State of New Jersey v. Janean D. Owens

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 30, 2025
• Docket: A-1477-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1477-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

JANEAN D. OWENS, a/k/a ALICIA SHANTA, and JANENA QOENS,

Defendant-Respondent. ________________________

Submitted March 4, 2025 – Decided April 30, 2025

Before Judges Gilson, Bishop-Thompson, and Augostini.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment Nos. 04-10- 1586, 07-01-0155, and 07-01-0158.

Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for appellant (Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the briefs).

Law Offices of Lora B. Glick, LLC, attorney for respondent (Lora B. Glick, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

In 2009, a jury convicted defendant Janean Owens of first-degree

aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a), and related crimes of theft and

weapons offenses. Thereafter, defendant separately pled guilty to a violation of

probation on a previous conviction for third-degree possession of controlled

dangerous substances (CDS), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-10(a)(1).

On the manslaughter conviction, defendant was sentenced to twenty-five

years in prison with periods of parole ineligibility and supervision as prescribed

by the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. She was also

sentenced to consecutive prison terms on several other convictions, as well as

the sentence imposed for the CDS conviction.

In 2023, defendant moved to change her sentences, contending that the

sentences had become illegal under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) because of sexual

assaults and harassment she had endured while in prison. The trial court granted

that motion in-part. The State now appeals from the amended judgments of

conviction that reduced defendant's sentence on the manslaughter conviction to

twenty years and changed the consecutive sentences to run concurrently.

Because defendant's sentences were not illegal when imposed, and because those

sentences did not become illegal based on her treatment in prison, we reverse

A-1477-23 2 and vacate the amended judgments of conviction entered on November 2, 2023

and December 11, 2023. We reinstate defendant's judgment of conviction

entered on November 15, 2012, which was entered in accordance with our

remand following defendant's direct appeal. 1

I.

In October 2006, defendant killed Robert Funderberk by shooting him in

the back of his head while sitting behind him in a car. Keith McBride was with

defendant at the time of the shooting and afterwards took Funderberk's money

and a jewelry chain. McBride and defendant then drove Funderberk's body to

Newark and dumped it next to garbage container.

Through subsequent investigations, defendant was linked to the murder.

She was arrested and after being given and waiving her Miranda2 rights, she

confessed to shooting Funderberk. She also provided details of her and

McBride's actions on the night of the shooting.

A grand jury indicted defendant for first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-

3(a)(1) and (2), as well as related charges of robbery, theft, and weapons

1 Defendant is also entitled to the jail credits she was awarded on a motion she made in 2022. Those jail credits should be added to the November 15, 2012 judgment of conviction. 2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-1477-23 3 offenses. Under a separate indictment, defendant was charged with fourth-

degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(a).

Following a ten-day trial conducted in 2009, a jury convicted defendant

of first-degree aggravated manslaughter, as a lesser included offense of murder;

two counts of third-degree theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; third-degree conspiracy to

commit theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3; second-degree possession

of a weapon for unlawful purposes, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and third-degree

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). In a separate trial, the

same jury convicted defendant of fourth-degree certain persons not to have

weapons.

Defendant was sentenced on June 26, 2009. On the aggravated

manslaughter conviction, she was sentenced to twenty-five years in prison

subject to NERA. On the conviction for conspiracy to commit theft and the two

theft convictions, defendant was sentenced to four years on each conviction and

those sentences were run concurrent to each other and consecutive to the

manslaughter conviction. On the convictions for possession of a weapon for

unlawful purposes and unlawful possession of a weapon, defendant was

sentenced to ten years and five years in prison respectively and those sentences

were run concurrent to all her other sentences. On the certain persons

A-1477-23 4 conviction, defendant was sentenced to eighteen months in prison and that

sentence was run consecutively to her other sentences.

On the same day that defendant was sentenced, she pled guilty to a

violation of probation for a previous conviction of third-degree possession of

CDS. For that violation of probation, defendant was sentenced to five years in

prison and that sentence was run consecutively to her other sentences.

Defendant filed a direct appeal from her convictions and sentences. We

rejected her arguments concerning her convictions and affirmed them. We

modified her sentences. State v. Owens (Owens I), No. A-0803-09 (App. Div.

