NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2816-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEFREY VASQUEZ-CALDERON,
Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________
Submitted May 20, 2026 – Decided July 9, 2026
Before Judges Vanek and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 19-05-0302.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Janetta D. Marbrey, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Defendant Jefrey Vasquez-Calderon appeals from an October 22, 2021
order denying his motion to suppress a recorded statement to police and a
February 11, 2022 order denying in part his motion to suppress physical
evidence seized before subsequent issuance of a search warrant. We affirm.
I.
On February 27, 2019, at approximately 8:00 a.m., East Windsor police
discovered Luis Sanchez (decedent) lying in a pool of blood in the rear yard of
his apartment complex residence. Detective Luis Vega interviewed the
decedent's roommate and showed him a still image from surveillance footage
taken at about 2:00 a.m. that same day at "Exit 8" bar, depicting decedent and
another individual. The roommate identified the other person in the still image
as "Flaco," decedent's co-worker. The roommate and decedent's girlfriend later
identified defendant as Flaco.
Police learned defendant was working elsewhere after being fired from his
former job where he had worked with decedent. Detectives located defendant
at his new workplace in the late evening of February 27 and informed him they
wanted to speak with him at the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO).
Defendant agreed to speak with detectives. Members of the Cranbury Police
Department drove defendant to the MCPO for questioning as a "person of
A-2816-24 2 interest." Before placing defendant in a patrol car, the police took defendant's
cell phone, wallet, work vest, and lunch bag.
While defendant was at the MCPO, police searched the premises of
defendant's workplace with the owner's permission. They found a wet sweater
in a dumpster. 1 The sweater matched that worn by the man accompanying
decedent in the video footage from Exit 8 bar.
Before conducting the interview, police placed defendant uncuffed in a
locked interview room. As Detective Vega later testified, the door to the
interview room "is always locked" because "we don't allow anyone to walk
freely on [the Homicide Task Force] floor. There's a lot of sensitive case
information up there." The detective testified that for the same reason, if
interviewees "need anything," to use the restroom, for example, they must knock
on the door and be escorted by an officer.
Defendant waited in the interview room for roughly two hours until two
Spanish-speaking detectives arrived to conduct the interview. The interview
began at approximately 12:50 a.m. on February 28. The detectives administered
1 Throughout the proceedings, witnesses and counsel referred alternatively to the garment in question as a "sweater" or a "sweatshirt."
A-2816-24 3 Miranda rights, which defendant waived. 2 After speaking with detectives for
about one hour, defendant requested counsel and, consequently, detectives
terminated the interview.
During questioning, defendant said "he'd been wearing [the] clothing that
he had on at the time of the interview for the past two or three days." However,
because the surveillance footage showed defendant wearing the now-recovered
sweater, "not the clothing he had on at the time [of the interview] which . . . was
a flannel shirt," detectives believed he was lying.
Detectives also questioned defendant about text messages exchanged with
his girlfriend on the afternoon of the murder, in which defendant revealed he
knew of decedent's death. Detective Vega found this information "significant"
because he did not "believe that information was out there yet." After this
interview, officers photographed defendant to document "injuries on his hands."
Consequently, detectives reclassified defendant as a suspect rather than a person
of interest.
At approximately 3:00 a.m., defendant knocked on the interview room
door and requested to speak with detectives. They again administered Miranda
rights and conducted a second interview. After the second interview concluded,
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-2816-24 4 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents took defendant into custody and
held him in the Essex County Jail on an immigration detainer.
Because detectives determined defendant was the last person to be seen
with decedent, Officer Janae Jones applied for a warrant to search defendant's
cell phone based on defendant's premature knowledge of decedent's death as
conveyed to detectives during the first interview.
On May 28, 2019, a Mercer County grand jury returned an indictment
charging defendant with: murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count one); third-
degree possession of weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count
two); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)
(count three).
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to police and
evidence seized without a warrant, arguing he had been arrested without
probable cause when taken from his place of employment and made to wait in a
locked interview room. Defendant also contended that detectives—not he—had
initiated the second interview.
Detective Vega testified regarding both issues. The court denied both
motions, finding Detective Vega's testimony credible. The court rejected
defendant's claims of unlawful arrest and improper re-initiation of questioning
A-2816-24 5 based on its assessment of defendant's desire to make both statements, consistent
with his demeanor and Detective Vega's testimony. The court also ruled the
evidence collected was not "fruit of the poisonous tree," as police had probable
cause to arrest defendant after detectives understood the significance of
defendant's incriminating statements in his first interview. The State conceded
at the motion hearing that defendant was "no longer free to leave the [MCPO]"
and was effectively under arrest at the conclusion of the first interview.
