NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2105-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JARON D. REEVEY, a/k/a JONATHAN LEE and JARONE REEVEY,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted March 17, 2026 – Decided July 1, 2026
Before Judges Susswein and Chase.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 03-11- 2080.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Raymond S. Santiago, Monmouth County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Monica do Outeiro, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
This prosecution has a long history of direct and collateral appeals arising
from a murder committed in May 2000. Defendant Jaron Reevey was convicted
in 2005 of the murder of George Lockhart, a Rite Aid pharmacist. The crime
involved a plan to steal Lockhart's vehicle, during which a struggle ensued and
Lockhart was fatally shot. The State's key witness was codefendant Sabrina
Wright, defendant's then seventeen-year-old girlfriend. Wright pled guilty to
second-degree armed robbery and agreed to testify against defendant in
exchange for a reduced sentence. In 2018, Wright gave a statement to a defense
investigator recanting her trial testimony.
In the matter before us, defendant appeals a December 13, 2024, Law
Division order denying reconsideration of his motion for a new trial. 1
Defendant's primary contention is that the trial court erred in denying his motion
for a new trial based on Wright's 2018 recantation statement. Defendant seeks
a new trial or in the alternative, a remand for an evidentiary hearing. Defendant
1 Defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) on May 24, 2012. Because more than a year had transpired since the PCR court's ruling on June 19, 2019, defendant was time barred from filing a subsequent PCR petition pursuant to Rule 3:22-4(b). Consequently, rather than filing a second PCR petition, defendant filed the present motion for a new trial. A-2105-24 2 also argues that proffered alibi affidavits constitute newly discovered evidence
establishing an alibi and warranting a new trial.
After reviewing the record in light of the governing legal principles, we
affirm the motion court's 2 holding that the proffered alibi affidavits do not
warrant a new trial. However, we deem it necessary to remand for an evidentiary
hearing with respect to Wright's 2018 recantation. The court concluded that her
recantation would not have altered the trial outcome because her credibility had
been impeached at trial. The applicable legal test, however, is whether Wright's
testimony at trial was probably false. No court has yet had an opportunity to
observe Wright's testimony regarding her 2018 recantation statement. We
therefore deem it prudent to remand for an evidentiary hearing at which Wright
can testify and be subject to cross-examination so that the motion court can
determine whether her trial testimony was probably false.
We acknowledge the skepticism that is accorded under the law to belated
recantations, and we offer no opinion on her veracity. However, considering the
stakes, we believe the motion court should make the determination as to when
she was not telling the truth—at the jury trial or thirteen years later when
2 We use the term "motion court" to refer to the judge who denied defendant's present motion for a new trial. A-2105-24 3 speaking with the Public Defender's investigator—after having an opportunity
to observe and assess her live testimony.
I.
We presume the parties are well acquainted with the proofs presented at
the murder trial and the ensuing direct and collateral appeals. We therefore only
briefly summarize the facts and procedural history pertinent to the issues
presently before us.
No physical evidence was presented at trial linking defendant to the
murder. The State's case hinged on Wright's testimony. She testified that she
and defendant planned to steal Lockhart's Mercedes automobile. Wright
explained that she approached Lockhart as he left the pharmacy to distract him,
then walked away. She further testified that, when defendant approached
Lockhart, she observed a "slight struggle," heard a gunshot, and saw defendant
running away.
Wright testified that immediately following the shooting, she and
defendant met in the woods near the crime scene and defendant admitted to her
that he had shot Lockhart because he would not give him the car key and had
seen defendant's face. She testified that defendant had a black revolver and told
her it did not leave shell casings.
A-2105-24 4 On cross-examination, Wright was questioned about the plea agreement
she made with the State in exchange for her testimony. Defense counsel also
questioned Wright about statements she made that, after initially pleading not
guilty, she decided to take a plea offer because she had no chance of success at
trial as a black defendant in front of what was likely to be an all-white jury. It
was also revealed on cross-examination that Wright lied in her initial statement
to police inculpating defendant. Wright was also cross-examined about a March
31, 2004, letter she wrote to defendant where she described wanting to "get home
as soon as possible by any means necessary."