Sept. 4, 2012). Concerning her sentences, we reversed the decision to make the

theft sentences consecutive to the aggravated manslaughter sentence. We also

ruled that the conviction for possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose s

should have merged with the aggravated manslaughter conviction. However,

we left the twenty-five-year sentence for aggravated manslaughter in-place.

Accordingly, we remanded for resentencing.

On November 15, 2012, an amended judgment of conviction was entered

that made the changes we had directed. Thereafter, the New Jersey Supreme

Court denied defendant's petition for certification. State v. Owens, 215 N.J. 485

(2013).

A-1477-23 5 In December 2013, defendant filed a petition for post-conviction relief

(PCR). In that petition, defendant made several arguments concerning alleged

ineffective assistance of her counsel. She did not make any claims concerning

her treatment in prison. The PCR court denied defendant's petition and we

affirmed that decision. State v. Owens (Owens II), No. A-3871-14 (App. Div.

June 8, 2017).

In July 2023, defendant moved to correct her sentences, alleging that her

sentences were illegal under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). She asserted that her sentences

should be vacated as unconstitutional and illegal due to the cruel and unusual

punishment she had suffered at the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility (EMCF).

In her supporting certification, defendant contended that she had been

imprisoned in EMCF in June 2009, and for the following fourteen years she had

been subjected to sexual abuse by several corrections officers. She also alleged

that when she reported those abuses, she was harassed and subject ed to

retaliation.

On November 2, 2023, the trial court granted in part and denied in part

defendant's motion. The court explained the reasons for its ruling in an oral

decision read into the record. The trial court acknowledged that there was no

court rule or case law supporting the relief requested by defendant. The court

A-1477-23 6 accepted defendant's representations regarding her mistreatment at EMCF and

then ruled that it would change her two consecutive sentences, for the certain

persons not to have weapons and violation of probation convictions, to run

concurrent to her sentence for aggravated manslaughter. The court also

explained that it was leaving in place the twenty-five-year sentence imposed for

the aggravated manslaughter conviction. That same day, the court entered an

amended judgment of conviction, changing the consecutive sentences to run

concurrent to defendant's sentence for aggravated manslaughter.

Shortly thereafter, defendant moved for reconsideration. Defendant

contended that even under the amended judgment of conviction, she would

remain in prison and could not be transferred to a halfway house due to the

mandatory period of parole ineligibility under NERA. Accordingly, defendant

sought to reduce her sentence for aggravated manslaughter from twenty-five

years to twenty years.

On December 5, 2023, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant's

motion for reconsideration. At that hearing, the court took testimony from

defendant. In her testimony, defendant described the sexual abuse and

retaliation she had been subjected to while at EMCF. She also explained that

she had been transferred from EMCF to another facility and acknowledged that

A-1477-23 7 she had not experienced any incidents of sexual abuse at the new facility. She

also stated that she had filed a civil suit because of her mistreatment at EMCF.

Ultimately, defendant had prevailed in her civil suit and had been awarded

monetary damages for the sexual assaults and mistreatment she had suffered.

On December 11, 2023, the trial court issued an order and written opinion

granting defendant's motion for reconsideration. The trial court also entered an

amended judgment of conviction, reducing defendant's sentence on the

aggravated manslaughter conviction from twenty-five years to twenty years.

In its written opinion, the trial court explained that it was changing its

November 2, 2023 decision because its goal had been to allow defendant's

immediate release from prison to a halfway house. The court went on to explain

that it granted reconsideration because it now understood that to accomplish that

objective, defendant's aggravated manslaughter conviction, which was subject

to NERA, had to be reduced.

The trial court again acknowledged that there was no direct precedent or

rule supporting its determination that defendant's sentence had become illegal

because of her treatment in prison. Nevertheless, the court reasoned that the

proper "administration of justice" would support changing defendant's

sentences. The court also explained that although Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) does not

A-1477-23 8 account for the circumstances of this case, it should allow for a sentence to be

considered illegal because of unconstitutional violations that a defendant suffers

while in prison. To support that broad proposition, the trial court cited Chief

Justice Vanderbilt's observations in State v. Culver, where the Chief Justice

noted that "[t]he nature of the common law requires that each time a rule of law

is applied it be carefully scrutinized to make sure that the conditions and needs

of the times have not so changed as to make further application of it the

instrument of injustice." 23 N.J. 495, 505 (1957).

