State of New Jersey v. Jaworski Sneed

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 8, 2025
• Docket: A-0538-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0538-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAWORSKI SNEED, a/k/a JAWORSKI SNEET,

Defendant-Appellant. ________________________

Submitted September 23, 2025 - Decided October 8, 2025

Before Judges Perez Friscia and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 11-10-1910.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shep A. Gerszberg, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Jaworski Sneed appeals from the August 9, 2023 order denying

his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) after an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant contends he demonstrated ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC)

warranting reversal of his convictions and sentence because trial counsel failed

to present alibi witnesses. Having reviewed the record, parties' arguments, and

applicable law, we affirm.

I.

This matter returns to us after we reversed and remanded the prior PCR

judge's June 28, 2018 order, which denied defendant's PCR petition without an

evidentiary hearing. See State v. Sneed, No. A-0638-18 (App. Div. Dec. 29,

2020) (slip op. at 1-12) (Sneed II). We directed that a new PCR judge hold an

evidentiary hearing. Sneed II, slip op. at 11. In 2013, defendant had filed a

direct appeal challenging his convictions and sentence after a jury found

defendant guilty of: first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1), (2) (count

one); second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)

(count two); and second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count three).

Although we affirmed defendant's convictions, we reversed and remanded

for resentencing. State v. Sneed, No. A-5865-12 (App. Div. Aug. 5, 2016) (slip

A-0538-23 2 op. at 1-12) (Sneed I). Following our remand, the court sentenced defendant to:

a thirty-year prison term with a thirty-year period of parole ineligibility on count

one; and a concurrent ten-year sentence on count two, subject to the Graves Act,

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). The Supreme Court later denied defendant's petition for

certification. State v. Sneed, 228 N.J. 239 (2016).

We limit our recitation of the facts to the issues raised in this appeal, as

we presume the parties are familiar with the facts detailed in our prior opinions.

At approximately 9:30 p.m. on December 24, 2010, two eyewitnesses observed

defendant fatally shoot a male convenience store worker on a Newark street.

One eyewitness was the victim's daughter, and the other was her stepfather.

They positively identified defendant as the shooter. Two other eyewitnesses,

including defendant's girlfriend at the time, corroborated their description of

defendant. Video evidence of the shooting from a nearby store's surveillance

cameras showed the shooter's attire and defendant's cousin, Jimmie Nickerson,

along with two other people, assaulting the victim immediately before the

shooting.

Defendant filed his self-represented PCR petition in 2017. PCR counsel

supplemented the petition in March 2018, arguing defendant's trial counsel's

failure to call alibi witnesses amounted to IAC warranting an evidentiary

A-0538-23 3 hearing. Defendant provided a certification along with certifications from the

following relatives: Cheron Sneed, defendant's mother; Nickerson; and Brittany

Tolliver, defendant's aunt. 1 The three relatives attested to defendant's

whereabouts on the night of the shooting.

On August 9, 2023, after an evidentiary hearing, Judge Christopher J.

Romanyshyn issued an order accompanied by a cogent twenty-one-page written

decision analyzing and rejecting defendant's PCR claim. At the hearing, Cheron,

Nickerson, Tolliver, defendant's trial counsel, and defendant testified. Cheron

maintained that shortly before the shooting, defendant "called . . . and told [her]

he was waiting for a ride to get home," but Cheron conceded she "did not see"

defendant after he left their house in the afternoon of December 24, 2010.

Nickerson asserted defendant could not have been the shooter because:

Nickerson was near the location of the shooting and he did not see defendant;

defendant was at Tolliver's house, which was a block-and-a-half away; and

defendant would not have had time to travel to the shooting location. Nickerson

acknowledged he did not "actually see the shooting" nor the shooter. Tolliver

testified that: defendant was at her house the night of the shooting; she gave

him her telephone to call for a ride home shortly before the shooting; and after

1 We refer to Cheron by her first name for clarity. We intend no disrespect. A-0538-23 4 "he went into the bathroom" to make a phone call, she went "upstairs" and did

not see him again.

