NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0713-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JELUDY TAVAREZ- RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Argued March 24, 2025 – Decided July 14, 2025
Before Judges Berdote Byrne, Jacobs and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 22-04-0566.
Eric W. Feinberg argued the cause for appellant (Caruso Smith Picini, PC, attorneys; Eric W. Feinberg, on the briefs).
Viviana M. Hanley, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Viviana M. Hanley, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Jeludy Tavarez-Rodriguez appeals from a Criminal Part order
denying her application to be admitted to the pre-trial intervention program
("PTI") and to dismiss the indictment that charged her with second-degree
unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).1 Defendant lived
in Pennsylvania and had a permit to carry a handgun there; however, she did
not have similar licensure in New Jersey, nor had she ever applied for that
authorization. After she was indicted on the weapons charge, she argued
before the trial court that she should be permitted to carry her weapon in New
Jersey under the Full Faith and Credit Clause ("the Clause") of the United
States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV § 1. In a cogent written opinion, the
motion judge denied the application, finding that the Clause did not permit the
relief defendant requested, nor did the recent United States Supreme Court in
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), prohibit her
prosecution. We agree with the motion judge and affirm.
1 Defendant has only briefed the issues related to the dismissal of the indictment and not the denial of PTI. We decline to address any issues concerning the denial of the PTI application. Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021), aff'd as modified, 252 N.J. 265 (2022); See R. 2:6-2(a)(5).
A-0713-23 2 I.
After defendant was stopped by Medford Township police officers for
speeding, the arresting officer detected an odor of alcohol from defendant's
vehicle. He consequently directed her to exit the car. She complied, and the
officer observed a loaded handgun lying on the driver's side floor. Defendant
admitted ownership of the gun and informed the officer that she held a valid
Pennsylvania permit to carry the firearm in that Commonwealth.
Defendant was indicted for second-degree unlawful possession of a
handgun under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). The State denied her initial
application for admission to PTI citing concerns about her criminal history that
included a previous conviction for driving while intoxicated in Pennsylvania, a
pending charge for the same offense in Ohio, and multiple violations of
custodial release conditions. She moved to dismiss the indictment and,
alternatively, to compel her admission to PTI. After the trial court denied both
applications, she pled guilty to the indictment and received a three -year, non-
custodial term of probation.
Defendant appealed and raises a single issue for our consideration:
POINT I THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY MUST RECOGNIZE CARRY PERMITS ISSUED BY PENNSYLVANIA.
A-0713-23 3 A. Prosecution of Defendant Violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution [U.S. Const. art. IV § 1].
B. Prosecution of Defendant Violates [N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)].
II.
We defer to a motion judge's decision to dismiss an indictment and
reverse only if we conclude the judge misapplied discretion. State v. Twiggs,
233 N.J. 513, 532 (2018). However, because the decision to dismiss involves
a legal question, we review the motion judge's interpretation of the
constitutional issues presented in this appeal de novo. Ibid.
Defendant first argues New Jersey must cede to Pennsylvania's gun
permit statute under the Clause. According to defendant, because New Jersey
does not recognize Pennsylvania gun licensure requirements, it creates a
"disjointed system which seeks to criminalize the law-abiding." We disagree
and conclude New Jersey is within its legal rights to enforce its own gun -
permitting laws and is not constitutionally required to honor Pennsylvania gun -
permitting statute.
Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution and the Full Faith and
Credit Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738) requires states to recognize the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of other states. This principle helps maintain
A-0713-23 4 unity and judicial efficiency by ensuring that states respect each other's legal
decisions, thus preventing duplicative litigation and waste of judicial
resources. See Simmermon v. Dryvit Sys., Inc. 196 N.J. 316, 329-30 (2008)
(citing Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health
Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 703-04 (1982)).
