washington Bridge around 3:29 p.m.
Police established surveillance at the storage facility and, approximately thirty
minutes later, saw the Range Rover enter the facility, followed closely by a
A-3919-22 6 Toyota Camry bearing New York license plates, driven by Moya. Detectives
observed Watson enter the keycode to the storage facility. Both vehicles then
drove "in close proximity to each other" toward Unit 126. When he saw police
stationed near the unit, Watson signaled to Moya to pass Unit 126. Both vehicles
drove past the unit toward the exit, where police conducted an investigatory stop
of both vehicles.
In response to police questioning, Moya stated he was driving a New York
taxicab and had dropped off a passenger in Paterson. Moya claimed he did not
know Watson but "could not provide a reason" for his presence at the storage
facility. In his search warrant affidavit, Bonner stated Moya "appeared
nervous," "his hands were visibly shaking[,] and he continued to lick his lips."
Moya gave police consent to search his car. Police searched the Toyota and
conducted a canine sniff around the vehicle. The canine positively alerted to the
presence of narcotics near the passenger seat. Police seized a bag of cocaine,
smaller bags of suspected heroin and cocaine, a digital scale, and other
paraphernalia from the seat. Police conducted a consent search of Watson's
Range Rover, with negative results. The canine positively alerted to the
presence of narcotics outside Unit 126.
A-3919-22 7 The following day, police executed a warrant to search Unit 126. During
the search, police seized a handgun, 337 bricks of heroin, a small amount of
marijuana, and paraphernalia. Defendant was arrested on September 17, 2018.
Pertinent to this appeal, after he was indicted, defendant moved to
suppress evidence seized from Unit 126 pursuant to the search warrant and for
a Franks hearing.5 We glean from the motion judge's March 5, 2020 oral
decision, defendant's arguments were limited to: "the search warrant was
[improperly] based on the words of an untested and uncorroborated informant";
"police did not conduct an adequate investigation"; "it's unclear whether the
canine actually alerted to the storage unit at 126"; and "police relied on the
unverified word of an anonymous allied law enforcement agency." The judge
noted defendant contended a Franks hearing was required because Bonner's
supporting affidavit neither included Nunez Vasquez's ultimate disposition in
the unrelated narcotics case nor "disclose[d] the identity of the 'allied law
5 Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154, 155-56 (1978) (holding "where the defendant makes a substantial preliminary showing that a false statement knowingly and intentionally, or with reckless disregard for the truth, was included by the affiant in the warrant affidavit, . . . a hearing [should] be held at the defendant's request").
A-3919-22 8 enforcement agency'" that informed police Watson's vehicle crossed the George
Washington Bridge. 6
At the request of defendant and Watson, who joined the motion but did
not file a brief, the judge denied the motion on the papers without conducting
oral argument. In his cogent oral decision, the judge addressed the issues raised
in view of the guiding legal principles. The judge found the evidence stated in
Bonner's warrant affidavit was "plainly sufficient" to support the issuing judge's
probable cause finding. In doing so, the judge detailed the police investigation,
including: the informant's tip; the surveillance conducted on the storage unit
and on defendant; the stop and search of Watson and Moya's vehicles and the
evidence found; and the canine's positive "alert[] to the presence of narcotics at
Unit 126." The judge concluded, based on all the information set forth in the
affidavit, there was "absolutely no doubt" the issuing judge "had a substantial
basis for concluding that probable cause existed," supporting issuance of a
warrant to search the storage unit.
Following the judge's decision, Watson's retained counsel informed the
judge he intended to file a brief on his motion to suppress evidence seized from
6 Defendant's appellate appendix does not include his motion papers. See R. 2:6-1(a)(2) (prohibiting the inclusion of trial court briefs in the appellate appendix unless the issue raised "is germane to the appeal"). A-3919-22 9 Moya's Toyota, previously denied without prejudice in view of plea
negotiations. Defendant neither moved to suppress the same evidence nor join
the motion.
On April 8, 2021, another judge held a testimonial hearing on Watson's
motion. Bonner testified on behalf of the State. Watson did not testify or call
any witnesses. Defendant and his retained counsel were present at the hearing.
