NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3002-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JELANI R. WEBSTER,
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
Submitted April 3, 2025 – Decided April 17, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Accusation No. 18-05-0815.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (William Kyle Meighan, Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Jelani Webster appeals from a March 23, 2023 order denying
her petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of
plea counsel, without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I.
We briefly summarize the relevant facts, which are undisputed. On July
10, 2017, defendant and two friends, including the deceased victim, rented a
motel room in Point Pleasant. There is no dispute the friends consumed alcohol
and drugs that evening and into the early morning hours of the next day.
At approximately 5:20 a.m., the Point Pleasant Beach Police Department
and Emergency Medical Services responded to a 9-1-1 call reporting an
unconscious female in the pool. Later that day, detectives conducted a recorded
interview of defendant after advising her of her Miranda rights.1 Defendant
initially told detectives the decedent had jumped into the pool on her own
accord, but changed her story after they indicated the whole encounter was
caught on video surveillance. Defendant, then-nineteen-years-old, admitted she
had pushed the decedent into the pool. Defendant also admitted to police neither
she nor the decedent knew how to swim.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-3002-22 2 Defendant pleaded guilty to an accusation charging her with second-
degree manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b), for causing the death of her friend.
The plea agreement provided for a sentence of five to ten years. The State
recommended a ten-year term of imprisonment and defendant provided a
Sentencing Memorandum and advocated for a five-year term. The court
sentenced defendant to six-and-a-half years in prison subject to the No Early
Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
We previously affirmed defendant's sentence pursuant to a Sentencing
Oral Argument calendar hearing. State v. Webster, No. A-3373-18 (App. Div.
May 5, 2020). Thereafter, defendant filed a timely pro se PCR petition, which
was later supplemented by a counselled brief. In her PCR petition, defendant
did not seek vacatur of her plea, but rather to reduce her sentence, arguing plea
counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a sentence in the third-degree range.2
Following oral argument, the PCR court denied her petition in an order
accompanied by a twenty-two-page written opinion. The court determined
"[a]lthough [d]efendant based her argument on ineffective assistance of counsel,
2 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) prescribes statutory ranges for a term of imprisonment based upon the degree of the offense: five to ten years for a second-degree crime, and three to five years for a third-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2)- (3). A-3002-22 3 the gravamen of her argument is that she received an excessive sentence and is
entitled to a sentence reduction." The court concluded "[d]efendant has no
colorable claim to a lesser sentence as it pertains to mitigating factors." Quoting
State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999), the court
determined "[d]efendant's argument is nothing but a 'bald assertion,'" stating :
[i]n plea counsel's sentencing memorandum, it is apparent that he addressed the lack of criminal history by [d]efendant, the lack of purpose to commit the crime, the culpability of [another friend at the scene], the presence of alcohol and drugs, [the decedent's blood alcohol content], and the age of [d]efendant. Defendant's argument is meritless as plea counsel addressed all of the above in addition to [d]efendant's willingness to cooperate, her acceptance of responsibility, the unlikeliness of this conduct to reoccur, and the inapplicability of aggravating factors.
The court relied on the sentencing transcript, which showed the sentencing
court considered defendant's age and other mitigating and aggravating factors.
The court determined defendant's sentence was "extremely favorable and well
below the ten-year maximum sought by the State."
The court found there was no indication the sentencing court "was clearly
convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweighed the aggravating
factors. Nor is there any evidence that justice must demand the downgrade."
The court determined defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of
A-3002-22 4 ineffective assistance of plea counsel under either Strickland prong. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
On appeal, defendant raises a single point for our consideration:
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HER CLAIM THAT COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO ADVOCATE ADEQUATELY AT SENTENCING BY ASKING FOR A DOWNGRADED SENTENCE.
II.
We review of the denial of PCR without an evidentiary hearing de novo.
State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2018). To reverse a
conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate that both: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient" and (2)
counsel's "errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987)
(adopting Strickland). Under the first prong, counsel's representation must be
objectively unreasonable. State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578 (2015).
Under the "'second, and far more difficult, prong of the' Strickland
standard," State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)
A-3002-22 5 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550-51 (alteration in original) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is an exacting
standard." Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). A
defendant seeking PCR "must 'affirmatively prove prejudice'" to satisfy the
second prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3002-22
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JELANI R. WEBSTER,
Defendant-Appellant. __________________________
Submitted April 3, 2025 – Decided April 17, 2025
Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Accusation No. 18-05-0815.
Jennifer Nicole Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (William Kyle Meighan, Supervising Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Jelani Webster appeals from a March 23, 2023 order denying
her petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) based on ineffective assistance of
plea counsel, without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I.
We briefly summarize the relevant facts, which are undisputed. On July
10, 2017, defendant and two friends, including the deceased victim, rented a
motel room in Point Pleasant. There is no dispute the friends consumed alcohol
and drugs that evening and into the early morning hours of the next day.