The Clause, however, is not absolute. It "does not require one state to
substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the
conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling
force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the same
persons and events." In re Winston, 438 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 2014)
(quoting Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502
(1939)). To that end, it "does not compel 'a state to substitute the statutes of
other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which
it is competent to legislate.'" Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522
U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Emps., 306 U.S. at 501). Consequently,
such "[a] rigid and literal enforcement" of the Clause, "without regard to the
statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict
arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but
A-0713-23 5 cannot be in its own." Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n., 294
U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
Consistent with these principles, we previously observed the Clause
would not require automatic adherence to a neighboring state's licensing
requirements as it applied specifically to firearm ownership.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0713-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JELUDY TAVAREZ- RODRIGUEZ,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Argued March 24, 2025 – Decided July 14, 2025
Before Judges Berdote Byrne, Jacobs and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 22-04-0566.
Eric W. Feinberg argued the cause for appellant (Caruso Smith Picini, PC, attorneys; Eric W. Feinberg, on the briefs).
Viviana M. Hanley, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Viviana M. Hanley, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
Defendant Jeludy Tavarez-Rodriguez appeals from a Criminal Part order
denying her application to be admitted to the pre-trial intervention program
("PTI") and to dismiss the indictment that charged her with second-degree
unlawful possession of a handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1).1 Defendant lived
in Pennsylvania and had a permit to carry a handgun there; however, she did
not have similar licensure in New Jersey, nor had she ever applied for that
authorization. After she was indicted on the weapons charge, she argued
before the trial court that she should be permitted to carry her weapon in New
Jersey under the Full Faith and Credit Clause ("the Clause") of the United
States Constitution. U.S. Const. art. IV § 1. In a cogent written opinion, the
motion judge denied the application, finding that the Clause did not permit the
relief defendant requested, nor did the recent United States Supreme Court in
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022), prohibit her
prosecution. We agree with the motion judge and affirm.
1 Defendant has only briefed the issues related to the dismissal of the indictment and not the denial of PTI. We decline to address any issues concerning the denial of the PTI application. Green Knight Cap., LLC v. Calderon, 469 N.J. Super. 390, 396 (App. Div. 2021), aff'd as modified, 252 N.J. 265 (2022); See R. 2:6-2(a)(5).
A-0713-23 2 I.
After defendant was stopped by Medford Township police officers for
speeding, the arresting officer detected an odor of alcohol from defendant's
vehicle. He consequently directed her to exit the car. She complied, and the
officer observed a loaded handgun lying on the driver's side floor. Defendant
admitted ownership of the gun and informed the officer that she held a valid
Pennsylvania permit to carry the firearm in that Commonwealth.
Defendant was indicted for second-degree unlawful possession of a
handgun under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1). The State denied her initial
application for admission to PTI citing concerns about her criminal history that
included a previous conviction for driving while intoxicated in Pennsylvania, a
pending charge for the same offense in Ohio, and multiple violations of
custodial release conditions. She moved to dismiss the indictment and,
alternatively, to compel her admission to PTI. After the trial court denied both
applications, she pled guilty to the indictment and received a three -year, non-
custodial term of probation.
Defendant appealed and raises a single issue for our consideration:
POINT I THE STATE OF NEW JERSEY MUST RECOGNIZE CARRY PERMITS ISSUED BY PENNSYLVANIA.
A-0713-23 3 A. Prosecution of Defendant Violates the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution [U.S. Const. art. IV § 1].
B. Prosecution of Defendant Violates [N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Ass'n v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1 (2022)].
II.
We defer to a motion judge's decision to dismiss an indictment and
reverse only if we conclude the judge misapplied discretion. State v. Twiggs,
233 N.J. 513, 532 (2018). However, because the decision to dismiss involves
a legal question, we review the motion judge's interpretation of the
constitutional issues presented in this appeal de novo. Ibid.
Defendant first argues New Jersey must cede to Pennsylvania's gun
permit statute under the Clause. According to defendant, because New Jersey
does not recognize Pennsylvania gun licensure requirements, it creates a
"disjointed system which seeks to criminalize the law-abiding." We disagree
and conclude New Jersey is within its legal rights to enforce its own gun -
permitting laws and is not constitutionally required to honor Pennsylvania gun -
permitting statute.
