State of New Jersey v. Jesse Roth

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3620-24

STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. JESSE ROTH,

Defendant-Appellant.

__________________________

Submitted June 4, 2026 ‒ Decided August 20, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Bergen County, Municipal Appeal No. 17-24.

Bruno & Ferraro, attorneys for appellant (Kenneth M.

Ralph, of counsel and on the brief).

Mark Musella, Bergen County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Edward F. Ray, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Jesse Roth appeals from the July 2, 2025 Law Division order denying his municipal appeal. His application challenged the municipal court's denial of his motion to withdraw and vacate his guilty plea for driving while intoxicated (DWI), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. We affirm.

I.

In May 2022, defendant was charged with the following motor vehicle offenses, for which five separate tickets were issued: DWI; careless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-97; failure to possess a driver's insurance card, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29; disregarding a stop or yield sign, N.J.S.A. 39:4-144; and delaying traffic, N.J.S.A. 39:4-56. On July 21, 2022, during defendant's first appearance in municipal court, he entered a plea of not guilty. His counsel informed the court defendant had been advised of the potential consequences if convicted of the various charges. That same day, the parties negotiated a plea agreement. The State completed a "Request to Approve Plea Agreement" form showing defendant would plead guilty to DWI, with the recommended sentence/comments noting "observation only – [first offense mandatory minimums]" and the remaining offenses would be dismissed. On the plea agreement, the defendant acknowledgement section provides:

I understand the nature of the amended charge(s)

against me and the consequences of my guilty plea. I

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understand and agree voluntarily to the terms of the plea agreement set forth above.

I further understand that if the judge does not accept my guilty plea or agree with the recommended sentence, I can withdraw it and plead not guilty.

However, defendant did not sign this agreement. The matter was adjourned to August 18, 2022.

On August 18, 2022, the State submitted an amended plea agreement form, but the relevant provisions—the charges, recommended disposition, sentence and comments, and defendant's acknowledgement—remained unchanged. Both defendant and the prosecutor reviewed and signed the acknowledgement section of the form.

The municipal court recited the terms of the plea agreement on the record, noting the DWI was an "observation matter" and the State recommended the mandatory minimum sentence for a first offense. Defense counsel then conducted a colloquy with defendant. In response to questions from his counsel, defendant allocuted to the plea and confirmed his plea was entered freely and voluntarily, with no undisclosed promises. He also acknowledged the mandatory penalties for pleading guilty to DWI had been explained to him by counsel.

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The court also conducted a colloquy with defendant, posing additional questioning regarding the factual basis for his plea, inquiring about his satisfaction with his attorney's services, and determining whether he had any questions for his counsel. It found there was a sufficient factual basis for defendant's plea and accepted it, concluding it was entered freely, knowingly, and voluntarily. The court imposed the minimum mandatory sentence for the first conviction: twelve hours of the Intoxicated Driver's Resource Center, surcharges, fines, assessments, and dismissed the remaining offenses. It also imposed a three-month driver interlock and forfeiture of his driver's license pending installation of the interlock device, but defendant had already installed it.

After imposing defendant's sentence, the court advised him of additional penalties if he were convicted of a second DWI under N.J.S.A. 39:4-50(a). It also explained the potential consequences defendant would face if convicted of a third or subsequent violation.

Approximately eighteen months later, defendant was arrested and charged with a second DWI in Mahwah. Faced with this second DWI, in June 2024, he moved to vacate his 2022 guilty plea in municipal court under Rule 7:4-2(b). Defendant argued the consequences of his plea to a DWI conviction were

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explained only after the court had already accepted his plea, in contravention of the court rules and applicable case law.

The municipal court conducted a hearing and denied defendant's motion on October 3, 2024. In its oral opinion, the court found Rule 7:4-2(b) was inapplicable and instead relied on Rule 7:6-2(a) to analyze defendant's argument. The court referenced the plea transcript, which showed defendant unequivocally acknowledged his counsel had explained the mandatory penalties for a conviction. The transcript also showed defendant did not ask any questions of his counsel, engaged in a detailed allocution, and waived his right to trial. The court concluded there was no omission that prejudiced defendant, nor did he demonstrate a significant possibility he would not have entered the plea if given additional information. The court issued a detailed written statement of reasons, restating its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Defendant appealed and a trial de novo was conducted in the Law Division. On July 2, 2025, the Law Division judge denied the appeal. He found defendant did not meet his burden of showing a manifest injustice under Rule 7:6-2, justifying the withdrawal of his guilty plea under State v. Slater, 198 N.J. 145, 157-60 (2009).

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II.

Defendant raises the following contention for our consideration:

[DEFENDANT]'S 2022 CONVICTION FOR [DWI]

SHOULD BE VACATED BECAUSE THE COURT DID NOT ADVISE HIM ON THE RECORD OF THE POTENTIAL PENALTIES BEFORE HE PLED GUILTY, WHICH IS A REQUIREMENT FOR A VALID GUILTY PLEA.

Upon review of the record, we conclude the judge properly denied defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in his well-reasoned opinion. We add the following comments.