At approximately 5:20 a.m., the Point Pleasant Beach Police Department
and Emergency Medical Services responded to a 9-1-1 call reporting an
unconscious female in the pool. Later that day, detectives conducted a recorded
interview of defendant after advising her of her Miranda rights.1 Defendant
initially told detectives the decedent had jumped into the pool on her own
accord, but changed her story after they indicated the whole encounter was
caught on video surveillance. Defendant, then-nineteen-years-old, admitted she
had pushed the decedent into the pool. Defendant also admitted to police neither
she nor the decedent knew how to swim.
1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-3002-22 2 Defendant pleaded guilty to an accusation charging her with second-
degree manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(b), for causing the death of her friend.
The plea agreement provided for a sentence of five to ten years. The State
recommended a ten-year term of imprisonment and defendant provided a
Sentencing Memorandum and advocated for a five-year term. The court
sentenced defendant to six-and-a-half years in prison subject to the No Early
Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2.
We previously affirmed defendant's sentence pursuant to a Sentencing
Oral Argument calendar hearing. State v. Webster, No. A-3373-18 (App. Div.
May 5, 2020). Thereafter, defendant filed a timely pro se PCR petition, which
was later supplemented by a counselled brief. In her PCR petition, defendant
did not seek vacatur of her plea, but rather to reduce her sentence, arguing plea
counsel was ineffective by failing to seek a sentence in the third-degree range.2
Following oral argument, the PCR court denied her petition in an order
accompanied by a twenty-two-page written opinion. The court determined
"[a]lthough [d]efendant based her argument on ineffective assistance of counsel,
2 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a) prescribes statutory ranges for a term of imprisonment based upon the degree of the offense: five to ten years for a second-degree crime, and three to five years for a third-degree crime. N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(a)(2)- (3). A-3002-22 3 the gravamen of her argument is that she received an excessive sentence and is
entitled to a sentence reduction." The court concluded "[d]efendant has no
colorable claim to a lesser sentence as it pertains to mitigating factors." Quoting
State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999), the court
determined "[d]efendant's argument is nothing but a 'bald assertion,'" stating :
[i]n plea counsel's sentencing memorandum, it is apparent that he addressed the lack of criminal history by [d]efendant, the lack of purpose to commit the crime, the culpability of [another friend at the scene], the presence of alcohol and drugs, [the decedent's blood alcohol content], and the age of [d]efendant. Defendant's argument is meritless as plea counsel addressed all of the above in addition to [d]efendant's willingness to cooperate, her acceptance of responsibility, the unlikeliness of this conduct to reoccur, and the inapplicability of aggravating factors.
The court relied on the sentencing transcript, which showed the sentencing
court considered defendant's age and other mitigating and aggravating factors.
The court determined defendant's sentence was "extremely favorable and well
below the ten-year maximum sought by the State."
The court found there was no indication the sentencing court "was clearly
convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweighed the aggravating
factors. Nor is there any evidence that justice must demand the downgrade."
The court determined defendant had failed to establish a prima facie case of
A-3002-22 4 ineffective assistance of plea counsel under either Strickland prong. Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
On appeal, defendant raises a single point for our consideration:
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HER CLAIM THAT COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE BY FAILING TO ADVOCATE ADEQUATELY AT SENTENCING BY ASKING FOR A DOWNGRADED SENTENCE.
II.
We review of the denial of PCR without an evidentiary hearing de novo.
State v. Jackson, 454 N.J. Super. 284, 291 (App. Div. 2018). To reverse a
conviction based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
demonstrate that both: (1) "counsel's performance was deficient" and (2)
counsel's "errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial."
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; see also State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987)
(adopting Strickland). Under the first prong, counsel's representation must be
objectively unreasonable. State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 578 (2015).
Under the "'second, and far more difficult, prong of the' Strickland
standard," State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient
performance prejudiced the defense." State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)
A-3002-22 5 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant
must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550-51 (alteration in original) (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is an exacting
standard." Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). A
defendant seeking PCR "must 'affirmatively prove prejudice'" to satisfy the
second prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at
693). "[C]ourts are permitted leeway to choose to examine first whether a
defendant has been prejudiced, . . . and if not, to dismiss the claim without
determining whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient."
State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
"[T]o establish a prima facie claim, a [defendant] must do more than make
bald assertions that [they were] denied the effective assistance of counsel."
Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. PCR petitions must be "accompanied by an
affidavit or certification by defendant, or by others, setting forth with
particularity," State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014), "facts sufficient to
A-3002-22 6 demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance." Cummings, 321 N.J.
Super. at 170. "[F]actual assertions in a [PCR petition must] be made by
affidavit or certification in order to secure an evidentiary hearing." Jones, 219
N.J. at 312 (citing R. 3:22-10(c)).