In addition to Wright's testimony, the State presented several jailhouse
informants who reported on defendant's inculpatory admissions to them. The
jury found defendant guilty of knowing/purposeful murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11 -
3(a)(l)-(2) (count one); felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3) (count two);
armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1 (count three); second-degree possession of a
weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count four); third-degree
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count five); and second-
degree conspiracy, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 (count six). On direct appeal, we affirmed
the murder conviction but reversed several lesser convictions due to improper
jury instructions. State v. Reevey, No. A-1414-05 (App. Div. Apr. 10, 2008).
A-2105-24 5 The State did not retry the vacated counts. Defendant was re-sentenced to life
imprisonment with a thirty-five-year period of parole ineligibility. We affirmed
the sentence and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied defendant's petition for
certification. State v. Reevey, 196 N.J. 85 (2008).
In May 2012, defendant filed a PCR petition alleging ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel. Defendant specifically claimed that
both failed to advise him of the five-year time limit for seeking PCR relief,
pursuant to Rule 3:22-12(a)(1), and that trial counsel failed to introduce
exculpatory documents and to subpoena alibi and other defense witnesses. The
PCR court denied defendant's petition without an evidentiary hearing. We
reversed that decision in part and remanded for an evidentiary hearing regarding
counsel's failure to investigate and present alibi witnesses. State v. Reevey, No.
A-5882-13 (App. Div. Nov. 4, 2016).
An evidentiary hearing was held on separate dates between November
2017 and April 2019. On June 13, 2019, the PCR court issued an oral opinion
again denying defendant's petition, finding no ineffective assistance. We
affirmed that decision. State v. Reevey, No. A-5379-18 (App. Div. Aug. 9,
2021).
A-2105-24 6 On November 15, 2018, Wright met with Leonard S. Thomas, an
investigator with the Office of the Public Defender, and relayed to him that her
initial statement to police inculpating defendant was a result of police coercion.
Specifically, she told the investigator that officers told her, "what she had done;
where she was; what she should say and what papers she should sign."
According to Wright, police officers kept her at the station for several hours,
denied her request to call her mother, failed to read her rights, and would not let
her leave until she signed the documents stating that she and defendant were at
the Rite Aid and that she saw defendant shoot the victim. Wright stated that
"[s]he was an overwhelmed, scared kid."
Wright further stated that she did not see police again until after a separate
shooting that occurred in Baltimore in January 2002, in which defendant was
shot by police. Wright told the investigator that, at the time of the Baltimore
shooting, police "threatened her that she had to cooperate with them if she
wanted to see [defendant] (after he had been shot)" and that if he died, she would
"take the weight." She further stated to the investigator that her prior statements
were "absolutely false" and that she was now willing to testify on defendant's
behalf. Wright also wrote several letters to defendant while he was incarcerated
expressing remorse for implicating him in the Rite Aid homicide.
A-2105-24 7 In May 2023, defendant filed the present motion for a new trial based upon
newly discovered evidence, namely, Wright's November 15, 2018, statement
recanting her trial testimony and expressing willingness to testify on his behalf.
Defendant also submitted additional letters Wright had written to him, further
indicating that she had implicated defendant to obtain a favorable plea deal.
Defendant's petition also included affidavits from three purported alibi
witnesses.
On June 25, 2024, the trial court issued an order and sixteen-page written
decision denying defendant's motion for a new trial. The court determined that
neither Wright's recantation nor the proffered alibi witness affidavits met all
three prongs of the Carter3 test necessary to grant a new trial based on newly
discovered evidence. The court found that Wright's recantation was not newly
discovered, as some of the letters from Wright to defendant were known at the
time of trial, and Wright was cross-examined at trial about a March 31, 2004
letter. The court characterized the newly produced 2018 recantation as "the next
logical step" of that correspondence.
3 State v. Carter, 85 N.J. 300, 314 (1981).
A-2105-24 8 The court concluded that while Wright's recantation was material, it would
not have affected the verdict because her credibility had already been impeached
at trial and the jury was aware of her plea agreement. The trial court noted that
Wright's prior letter expressing concerns about testifying had already been
admitted, and thus her 2018 recantation presented "limited value" that would not
have changed the jury's verdict. The court also ruled that defendant failed to
show this evidence could not have been discovered earlier.