Defendant moved for reconsideration. In response, the State presented
additional testimony from Officer Jones, focusing on the seizure of defendant's
lunch bag and cell phone and subsequent warrant for the phone. At conclusion
of the hearing, the court suppressed the lunch bag but denied suppression of the
cell phone. The court reasoned police had probable cause to seize the cell phone
when, at the time of the seizure, police knew: (1) defendant was the last person
seen with decedent; (2) defendant and decedent were together at Exit 8 Bar in
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2816-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JEFREY VASQUEZ-CALDERON,
Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________
Submitted May 20, 2026 – Decided July 9, 2026
Before Judges Vanek and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Mercer County, Indictment No. 19-05-0302.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Stefan Van Jura, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Janetta D. Marbrey, Mercer County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Laura Sunyak, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Defendant Jefrey Vasquez-Calderon appeals from an October 22, 2021
order denying his motion to suppress a recorded statement to police and a
February 11, 2022 order denying in part his motion to suppress physical
evidence seized before subsequent issuance of a search warrant. We affirm.
I.
On February 27, 2019, at approximately 8:00 a.m., East Windsor police
discovered Luis Sanchez (decedent) lying in a pool of blood in the rear yard of
his apartment complex residence. Detective Luis Vega interviewed the
decedent's roommate and showed him a still image from surveillance footage
taken at about 2:00 a.m. that same day at "Exit 8" bar, depicting decedent and
another individual. The roommate identified the other person in the still image
as "Flaco," decedent's co-worker. The roommate and decedent's girlfriend later
identified defendant as Flaco.
Police learned defendant was working elsewhere after being fired from his
former job where he had worked with decedent. Detectives located defendant
at his new workplace in the late evening of February 27 and informed him they
wanted to speak with him at the Mercer County Prosecutor's Office (MCPO).
Defendant agreed to speak with detectives. Members of the Cranbury Police
Department drove defendant to the MCPO for questioning as a "person of
A-2816-24 2 interest." Before placing defendant in a patrol car, the police took defendant's
cell phone, wallet, work vest, and lunch bag.
While defendant was at the MCPO, police searched the premises of
defendant's workplace with the owner's permission. They found a wet sweater
in a dumpster. 1 The sweater matched that worn by the man accompanying
decedent in the video footage from Exit 8 bar.
Before conducting the interview, police placed defendant uncuffed in a
locked interview room. As Detective Vega later testified, the door to the
interview room "is always locked" because "we don't allow anyone to walk
freely on [the Homicide Task Force] floor. There's a lot of sensitive case
information up there." The detective testified that for the same reason, if
interviewees "need anything," to use the restroom, for example, they must knock
on the door and be escorted by an officer.
Defendant waited in the interview room for roughly two hours until two
Spanish-speaking detectives arrived to conduct the interview. The interview
began at approximately 12:50 a.m. on February 28. The detectives administered
1 Throughout the proceedings, witnesses and counsel referred alternatively to the garment in question as a "sweater" or a "sweatshirt."
A-2816-24 3 Miranda rights, which defendant waived. 2 After speaking with detectives for
about one hour, defendant requested counsel and, consequently, detectives
terminated the interview.
During questioning, defendant said "he'd been wearing [the] clothing that
he had on at the time of the interview for the past two or three days." However,
because the surveillance footage showed defendant wearing the now-recovered
sweater, "not the clothing he had on at the time [of the interview] which . . . was
a flannel shirt," detectives believed he was lying.
Detectives also questioned defendant about text messages exchanged with
his girlfriend on the afternoon of the murder, in which defendant revealed he
knew of decedent's death. Detective Vega found this information "significant"
because he did not "believe that information was out there yet." After this
interview, officers photographed defendant to document "injuries on his hands."
Consequently, detectives reclassified defendant as a suspect rather than a person
of interest.
At approximately 3:00 a.m., defendant knocked on the interview room
door and requested to speak with detectives. They again administered Miranda
rights and conducted a second interview. After the second interview concluded,
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-2816-24 4 Immigration and Customs Enforcement agents took defendant into custody and
held him in the Essex County Jail on an immigration detainer.
Because detectives determined defendant was the last person to be seen
with decedent, Officer Janae Jones applied for a warrant to search defendant's
cell phone based on defendant's premature knowledge of decedent's death as
conveyed to detectives during the first interview.
On May 28, 2019, a Mercer County grand jury returned an indictment
charging defendant with: murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count one); third-
degree possession of weapon for unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count
two); and fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d)
(count three).
