State of New Jersey v. Jamier Gibson

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: May 15, 2026
• Docket: A-3858-22
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3858-22

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMIER GIBSON, a/k/a JAMIER N. GIBSON,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Argued January 28, 2026 – Decided May 15, 2026

Before Judges Gummer, Paganelli, and Jacobs.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 21-03-0672.

Michael J. Kenney, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for appellant (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Michael J. Kenney, of counsel and on the briefs).

Lila B. Leonard, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Acting Attorney General, attorney; Lila B. Leonard, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

Defendant Jamier N. Gibson appeals his convictions and sentence for

first-degree robbery and related crimes. He contends the trial court erred by

admitting portions of his police interrogation containing alleged inadmissible

lay opinion and by permitting the prosecutor to accuse him of an uncharged

attempted theft during summation. Defendant also challenges the sentence as

excessive. We affirm.

I.

In March 2021, a Camden County grand jury indicted defendant on five

counts arising from a September 29, 2020 robbery of Dhahran Muse: first-

degree armed robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(2) (count one); second-degree

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) (count two); second-

degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -4(a)(1)

(count three); fourth-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4) (count

four); and second-degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

7(b)(1) (count five). The charges stemmed from an incident in which Muse,

walking home from work, was approached by defendant, who emerged from

behind and asked for directions, then pointed a pistol and demanded Muse's

A-3858-22 2 wallet and phone. Muse complied and ran away. His wallet contained a Cash

App and Apple card. Defendant left the scene in a vehicle.

Muse called 9-1-1 and reported the robbery. Police responded, and

Detective Jake Siegfried became the primary investigator. Surveillance video

from the area showed the suspect's vehicle, leading to a motor-vehicle stop of

defendant. Muse's cell phone was found in defendant's vehicle. Muse also

received a Cash App request for $250 from defendant's wife minutes after the

robbery.

Defendant was arrested and interrogated. He denied robbing Muse,

instead claiming Muse stole drugs from him in a failed drug deal. During

interrogation, Siegfried and another detective told defendant the surveillance

video contradicted his account, though the video did not actually show the

robbery or that it visually contradicted defendant's account. At trial, Siegfried

acknowledged he had lied to defendant as an interrogation technique.

Before trial, the judge conducted a Miranda1 hearing and found

defendant's statement was voluntary. The judge and parties agreed to redact

portions of the interrogation video, including references to defendant's social

security number and prior criminal history. However, defense counsel did not

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-3858-22 3 request the redaction of the detectives' statements accusing defendant of lying

or mentioning the surveillance video, nor did the judge independently order

those portions redacted.

At trial, the jury viewed the surveillance and interrogation videos. Muse

testified to the robbery and the Cash App request. The State introduced evidence

of the Cash App request. The jury found defendant guilty on the first four

counts, and the State dismissed the remaining charge.

At sentencing, the judge denied the State's request for an extended term.

The judge then merged convictions on counts three and four with the conviction

on count one and imposed a twenty-year imprisonment term with an eighty-five

percent parole disqualifier pursuant to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.

2C:43-7.2. On count two, the court imposed a concurrent ten-year term with a

five-year parole disqualifier. In imposing sentence, the judge detailed

defendant's criminal history and found aggravating factors three (risk of re -

offense), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(3); six (extent of prior record), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-

1(a)(6); and nine (need for deterrence), N.J.S.A. 2C:44-1(a)(9). The judge found

no mitigating factors.

On appeal, defendant raises the following points:

A-3858-22 4 POINT I

THE COURT FAILED TO REDACT PORTIONS OF GIBSON'S RECORDED INTERROGATION THAT INCLUDED INADMISSIBLE LAY OPINION OF DETECTIVES. (Not raised below.)

POINT II

THE STATE IMPROPERLY ACCUSED GIBSON OF AN UNCHARGED ATTEMPTED THEFT DURING SUMMATION DESPITE NO FACTS IN EVIDENCE SUPPORTING THE ACCUSATION. (Not raised below.)

POINT III

THE COURT ERRED IN CONSIDERATION OF THE AGGRAVATING AND MITIGATING FACTORS RESULTING IN AN EXCESSIVE SENTENCE.

II.