As to the proffered alibi affidavits, the trial court determined that the
information offered by the affiants was known to defendant at the time of trial
and thus was not newly discovered.
Defendant moved for reconsideration of the court's denial of his motion
for a new trial. On December 14, 2024, the court denied the reconsideration
motion. This appeal followed. Defendant contends that the trial court
improperly denied his motion for a new trial.
II.
We first address defendant's arguments concerning Wright's 2018
recantation statement. We begin by acknowledging the legal principles
governing this appeal.
A-2105-24 9 Motions for a new trial are governed by Rule 3:20-1, which provides in
relevant part:
The trial judge on defendant's motion may grant the defendant a new trial if required in the interest of justice . . . The trial judge shall not, however, set aside the verdict of the jury as against the weight of the evidence unless, having given due regard to the opportunity of the jury to pass upon the credibility of the witnesses, it clearly and convincingly appears that there was a manifest denial of justice under the law.
To warrant a new trial based on newly discovered evidence, a defendant
must satisfy the three-prong test set forth by our Supreme Court in State v.
Carter:
[T]o qualify as newly discovered evidence entitling a party to a new trial, the new evidence must be (1) material to the issue and not merely cumulative or impeaching or contradictory; (2) discovered since the trial and not discoverable by reasonable diligence beforehand; and (3) of the sort that would probably change the jury's verdict if a new trial were granted.
[85 N.J. at 314 (citing State v. Artis, 36 N.J. 538, 541 (1962)).]
"Failure of a defendant to satisfy any one of the three prerequisites of newly
discovered evidence is sufficient to warrant a denial of a motion for a new trial."
State v. Johnson, 34 N.J. 212, 223 (1961).
A-2105-24 10 As to the first prong, "[m]aterial evidence is any evidence that would 'have
some bearing on the claims being advanced.'" State v. Ways, 180 N.J. 171, 188
(2004) (quoting State v. Henries, 306 N.J. Super. 512, 531 (App. Div. 1997)).
"Clearly, evidence that supports a defense, such as alibi, third-party guilt, or a
general denial of guilt would be material." Ibid.
Prong two "requires that the new evidence must have been discovered
after completion of trial and must not have been discoverable earlier through the
exercise of reasonable diligence." Id. at 192 (citing Carter, 85 N.J. at 314). "A
defendant is not entitled to benefit from a strategic decision to withhold
evidence." Ibid. (citing State v. Drisco, 355 N.J. Super. 283, 290-91 (App. Div.
2002) (holding that defense attorney's strategic decision to withhold alibi
defense did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel)).
"[P]rongs one and three are inextricably intertwined. Thus, 'evidence
[that] would shake the very foundation of the State's case and almost certainly
alter the earlier jury verdict' could not be categorized as 'merely cumulative.'"
State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 549-50 (2013) (second alteration in original)
(quoting Ways, 180 N.J. at 189). "The power of the newly discovered evidence
to alter the verdict is the central issue, not the label to be placed on that
evidence." Ibid. (quoting Ways, 180 N.J. at 191-92). "[E]vidence that would
A-2105-24 11 have the probable effect of raising a reasonable doubt as to the defendant's guilt
would not be considered merely cumulative, impeaching, or contradictory." Id.
at 549 (quoting Ways, 180 N.J. at 189).
"One important caveat must be kept in mind." Id. at 550. "[E]vidence
clearly capable of altering the outcome of a verdict that could have been
discovered by reasonable diligence at the time of trial would almost certainly
point to ineffective assistance of counsel." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting
Ways, 180 N.J. at 192). "We would not require a person who is probably
innocent to languish in prison because the exculpatory evidence was
discoverable and overlooked by a less than reasonably diligent attorney." Ways,
180 N.J. at 192 (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688, 694 (1984)).
"Newly discovered evidence must be reviewed with a certain degree of
circumspection to ensure that it is not the product of fabrication, and, if credible
and material, is of sufficient weight that it would probably alter the outcome of
the verdict in a new trial." Id. at 187-88 (citing State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J.