The day after the December 11, 2023 amended judgment of conviction

was entered, the Department of Corrections notified the State that defendant was

being released from prison to a halfway house. The State now appeals from the

amended judgments of conviction that were entered on November 2, 2023 and

December 11, 2023.

II.

On this appeal, the State makes one argument, contending that the trial

court improperly relied on Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) to reduce defendant's legal

sentence. The State candidly acknowledges that defendant was subject to sexual

assaults and mistreatment at EMCF. The State contends, however, that

defendant's mistreatment does not make her sentences illegal, and that defendant

A-1477-23 9 has civil and administrative remedies available to address her mistreatment in

prison.

"'An "illegal sentence" is one "not imposed in accordance with the law,"'

including a sentence that violates a constitutional safeguard." State v. Ryan,

249 N.J. 581, 592 (2022) (quoting State v. Zuber, 227 N.J. 422, 437 (2017)

(quoting State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011))). In other words, "[a]n illegal

sentence is one that is either unconstitutional or not authorized by the New

Jersey Code of Criminal Justice." State v. Dunlap, 462 N.J. Super. 274, 283

(App. Div. 2020) (citing Zuber, 227 N.J. at 437).

A defendant can challenge an illegal sentence under Rule 3:21-10(b)(5).

That rule states, in relevant part, "[a] motion may be filed and an order may be

entered at any time . . . correcting a sentence not authorized by law including

the Code of Criminal Justice." R. 3:21-10(b)(5). "Whether a sentence is illegal

as unconstitutional . . . is a question of law to which a reviewing court affords

no deference." State v. Thomas, 470 N.J. Super. 167, 196 (App. Div. 2022)

(citing Zuber, 227 N.J. at 437).

Defendant acknowledges that defendant's sentence on the aggravated

manslaughter conviction was within the sentencing range for that crime and that

the sentence was legal when it was imposed in 2009. See N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(c)

A-1477-23 10 (stating that the range of imprisonment for first-degree aggravated manslaughter

is between ten and thirty years). So, defendant's sentences were authorized

under the Criminal Code. Indeed, on defendant's direct appeal, we affirmed the

twenty-five-year sentence on her conviction for aggravated manslaughter.

Owens I, slip op. at 2.

Rule 3:21-10(b)(5) allows a defendant to challenge a sentence that was or

has become unconstitutional. Thus, if there is a change in constitutional law, a

defendant may have a right to challenge her sentence as illegal years after it was

imposed. See Zuber, 227 N.J. at 437. No case, however, has held that

subsequent mistreatment of a defendant in prison transforms the sentence itself

into an unconstitutional or illegal one.

Instead, existing case law has held that certain sentences as imposed have

later been recognized to be unconstitutional. Accordingly, in Miller v. Alabama,

the United States Supreme Court held that it was a violation of the Eighth

Amendment to impose mandatory life imprisonment without parole on juveniles

who were under the age of eighteen at the time they committed their crimes.

567 U.S. 460, 470 (2012). In Zuber, the New Jersey Supreme Court extended

the application of the Miller factors to juveniles facing a term of imprisonment

that is the practical equivalent of life without parole. Zuber, 227 N.J. at 428-30.

A-1477-23 11 In State v. Comer, the Court held that under New Jersey's Constitution, juveniles

who had previously been sentenced to a mandatory prison term of at least thirty

years without parole will be permitted to petition for a review of their sentence

after they have served twenty years in prison. 249 N.J. 359, 369-70 (2022).

Miller, Zuber, Comer, and the line of cases that follow them, are not

applicable to defendant. As already noted, defendant was not a juvenile when

she committed aggravated manslaughter. Moreover, there is no recognized

constitutional rationale for holding that subsequent mistreatment in prison

makes previously imposed sentences unconstitutional. Nor do the facts of this

case warrant the creation of a new constitutional right. While there is no dispute

that defendant was grossly mistreated while she was serving her sentences at

EMCF, she has civil and administrative remedies for that mistreatment. In that

regard, defendant filed and prevailed in a civil action regarding the violations of

her Eighth Amendment rights while in prison. Moreover, defendant was

administratively transferred from EMCF to a new facility.

