NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2699-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JIHAD SHARRIEFF a/k/a ABDULLAH SHARRIF,1
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted May 29, 2025 — Decided June 10, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 00-04-1149 and 00-06-1713.
Jihad Sharrieff, appellant pro se.
Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shep A. Gerszberg, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
1 The record reflects defendant is known by several aliases, many of which involve different spellings of his surname. PER CURIAM
Defendant Abdullah Sharrif appeals from an April 2, 2024 order which
denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He argues our Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) applies retroactively and the
sentencing court failed to make an explicit statement considering the overall
fairness of the consecutive sentence imposed under State v. Yarbrough, 100 N.J.
627 (1985). Because we have previously held defendant's sentence is valid, and
the absence of a Torres statement does not render his sentence illegal, we affirm.
We incorporate the facts and procedural history set forth in our prior
unpublished opinion affirming defendant's convictions and sentence, State v.
Sharrif (Sharrif I), No. A-2956-01 (App. Div. Apr. 8, 2004) (slip op. at 31-32),
certif. denied, 182 N.J. 629 (2005), and our decisions affirming the denial of
defendant's petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR), State v. Sharieff (Sharieff
II), No. A-0728-11 (App. Div. May 21, 2013), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 285
(2014); State v. Sharrieff (Sharrieff III), No. A-0264-19 (App. Div. May 5,
2021), certif. denied, 250 N.J. 488 (2022). We nevertheless briefly summarize
the facts to lend context to the present appeal.
In September 1999, defendant and two others engaged in a crime spree
that resulted in several robberies at gunpoint and the murder of Anthony Ralph.
A-2699-23 2 Following a 2001 jury trial on consolidated indictments, defendant was
convicted of two counts of first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; third-
degree unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).
The jury deadlocked on the remaining charges and, upon retrial, defendant was
found guilty of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); third-degree
unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).
Defendant moved for new trials, which the court heard and denied on
October 12, 2001. The court imposed an aggregate life sentence plus forty years
with sixty-four years of parole ineligibility.
Defendant filed a direct appeal on February 24, 2004. Sharrif I, slip op.
at 31-32. On September 16, 2005, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which was denied on December 4, 2006. Sharrieff v. Cathel, Civil No.
05-4525, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87818 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2006). The District
Court denied defendant's petition and found he had "not made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. at *44.
Defendant appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed in part and
remanded with instructions to grant the petition for habeas relief and for
A-2699-23 3 resentencing in state court. Sharrieff v. Cathel, 574 F.3d 225, 226 (3d Cir.
2009), cert. denied, Sharrieff v. Ricci, 558 U.S. 1120 (2010).
Defendant was resentenced in 2009 to a life term plus fifteen years with
forty-two years of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed his new sentence as
excessive. That appeal was denied on the merits. In denying defendant’s claim,
we specifically held “the guidelines for imposing consecutive sentences were
correctly applied." State v. Sharrieff, No. A-2271-10 (App. Div. Aug. 31, 2011)
Defendant filed his first PCR petition on March 18, 2010. The PCR court
denied the petition as procedurally barred, and we affirmed the denial in May
2013. Sharieff II, slip op. at 5. Defendant filed a second PCR on January 19,
2012, alleging PCR counsel was ineffective. On June 11, 2013, the PCR was
denied. Defendant filed his third PCR on April 8, 2019. The PCR court denied
the petition and we affirmed the denial on May 5, 2021. Sharrieff III, slip op.
at 2.
In July 2023, defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence
based on Yarbough and Torres. In denying defendant's motion on April 2, 2024,
the court stated:
the sentencing court conducted a comprehensive hearing that included arguments of counsel, a statement of support from [defendant]'s brother and a statement from the victim's family[,] . . . addressed all important
A-2699-23 4 sentencing issues including the nature of the offense, aggravating and mitigating factors, rules and laws governing consecutive and concurrent terms, and . . . further discussed its opinion on the fairness of the sentences.
The court concluded the final sentence imposed was lawful and defendant has
not raised any issues that would justify resentencing. Defendant raises the same
issue before us in this appeal.
Our review of the legality of a sentence is de novo. State v. Jones, 478
N.J. Super. 532, 541 (App. Div. 2024). "There is no temporal limit on a court's
ability to review an illegal sentence; 'it may be corrected at any time before it is
completed.'" Id. at 540 (quoting State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)). If
we determine a sentence is illegal, we are constrained to remand to the trial court
for resentencing. Jones, 478 N.J. Super. at 541.