22, 51 (1991) (finding "sketchy" evidence insufficient to warrant new trial) ).
"However difficult the process of review, the passage of time must not be a bar
to assessing the validity of a verdict that is cast in doubt by evidence suggesting
that a defendant may be innocent." Id. at 188.
A-2105-24 12 "[T]he reviewing court must engage in a thorough, fact-sensitive analysis
to determine whether the newly discovered evidence would probably make a
difference to the jury." Id. at 191. The strength of the State's case at trial is a
factor to be weighed in determining whether the newly discovered evidence
would change the jury's verdict. See id. at 194-95 ("There were substantial
questions raised concerning the credibility and reliability of the witnesses for
both the State and the defense at trial. The jury by its verdict answered those
questions in favor of the State. We cannot ignore, however, that the State's
proofs were far from overwhelming".).
"[M]otions based solely upon affidavits are disfavored because the
affiants' statements are obtained without the benefit of cross-examination and
an opportunity to make credibility determinations." Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S.
390, 417 (1993). "Appellate courts should defer to trial courts' credibility
findings that are often influenced by matters such as observations of the
character and demeanor of witnesses and common human experience." State v.
Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 474 (1999).
The motion court is not categorically required to engage in its own
credibility determinations, separate from the original court's conclusions; rather,
the motion court must describe in the record the existing testimony undergirding
A-2105-24 13 its contemporaneous credibility determinations. See Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474-
75 (explaining that although the Law Division did not make independent
credibility findings, "it described on the record the evidence and testimony
presented before the Municipal Court that persuaded it to 'accede' to the
Municipal Court's credibility determinations" and concluding that the
"comments made on the record by the lower courts were sufficient to support"
the conclusion that a police officer witness was more credible th an the
defendant).
We note that case law addressing newly discovered evidence in the form
of recantation emphasizes that "the sincerity of a recantation is to be viewed
with 'extreme suspicion."' State v. Hogan, 144 N.J. 216, 239, (1996) (quoting
United States v. Santiago, 837 F.2d 1545, 1550 (11th Cir. 1988)). See also
Ways, 180 N.J. at 197 (describing recantation testimony generally "as suspect
and untrustworthy" (quoting State v. Carter, 69 N.J. 420, 427 (1976))); State v.
Engel, 249 N.J. Super. 336, 386 (App. Div. 1991) ("Prisoners often have nothing
to lose and much to gain by repudiating their trial testimony. For that reason,
we regard recantations as inherently suspect"). Given the unreliability of
recantation testimony, "[t]he burden of proof rests on those presenting such
testimony to establish that [the recantation] is probably true and the trial
A-2105-24 14 testimony [is] probably false." State v. Feaster, 184 N.J. 235, 264 n.14 (2005)
(quoting Carter, 69 N.J. at 427).
Furthermore, when an application for a new trial is based on newly
discovered evidence in the form of recantation testimony, "[t]he issue for the
trial court upon the application for a new trial 'is not whether the new story, had
it been available at trial, would have impugned the credibility of the witness.'"
Engel, 249 N.J. Super. at 386 (quoting State v. Baldwin, 47 N.J. 379, 400
(1966)). "Obviously, a new and different version under oath would necessarily
raise questions concerning the credibility of the witness's trial testimony." Ibid.
Rather, "[t]he appropriate test is 'whether the testimony given at the trial
was probably false' and whether 'on that account there is a substantial possibility
of [a] miscarriage of justice.'" Id. at 386 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Baldwin, 47 N.J. at 400). "The trial judge is thus obliged to consider 'where the
truth probably lies.' If the judge is satisfied that the present testimony of the
recanting witness is untrue, the application must be denied." Ibid. (quoting
Baldwin, 47 N.J. at 400). See also Carter, 69 N.J. at 427 ("The test for the judge
in evaluating a recantation upon a motion for a new trial is whether it casts
serious doubt upon the truth of the testimony given at the trial and whether if
believable, the factual recital of the recantation so seriously impugns the entire
A-2105-24 15 trial evidence as to give rise to the conclusion that there resulted a possible
miscarriage of justice." (quoting State v. Puchalski, 45 N.J. 97, 107-08 (1965))).