Before trial, defendant moved to suppress his statements to police and
evidence seized without a warrant, arguing he had been arrested without
probable cause when taken from his place of employment and made to wait in a
locked interview room. Defendant also contended that detectives—not he—had
initiated the second interview.
Detective Vega testified regarding both issues. The court denied both
motions, finding Detective Vega's testimony credible. The court rejected
defendant's claims of unlawful arrest and improper re-initiation of questioning
A-2816-24 5 based on its assessment of defendant's desire to make both statements, consistent
with his demeanor and Detective Vega's testimony. The court also ruled the
evidence collected was not "fruit of the poisonous tree," as police had probable
cause to arrest defendant after detectives understood the significance of
defendant's incriminating statements in his first interview. The State conceded
at the motion hearing that defendant was "no longer free to leave the [MCPO]"
and was effectively under arrest at the conclusion of the first interview.
Defendant moved for reconsideration. In response, the State presented
additional testimony from Officer Jones, focusing on the seizure of defendant's
lunch bag and cell phone and subsequent warrant for the phone. At conclusion
of the hearing, the court suppressed the lunch bag but denied suppression of the
cell phone. The court reasoned police had probable cause to seize the cell phone
when, at the time of the seizure, police knew: (1) defendant was the last person
seen with decedent; (2) defendant and decedent were together at Exit 8 Bar in
the early morning; (3) defendant had exchanged text messages with his
girlfriend referencing decedent's death; and (4) defendant had early knowledge
of the death.
The court also found exigent circumstances justified seizure of the cell
phone. The court observed that were defendant permitted to keep the phone
A-2816-24 6 while being transported to the MCPO, the phone "could be smashed, [the
message data] could be deleted."
So, I do find that that gives rise to the police for having probable cause to believe that evidence related to a crime would be found on the phone. And for that reason I think they had a right to seize the phone considering that if they hadn't, it could have been destroyed or in some way compromised and seize it until they applied for a warrant and that's what they did. And for that reason I am denying . . . defendant's motion to suppress the physical evidence, the cell phone that was taken. . . .
The court found no probable cause or exigency to exist in connection with
defendant's lunch bag or its warrantless seizure and suppressed that evidence.
In September 2022, defendant pleaded guilty to count one of the
indictment, as amended to first-degree aggravated manslaughter. In exchange,
the court sentenced defendant to a twenty-two-year term of incarceration,
subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, as agreed between the
State and defendant.
Defendant appeals, raising the following arguments:
POINT I
THE CELL PHONE SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE IT WAS SEIZED WITHOUT PROBABLE CAUSE IRRESPECTIVE OF WHETHER PROBABLE CAUSE TO SEARCH THE PHONE WAS LATER DEVELOPED.
A-2816-24 7 POINT II
DEFENDANT'S STATEMENTS AND THE PHOTOGRAPHS TAKEN OF HIM SHOULD BE SUPPRESSED BECAUSE THEY WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF AN UNLAWFUL ARREST.
II.
"Generally, on appellate review, a trial court's factual findings in support
of granting or denying a motion to suppress must be upheld when 'those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. S.S., 229
N.J. 360, 374 (2017) (quoting State v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014)). This
is because the trial court had the "opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and
to have the 'feel' of the case, which a reviewing court cannot enjoy." State v.
Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161
(1964)). "Thus, appellate courts should reverse only when the trial court's
determination is so clearly mistaken that the interests of justice demand
intervention and correction." Gamble, 218 N.J. at 425 (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Elders, 192 N.J. at 244).
"A trial court's interpretation of the law, however, and the consequences
that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special deference." Ibid.
(citing State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 176 (2010)). "Therefore, a trial court's
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo." Ibid. (citing Gandhi, 201 N.J. at 176).
A-2816-24 8 Such legal conclusions encompass possible violations of the Fourth Amendment
to United States Constitution and Article I, Paragraph 7 of our State
Constitution. See State v. Missak, 476 N.J. Super. 302, 314 (App. Div. 2023)
(holding the validity of a search warrant is a "purely legal" question) (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). Even in the Fourth Amendment context,
"[w]e accord substantial deference to a trial court's determination that there was
probable cause to issue a warrant." State v. Marshall, 199 N.J. 602, 612 (2009)
(citing State v. Jones, 179 N.J. 377, 388-89 (2004)).
"Probable cause exists when the totality of the facts and circumstances
presented to an arresting officer would support a person 'of reasonable caution
in the belief that an offense has been or is being committed.'" State v. Torres,
253 N.J. 485, 503 (2023) (quoting State v. Sims, 75 N.J. 337, 354 (1978)).
Probable cause to arrest "is something less than [the] proof needed to convict
and something more than a raw, unsupported suspicion." State v. Davis, 50 N.J.