Because defendant did not object to the admission of the challenged

statements or the prosecutor's summation at trial, we review under the plain error

standard of Rule 2:10-2. State v. Singh, 245 N.J. 1, 13 (2021). Plain error must

be "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." Ibid. (quoting R. 2:10-2).

"The mere possibility of an unjust result is not enough." State v. Funderburg,

225 N.J. 66, 79 (2016). "In the context of a jury trial, the possibility must be

'sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a

result it otherwise might not have reached.'" State v. G.E.P., 243 N.J. 362, 389-

A-3858-22 5 90 (2020) (quoting State v. Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997)).

Interrogation Video

At the outset, we emphasize the distinction between a witness's

contemporaneous narration of a video shown to the jury and recorded

statements. Here, the issue concerns recorded statements presented to the jury

in the form of an interrogation recording. Thus, our focus is distinct from Singh,

where the Supreme Court "consider[ed] whether it was plain error for the trial

court to allow the detective to make two references to 'the defendant' in narrating

the surveillance footage of a robbery for the jury" under N.J.R.E. 701. 245 N.J.

at 4.

Instead, we must determine if the interrogation played before the jury

satisfies the strictures of N.J.R.E. 701:

If a witness is not testifying as an expert, the witness'[s] testimony in the form of opinions or inferences may be admitted if it:

(a) is rationally based on the witness'[s] perception; and

(b) will assist in understanding the witness'[s] testimony or determining a fact in issue.

Defendant asserts, pursuant to N.J.R.E. 701, an officer may not offer lay

opinion testimony regarding credibility of another witness. He argues "the court

erred by failing to redact lay opinion statements by detectives assessing [his]

A-3858-22 6 credibility." Because "[t]he detectives would not have been permitted to testify

at trial regarding these opinions[,]" the statements should have been redacted

from the video. Defendant further argues the statements should have been

excluded under N.J.R.E. 403 in that their probative value was substantially

outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. We disagree.

The record shows the court and parties conducted a line-by-line review of

the interrogation transcript. Defendant originally objected to a statement by

Detective Siegfried, "[b]ut listen, we don't just sit here and we don't just bring

you up here for no reason." When asked to explain his reasoning, counsel said:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: . . . Your Honor, I think it's a [Rule] 403 argument that . . . it doesn't really offer very much of probative value but rather it sort of intimates the idea that . . . there is reason to believe that he's guilty of what the police suspect him to be involved with.

There's sort of a presumption if we don't bring you here for any reason[,] they must have some good reason.

THE COURT: But they go on and say, "We don't just -- do you know? Everything has a purpose and you're here for a reason." He goes, "Right. Okay. All right."

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Yes, Judge.

THE COURT: "So we see you get out of a car," [th]at all goes into the reason why the officer says, "We're interviewing [Muse]." I don't see any –

A-3858-22 7 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: We can withdraw that [objection].

Defense counsel limited his substantive objections to portions of the

statement concerning comments defendant made about his father:

THE COURT: . . . [Counsel] need[s] to draft and provide to the [c]ourt . . . what is it that you want the [c]ourt to read to the jury regarding those statements [made during the interrogation].

So on page 19 he gets specific and he makes contact with this person on lines 11 . . . on down. He start[s] talking like you, what you got man, I got dimes and -- so this is when he starts talking about it.

But throughout the statement he talks about he was selling these drugs and that the person robbed him of his drugs. It's a drug deal that went bad. And again, I'm making my record. No redactions are being sought regarding any of that but with limiting instructions for the jury, correct?

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That's correct, Judge.

THE COURT: Okay. In reference to these pages starting on page 6.

Okay. What's being sought to be redacted is . . . defendant stating, "I'm willing to give my Pop's up right now, bird and walk the f[*]ck out of here, bro."

....

And then on page 29 he says, "Now and I understand . . . that you all are not drug cops. What I'm telling you here is you heard . . . these names, the name

A-3858-22 8 that I give you, my father's name. Uh-huh. (Inaudible). Yeah. He's a big dog. He's a big man. Okay. Listen, I get you. We're talking about big dog like I'm going to work with you all . . . like I don't -- like this sh[*]t right here."

[(Emphases added).]