During direct examination, defendant's counsel objected to the form of a
question about surveillance footage depicting Watson's and defendant's
vehicles. The judge sustained the objection and the deputy attorney general
(DAG) rephrased the question. Shortly thereafter, defendant's attorney
indicated he had no objection to the admission of a document and video in
evidence.
However, during an ongoing objection concerning foundation raised by
defendant's attorney, the DAG objected, arguing defendant was "not involved in
this motion." The judge continued the hearing, only permitting Watson's
attorney to raise objections. But shortly after he cross-examined Bonner, the
judge adjourned the hearing to permit briefing as to whether defendant's attorney
was "permitted to cross-examine the witness."
A-3919-22 10 On the April 26, 2021 return date, defendant's attorney indicated he
"might even concede on the issue of standing" but the issue was "the scope of
[the DAG's] direct examination of [Bonner]," which mentioned defendant.
Citing N.J.R.E. 611, defendant's attorney argued he was permitted to cross-
examine the detective on credibility, even though he lacked standing to
challenge the search of Moya's vehicle "on constitutional grounds."
In his ensuing oral decision, the motion judge considered defendant's
argument in view of our Supreme Court's holding in State v. Bruns, 172 N.J. 40
(2002), "evidence implicat[ing] a defendant in a crime is not, in and of itself,
sufficient to confer standing." See id. at 58. Noting the motion was filed by
Watson, and defendant was not charged as Watson's co-conspirator on the
offenses involving the evidence seized from Moya's car, the judge found
defendant lacked standing to contest the search of the vehicle. Accordingly, the
judge concluded his attorney could not cross-examine Bonner.
On August 3, 2021, the judge issued a written decision and order denying
Watson's motion. The judge found the investigatory stop of the Toyota "was
valid based on the detectives' reasonable and articulable suspicion that Moya
was engaged in criminal wrongdoing." Recognizing "the standard to justify an
investigatory stop is low," the judge noted each stage of the investigation and
A-3919-22 11 determined "the totality of the circumstances and the detective's training and
experience" gave rise to sufficient reasonable suspicion to support the
investigatory stop. The judge further determined the search of the car was
constitutionally permissible because it did not exceed the scope of consent Moya
granted police.
II. Standing
For the first time on appeal, defendant expressly argues he had standing
to challenge the stop of Moya's vehicle. Acknowledging he was not charged
with any offenses emanating from the evidence seized from Moya's, defendant
cites the Court's decision in State v. Mollica, 114 N.J. 329, 339-40 (1989), and
now argues he had "a participatory interest" in that evidence because it was
related to the investigation of his and Watson's alleged narcotics distribution
from the storage unit. In its responding brief, the State maintains defendant
lacked standing to challenge the narcotics seized from Moya's vehicle but
addresses the merits, urging us to affirm the judge's decision denying Watson's
motion.
Generally, "standing" is broadly defined. See State v. Lavrik, 472 N.J.
Super. 192, 204 (App. Div. 2022). Our Supeme Court has long recognized:
Under [this state's] automatic standing rule, virtually all defendants have standing to contest a search or seizure
A-3919-22 12 by police where they have either "a proprietary, possessory or participatory interest in either the place searched or the property seized," or if "possession of the seized evidence at the time of the contested search is an essential element of guilt."
[State v. Lamb, 218 N.J. 300, 313 (2014) (quoting State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 228 (1981)).]
"[T]he State bears the burden of showing that defendant has no proprietary,
possessory, or participatory interest in either the place searched or the property
seized." State v. Randolph, 228 N.J. 566, 582 (2017).
"A participatory interest in seized evidence extends beyond the kind of
relationship that could otherwise be considered only proprietary or possessory. "
Mollica, 114 N.J. at 339. Instead, a participatory interest "stresses the
relationship of the evidence to the underlying criminal activity and defendant's
own criminal role in the generation and use of such evidence." Ibid. "Unlike
the terms 'possessory' or 'proprietary,' which denote property concepts,
'participatory' connotes some involvement in the underlying criminal conduct in
which the seized evidence is used by the participants to carry out the unlawful
activity." Id. at 339-40. A participatory interest thus "provides standing to a
person who, challenging the seizure and prosecutorial use of incrimination
evidence, had some culpable role, whether as a principal, conspirator, or
accomplice, in a criminal activity that itself generated the evidence." Id. at 340.
