NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2169-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JACLYN M. APPLEGATE,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted May 18, 2026 – Decided May 28, 2026
Before Judges Sabatino and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 23-08-1395.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Colin Sheehan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel and on the brief; Cheryl L. Hammel, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM After a jury convicted defendant Jaclyn M. Applegate for obstructing the
administration of law or other governmental functions, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a), and
unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), both fourth-degree
crimes, she was sentenced to concurrent terms of twelve-months of probation
plus related fines and costs. Before us, she challenges only her convictions and
argues:
POINT I
[HER] CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT EVERY ESSENTIAL ELEMENT OF OBSTRUCTION AND THE UNLAWFUL POSSESSION OF A WEAPON.
a. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [she] acted with the purpose of obstruction.
b. The State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that [she] possessed the pocketknife under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for lawful use.
For the reasons that follow, we disagree with all of defendant's arguments and
accordingly affirm her convictions.
I.
After her arrest following an incident on January 19, 2021, defendant was
charged with third-degree resisting arrest, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-2(a)(3)(a); fourth-
A-2169-23 2 degree obstructing; fourth-degree possessing certain weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
3(e), namely an "out[-]of[-]the[-]front automatic switch blade"; fourth-degree
unlawfully possessing that "out[-]of[-]the[-]front automatic switch blade"; and
fourth-degree unlawfully possessing a separate "four[-]inch pocket[-]knife."
During trial, Officer Gregory Mezzanotte, a police officer with five years
of experience in the Ocean Township Police Department in Waretown and the
first responding officer, testified to the facts that led to defendant's arrest.
Officer Mezzanotte stated that on the night of January 19th, before his shift, he
attended a briefing where he learned the Department received information from
a neighboring police department "to be on the lookout for a vehicle and a
subject" because the individual lived in the town and was allegedly "involved in
. . . buying and selling . . . drugs, acting as a police officer, and robbing other
drug dealers in the area . . . ." He testified he and the other officers at the briefing
were informed of the individual's identity, that he drove or was associated with
a "2009 [black] Dodge Charger," his potential possession of a firearm, and an
outstanding warrant in a separate municipality for a "motor vehicle offense."
Within "two minutes of leaving [the] briefing," at 8:15 p.m., Officer
Mezzanotte testified that he observed a black Dodge Charger with a female
driver, as well as a "male front passenger and . . . another . . . male sitting in the
A-2169-23 3 back seat," who Officer Mezzanotte recognized as the individual from the
photograph he received at the briefing. Officer Mezzanotte stated he observed
the driver commit several traffic violations including operating the car
erratically and not using a turn signal. At this point, Officer Mezzanotte testified
that he "alerted other officers [over the radio] . . . and . . . attempted to turn
around to make contact" with the vehicle and the individual discussed at the
briefing.
Officer Mezzanotte next observed the Dodge Charger already parked on
the side of the road with the individual, later revealed to be defendant's
boyfriend, "outside of the vehicle . . . [and] waving [him] down." In addition to
waving, Officer Mezzanotte testified he observed defendant's boyfriend
"reaching . . . inside of the back of the car," in what he believed was the
boyfriend's attempt to "ambush" him with the firearm referenced during the
briefing. Concerned with his safety, Officer Mezzanotte testified he activated
his vehicle's emergency lights, alerted other officers, and parked further behind
the vehicle, approximately fifty feet, than he would have normally.
Officer Mezzanotte stated the mobile video recorder (MVR), which is
"essentially a dash cam with a microphone" that clips onto his uniform was
activated but did not have audio due to his decision to not attach the microphone
A-2169-23 4 to his uniform as he approached because he believed that he "was being
ambushed" and needed to exit his vehicle as "immediately as [he] could to
protect [him]self."1 As he approached the vehicle from the passenger's side,
Officer Mezzanotte stated he instructed defendant's boyfriend to place his hands
on the trunk of the vehicle. He testified the boyfriend complied but also
informed the officer that the male front passenger, later identified as a friend of
the boyfriend, was overdosing.
As Officer Mezzanotte attempted to secure and isolate the boyfriend, he
observed the female driver, later identified as defendant, moving her hands
"through the passenger compartment, the center console, and the back seat of
the vehicle." Officer Mezzanotte testified that in light of defendant's movements
and the arrival of Officer Joel Sawyer, who removed defendant's boyfriend from
the immediate vicinity of the vehicle, he shifted his focus onto defendant and
accordingly instructed her "approximately ten times" to "show [him] her hands
and put her hands on the steering wheel."