Before us, defendant contends she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
her claim plea counsel rendered ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing
to advocate adequately for a downgraded sentence in the third-degree range
rather than the second-degree range.3 More particularly, defendant asserts she
"presented a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel under
Strickland . . . , and her claim was dependent . . . on evidence outside the trial
record. Thus, resolution of the claim required an evidentiary hearing."
Additionally, defendant contends "a sentence in the third-degree
range . . . would have been appropriate," under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2), which
provides:
[i]n cases of convictions for crimes of the first or second degree where the court is clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the aggravating factors and where the interest of justice demands, the court may sentence the defendant to a term appropriate to a crime of one degree lower than that of the crime for which the defendant was convicted.
3 We address the merits of defendant's arguments, finding no support for the State's argument her claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are moot. A-3002-22 7 She maintains counsel did not properly argue the mitigating factors—including
her age, maturity, and lack of criminal history—substantially outweighed the
aggravating factors, and the interest of justice demands a lower sentence.
We review a court's sentencing decision under an abuse of discretion
standard. State v. Blackmon, 202 N.J. 283, 297 (2010). Our limited review
assures aggravating and mitigating factors found by the court are supported by
competent, credible evidence in the record. State v. Miller, 205 N.J. 109, 127
(2011). Further, we must: (1) "require that an exercise of discretion be based
upon findings of fact that are grounded in competent, reasonably credible
evidence[;]" (2) "require that the factfinder apply correct legal princip les in
exercising its discretion[;]" and (3) "modify sentences [only] when the
application of the facts to the law is such a clear error of judgment that it shocks
the judicial conscience." State v. Roth, 95 N.J. 334, 363-64 (1984).
We reject defendant's contention she satisfied Strickland's two prong
standard and established a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel
and, is therefore, entitled to an evidentiary hearing as to counsel's deficient
representation at sentencing. The record includes plea counsel's Sentencing
Memorandum which addressed several mitigating factors under N.J.S.A. 2C:44-
1 and requested the court consider defendant's age (nineteen) and lack of
A-3002-22 8 maturity prior to sentencing. Counsel further asked the court to consider
defendant's close relationship with the decedent, the lack of purposeful intent to
cause harm, and "the mitigating factors present in this matter preponderate the
aggravating factors," in asking the court for "a sentence in the lower end of the
range." In reviewing this record, the PCR court concluded, "[t]he argument that
the mitigating factors were not raised during the sentencing are directly refuted
by the sentencing transcript," which confirms the court addressed the factors
directly on the record as previously iterated. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355
(2013) (A "defendant must allege specific facts and evidence supporting [her]
allegations."); see also Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170 ("[A] petitioner must
do more than make bald assertions that [she] was denied the effective assistance
of counsel.").
Defendant does not challenge the plea or argue she would not have
accepted its terms but for counsel's deficient representation. State v. Maldon,
422 N.J. Super. 475, 486 (App. Div. 2011) (stating a defendant must show that,
"had he been properly advised, it would have been rational for him to decline
the plea offer and insist on going to trial and, in fact, that he probably would
have done so."). Rather, she posits counsel failed to "advocate adequately at
[her] sentencing hearing," despite her plea to manslaughter knowing the State
A-3002-22 9 had requested a ten-year-maximum term of incarceration. Defendant suggests
that additional advocacy by counsel would have resulted in a lower sentence.
She makes this argument without any support.
Defendant's arguments are unpersuasive because N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(f)(2)
is permissive in nature and grants courts the discretion to sentence a defendant
convicted of a first- or second-degree crime to a term one degree lower than that
of the crime for which he or she was convicted. The statute requires the court
be "clearly convinced that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the
aggravating factors" and to decide that the lower sentence is in the interest of
justice. Ibid. The fact that counsel did not make this specific argument is not
indicative of constitutionally deficient representation under Strickland's first
prong.
Defendant also cannot establish that but for counsel's failure to argue for
a downgraded sentence, the court would have downgraded her sentence from six
years and six months to within the third-degree range of three to five years'
incarceration, thereby establishing Strickland's prejudice prong. 466 U.S. at
687. Defendant's argument is merely speculative, tantamount to a "bald
assertion," and, thus, insufficient to establish counsel's representation was
constitutionally deficient. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super at 170.
A-3002-22 10 Lastly, because we reject defendant's contention she established a prima
facie case of ineffective assistance of plea counsel, there is no support for her
primary claim she is entitled to an evidentiary hearing. "The mere raising of a
claim for PCR does not entitle the defendant to an evidentiary hearing." State
v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (2023) (citing Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.
at 170). The PCR court should grant an evidentiary hearing only if:
(1) the defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court determines that there are disputed issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record; and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve the claims asserted.
[Ibid. (citing Porter, 216 N.J. at 354).]
Because the PCR court properly found defendant failed to establish a prima facie
case of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant cannot establish she is
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. R. 3:22-10(b).
To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining
arguments, it is because they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-3002-22 11