NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3837-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEROME BEARFIELD, a/k/a JEROME W. BEARFIELD, JR.,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted September 30, 2025 – Decided October 30, 2025
Before Judges Rose and Torregrossa-O'Connor.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 18-08-2362.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Mark Zavotsky, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Matthew E. Hanley, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Jerome Bearfield appeals from a June 10, 2024 Law Division
order denying his application for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. On appeal defendant alleges ineffective assistance of
counsel by both his attorney at his initial central judicial processing (CJP)
appearance and his attorney at sentencing. Specifically, he claims: (1) CJP
counsel failed to adequately advise him against requesting a meeting with
detectives after he was arrested and charged with murder and provided a
statement without counsel present, and thereafter improperly brokered that
meeting; and (2) sentencing counsel inadequately presented available mitigating
factors before the sentencing court. Having reviewed the record in light of
applicable legal principles, we affirm.
I.
We derive the following salient facts and procedural history from the
record and our decision affirming defendant's convictions and sentence on direct
appeal, State v. Bearfield, No. A-1498-19 (App. Div. Nov. 18, 2021) (slip op. at
17). After the 2018 fatal shooting of Basil Howard following a motor vehicle
collision, defendant was charged with first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:1l-
3(a)(1)(2); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(b)(1); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,
A-3837-23 2 N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1). Following an N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing, the trial court
determined two statements defendant provided to law enforcement were
admissible at trial, and defendant subsequently pled guilty to an amended charge
of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(l), and unlawful
possession of a weapon.
A. Defendant's Statements to Law Enforcement
Law enforcement located defendant after reviewing surveillance footage
that captured the collision and the shooting, which took place on a roadway in
East Orange in the early morning of May 5, 2018. Bearfield, slip op. at 3. Six
days later, defendant surrendered to police after they obtained search warrants
for his home and his mother's home, and a warrant was issued for his arrest.
Ibid.
Essex County Prosecutor's Office (ECPO) Detective Robert O'Neal
conducted a formal interview of defendant. Id. at 4. After waiving his Miranda1
rights, defendant gave the first of two statements to investigators. Ibid.
Defendant advised "he was driving with his mother from a party when a car
struck his in the rear. Defendant was about to exit the car but heard shots and
drove away." Ibid. Defendant also "identif[ied] still surveillance photos" of his
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-3837-23 3 car; and when the statement concluded, defendant was transported to the Essex
County jail. Ibid.
The next day, defendant appeared in CJP court. Ibid. We previously
summarized the circumstances leading up to defendant's second formal
statement:
On Saturday, May 12, 2018, O'Neal received word from his superior, Lieutenant Carter, [2] that an assistant prosecutor had contacted Carter and said defendant wished to speak with him. The assistant prosecutor and defense counsel at the Rule 104 hearing stipulated to the introduction of a memo from [the] Assistant Prosecutor in lieu of calling [the assistant prosecutor] as a witness. The prosecutor's memo to the file . . . said:
On Saturday, May 12, 2018, I received a text message from [the] Assistant Deputy Public Defender . . . indicating he was covering CJP court and . . . defendant requested to speak to . . . Carter of this office. The message was received via SMS. A screen shot of the message is saved and attached to this memo.
2 As we noted in our prior opinion, Carter's first name was not contained in the record. Id. at 5 n.4. A-3837-23 4 The text message said: "Saturday 3:51 p.m. Hey bud, sorry to bug you on the weekend but I was just covering CJP, Jerome Bearfield, on homicide came up. Bearfield requested to speak to . . . Carter of ECPO. Just passing along the request."
[Id. at 5.] Later the same day, Carter, O'Neal, and two additional detectives
proceeded to the jail where they met with defendant. With a handheld recorder,
they conducted an interview that began with O'Neal asking: "I was advised
today by my supervisor, Carter, that you . . . had somebody reach out to the
Prosecutor's Office and you wish[ed] to speak to us. Is that correct?" Defendant
responded, "Correct." Id. at 6. O'Neal again issued defendant his Miranda
warnings, which defendant waived, and indicated he wished to provide a
statement. Thereafter, as we recounted:
Defendant proceeded to tell the detectives that when the accident occurred, he exited his car to approach the car behind him. That driver exited the car and the trunk "popped" open; defendant was "intoxicated" and "scared." When the other driver "went to the trunk," defendant said he "didn't allow him to come back up with nothing in the trunk." To "protect [him]self," defendant shot the man five times with a ".38 Smith & Wesson."