The judge permitted defendant's proposed redactions over the State's

objection. Beyond challenging admission of the statement as a whole, defense

counsel did not renew his objection to admission of the detectives' statements

now at issue. This signaled a strategic choice by defense counsel to capitalize

on the detectives' blatant deception and defendant's persistent claims of

innocence. See State v. Timmendequas, 161 N.J. 515, 576 (1999) ("Generally,

if no objection was made to the improper remarks, the remarks will not be

deemed prejudicial.") (citing State v. Ramseur, 106 N.J. 123, 323 (1987)).

Failure to make a timely objection indicates defense counsel did not believe the

remarks were prejudicial at the time they were made. State v. Irving, 114 N.J.

427, 444 (1989) (citing State v. Johnson, 31 N.J. 489, 511 (1960)).

Counsel implemented this strategy on cross-examination:

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And he said, "I don't know what you want. I told you the truth," or something to that effect, is that – [?]

[DETECTIVE SIEGFRIED]: Yes.

A-3858-22 9 [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: And in reality you didn't have any evidence that he wasn't telling you the truth[,] right?

[DETECTIVE SIEGFRIED]: On video, yes.

[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. All that you had was a statement from the so-called victim[?]

The jury thus knew the detectives' accusations of visual corroboration

were not true. The jury also viewed the video, which did not show the robbery

or contradict defendant's rendition.

In summation, defense counsel highlighted defendant's conduct under

interrogation.

Now, [defendant] is sitting there in that police station. He hadn't seen the video. He doesn't know what's on it. Still, as the police continue to lie to him and tell him that his story was not what they see happening in the video, he may as well tell them the truth.

He never waivered. He never flinched from the truth. He asked them what did they see in this video and challenges them to go get that video right now so they could all see it in the room together because he mistakenly believed that the video would show what really happened and it would clear his name.

But it doesn't. After a fairly long interrogation with his story of a drug deal gone bad never changed,

A-3858-22 10 . . . and under continued police urgings to help himself and to come clean and confess[, defendant] stuck to his guns . . . .

In the final charge, the trial court instructed the jury, "[y]ou and you alone

are the sole and exclusive judges of the evidence, of the credibility of the

witnesses, and the weight to be attached to the testimony of each witness."

Regarding defendant's recorded statements, the judge instructed, "[i]t is your

function to determine whether or not the statements were actually made by . . .

defendant and if made, whether the statements or any portion of them are

credible." We are satisfied no additional limiting instruction was requested or

warranted. See State v. Krivacska, 341 N.J. Super. 1, 43-44 (App. Div. 2001)

(finding a counsel's decision not to request a limiting instruction can be a "well

reasoned strategic determination").

When a defendant fails to raise an issue before the trial court, that

defendant "'bears the burden of establishing that the trial court's actions

constituted plain error' because 'to rerun a trial when the error could easily have

been cured on request[] would reward the litigant who suffers an error for

tactical advantage either in the trial or on appeal.'" State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J.

390, 404-05 (2019) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Ross, 229 N.J. 389,

407 (2017)). From this record we are satisfied there was no error in admission

A-3858-22 11 of the detectives' statements as redacted.

Even if their admission was improper, it was not "clearly capable of

producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2. The jury was aware the detectives lied

to defendant. Defense counsel emphasized this point and attempted to use it to

his advantage. In the end, the evidence against defendant was strong. Aside

from Muse's testimony, Muse's phone was found in defendant's vehicle, the

vehicle was identified in surveillance footage, and defendant's wife sent a Cash

App request to Muse minutes after the robbery.

Prosecutor's Summation

Defendant claims prosecutorial misconduct, asserting that during

summation, the prosecutor accused defendant of having committed an

uncharged attempted theft. Again, because there was no objection at trial, we

review for plain error.

During summation, prosecutor stated:

Next, what is consistent? How can we confirm that [Muse]'s wallet was in fact stolen? Because of the attempted [C]ash [A]pp transfer which is[,] I believe[,] S-8 in evidence. As you heard [Muse] explain, Cash App is a phone application to transfer money, but he also had a [C]ash [A]pp card which . . . as I explained[,] is used just like a debit card.