Article IV, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution and the Full Faith and
Credit Act (28 U.S.C. § 1738) requires states to recognize the public acts,
records, and judicial proceedings of other states. This principle helps maintain
A-0713-23 4 unity and judicial efficiency by ensuring that states respect each other's legal
decisions, thus preventing duplicative litigation and waste of judicial
resources. See Simmermon v. Dryvit Sys., Inc. 196 N.J. 316, 329-30 (2008)
(citing Underwriters Nat'l Assurance Co. v. N.C. Life & Accident & Health
Ins. Guar. Ass'n, 455 U.S. 691, 703-04 (1982)).
The Clause, however, is not absolute. It "does not require one state to
substitute for its own statute, applicable to persons and events within it, the
conflicting statute of another state, even though that statute is of controlling
force in the courts of the state of its enactment with respect to the same
persons and events." In re Winston, 438 N.J. Super. 1, 9 (App. Div. 2014)
(quoting Pac. Emps. Ins. Co. v. Indus. Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 502
(1939)). To that end, it "does not compel 'a state to substitute the statutes of
other states for its own statutes dealing with a subject matter concerning which
it is competent to legislate.'" Baker by Thomas v. Gen. Motors Corp., 522
U.S. 222, 232 (1998) (quoting Pac. Emps., 306 U.S. at 501). Consequently,
such "[a] rigid and literal enforcement" of the Clause, "without regard to the
statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict
arises, the statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but
A-0713-23 5 cannot be in its own." Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Indus. Accident Comm'n., 294
U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
Consistent with these principles, we previously observed the Clause
would not require automatic adherence to a neighboring state's licensing
requirements as it applied specifically to firearm ownership. Winston, 438
N.J. Super. at 9 (holding "[t]here is no constitutional requirement that New
Jersey deem [defendant] not disqualified for a permit under its firearms law
just because [another state] has seen fit to do so under its law."). In Winston,
we considered whether the applicant in that case, who had taken affirmative
steps to apply for licensure in New Jersey, was unconstitutionally precluded
from that perceived entitlement. Ibid.
In the present matter, the facts are different. Here, at the time of the
offense, defendant had not attempted to apply for a New Jersey firearms permit
that would require her to be subject to the process created to receive that
authorization. Impermissibly, defendant sought to side-step the procedural and
substantive scrutiny of our Legislature requiring that all New Jersey firearm
licensees be "responsible, law-abiding, and appropriately trained individuals
who would not pose undue safety risks if armed in public places." N.J.S.A.
2C:58-4.2(c).
A-0713-23 6 Specifically, New Jersey allows the issuance of a license to carry a
handgun only following satisfactory completion and administrative (and
potential judicial) approval of a comprehensive application. N.J.S.A. 2C:58 -4.
Restrictions follow licensure, including a prohibition that the permit "shall not
be construed to authorize a holder to carry a handgun openly . . . ." Ibid.
Among other requirements, under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4, the application requires
nonrelative character references who can speak to the applicant's fitness to
carry a handgun (2C:58-4(b)), a criminal background check (2C:58-4(c)), and
a training course in safe handling and storage (2C:58-4(g)). Additionally, an
"applicant must 'not [be] subject to any of the disabilities set forth in [N.J.S.A.
2C:58-3(c)],' which consider the applicant's age, mental and physical health,
criminal history, and potential danger to public safety." State v. Wade, 476
N.J. Super 490, 504 (alterations in original) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c)); see
also N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c).
Pennsylvania's licensing requirements are different both in the
application's matter and in its form. See 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6109. Some of
the requirements for licensure in Pennsylvania are broader than those required
in New Jersey, and others more narrowly drawn. See ibid. For instance, New
Jersey permits must be renewed every two years, and those in Pennsylvania,
A-0713-23 7 every five. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(a); 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 6109(f)(1). New
Jersey firearm carry permits require no fewer than four character references
and Pennsylvania requires none. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(b). New Jersey mandates
applicants complete an approved firearm safety course, whereas Pennsylvania
has no such requirement. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c).