On appeal, defendant raises a single point for our consideration:

MR. SNEED IS ENTITLED TO RELIEF ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO PRESENT ALIBI WITNESSES BECAUSE MR. SNEED PROVED HIS CLAIM AND/OR BECAUSE THE PCR COURT APPLIED THE WRONG STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND A FACTUALLY UNSUPPORTED AND FAULTY ANALYSIS.

II.

"Our review of a PCR [judge]'s factual findings" after it conducts an

evidentiary hearing "is 'necessarily deferential.'" State v. Hernandez-Peralta,

261 N.J. 231, 246 (2025) (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013)). "An

appellate court's reading of a cold record is a pale substitute for a trial judge's

assessment of the credibility of a witness he has observed firsthand." State v.

Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 562 (2021) (quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 540). Therefore,

when a PCR judge holds an evidentiary hearing, we should "uphold the PCR

[judge]'s findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the

record." Id. at 551 (quoting Nash, 212 N.J. at 540). "However, we review a

A-0538-23 5 PCR court's legal conclusions de novo." Hernandez-Peralta, 261 N.J. at 246;

see also State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 415-16 (2004).

To succeed on an IAC claim, a defendant must satisfy both prongs of the

test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), as adopted

by our Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), "by a

preponderance of the credible evidence." Nash, 212 N.J. at 541 (quoting State

v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). "'To sustain that burden, specific facts'

which 'would provide the court with an adequate basis on which to rest its

decision' must be articulated." State v. Hand, 480 N.J. Super. 15, 26 (App. Div.

2024) (quoting State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992)). "First, the

defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. This requires

showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as

the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687. The PCR judge "must indulge a strong presumption that

counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance," and "the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the

circumstances, the challenged action [by counsel] 'might be considered sound

trial strategy.'" Id. at 689 (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101

(1955)).

A-0538-23 6 Under the second prong of the Strickland test, the defendant must show

"the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Id. at 687. This means

"counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable." Ibid. It is insufficient for the defendant to show the

errors "had some conceivable effect on the outcome." Id. at 693.

"The 'benchmark' for judging whether counsel's assistance was

constitutionally ineffective is 'whether counsel's conduct so undermined the

proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as

having produced a just result.'" Hernandez-Peralta, 261 N.J. at 247 (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686). Moreover, courts must "make 'every effort . . . to

eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of

counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's

perspective at the time.'" Id. at 251 (omission in original) (quoting State v.

Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 579 (2015)).

III.

After reviewing defendant's arguments in light of the evidentiary hearing

record and affording deference to the PCR judge's factual findings, we affirm

substantially for the reasons set forth in Judge Romanyshyn's sound decision.

We add the following comments.

A-0538-23 7 Defendant contends the judge erred in finding he did not meet his burden

of demonstrating IAC after applying "a legally incorrect and far too stringent

standard." Defendant specifically argues he established that trial counsel was

deficient for failing to present the alibi testimony of Cheron, Nickerson, and

Tolliver, all of whom he contends would have strengthened his defense and

created a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. Defendant further avers the judge

incorrectly focused on Cheron's, Nickerson's, and Tolliver's credibility rather

than focusing on whether their testimony would have "bolster[ed] the defense

or refute[d] the prosecution." We reject defendant's arguments.

We are guided by the general principles regarding alibi witnesses. "Where

a person must be present at the scene of the crime to commit it, the burden of

proving the defendant's presence beyond a reasonable doubt is upon the State."

Model Jury Charges (Criminal), "Alibi," at 1 (rev. May 12, 2008); see also State

v. Mucci, 25 N.J. 423, 431 (1957). Thus, "the accused may offer evidence

tending to show that at the alleged time of the commission of the act charged ,

he was elsewhere . . . to overcome the" State's evidence. Mucci, 25 N.J. at 431.