1 Officer Mezzanotte also testified, and his MVR footage confirmed, that he was able to clip the microphone onto his uniform after the scene was "secure," once defendant was in handcuffs and the officers tended to the friend in the front seat. A-2169-23 5 During their interaction, defendant responded to the officers' repeated
instructions with "vulgar language," in which she emphasized her displeasure
and her intent to ignore his instructions. Officer Mezzanotte observed, using his
flashlight, a "folding knife with a black handle in the [vehicle's] center console,"
which he could see because the console did not have a lid. In light of the
"folding knife," referred to as a pocketknife in the indictment, Officer
Mezzanotte drew his firearm and continued to instruct defendant to place her
hands on the steering wheel.
Officer Nicholas McGavin also arrived at the scene. He, like Officer
Sawyer and Mezzanotte, was also at the briefing minutes earlier. Officer
Mezzanotte testified he quickly "advised [Officer McGavin] that the occupants
of the vehicle were moving around, [he] saw a knife in the car, and that
[defendant] needed to be removed from the vehicle." At this point, Officer
Mezzanotte stated Officer McGavin approached the driver's side of the vehicle,
instructed defendant to exit the vehicle, and attempted to remove her from the
car after she continued to fail to comply with his orders.
After holstering his weapon, Officer Mezzanotte testified he observed
Officer McGavin "struggling to remove [defendant] from the vehicle," and
maneuvered around the rear of the car to the driver's side to assist him. While
A-2169-23 6 he ran behind the vehicle, Officer Mezzanotte stated he observed Officer
McGavin deploy "O.C. spray," which is the "police version of . . . mace or
pepper spray," in what he believed, was an attempt to stop defendant from her
repeated attempts to reach into the center console where the pocketknife was
located.
Officer Mezzanotte stated defendant "lock[ed] her arms up through the
steering wheel . . . and then pushe[d] herself back into the seat of the car." After
Officer Mezzanotte used a "head control technique" to free defendant's arms
from the steering wheel, Officer Mezzanotte observed Officer McGavin grab her
left arm, but defendant used her right arm to continue "grabbing throughout the
center console." The officers finally removed her from the vehicle after
"continu[ing] to pull on her body until she finally let go and loosen[ed] her
body." Officer Mezzanotte stated defendant initially "covered and tensed up"
such that the officers could not control her hands and arms immediately.
After struggling with defendant on the ground on the side of the road but
finally securing her in handcuffs, the officers attended to the friend, who
remained in the passenger's seat of the car and insisted he was overdosing on a
drug he had earlier ingested but could not confirm what, and how much, he
consumed. Officer Mezzanotte "immediately contact[ed] dispatch to send an
A-2169-23 7 ambulance to [their] location," but stated he did not believe the individual was
overdosing based on his experience and observations that his eyes reacted to
light, he was not lethargic, and he was completely aware of his surroundings.
After receiving emergency aid, defendant, her boyfriend, and the vehicle were
searched, and the officers seized the "black[-]handled folding pocketknife from
the center console of the vehicle," which Officer Mezzanotte observed during
his initial interaction with defendant.
After introducing a photo of the pocketknife from the night of the incident,
the State introduced the knife at trial, which Officer Mezzanotte handled and
described as having "flipper on it . . . to [o]pen it up in a fast manner and . . . a
pocket clip." He also stated it was an "approximately four-to-four-and-a-half-
inch knife" and confirmed it was, indeed, the pocketknife he believed defendant
was attempting to reach during their initial exchange. As noted, the State also
introduced MVR recordings from Officer Mezzanotte and Officer McGavin of
the incident which confirmed that the entire interaction from Officer
Mezzanotte's arrival to defendant's eventual handcuffing occurred over the
course of only a few minutes.
The State also called Officer McGavin, who corroborated Officer
Mezzanotte's testimony, including the information disseminated at the officers'
A-2169-23 8 briefing, Officer Mezzanotte's call for backup, and his repeated instructions to
defendant. As he approached the vehicle from the driver's side, Officer
McGavin testified he, like Officer Mezzanotte, observed defendant reaching
toward the center console. After opening the driver's door to remove defendant,
Officer McGavin asked her to exit the vehicle, at which point he grabbed her
left arm to forcibly remove her while she repeatedly reached "toward the center
console area," where he observed a "folding-type knife," identified as the
pocketknife. He testified that, although defendant later told the officers that she
was merely attempting to reach for her phone, he stated she was, indeed,
"reaching in the area [of the knife] and was uncooperative."
Next, the State called Officer Sawyer, who corroborated the previous
officers' testimony, including the officers' instructions to defendant and her
corresponding refusal to comply. He testified, however, that because he was
attempting to "secure" defendant's boyfriend in one of the patrol vehicles away
from the immediate vicinity of defendant's vehicle, he "was unable to make out
exactly what was being said."