Additionally, Pennsylvania explicitly and implicitly prohibits the form
of comity advocated by defendant in this case and rejects the blanket
entitlement defendant claims. According to its authorizing statute, any license
issued in Pennsylvania is nominally restricted to the Commonwealth's borders.
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 6109 ("A license to carry a firearm shall be for the
purpose of carrying a firearm concealed on or about one's person or in a
vehicle throughout this Commonwealth.").
Because the licensing requirements vary between the two states, both
New Jersey and Pennsylvania are permitted to set their own qualifications as
they see fit, so long as they remain within constitutional parameters. The
additional New Jersey requirements, which the state is free to impose, further
define characteristics and qualities for which Pennsylvania does not require.
Therefore, the automatic reciprocity requested by defendant does not exist in
this context.
A-0713-23 8 III.
Next, defendant argues that New Jersey's prosecution of defendant is
unconstitutional because it violates the Second Amendment to the United
States Constitution and the rule established by the United States Supreme
Court in Bruen. Specifically, as she did before the motion judge, defendant
argues she is immune from New Jersey firearms licensure statutes and
regulations because she held a valid Pennsylvania permit. We disagree.
According to the Second Amendment, "[a] well-regulated Militia, being
necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and
bear Arms, shall not be infringed." U.S. Const. amend. II. The Second
Amendment protects the right of individuals to keep and bear arms apart from
service in a militia. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 582 (2008). The
Amendment "is fully applicable to the States" through the Fourteenth
Amendment. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010). In
short, Heller and McDonald "recognized that the Second and Fourteenth
Amendments protect the right of an ordinary, law-abiding citizen to possess a
handgun in the home for self-defense." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 8-9. This
precedent, however, does not preclude any state from regulating handgun
possession for their state.
A-0713-23 9 In Bruen, the Court expressly endorsed state gun licensing and permit
systems. Wade, 476 N.J. Super. at 502-03 (stating "Bruen expressly endorsed
gun-permitting regimes that contained narrow, objective, and definitive
standards to guide officials in determining whether applicants were 'in fact,
law-abiding, responsible citizens.'" (quoting Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9)).
Additionally:
[T]he [United States Supreme] Court's decision does not prohibit States from imposing licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for self-defense [and] . . . does not affect the existing licensing regimes—known as "shall-issue" regimes—that are employed in [forty-three] States.
....
Likewise, the [six] States including New York [and New Jersey] potentially affected by today's decision may continue to require licenses for carrying handguns for self-defense so long as those States employ objective licensing requirements like those used by the [forty-three] shall issue States.
. . . Properly interpreted, the Second Amendment allows a "variety" of gun regulations.
[Wade, 476 N.J. Super. at 503 (fourth, fifth, and sixth alterations in original) (citing Bruen, 597 U.S. at 78- 79 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (citations omitted)).]
The day after Bruen was decided, the New Jersey Attorney General
issued Law Enforcement Directive No. 2022-07, consistent with Bruen,
A-0713-23 10 instructing that a "justifiable need" was no longer required of applicants
seeking a carry permit but that all other mandatory application requirements
should be considered. Off. of the Att'y Gen., Law Enf't Directive No. 2022 -07,
Directive Clarifying Requirements for Carrying of Firearms in Public 1-2
(June 24, 2022). In December 2022, the New Jersey Legislature passed, and
the Governor approved, a framework that re-committed to New Jersey's long-
standing tradition requiring a person obtain a permit before carrying a firearm
in public and eliminated the justifiable need requirement for this authorization.
See L. 2022 c. 131.
We have already held that, "consistent with Heller and Bruen, New
Jersey can continue to regulate who can purchase and carry a handgun in
public so long as those regulations are consistent with the text of the Second
Amendment and our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation." Wade,
467 N.J. Super. at 510. Moreover, the constitutionality of the "public health,
safety or welfare" requirement for the issuance of a handgun purchase permit
has been upheld following Bruen. In re M.U.'s Application for a Handgun
Purchase Permit, 475 N.J. Super. 148, 163, 193-94 (2023) (upholding the
constitutionality of N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(5)).