16, 23 (1967).
"Exigent circumstances may excuse the need for the police to obtain a
warrant." State v. Miranda, 253 N.J. 461, 480 (2023) (quoting State v. DeLuca,
168 N.J. 626, 632 (2001)). Under the exception, police may perform a
warrantless search when "officers have an 'objectively reasonable basis to
A-2816-24 9 believe that prompt action is needed to meet an imminent danger.'" Ibid.
(quoting State v. Hemenway, 239 N.J. 111, 126 (2019)).
The "preeminent determinants of exigency" are "[p]olice safety and the
preservation of evidence[.]" Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting In Int. of J.A.,
233 N.J. 432, 448 (2018)). "In the typical setting in which our courts have found
exigency, 'there was an objectively reasonable basis to believe that lives might
be endangered or evidence destroyed by the delay necessary to secure a warrant"
because in those situations, "time was of the essence, and delay was not a
reasonable option." Ibid. (quoting State v. Manning, 240 N.J. 308, 337 (2020)).
Generally, to invoke the exception, the State "must prove by a preponderance of
the evidence that (1) the search was premised on probable cause and (2) law
enforcement acted in an objectively reasonable manner to meet an exigency that
did not permit time to secure a warrant." Ibid. (quoting Manning, 240 N.J. at
333).
"Similar to probable cause, the term 'exigent circumstances' is, by design,
inexact. It is incapable of precise definition because, by its nature, the term
takes on form and shape dependent on the facts of any given case." Ibid.
(quoting State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 516 (2003)) (internal quotation marks
omitted). Courts consider the following "non-exclusive" list of factors:
A-2816-24 10 (1) the seriousness of the crime under investigation, (2) the urgency of the situation faced by the officers, (3) the time it would have taken to secure a warrant, (4) the threat that evidence would be destroyed or lost or people would be endangered unless immediate action was taken, (5) information that the suspect was armed and posed an imminent danger, and (6) the strength or weakness of the probable cause relating to the item to be searched or seized.
[Id. at 481 (quoting Manning, 240 N.J. at 333-34).]
"The determination whether exigent circumstances existed at the time of
the disputed search 'is fact-sensitive' and requires the court to assess 'the totality
of the circumstances.'" Ibid. (quoting J.A., 233 N.J. at 448).
Having reviewed the record, and applying these principles, we are
satisfied the trial court did not err in denying defendant's motion to suppress the
cell phone. The court's findings regarding probable cause were supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the form of testimony, as corroborated by video
footage and information from witnesses, particularly defendant's girlfriend.
S.S., 229 N.J. at 374. The exigent circumstances exception applies to the seizure
of the phone here because, as the trial court found, defendant could have
destroyed the phone and the evidence it contained while on the way to the
MCPO.
Defendant additionally argues that, even assuming the trial court's
A-2816-24 11 determination that defendant initially voluntarily agreed to go to the MCPO to
give a statement was correct, it became an unlawful arrest when detectives
transported defendant in a police car, seized his personal effects, never informed
him he was free to leave, and kept him in a locked room for two hours before
beginning the interview. Based on this sequence of events, defendant maintains
his statement and the photographs "flowed directly from his unlawful arrest" and
should be suppressed.
We disagree. The touchstone of an arrest is whether a reasonable person
in the situation would feel free to end the encounter with police. State v. Shaw,
213 N.J. 398, 410 (2012). If a police officer's conduct is more than what is
"minimally intrusive" than required to investigate, it can be regarded as an
arrest. State v. Dickey, 152 N.J. 468, 478 (1998).
Here, the court reasonably found defendant went voluntarily to the MCPO
to be interviewed because he wished to speak to them. Contrary to defendant's
position, the seizure of his personal effects, transportation in a police car, and
extended wait for Spanish-speaking assistance was not tantamount to arrest. The
court found credible testimony that these measures were taken to conform with
safety protocols with respect to the seizure, transport, and security at
headquarters. Moreover, in this instance, extra time was needed for arrival of
A-2816-24 12 Spanish-speaking detectives to conduct the interview. Defendant was not
handcuffed during the pertinent time and was free to knock on the door for
bathroom access or other needs. Although restrictive to some degree, whether
considered separately or in combination, none of these measures negate the
substantial evidence of voluntariness or transform the encounter into an arrest,
as the trial court properly concluded.
Affirmed.
A-2816-24 13