[Ibid.] At the N.J.R.E. 104(c) hearing, the trial court found the statement
admissible, concluding defendant elected to speak after a knowing, intelligent,
A-3837-23 5 and voluntary waiver of his right to counsel. Id. at 8. The court found neither
CJP counsel nor defendant demanded that defendant have an attorney present
during either of the interviews. Further, the court noted:
All too often we see many defense counsel write a letter to the police or the Prosecutor's Office, hey, I . . . represent so-and-so, do not speak to him without me being present. This was just sort of the opposite. This was initiated by the Public Defender and the clear implication was that, hey, it's okay for you to speak to my client. . . . [H]e wants to speak to you.
Thus, the trial court found no Miranda violation as defendant did not invoke his
right to counsel.
B. Plea and Sentencing Proceedings
Thereafter, pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement, defendant pled guilty
to an amended charge of aggravated manslaughter. In exchange, the State
recommended a sentence of twenty-five years' imprisonment. In providing the
factual basis for his guilty plea, defendant admitted he drove his car while in
possession of a loaded firearm without a permit when he was rear-ended by
Howard's vehicle. Defendant explained he exited his car, approached Howard,
pointed his loaded firearm, and shot him multiple times, causing his death.
Defendant agreed he fired "knowing [Howard] could die, but not really caring
whether he did or not." He further conceded "at that time . . . [Howard] did not
A-3837-23 6 pose an immediate threat to [him] . . . . [Howard] was out of his car. [But] he
was not threatening [defendant] at that point."
Defendant's sentencing counsel provided a written submission in advance
of the sentencing proceeding. In his written submission, sentencing counsel
asserted,
in light of the character letters attached, the defendant will be requesting at sentencing that the court consider mitigating factors (3) [(defendant acted under strong provocation)], (4) [(there were grounds tending to excuse or justify defendant's conduct, though not constituting a defense)], (5) [(the victim induced or facilitated the offense)], (8) [(defendant's conduct was unlikely to recur)], (9) [(defendant's character and attitude indicated he was not likely to commit another offense)], (11) [(imprisonment would cause excessive hardship to defendant and dependents)] and (12) [(defendant's cooperation with law enforcement)].
At the hearing, sentencing counsel argued the mitigating factors "at their
height would actually outweigh the aggravating factors, but at the minimum
would have the aggravating and mitigating factors stand in equipoise." Counsel
asked the court to consider defendant's difficult past, his young child, his
"thoughtful and remorseful" confession after turning himself in under "his own
volition," and his remorse and regret over what counsel characterized as
defendant "reacting" "rashly, stupidly, and unfortunately" in the circumstances.
Counsel indicated, although this did not "amount to a defense," defendant was
A-3837-23 7 contrite for what was a "bad decision," by someone who is not a "bad person,"
and should not be judged by this "one night." Counsel requested a twenty-year
prison term.
The sentencing court cited defendant's "three prior [indictable]
convictions," his decision "to carry a loaded weapon" and, "with his mother
present, . . . get out and shoot the man who had committed the sin of rear-ending
him in a traffic collision." The court considered the sentencing factors under
N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1, and found aggravating factors (3) risk of another offense, (6)
nature and extent of prior record, and (9) the need to deter defendant and others
applied, and determined they substantially outweighed the non-existent
mitigating factors. See N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3),(6), and (9). The court sentenced
defendant in accordance with the plea agreement to twenty-five-years'
imprisonment with an eighty-five-percent period of parole ineligibility pursuant
to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, for aggravated manslaughter
conviction and a concurrent twelve-and-one-half-year period of parole
ineligibility under the Graves Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c), for possession of the
firearm.
A-3837-23 8 C. Direct Appeal
On direct appeal, defendant argued the trial court incorrectly found his
second statement admissible when he "did not knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waive his rights against self-incrimination because the interrogating
officer, knowing that defendant was assigned counsel, failed to question
defendant whether he wanted to waive his rights in light of the fact that he was
represented by counsel but his attorney was not present." Bearfield, slip op. at
2-3.
We rejected defendant's comparison of the circumstances surrounding his
second statement with those presented in State v. Reed, 133 N.J. 237 (1993),
where police violated the defendant's right to counsel by failing to inform the
defendant that counsel wished to speak to him prior to custodial interrogation.