After the State presented its witnesses, defendant moved for a directed
verdict with respect to the charges for resisting arrest, possessing certain
prohibited weapons, and unlawfully possessing a separate "out-of-the-front"
A-2169-23 9 automatic switchblade that the officers did not identify until after their search
of the vehicle. After considering the parties' arguments and the testimony, the
court denied the motion for a directed verdict, in light of the "credible
testimony" from the officers, as well as the MVR footage and the seizure of the
weapons.
Next, defendant presented her case and began with testimony from her
boyfriend. Relevant to the appeal before us, defendant's boyfriend testified the
pocketknife at the top of the center console that the officers observed, which he
further described as including a "benchmark-assisted blade" was, indeed, his
knife, which he regularly used to repair his car, along with the other contents of
the center console including a screwdriver, wires, scissors, and flashlights.
Specifically, he testified he used the knives, both the folding pocketknife and
the switchblade, to "strip wire . . . and to turn screw[s]." He explained that
because he is not a mechanic, he repaired the car weekly and testified he used
the knives for their convenience and the fact that he "can use what he wants,"
especially when he was "on the road."
Defendant also testified and explained, to the extent she was grabbing with
her hands around the car, she "want[ed] to grab [her] phone," which was located
in the center console, to record the officers, who she characterized as
A-2169-23 10 approaching the vehicle rudely and aggressively. She testified she was unaware
of the specific tools in the center console but stated her boyfriend owned many
knives and was aware he used them in the scenario where they "were going
somewhere and something happen[ed] to the car." She stated she also was
grabbing with her hands in the backseat because her dog was in the backseat,
and she was worried it would get hurt or escape. She also testified that the black
2009 Dodge Charger was registered to her. Defendant's testimony otherwise
corroborated the officers' account of the interaction, including her decision to
not heed the officers' orders, to "reach below," and "to grip into the steering
wheel."
In her closing argument, defendant's counsel contended the MVR footage,
in particular, established Officer McGavin immediately upon approaching the
vehicle dispersed spray without any provocation. Counsel argued she was never
told she was part of an investigation, and that she received "misdirection from
the officers," where she was told to simultaneously place her hands on the
steering wheel and exit it. Counsel contended, with respect to the pocketknife,
"people carry knives," and her boyfriend kept a knife in the car to "repair cars
. . . as a wire stripper," consistent with the other tools in the center console.
A-2169-23 11 Defendant's counsel also argued defendant was unaware of the pocketknife at
the time of the interaction.
In response, the State contended defendant possessed the knives,
including the pocketknife, which the officers "who approached that car . . . saw
almost immediately." It argued her actions, including "refusing to exit the car
after repeated commands," "locking her arms on the steering wheel," "pushing
her body back into the seat," and "reaching for the center console" where two
knives, including the pocketknife, were located, intentionally "create[d] chaos"
to purposefully obstruct the investigation involving her boyfriend.
It emphasized these actions were not intended to help the friend, who, she
believed, was overdosing, but rather her purpose was to specifically "protect her
boyfriend" by obstructing. Finally, with respect to the pocketknife, the State
argued she possessed it, and under the circumstances, it was likely to be used as
a weapon.
The jury found defendant guilty of obstructing an investigation and
unlawfully possessing the pocketknife but acquitted her of the remaining
charges. Thereafter, defendant immediately moved to set aside the verdict.
With respect to the obstruction conviction, she argued there was "[in]sufficient
evidence presented to demonstrate[e] that [she] . . . was purposeful in her
A-2169-23 12 intention." As to the unlawful possession conviction, she argued the pocketknife
"ha[d] a useful purpose" that her boyfriend relied upon "for stripping wires, as
he repair[ed] cars." In response, the State contended sufficient evidence
supported the convictions in light of the testimony of the officers, defendant,
and her boyfriend.
After considering the parties' oral arguments, the court orally denied
defendant's motion in light of the "considerable testimony provided by the
witnesses," in addition to the MVR footage from Officer McGavin and Officer
Mezzanotte. The court also issued a written order and corresponding decision
that denied defendant's motion pursuant to Rule 3:20-1.2 In its written decision,
the court relied on State v. Reyes, 50 N.J. 454 (1967) to support its conclusion
that the jury "heard considerable evidence by the witnesses in this matter," and
included both physical as well as testimonial proofs including testimony from
officers, defendant, and her boyfriend, the playback of portions of that
testimony, and footage of the MVRs from two of the officers. Defendant was
sentenced, as noted, a Judgment of Conviction entered, and this appeal followed.