A-3919-22 13 In Mollica, our Supreme Court considered whether the defendant had
standing to challenge telephone records seized from a co-defendant's hotel room
without a warrant. Id. at 335. The records were then used as the basis to obtain
warrants to search the hotel rooms of the defendant and his co-defendant. Id. at
336. Evidence of gambling offenses was found in the rooms. Ibid. At their
trial, both defendants challenged the constitutionality of the warrantless seizure
of the phone records. Ibid.
Pertinent to this appeal, the Court held the defendant had a participatory
interest in the phone records seized from his co-defendant's room. Id. at 340.
The Court noted the State alleged the defendant's "participat[ion] in the
underlying criminal gambling activities," included use of the phone in his co-
defendant's hotel room. Ibid. The Court concluded the defendant's involvement
"in criminal gambling activities that generated telephone toll records invest [ed
the] defendant with standing to challenge the validity" of the evidence seized
from his co-defendant's hotel room. Ibid.
However, in Bruns, the Court clarified "evidence implicat[ing] a
defendant in a crime is not, in and of itself, sufficient to confer standing." 172
N.J. at 58. "There also must be at a minimum some contemporary connection
between the defendant and the place searched or the items seized." Ibid.
A-3919-22 14 "[S]uppression of the product of a Fourth Amendment violation can be
successfully urged only by those whose rights were violated by the search itself,
not by those who are aggrieved solely by the introduction of damaging
evidence." Ibid. (quoting Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 171-72
(1969)).
In Bruns, the Court held the defendant failed to demonstrate he had a
participatory interest in weapons seized from another individual's car when the
defendant was not a passenger in the car or otherwise present when the search
was conducted. Id. at 57-58. The weapons seized implicated both the defendant
and the other individual in a robbery that took place one week prior to the
contested search. Id. at 59. The Court concluded there was no evidence to
suggest the defendant and the individual "had a continuing criminal
relationship" when the weapons were seized, and substantial time had passed
between the crime and the seizure of the weapons; therefore, the defendant
lacked standing to challenge the search. Id. at 58.
Having considered defendant's belated contentions in view of these well-
established principles, we are satisfied he lacked standing to challenge the stop
of Moya's vehicle and the evidence seized pursuant to the consent search .
Defendant neither filed a motion to suppress challenging the stop nor joined
A-3919-22 15 Watson's motion. He was not charged in the same conspiracy or substantive
charges with Watson and Moya, which emanated from the evidence seized from
Moya's car. Defendant's charges were based solely on the evidence seized from
the storage unit and conspiracy with Watson. As the State maintains, the
indictment charged two separate conspiracies – and defendant was not charged
in the same conspiracy as Watson and Moya.
Because defendant was not a passenger in Moya's car and was not present
nearby when the stop and search occurred, there was no "contemporary
connection" between defendant and Moya. See Bruns, 172 N.J. at 58; cf.
Mollica, 114 N.J. at 340. Defendant otherwise had no relationship with the
evidence seized from Moya's car – and that evidence was not used against him
to prove his guilt. See State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 13 (1997).
Assuming arguendo defendant had standing to challenge the stop of
Moya's car, we have considered defendant's arguments on the merits and
conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion.
R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm for the sound reasons stated in the motion judge's
written decision. In addition, although not expressly challenged on appeal, we
further conclude the judge did not abuse his discretion by barring trial counsel's
A-3919-22 16 application to cross-examine Bonner. See N.J.R.E. 611(a) (vesting the trial
court with "control over the mode and order of interrogating witnesses").
III. Probable Cause to Search the Storage Unit
On appeal, defendant challenges the first motion judge's decision that the
warrant to search his storage unit was based on sufficient probable cause.