We found that, here, defendant was aware he was represented and affirmatively
requested his counsel contact investigators to advise them defendant wished to
speak to them. Bearfield, slip op. at 10-11. We noted defendant's circumstances
more closely aligned with those in State v. Kennedy, 97 N.J. 278, 288-89 (1984),
where the defendant's attorney told police the defendant wanted to provide
information, the defendant waived his Miranda rights without counsel present,
and provided incriminating information. Bearfield, slip op. at 13-14. We noted
A-3837-23 9 the Court in Kennedy found no obligation on the prosecutor to further safeguard
the defendant from voluntarily waiving his right to counsel and speaking to law
enforcement given defense counsel's role in setting up the interview. Id. at 14.
We affirmed the trial court's finding that the State had not violated
defendant's Miranda rights in these circumstances when the interview arose from
defense counsel's initiation on defendant's behalf and at defendant's request.
Ibid. We noted, "The attorney imposed no conditions precedent to the
investigators commencing the interview, and O'Neal confirmed with defendant
that he had asked to speak with the investigators before the interrogation even
began." Ibid.
We also affirmed the sentence, rejecting defendant's claim the
"[sentencing] court's rejection of mitigating factors was not supported by
competent, credible evidence in the record." Id. at 17.
D. PCR Proceedings
On August 25, 2023, defendant filed a pro se petition for PCR, generally
asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Thereafter, with the assistance of
assigned counsel, defendant filed an amended petition, raising several claims
against CJP counsel and sentencing counsel. PCR counsel also filed a
supporting supplemental brief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel,
A-3837-23 10 claiming his "CJP attorney facilitated [defendant's] giving an uncounseled
statement to law enforcement," and his trial "[c]ounsel failed to present
information . . . at sentencing that would have supported mitigating factors."
At oral argument, PCR counsel contended CJP counsel was deficient for
"allowing [defendant] without much resistance, without much fight, without any
legal advice to the contrary, allowing him to go speak with law enforcement,
and then going and doing so un-counseled." Regarding sentencing counsel's
performance, PCR counsel argued, "had there been an investigation, there might
have been more information to present at the sentencing argument about . . . a
self-defense component to this case." The State countered it was "the first
statement that doomed [defendant]," it was not uncommon for defendants to
meet with investigators without their counsel once they've decided they wish to
provide information, and it would have been unethical for CJP counsel to
disregard defendant's direction.
On June 10, 2024, the PCR court denied defendant's petition, and in its
accompanying written decision, addressed the claims under the Strickland 3 two-
part test. Regarding CJP counsel, the court initially noted defendant's decision
to offer information about the shooting "was likely a factor that the State
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A-3837-23 11 considered during plea negotiations," and "aided in reaching the negotiated
plea." Accordingly, the court rejected any claim that CJP's conduct rendered it
"impossible" to negotiate any favorable plea negotiations.
The PCR court next emphasized the trial judge deemed the statement
admissible as knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily provided, and that
decision was affirmed on appeal. Thus, the court reasoned, "regardless of
whether [defendant's] CJP attorney advised him not to speak to law enforcement,
[defendant] was well aware of the effects of waiving his Miranda rights and
giving a statement." The court specifically found, irrespective of whether CJP
counsel advised defendant not to submit to an interview without counsel present,
defendant knew he had the right to have counsel with him and waived that right.
The court indicated defendant's conduct reflected his desire to speak to
investigators and his direction to counsel to contact investigators on his behalf;
thus, the court noted, CJP counsel was not free to simply disregard defendant's
strategic choice.
The PCR court further recognized defendant's decision to provide
additional information "was not an irrational decision," particularly after
defendant learned the evidence against him at the CJP hearing. The court found,
without the second statement, it was "unlikely" defendant would have secured
A-3837-23 12 such a favorable plea offer. Alternatively, the court envisioned risks if
defendant proceeded to trial, as his first statement placing himself at the scene
but denying the shooting would have "established inconsistencies before the
jury." The PCR court cited Kennedy, 97 N.J. at 289, and found it "clear" that it
was "defendant's desire to talk to the detectives," aware he had counsel and could
invoke his right to have counsel present.
Finally, the PCR court held "even if CJP counsel acted inappropriately,"
defendant had not established prejudice, namely, "a reasonable probability that,
but for counsel's errors, he would not have pled guilty and would have insisted
on going to trial." Specifically, as to the second prong of Strickland, the PCR
court noted
the State had a very strong a case against [defendant]. The homicide was caught on surveillance video, as well as, video from the bar shortly before the murder clearly showing [defendant] wearing the same clothes as the shooter. Additionally, [defendant] put himself at the murder scene in his first statement to detectives on May 11, 2018. There is not a reasonable probability that [defendant] would have insisted on going to trial and risk[ed] the likelihood of being convicted of murder and facing a sentence far in excess of the 25 years he pled guilty to.