A-0713-23 11 "Properly interpreted, the Second Amendment allows a 'variety' of gun
regulations." Bruen, 597 U.S. at 80 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring) (quoting
Heller, 554 U.S. at 636.). The validity of state regulations of handgun
possession is determined under the two-step approach adopted by the Bruen
Court:
We reiterate that the standard for applying the Second Amendment is as follows: When the Second Amendment's plain text covers an individual's conduct, the Constitution presumptively protects that conduct. The government must then justify its regulation by demonstrating that it is consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation. Only then may a court conclude that the individual's conduct falls outside the Second Amendment's "unqualified command."
[Id. at 24 (quoting Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1961)).]
Permission given to the public to carry handguns has long been "the
most closely-regulated aspect of" New Jersey's firearms statutes. In re Preis,
118 N.J. 564, 568 (1990). As early as 1882, New Jersey has regulated the
carrying of handguns, and since 1905, it has required private citizens to obtain
a permit before carrying firearms in public. Wade, 476 N.J. Super. at 503
The regulatory and administrative requirements to secure permission to
carry a handgun in New Jersey are robust. Applicants must follow a two -step
A-0713-23 12 process. First, the applicant must apply to the relevant law enforcement
official—the chief police officer in the municipality, or, in some instances, the
Superintendent of the State Police. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c). In addition to the
application, a potential licensee must secure the endorsement of at least four
reputable nonrelative persons who have known the applicant for at least three
years before the application and "who shall certify . . . that the applicant is a
person of good moral character and behavior." N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(b).
An applicant must also satisfy several other criteria. See N.J.S.A.
2C:58-4; N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c); see also N.J.A.C. 13:54-2.1 to 2.10; In re M.U.,
475 N.J. Super. at 171-72, 178-80. Specifically:
[an] applicant must "not [be] subject to any of the disabilities set forth in [N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)]," which consider the applicant's age, mental and physical health, criminal history, and potential danger to public safety. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:58- 3(c). The applicant must also demonstrate "familiar[ity] with the same handling and use of handguns," evidenced by certified completion of a training course, submission of scores, or passage of a test. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c); see also N.J.A.C. 13:54- 2.4(b) and (c).
[Wade, 476 N.J. Super. at 504 (all but first alteration in original).]
Additional requirements include the applicant to demonstrate, among
other things, he or she has no juvenile adjudications for certain weapons
A-0713-23 13 offenses; is not the subject of a domestic violence restraining order; has not
violated certain types of court orders; has not been committed due to mental
health issues; is not a fugitive or the subject of an open warrant; and has
complied with liability insurance requirements. See N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(6),
(7), (10) to (15); N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d)(4); N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4.3.
After submission of the application, the chief or superintendent conducts
the necessary background checks. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(c). If the chief or
superintendent does not approve the application, the applicant may appeal to
the Superior Court. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-4(d) to (e). The court is required to hold a
hearing to allow the applicant to "proffer reasons why he satisfies the standard
and respond to any questions from the judge." In re Carlstrom, 240 N.J. 563,
572 (2020).
If an applicant does not follow these requirements and carries a weapon
without a permit, the State may prosecute that offender. Under N.J.S.A.
2C:39-5(b)(1), "[a]ny person who knowingly has in his possession any
handgun . . . without first having obtained a permit to carry the same as
provided in N.J.S.[A.] 2C:58-4, is guilty of a crime of the second degree."
We are not persuaded by defendant's argument that her prosecution was
constitutionally infirm. Despite her argument to the contrary, Bruen only
A-0713-23 14 permits the possession of a weapon—subject to an individual state's licensing
requirements—that ensures "that those bearing arms in the jurisdiction are . . .
'law-abiding, responsible citizens.'" Bruen, 597 U.S. at 38 n.9 (quoting Heller,
554 U.S. at 635). Defendant failed to comply with New Jersey's firearm
statutes, regulations, and mandate regarding the proper substance and
procedure to carry a weapon in this State. Since defendant failed to follow
those requirements, her prosecution is constitutional.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed them, any remaining
arguments raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R.
2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-0713-23 15