A municipal court decision is appealed to the Law Division. See R. 3:23-

1; R. 7:13-1. "In the Law Division, the trial judge 'may reverse and remand for a new trial or may conduct a trial de novo on the record below.'" State v. Robertson, 228 N.J. 138, 147 (2017) (quoting R. 3:23-8(a)(2)). "At a trial de novo, the court makes its own findings of fact and conclusions of law but defers to the municipal court's credibility findings." Ibid.

Unlike the trial court, which conducts a trial de novo on the record pursuant to Rule 3:23-8(a)(2), we do not independently assess the evidence. State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999). Under the two- court rule, only "a very obvious and exceptional showing of error" will support A-3620-24

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setting aside the Law Division and municipal court's "concurrent findings of facts[.]" Id. at 474. However, when issues on appeal turn on purely legal determinations, our review is plenary. State v. Adubato, 420 N.J. Super. 167, 176, 19 A.3d 1023 (App. Div. 2011).

Rule 7:6-2(a)(1) provides in part that a municipal court shall not "accept a guilty plea without first . . . determining . . . there is a factual basis for the plea." Maida v. Kuskin, 221 N.J. 112, 123 (2015) (quoting R. 7:6-2(a)(1)). "The Rule thus contemplates that the plea be made in open court, [and] that the municipal court judge make a sufficient inquiry to conclude that any plea is knowing and voluntary . . . ." Ibid. Defendant must enter the plea knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily, and "must understand the nature of the charge and the consequences of the plea . . . that are 'direct' or 'penal.'" State v. Johnson, 182 N.J. 232, 236 (2005) (quoting State v. Howard, 110 N.J. 113, 122 (1988)); see also R. 3:9-2 (requiring defendant to complete and sign the appropriate plea forms before accepting a guilty plea). While under Rule 7:6-2(b), "[a] motion to withdraw a plea of guilty shall be made before sentencing, . . . the court may permit it to be made thereafter to correct a manifest injustice."

A defendant's withdrawal of a guilty plea is analyzed using the four-factor test articulated in Slater: "(1) whether the defendant has asserted a colorable

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claim of innocence; (2) the nature and strength of [the] defendant's reasons for withdrawal; (3) the existence of a plea bargain; and (4) whether withdrawal would result in unfair prejudice to the State or unfair advantage to the accused." 198 N.J. at 157-58. A defendant's "efforts to withdraw a [guilty] plea after sentencing must be substantiated by strong, compelling reasons." Id. at 160.

We are satisfied the judge thoroughly analyzed each of the four Slater factors in the context of Rule 7:6-2. Based on our review, we likewise conclude defendant's colorable claim of innocence does not rest on "'particular, plausible facts' that, if proven in court, would lead a reasonable factfinder to determine the claim is meritorious." State v. Munroe, 210 N.J. 429, 442 (2012) (quoting Slater, 198 N.J. at 159). He admitted driving while under the influence of alcohol during the plea allocution and when further questioned by the court.

As to the second factor—the nature and strength of defendant's reasons for withdrawal—the crux of defendant's argument is that the municipal court judge did not advise him of the potential consequences of his conviction until after he entered his guilty plea. He asserts the municipal judge did not advise him of the mandatory minimum sentence: installation of the interlock device, mandatory fines, and assessments. Defendant also contends he was not advised

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of the maximum penalties of a guilty plea at the time of sentencing or during sentencing. Therefore, he did not knowingly enter his guilty plea.

The record does not support defendant's contentions. The plea and sentencing transcript shows, when asked if his counsel explained the mandatory penalties for a guilty plea or conviction, defendant responded: "That's correct." The court then questioned defendant regarding his attorney's services and the nature of the charge. Defendant confirmed in his prior testimony he had consumed alcohol, which adversely affected his ability to operate a motor vehicle. Satisfied with the factual basis, the court accepted defendant's guilty plea in accordance with Rule 7:6-2(a)(1).

Before sentencing, defense counsel requested the court impose the minimum mandatory sentence as negotiated and recommended. Defendant did not seek clarification about the mandatory penalties from either his counsel or the court. Instead, he had installed the ignition interlock device before entering his guilty plea, which undermines his claim and demonstrates his understanding of the penal consequences, showing these consequences did not affect his decision to plead guilty. Simply stated, defendant has not shown the court's lack of direct inquiry into his understanding of the mandatory penalties prejudiced his decision to plead guilty. Johnson, 182 N.J. at 244.

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Concerning the third Slater factor, the judge found defendant had negotiated his plea and received the expected benefit of the bargained agreement; thus the factor weighed against defendant and supported denial of the motion. Finally, the fourth factor did not weigh in either party's favor.

Having considered the record, we discern no error in the Law Division judge's analysis of the Slater factors. Nor has defendant suffered a manifest injustice within the meaning of Rule 7:6-2(b). We therefore affirm the denial of defendant's motion to vacate his 2022 guilty plea.

To the extent we have not addressed them, any additional contentions raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

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