Accordingly, the PCR court held defendant failed to make a prima facie showing
of ineffective assistance from CJP counsel.
A-3837-23 13 Regarding defendant's challenge to the adequacy of sentencing counsel's
presentation of mitigating factors, the PCR court cited this court's decision on
direct appeal in which we concluded no mitigating factors were supported by
credible evidence in the record. The PCR court also highlighted sentencing
counsel's arguments advancing mitigating factors both in its submission to the
court and at the sentencing hearing. The court again analyzed the mitigating
factors and found none applied, rejecting defendant's claims against sentencing
counsel.
II.
On appeal defendant reprises his arguments made before the PCR court.
He argues:
[POINT I]
DEFENDANT MADE A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR [CJP] COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REPRESENT HIM AT THE TIME A STATEMENT WAS MADE TO POLICE AND FOR COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY REPRESENT HIM AT SENTENCING.
A. APPLICABLE LAW.
B. DEFENDANT'S CONS[T]ITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL WAS VIOLATED WHEN [CJP] COUNSEL FACILITATED A WAIVER OF THAT RIGHT DURING DEFENDANT'S SECOND
A-3837-23 14 STATEMENT TO THE POLICE WHICH DIRECTLY LED TO HIS INCRIMINATION.
C. DEFENDANT MADE A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR [CJP] COUNSEL'S FAILURE [TO] REPRESENT HIM AT A TIME A STATEMENT WAS GIVEN TO THE POLICE.
D. DEFENDANT MADE A PRIMA FACIE CLAIM OF [IN]EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR [SENTENCING COUNSEL'S] FAILURE TO ADEQUATELY ARGUE MITIGATING FACTORS AT SENTENCING. "We review the legal conclusions of a PCR judge de novo," State v.
Reevey, 417 N.J. Super. 134, 146 (App. Div. 2010), but "review under the abuse
of discretion standard the PCR court's determination to proceed without an
evidentiary hearing," State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div.
2013). "Where . . . no evidentiary hearing was conducted," as here, "we may
review the factual inferences the [trial] court has drawn from the documentary
record de novo." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016)
(citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)).
An evidentiary hearing is warranted only when (1) a defendant establishes
"a prima facie case in support of [PCR]," (2) the court determines that there are
"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the
existing record," and (3) the court determines that "an evidentiary hearing is
A-3837-23 15 necessary to resolve the claims" asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354
(2013) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)); see also R. 3:22-10(e)(2)
(providing "a court shall not grant an evidentiary hearing . . . if the defendant's
allegations are too vague, conclusory, or speculative"). Indeed, "if the court
perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid the court's analysis of
whether the defendant is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an evidentiary hearing need
not be granted." Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. at 401 (omission in original) (quoting
State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997)).
"To establish a prima facie case, [a] defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light
most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-
10(b). Moreover, a defendant must make this showing "by a preponderance of
the credible evidence." State v. Goodwin, 173 N.J. 583, 593 (2002).
The United States Supreme Court in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687,
established a two-part test to determine whether a defendant has been deprived
of the effective assistance of counsel, which the New Jersey Supreme Court
adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), under New Jersey's
Constitution. Failure to establish either prong requires the denial of an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700.
A-3837-23 16 To satisfy the first prong, defendant must demonstrate counsel's
performance was deficient and "fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness," meaning, "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment."
Id. at 687-88. Defendants "must allege specific facts and evidence supporting
[their] allegations." Porter, 216 N.J. at 355. "Bald assertions" will not suffice.
State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). Further,
reviewing courts "must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls
within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance," and "the defendant
must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged
action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound trial strategy.'" Strickland, 466
U.S. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955)).
Under Strickland's second prong, a defendant must "affirmatively prove"
there exists "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." State v. Gideon,
244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "Although a
demonstration of prejudice constitutes the second part of the Strickland analysis,
courts are permitted leeway to choose to examine first whether a defendant has
been prejudiced, . . . and if not, to dismiss the claim without determining
A-3837-23 17 whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan,
209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation omitted); see also State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J.
Super. 448, 455-56 (App. Div. 2022).
Ultimately, "an error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does
not warrant setting aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if [it] had no
effect on the judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691. Errors with "some
conceivable effect on the outcome" fall short of warranting relief. Id. at 693.