Defendant concedes that no rule or existing case law explicitly supports

her position. In that regard, neither defendant nor the trial court cited to any

state or federal cases where a lawfully imposed sentence has been declared

A-1477-23 12 illegal due to sexual assault or mistreatment a defendant suffered while in prison

serving the sentence.

Instead, defendant relies on the "fundamental fairness doctrine" and our

decision in Thomas. 470 N.J. Super. at 200-01. The defendant in Thomas

murdered two teenage acquaintances when he was seventeen years old. Id. at

172. In 1982, Thomas was sentenced to concurrent life sentences, with no parole

disqualifiers. Id. at 173. Thomas thereafter became eligible for parole in May

1995, but was repeatedly denied parole. Id. at 174. Thomas thus filed a motion

in the trial court for a hearing under Miller to correct his sentence, which he

argued had effectively become a life sentence without parole. Id. at 177. The

issue in Thomas was "not defendant's sentence, but rather the practices of the

[p]arole [b]oard." Id. at 179. In an matter of first impression, we held that a

"defendant[] who [had] . . . been imprisoned for more than four decades even

though his sentence did not impose a specified period of parole ineligibility []

[had] the constitutional right to an adversarial hearing [on his request to correct

his sentence]." Id. at 171. We reasoned that fundamental fairness required relief

where "legal concepts [had] hindered defendant's ability to obtain the review to

which he [was] constitutionally entitled." Id. at 200-01. Thus, we reversed and

remanded the denial of his request to correct his sentence and instructed the trial

A-1477-23 13 court to conduct a hearing as called for in Comer and to consider the Miller

factors in determining whether Thomas had achieved maturity and rehabilitation

warranting relief under the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 201.

Thomas does not support defendant's position in this matter. Defendant

was not a juvenile when she committed her crimes. More importantly, defendant

is not seeking a hearing to address her eligibility for parole; rather she is seeking

relief from her underlying sentences. Her sentences, however, were legal when

imposed and there is no support for the concept that mistreatment in prison, no

matter how deplorable, transforms legal sentences into illegal sentences.

The trial court's decision to reduce defendant's sentence for aggravated

manslaughter from twenty-five years to twenty years is also inconsistent with

NERA. NERA mandates that defendants convicted of certain crimes be

sentenced to a term of imprisonment from which they cannot be released until

they have served at least eighty-five percent of the sentence imposed. N.J.S.A.

2C:43-7.2. The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained that NERA is

mandatory and once imposed, a NERA term cannot be reduced unless the

conviction is revered or the sentence is illegal. See State v. Chavies, 247 N.J.

245, 261 (2021). In Chavies, the Court stated:

In our view, NERA represents a clear mandate by the Legislature that those who commit the most violent of

A-1477-23 14 crimes must serve [eighty-five percent] of the sentence imposed -- their period of parole ineligibility -- before they are eligible for release under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2). To permit defendant's release in this instance under Rule 3:21-10(b)(2) would effectively reduce his NERA sentence, which the Legislature and the plain language of NERA expressly forbid.

[Ibid. (first citing N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a); and then citing In re H.D., 241 N.J. 412, 418 (2020)).]

In other words, while the sexual abuse and mistreatment that defendant suffered

at EMCF was deplorable, it did not make her sentence illegal under Rule 3:21-

10(b)(5) and did not warrant relief from the statutorily mandated period of

parole ineligibility under NERA.

Finally, there are two procedural considerations that further support our

holding in this matter. First, as already noted, defendant's sentences were

affirmed on direct appeal. After the Supreme Court denied certification, those

sentences became final. Second, when defendant filed her PCR petition in 2013,

she was unfortunately already enduring sexual abuse. Indeed, she testified that

her harassment began in 2011. Defendant, however, did not raise the sexual

harassment or mistreatment as grounds for PCR.

Having considered this matter in full context, we reverse and vacate the

amended judgments of conviction entered on November 2, 2023 and December

11, 2023, as well as all related orders. We remand with direction that the trial

A-1477-23 15 court reinstate the November 15, 2012 judgment of conviction with appropriate

jail credits.

Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-1477-23 16