Defendant maintains the court "never considered the overall fairness of
the sentence as required by Torres. Torres requires [s]entencing [c]ourts to
consider the 'overall fairness' when sentencing defendants to lengthy
consecutive sentences and part of that consideration relies on the Yarbough
factors."
In Torres, our Supreme Court explained:
Through the years, our Court has sought again and again to underscore that concepts of uniformity,
A-2699-23 5 predictability, and proportionality in sentencing birthed the Yarbough factors. See, e.g., State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 371-72 (2019); State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 427- 28 (2001). In this matter, we again take steps to promote those goals, . . . .
[Torres, 246 N.J. at 252-53 (emphasis added).]
The Court further stated,
sentencing is a holistic endeavor. A court performing the Yarbough fairness assessment must be mindful that aggravating and mitigating factors and Yarbough factors, as well as the stated purposes of sentencing in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b), in their totality, inform the sentence's fairness. All are relevant to the overall fairness of the aggregate sentence imposed on the sole defendant before the court.
[Id.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2699-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JIHAD SHARRIEFF a/k/a ABDULLAH SHARRIF,1
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted May 29, 2025 — Decided June 10, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 00-04-1149 and 00-06-1713.
Jihad Sharrieff, appellant pro se.
Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shep A. Gerszberg, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
1 The record reflects defendant is known by several aliases, many of which involve different spellings of his surname. PER CURIAM
Defendant Abdullah Sharrif appeals from an April 2, 2024 order which
denied his motion to correct an illegal sentence. He argues our Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021) applies retroactively and the
sentencing court failed to make an explicit statement considering the overall
fairness of the consecutive sentence imposed under State v. Yarbrough, 100 N.J.
627 (1985). Because we have previously held defendant's sentence is valid, and
the absence of a Torres statement does not render his sentence illegal, we affirm.
We incorporate the facts and procedural history set forth in our prior
unpublished opinion affirming defendant's convictions and sentence, State v.
Sharrif (Sharrif I), No. A-2956-01 (App. Div. Apr. 8, 2004) (slip op. at 31-32),
certif. denied, 182 N.J. 629 (2005), and our decisions affirming the denial of
defendant's petitions for post-conviction relief (PCR), State v. Sharieff (Sharieff
II), No. A-0728-11 (App. Div. May 21, 2013), certif. denied, 217 N.J. 285
(2014); State v. Sharrieff (Sharrieff III), No. A-0264-19 (App. Div. May 5,
2021), certif. denied, 250 N.J. 488 (2022). We nevertheless briefly summarize
the facts to lend context to the present appeal.
In September 1999, defendant and two others engaged in a crime spree
that resulted in several robberies at gunpoint and the murder of Anthony Ralph.
A-2699-23 2 Following a 2001 jury trial on consolidated indictments, defendant was
convicted of two counts of first-degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; third-
degree unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-
degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).
The jury deadlocked on the remaining charges and, upon retrial, defendant was
found guilty of first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); third-degree
unlawful possession of a firearm, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); and second-degree
possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a).
Defendant moved for new trials, which the court heard and denied on
October 12, 2001. The court imposed an aggregate life sentence plus forty years
with sixty-four years of parole ineligibility.
Defendant filed a direct appeal on February 24, 2004. Sharrif I, slip op.
at 31-32. On September 16, 2005, defendant filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which was denied on December 4, 2006. Sharrieff v. Cathel, Civil No.
05-4525, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 87818 (D.N.J. Dec. 4, 2006). The District
Court denied defendant's petition and found he had "not made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right." Id. at *44.
Defendant appealed to the Third Circuit, which reversed in part and
remanded with instructions to grant the petition for habeas relief and for
A-2699-23 3 resentencing in state court. Sharrieff v. Cathel, 574 F.3d 225, 226 (3d Cir.
2009), cert. denied, Sharrieff v. Ricci, 558 U.S. 1120 (2010).
Defendant was resentenced in 2009 to a life term plus fifteen years with
forty-two years of parole ineligibility. Defendant appealed his new sentence as
excessive. That appeal was denied on the merits. In denying defendant’s claim,
we specifically held “the guidelines for imposing consecutive sentences were
correctly applied." State v. Sharrieff, No. A-2271-10 (App. Div. Aug. 31, 2011)
Defendant filed his first PCR petition on March 18, 2010. The PCR court
denied the petition as procedurally barred, and we affirmed the denial in May
2013. Sharieff II, slip op. at 5. Defendant filed a second PCR on January 19,
2012, alleging PCR counsel was ineffective. On June 11, 2013, the PCR was
denied. Defendant filed his third PCR on April 8, 2019. The PCR court denied
the petition and we affirmed the denial on May 5, 2021. Sharrieff III, slip op.
at 2.