To show sufficient prejudice when a conviction results from a guilty plea,
defendant must show a "reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the
defendant] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial,"
State v. Nuñez-Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting
State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)); see also Gaitan, 209 N.J. at 351,
and that "a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under
the circumstances," Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
Against this legal backdrop, we first address and reject defendant's claim
regarding CJP counsel's conduct and failure to properly advise defendant against
providing an uncounseled statement to investigators. We recognize defendant
had been arrested and charged with murder at the time CJP counsel advised the
assistant prosecutor, through a text message, that defendant wished to speak with
A-3837-23 18 investigators. We similarly acknowledge defendant's assertion that CJP counsel
never advised defendant of the potential perils of such a meeting with detectives.
Defendant also claims counsel never recommended that counsel accompany
defendant should he elect to initiate a second meeting and provide another
statement.
We previously determined defendant voluntarily waived his right to
counsel and, although defendant was represented at the time he elected to speak
to detectives, defense counsel's absence at that meeting did not render
defendant's subsequent uncounseled confession violative of Miranda's
safeguards. Bearfield, slip op. at 14. However, our inquiry on direct appeal
addressed the propriety of law enforcement's conduct, not CJP counsel's.
Nevertheless, assuming without deciding CJP counsel's actions were
constitutionally deficient, we are satisfied defendant failed to show prejudice
resulted from counsel's conduct. We are not persuaded that, "but for" CJP
counsel's failure to advise against speaking to detectives without an attorney or
accompany him to the second interview, defendant would not have pled guilty.
We view defendant's claim in light of the circumstances known to defendant at
the time he elected to speak.
A-3837-23 19 At the time defendant chose to reinitiate contact with detectives and offer
additional information, he had been arrested for murder. He had seen at least a
proffer of the evidence against him, including video surveillance of the collision
and the shooting of the unarmed victim after the shooter's car was rear-ended.
Nearby video captured defendant dressed in clothing matching that of the
shooter, and police traced the shooter's car to defendant. Defendant had already
voluntarily offered information to investigators, admitting he was the driver of
the car struck by the victim, and placed himself at the scene of the shooting.
Faced at the CJP hearing with evidence contradicting his previous denial
in multiple aspects, defendant asked CJP counsel to notify detectives he wished
to speak with them. Defendant again waived his Miranda rights, including his
right to have counsel present, and willingly corrected his previous statement,
resulting in a plea to a reduced charge and limited defendant's sentencing
exposure. He has not demonstrated that his decision to waive counsel—perhaps
in the hopes of gaining favor with the State or to counteract the repercussions of
his initial denial—resulted from CJP counsel's allegedly deficient performance.
He did not establish counsel's alleged failures caused him to plead guilty to his
detriment. Defendant also failed to show, if properly counseled, he would have
A-3837-23 20 negotiated a better plea or proceeded to trial, risking a murder conviction, and
obtained a more favorable outcome.
Importantly, pursuant to the negotiated plea agreement, the State's
recommended sentence—capped at twenty-five years' imprisonment—undercut
the maximum thirty-year sentence for aggravated manslaughter, and the
maximum life sentence and the thirty-year mandatory minimum term for murder
he would have faced if convicted after a trial. Defendant failed to show different
advice from CJP counsel would have changed the outcome.
Similarly, we reject defendant's claims that sentencing counsel's
performance was deficient. The record reveals defense counsel raised mitigating
factors in both the written submission to the court and at the sentencing hearing.
The sentencing court's findings confirmed the court considered the
circumstances surrounding the shooting and defendant's personal characteristics
in fashioning its sentence. As we determined on direct appeal:
The judge specifically addressed the mitigating factors . . . . [and] found that defendant did not act under strong provocation, noting that an auto accident "is in no way somehow grounds for [defendant] to do what [he] did," and he rejected mitigating factor four for the same reasons. The judge concluded the victim in no way induced or facilitated the homicide "just because his car struck [defendant's] car. It was an accident, an auto accident."
A-3837-23 21 Defendant contends the judge minimized the circumstances he faced on the night of the shooting, reducing the incident to merely "an auto accident." He argues the judge failed to consider defendant's concern for his own safety and that of his mother, who was a passenger in his car. However, there was nothing in the record to indicate that the victim posed any threat to defendant. We defer to the judge's conclusion that none of the mitigating factors applied because they were not supported by credible evidence in the record.
[Id. at 16-17.] Having reviewed the sentencing record, we are satisfied counsel's
performance was not deficient. To the contrary, sentencing counsel advanced
the precise mitigating information defendant claims was omitted. Further, the
sentencing court's findings readily reflect its consideration of the proposed
mitigating factors. Accordingly, the PCR court reasonably concluded counsel's
advocacy at sentencing did not prejudice defendant. We therefore conclude
defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.
Affirmed.
A-3837-23 22