We add that a trial court's decision on a motion for a new trial is generally
reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Fortin, 464 N.J. Super. 193, 216
(App. Div. 2020). Stated another way, appellate review "is limited to a
determination of 'whether the findings made by the trial court could reasonably
have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record.'" State
v. Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. 447, 454 (App. Div. 2004) (quoting State v. Russo,
333 N.J. Super. 119, 137 (2000)).
Importantly for purposes of this appeal, the deference we owe to a trial
court's decision is due in part to its ability to observe witness testimony. See
Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. at 454 ("[W]e will 'give deference to the trial judge's
feel for the case since [they] presided over [it] . . . and had the opportunity to
observe and hear the witnesses as they testified.'" (second alteration in original)
(quoting Russo, 333 N.J. Super. at 137)). However, as our Supreme Court has
explained, that deference does not extend to all areas of the trial court's decision:
The standard governing an appellate tribunal's review of a trial court's action on a new trial motion is essentially the same as that controlling the trial judge . . . . We say the test is 'essentially the same,' because where certain aspects are important—witness credibility, 'demeanor,' 'feel of the case,' or other
A-2105-24 16 criteria which are not transmitted by the written record—,the appellate court must give deference to the views of the trial judge thereon. [The trial judge's] decision, however, is not entitled to any special deference where it rests upon a determination as to worth, plausibility, consistency or other tangible considerations apparent from the face of the record with respect to which [the trial judge] is no more peculiarly situated to decide than the appellate court.
[Dolson v. Anastasia, 55 N.J. 2, 7 (1969).]
III.
We next apply these general principles to the present facts. Here, the trial
court decided defendant's motion on the papers without conducting an
evidentiary hearing. As to the first Carter prong, the trial court determined that
Wright's recantation was "clearly material" considering she was the State's
primary witness and was the only person to have purportedly seen defendant
commit the crime. As for the second prong, the trial court found that Wright's
recantation was "the next logical step" of the "copious" letters she had sent to
defendant.
Turning to the third prong, the trial court determined that Wright's
recantation would not change the jury's verdict. The trial court based its decision
on the PCR court's and our own review of Wright's previous letter to defendant.
Specifically, the trial court relied on the PCR court's review of the original trial
A-2105-24 17 transcript, where Wright was cross-examined about a letter she wrote to
defendant expressing remorse for testifying against him and was subject to
cross-examination on agreements she made with the State in exchange for her
testimony. The trial court reasoned that the PCR court's findings were further
supported by our 2016 opinion in which we found that Wright's letter to
defendant "provided no impeachment material" and "[t]he letter expressed
[Wright's] concern about her upcoming testimony and the prosecutor's jailhouse
visit to confirm her continued cooperation. However, [Wright] freely admitted
during trial that she had undergone trial preparation."
The trial court concluded that the 2018 recantation "provides no further
value than the previous letters supplied by the [d]efendant." Thus, the trial court
determined that defendant failed to satisfy his burden under prong two to
demonstrate that the recantation could not have been discovered by reasonable
diligence beforehand.
We do not agree with the trial court that the recantation statement
"provides no further value" to Wright's March 31, 2004, letter that had been
admitted at trial. We are satisfied the recantation statement goes beyond the
March 31 letter because at no point in her letter did Wright explicitly state that
she provided false information.
A-2105-24 18 More importantly, with respect to the third prong, we are concerned the
trial court may have applied the wrong test. As noted, the critical question
regarding recantation testimony is "'whether the testimony given at the trial was
probably false' and whether 'on that account there is a substantial possibility of
[a] miscarriage of justice.'" Engel, 249 N.J. super at 386 (alteration in original)
(quoting Baldwin, 47 N.J. at 400). Under this analytical framework, the trial
court should have considered the veracity of Wright's trial testimony in light of
her explicit recantation—an issue not yet explicitly resolved by any court. The
trial court relied on the PCR court's review of the trial transcript, in which the
PCR judge found Wright testified credibly at trial. While reliance on a prior
court's credibility finding is permissible, see Locurto, 157 N.J. at 474-75, the
PCR court did not have an opportunity to test Wright's credibility firsthand, see
Ways, 180 N.J. at 196 ("We defer to a PCR judge's credibility findings because
that judge has the ability to evaluate the witnesses firsthand."). Stated another
way, Wright has never testified before a judge regarding her 2018 recantation
and has not been subject to cross-examination on that statement. Cf. State v.
Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 370 (2005) ("We must not minimize the importance of the
role that cross-examination plays in the ascertainment of truth in our criminal
justice system."). Because no court has yet determined whether Wright was
A-2105-24 19 lying on the stand or lying when she gave her 2018 recantation statement, we
are not convinced the trial court was able to engage in the "fact-sensitive
analysis" necessary "to determine whether the newly discovered evidence would
probably make a difference to the jury." Ways, 180 N.J. at 191. An analysis
grounded in a developed factual record is especially necessary here considering
the pivotal importance of Wright's trial testimony to the State's case. Cf. id. at
194-95.
We emphasize, moreover, that our deference to a trial court's credibility
determinations generally presupposes that it "had the opportunity to observe and
hear the witnesses as they testified," Brooks, 366 N.J. Super. at 454 (quoting
Russo, 333 N.J. Super. at 137). Considering all of these circumstances, we
believe the record should be further developed by providing an opportunity for
the trial court to observe Wright's testimony firsthand. In making its firsthand
credibility findings, the trial court on remand, of course, should keep in mind
that recantation testimony is to be viewed with "extreme suspicion." Hogan,
144 N.J. at 239 (quoting Santiago, 837 F.2d at 1550). But that principle does
not categorically eliminate the need to hear from a live recantation witness when
they are available.
A-2105-24 20 Accordingly, we remand for the trial court to convene an evidentiary
hearing at which Wright will testify to determine whether, in light of her
recantation, her trial testimony was probably false. We do not retain
jurisdiction.
IV.
We next address defendant's contentions regarding the proffered alibi
affidavits. Defendant asserts that three separate alibi affidavits presented post -
trial serve as an additional basis for granting a new trial. Specifically, defendant
produced a November 19, 2014, affidavit from Barbara Mancle-Miles (Miles);
a December 15, 2014, affidavit from Narika Scott (Scott); and a May 9, 2016,
affidavit from Josephine Rivera (Rivera), each proffered to support defendant's
alibi defense that he was not present at the scene when the Rite Aid shooting
occurred.
We have already addressed Miles and Rivera as potential witnesses in our
earlier decision affirming the PCR court's denial of defendant's petition. State
v. Reevey, No. A-5379-18 (App. Div. Aug. 9, 2021). Exercising original
jurisdiction, we found Miles was not credible because "she was unsure whether
she testified at defendant's trial when she clearly did not." Id. at 17-18. After
reviewing a 2016 affidavit from Rivera that corroborated defendant's version of
A-2105-24 21 events on the night of the murder, we likewise concluded that "if Rivera's
testimony [was what] was stated in the 2016 affidavit, it would not have
mattered." Id. at 20. As the PCR judge noted, defendant's testimony failed to
establish an alibi, and given the time of the shooting, Rivera's testimony would
not have definitively supported defendant's version of events. See id. at 20.
Having now reviewed the Scott affidavit, we agree with the trial court's
finding that it is substantially similar to the previously proffered alibi affidavits.
Scott explains that she "vaguely" remembers the times surrounding May 9, 2000.
Therefore, her version of events does not definitively establish a defense alibi
and fails to satisfy the materiality prong of the Carter test.
Furthermore, the trial court's conclusion that the alibi affidavits could not
satisfy prong three of the Carter test is substantially supported not only by the
prior PCR court decision but also by our own prior findings. See State v.
Reevey, No. A-5379-18 (App. Div. Aug. 9, 2021) (slip op. at 17-18, 20). As the
trial court explained, "the PCR court and the Appellate Division actually
considered the proffered evidence and determined that [d]efendant could not
establish an alibi at the time of the shooting based on this information." In these
circumstances, the trial court appropriately denied defendant's motion fo r a new
trial based on the alibi affidavits.
A-2105-24 22 To the extent we have not addressed them, any remaining arguments made
by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed in part and remanded in part for proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-2105-24 23