Defendant renews his argument that the informant's tip was not sufficiently
corroborated. For the first time before us, he claims: "[b]ecause police lacked
reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop Moya's car," the evidence seized
therefrom "must be excised from the affidavit"; and the affidavit failed to detail
the canine "was trained in narcotics detection." Because defendant abandoned
his Franks hearing argument, the issue is deemed waived. See State v. Huang,
461 N.J. Super. 119, 125 (App. Div. 2018).
As a threshold matter, the motion judge's decision that probable cause
supported the warrant was not based solely on the informant's tip but rather on
the totality of the circumstances set forth in the affidavit. See State v. Chippero,
201 N.J. 14, 27 (2009) (holding when ascertaining whether probable cause
supports the validity of a search warrant, the court must look at "the totality of
the circumstances"). Moreover, a search executed pursuant to a warrant enjoys
the presumption of validity. See State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 612 (2009).
A-3919-22 17 "Doubt as to the validity of the warrant 'should ordinarily be resolved by
sustaining the search.'" State v. Keyes, 184 N.J. 541, 554 (2005) (quoting State
v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 389 (2004)). The defendant, therefore, bears the burden
of challenging the search, and must "prove 'that there was no probable cause
supporting the issuance of the warrant or that the search was otherwise
unreasonable.'" Jones, 179 N.J. at 388 (quoting State v. Valencia, 93 N.J. 126,
133 (1983)). Probable cause exists where there is "a reasonable ground for
belief of guilt" based on facts of which the officers had knowledge and
reasonably trustworthy sources. Marshall, 199 N.J. at 610 (quoting State v.
O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 612 (2007)).
Further, "[w]hen reviewing the issuance of a search warrant by another
judge, the [motion judge] is required to pay substantial deference to the [issuing]
judge's determination." State v. Dispoto, 383 N.J. Super. 205, 216 (App. Div.
2006) (citing State v. Kasabucki, 52 N.J. 110, 117 (1968)). Whether a search
warrant was supported by adequate probable cause is a question of law, which
this court reviews de novo. See State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44-45 (2011).
Information received by police "from confidential informants may serve
as a valid basis for a court to find probable cause and issue a search warrant"
provided there is "substantial evidence in the record to support the informant's
A-3919-22 18 statements." Keyes, 184 N.J. at 555. "[T]he issuing court must consider the
'veracity and basis of knowledge' of the informant as part of" the totality of the
circumstances analysis. Jones, 179 N.J. at 389 (quoting State v. Novembrino,
105 N.J. 95, 123 (1987)). "[I]f police corroborate 'information from which it
can be inferred that the informant's tip was grounded on inside information, this
corroboration is sufficient to satisfy the basis of knowledge prong' as well as the
veracity prong." State v. Sullivan, 169 N.J. 204, 214 (2001) (quoting State v.
Smith, 155 N.J. 83, 98 (1998)).
In the present matter, as the motion judge correctly recognized, Nunez
Vasquez was not a "confidential" informant. Moreover, the information
provided by Nunez Vasquez was sufficiently corroborated by TCU's
investigation. The affidavit detailed Nunez Vasquez's disclosures to police,
including he personally delivered narcotics to the storage unit at the direction of
defendant and identified the storage unit to police. The phone number he
provided police for defendant matched the storage facility's phone records.
Police confirmed defendant and Watson owned the unit and accessed it
numerous times in one month. Police also witnessed defendant visit the storage
unit and engage in a suspected drug transaction. These circumstances of the
A-3919-22 19 investigation, including the stop and search of Watson and Moya, were outlined
in the warrant affidavit and sufficiently corroborated the informant's tip.
Having upheld the stop of Moya's car, we reject defendant's newly minted
assertion that the stop was not valid. Because defendant's belated contention
concerning the canine's training was not preserved for appellate review, we
could decline to consider it. See State v. Witt, 223 N.J. 409, 419 (2015). For
the sake of completeness, however, we have considered his assertion and
conclude it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed but remanded solely to correct the JOC. Jurisdiction is not
retained.
A-3919-22 20