In July 2023, defendant filed a pro se motion to correct an illegal sentence
based on Yarbough and Torres. In denying defendant's motion on April 2, 2024,
the court stated:
the sentencing court conducted a comprehensive hearing that included arguments of counsel, a statement of support from [defendant]'s brother and a statement from the victim's family[,] . . . addressed all important
A-2699-23 4 sentencing issues including the nature of the offense, aggravating and mitigating factors, rules and laws governing consecutive and concurrent terms, and . . . further discussed its opinion on the fairness of the sentences.
The court concluded the final sentence imposed was lawful and defendant has
not raised any issues that would justify resentencing. Defendant raises the same
issue before us in this appeal.
Our review of the legality of a sentence is de novo. State v. Jones, 478
N.J. Super. 532, 541 (App. Div. 2024). "There is no temporal limit on a court's
ability to review an illegal sentence; 'it may be corrected at any time before it is
completed.'" Id. at 540 (quoting State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)). If
we determine a sentence is illegal, we are constrained to remand to the trial court
for resentencing. Jones, 478 N.J. Super. at 541.
Defendant maintains the court "never considered the overall fairness of
the sentence as required by Torres. Torres requires [s]entencing [c]ourts to
consider the 'overall fairness' when sentencing defendants to lengthy
consecutive sentences and part of that consideration relies on the Yarbough
factors."
In Torres, our Supreme Court explained:
Through the years, our Court has sought again and again to underscore that concepts of uniformity,
A-2699-23 5 predictability, and proportionality in sentencing birthed the Yarbough factors. See, e.g., State v. Liepe, 239 N.J. 359, 371-72 (2019); State v. Carey, 168 N.J. 413, 427- 28 (2001). In this matter, we again take steps to promote those goals, . . . .
[Torres, 246 N.J. at 252-53 (emphasis added).]
The Court further stated,
sentencing is a holistic endeavor. A court performing the Yarbough fairness assessment must be mindful that aggravating and mitigating factors and Yarbough factors, as well as the stated purposes of sentencing in N.J.S.A. 2C:1-2(b), in their totality, inform the sentence's fairness. All are relevant to the overall fairness of the aggregate sentence imposed on the sole defendant before the court.
[Id. at 272.]
Having reviewed the extensive record and applicable case law, we reject
defendant's contention that Torres applies retroactively, and he is entitled to
"resentencing anew" due to "the trial court's failure to properly rely on the
Yarbough factors." Defendant was resentenced in 2009, over ten years before
Torres. On September 2, 2011, we addressed the matter on a sentencing calendar
pursuant to Rule 2:9-11, wherein we affirmed his sentence and specifically
expressed our satisfaction that the guidelines for imposing consecutive
sentences under Yarbough were correctly applied.
A-2699-23 6 Having reached that determination, defendant is barred from any further
appeal of his sentence under Rule 3:22-5, which provides "[a] prior adjudication
upon the merits of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made in the
proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction proceeding
brought pursuant to this rule or prior to the adoption thereof, or in any appeal
taken from such proceedings."
Additionally, the Court in Torres did not create a new rule of law, and
therefore retroactivity is not applicable. State v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 307 (2008);
State v. Burstein, 85 N.J. 394, 403 (1981) (stating "retroactivity can arise only
where there has been a departure from existing law"). Instead, our Court in
Torres reviewed fundamental sentencing principles and "reiterate[d] the
repeated instruction that a sentencing court's decision whether to impose
consecutive sentences should retain focus on 'the fairness of the overall
sentence.'" Torres, 246 N.J. at 270 (quoting State v. Miller, 108 N.J. 112, 122
(1987)); see also State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 42 (2011) (holding the mere
excessiveness of a sentence otherwise within authorized limits, as distinct from
illegality, could only be raised on direct appeal from the conviction). Stated
differently, Torres does not provide an independent ground for resentencing, and
A-2699-23 7 we are satisfied the sentencing court painstakingly fashioned defendant's
sentence guided by the very sentencing principles amplified by the Torres Court.
Because we have previously determined defendant's sentence is valid,
defendant is barred from any further challenge to his sentence and no further
review is warranted. R. 3:22-5.
Affirmed.
A-2699-23 8