We know that . . . defendant had [Muse]'s wallet because he couldn't have used the [C]ash [A]pp phone

A-3858-22 12 application because [Muse]'s phone was locked. Nobody could access it but [Muse]. The only other option was to use the [C]ash [A]pp card inside . . . the wallet that was stolen.

A conviction may be reversed based on prosecutorial misconduct only

where the misconduct is "so egregious" in the context of the trial as a whole as

to deprive the defendant of a fair trial. State v. Pressley, 232 N.J. 587, 593-94

(2018) (quoting State v. Wakefield, 190 N.J. 397, 437-38 (2007)). In making

this assessment, the court must "consider the tenor of the trial and the

responsiveness of counsel and the court to the improprieties when they

occurred." Timmendequas, 161 N.J. at 575. Where defense counsel fails to

object at trial to the alleged prosecutorial misconduct, it suggests "defense

counsel did not believe the remarks were prejudicial at the time they were

made." Id. at 576.

At trial, defense counsel did not object to the prosecutor's remarks, and so

we infer counsel did not consider the remarks to be inappropriate. Moreover,

the prosecutor's comments were based on evidence that defendant's wife sent a

Cash App request to Muse minutes after the robbery, using information from

Muse's stolen wallet. The prosecutor fairly argued that evidence supported an

inference defendant had stolen Muse's wallet. The comments were not focused

on an accusation defendant committed a separate, uncharged crime. Rather, they

A-3858-22 13 were directed to linking defendant to Muse's wallet. The evidence establishing

that link was especially vital as Muse's wallet was never recovered. It also

confirmed there was more to the interaction between defendant and Muse than

a mere "drug deal gone bad." In sum, the prosecutor's statement was a fair

comment on the evidence and not clearly capable of producing an unjust result.

Sentencing

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-7 provides:

Any action taken by the court in imposing sentence shall be subject to review by an appellate court. The court shall specifically have the authority to review findings of fact by the sentencing court in support of its findings of aggravating and mitigating circumstances and to modify the defendant's sentence upon his application where such findings are not fairly supported on the record before the trial court.

We review sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. State v. Jones,

232 N.J. 308, 318 (2018). We affirm "unless . . . the sentencing guidelines were

violated[,]" the findings of aggravating and mitigating factors "were not based

upon competent credible evidence[,]" or the sentence "shock[s] the judicial

conscience." State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 70 (2014) (quoting State v. Roth, 95

N.J. 334, 364-65 (1984)).

The deferential standard of review applies, however, "only if the trial

judge follows the Code and the basic precepts that channel sentencing

A-3858-22 14 discretion." State v. Trinidad, 241 N.J. 425, 453 (2020) (quoting State v. Case,

220 N.J. 49, 65 (2014)).

Defendant contends the court failed to provide a sufficient basis to support

its findings of aggravating factors three and nine. He further asserts the sentence

was excessive and inadequately explained. Our review of the record shows the

contrary. The judge carefully considered the aggravating and mitigating factors,

detailed defendant's criminal history, and explained her reasoning. The sentence

imposed was within the statutory range and does not shock the judicial

conscience.

In weighing the factors, the judge mentioned defendant is the father of

four young children his mother helps raise. The judge observed defendant was

fortunate in that respect, in that "I've seen so many people in my courtroom that

come by themselves with no mother, no father, no sister, no brother, not even a

friend." The judge stated that notwithstanding this support, it "still wasn't

enough for him to not have contact with the law."

Defendant argues the judge "inappropriate[ly]" used defendant's family

circumstances against him, "plac[ing defendant] in a worse position at

sentencing." He argues "having a family does not make [defendant] either more

A-3858-22 15 likely to reoffend under aggravating factor three or increase the need for

deterrence under aggravating factor nine."

We do not construe the judge's remarks to constitute an "inappropriate

consideration of [defendant]'s family status." Rather, we see the judge's

observation as a generalized lament based on her extensive courtroom

experience, nothing more.

Lastly, we note the judge exercised discretion in defendant's favor,

rejecting the State's application for an extended-term sentence. Thus, in

declining to impose an extended-term sentence and sentencing defendant within

the statutory framework, we are satisfied there was no abuse of discretion.

Affirmed.

A-3858-22 16