"An alibi is asserted whenever there is evidence that would suggest the accused

was in some other location, and thus, could not have possibly committed the

crime." State v. Echols, 398 N.J. Super. 192, 207-08 (App. Div. 2008), rev'd on

A-0538-23 8 other grounds, 199 N.J. 344 (2009). An alibi defense is only sustainable where

the offered evidence establishes "the physical impossibility of the accused's

guilt." Id. at 207 (quoting Mucci, 25 N.J. at 431).

In the absence of clear exculpatory alibi evidence, our Supreme Court has

recognized that "[d]etermining which witnesses to call to the stand is one of the

most difficult strategic decisions that any trial attorney must confront." Pierre,

223 N.J. at 579 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307,

320 (2005)). The Supreme Court has elucidated that:

A trial attorney must consider what testimony a witness can be expected to give, whether the witness's testimony will be subject to effective impeachment by prior inconsistent statements or other means, whether the witness is likely to contradict the testimony of other witnesses the attorney intends to present and thereby undermine their credibility, whether the trier of fact is likely to find the witness credible, and a variety of other tangible and intangible factors.

[Arthur, 184 N.J. at 320-21.]

Therefore, "[a]s a general rule, strategic miscalculations or trial mistakes are

insufficient to warrant reversal except in those rare instances where they are of

such magnitude as to thwart the fundamental guarantee of a fair trial." State v.

Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314-

15 (2006)). "[C]ounsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make

A-0538-23 9 a reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary." State

v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 353 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting State v.

Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 217 (2004)). "[I]f counsel makes a thorough investigation

of the law and facts and considers all likely options, counsel's trial strategy is

'virtually unchallengeable.'" Nash, 212 N.J. at 542 (alteration in original)

(quoting Chew, 179 N.J. at 217).

We agree with Judge Romanyshyn's determination that Cheron's,

Nickerson's, and Tolliver's testimony did not sufficiently establish that

defendant could not have been at the shooting location and committed the crime.

The judge found that "none of the three" witnesses were "true alibi witness[es]

and at best could be characterized as imperfect alibi witnesses[es]." Stated

another way, the witnesses' purported alibi testimony did not negate that on

December 24, 2010, at 9:30 p.m., defendant had the ability to commit the

murder.

We further discern no error in the judge's determination that trial counsel

was not deficient, as trial counsel "fully investigated and evaluated the proffered

witnesses, determined that they did not add much, if anything, to his case, and

advised [defendant] accordingly," and defendant "accepted that advice." The

judge found trial counsel "credibly testified" and established the trial strategy

A-0538-23 10 was "objectively reasonable." Trial counsel's inability to fully examine

Nickerson's and Tolliver's possible testimony because they declined to be

interviewed and to cooperate is not IAC. See Nash, 212 N.J. at 543 ("[C]ounsel

cannot be faulted if he [or she] was stonewalled."). Moreover, trial counsel

testified that although he made the ultimate strategic decisions, defendant was

informed because they had discussed the witnesses' testimony and evidence. It

is well-established that "[m]ere dissatisfaction with a 'counsel's exercise of

judgment' is insufficient to warrant overturning a conviction." Nash, 212 N.J.

at 542 (quoting Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). Therefore, defendant failed to establish

that trial counsel was deficient in declining to call the witnesses who could not

provide an exculpatory alibi.

Finally, the record also demonstrates Cheron's, Nickerson's, and Tolliver's

testimony would have had no effect on the trial's outcome. As the judge found,

none of the witnesses' testimony provided "concrete facts . . . to undermine the

direct eyewitness testimony the State offered." In fact, their testimony would

have had a likelihood of weakening defendant's identification and reasonable

doubt defense.

A-0538-23 11 For these reasons, the record supports the PCR judge's conclusion under

Strickland that defendant failed to establish trial counsel was deficient and he

suffered prejudice.

Affirmed.

A-0538-23 12