2 Before us, the parties maintain defendant intended to move pursuant to Rule 3:18-2. A-2169-23 13 II.
Rule 3:18-2 provides that "[i]f the jury returns a verdict of guilty . . . a
motion for judgment of acquittal may be made, . . . [and] [t]he court on such
motion may set aside a verdict of guilty and order the entry of a judgment of
acquittal . . . ." A court applies the same standard when deciding a motion for a
judgment of acquittal under Rule 3:18-1 (a motion made before submission to a
jury) or Rule 3:18-2. State v. Papasavvas, 170 N.J. 462, 521 (2002). The test
is "whether, based on the entirety of the evidence and after giving the State the
benefit of all its favorable testimony and all the favorable inferences drawn from
that testimony, a reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. "
State v. Williams, 218 N.J. 576, 594 (2014). "Under both Rules 3:18-1 and -2,
the court 'is not concerned with the worth, nature or extent (beyond a scintilla)
of the evidence, but only with its existence, viewed most favorably to the State.'"
Papasavvas, 170 N.J. at 521 (quoting State v. Kluber, 130 N.J. Super. 336, 342
(App. Div. 1974)).
"An appellate court will apply the same standard as the trial court to
decide if a judgment of acquittal was warranted." State v. Felsen, 383 N.J.
Super. 154, 159 (App. Div. 2006) (citing State v. Moffa, 42 N.J. 258, 263
(1964)). To assess the sufficiency of evidence on an acquittal motion, an
A-2169-23 14 appellate court applies a de novo standard of review. Williams, 218 N.J. at 593-
94.
III.
Defendant first contends the State failed to establish beyond a reasonable
doubt that she acted with the purpose of obstruction, an element necessary to
support the conviction. She contends, at the time of the incident, which took
place over the course of less than two minutes from the officers approaching to
her arrest, she "was panicking, preoccupied with the chaos of the situation when
she did not immediately comply with the officers' demands." (Emphasis in
original). She asserts the context that her boyfriend was being arrested, that she
believed the friend was overdosing, and that the officers did not clarify "what
she was doing wrong," supports her contention that she did not purposefully act
to obstruct.
Defendant argues the officers needlessly escalated the situation, their
instructions contradicted themselves, and she was pepper-sprayed before she
could react and "keep up with an increasingly volatile situation." Defendant
emphasizes that she could not have acted purposefully because she "did not
understand what was happening to form the requisite purposeful mental state for
obstruction."
A-2169-23 15 N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) provides as follows:
A person commits an offense if he purposely obstructs, impairs or perverts the administration of law or other governmental function or prevents or attempts to prevent a public servant from lawfully performing an official function by means of flight, intimidation, force, violence, or physical interference or obstacle, or by means of any independently unlawful act.
The offense is a fourth-degree crime "if the actor obstructs the detection
or investigation of a crime." N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b). The obstruction or
impairment "must be carried out in [the] manner [specifically] described in the
statute." State v. Camillo, 382 N.J. Super. 113, 118 (App. Div. 2005). The
statute does not require physical contact, but it does require obstruction by
physical conduct. Id. at 121-22; see also State v. Berlow, 284 N.J. Super. 356,
360 (App. Div. 1995) ("[D]efendant must have affirmatively done something to
physically interfere or place an obstacle to prevent the police from performing
an official function.").
As relevant to the appeal before us, one of the elements to this charge is
that a defendant must act purposely. N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1. While not defined in
N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(b) specifically, our Criminal Code defines "purposely" as
follows:
A person acts purposely with respect to the nature of his conduct or a result thereof if it is his conscious
A-2169-23 16 object to engage in conduct of that nature or to cause such a result. A person acts purposely with respect to attendant circumstances if he is aware of the existence of such circumstances or he believes or hopes that they exist.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:2-2(b)(1).]
We are satisfied the record is replete with overwhelming direct evidence
that supports the jury's reasonable decision to find defendant guilty of
obstruction, including that she acted purposely to this end. As confirmed by the
officers' testimony and defendant herself, defendant repeatedly not only refused
to comply with any of the officers' instructions, but instead decided to actively
disobey them and reinforced her intent to continue to do so in vulgar and strong
language. Although Officer Mezzanotte's MVR footage does not contain audio
of what she specifically said to the officers, Officer McGavin's footage
corroborates defendant's aggressive recalcitrance and failure to comply with any
instructions. To the extent defendant claims her actions were actually motivated
by her concern for the friend, we reject that contention in light of the officers'
testimony, her own testimony, and the MVR footage.
Further, we reject defendant's argument that she could not have acted
purposely in light of the alleged contradictory instructions she was given by the
officers. To the extent that Officers McGavin and Mezzanotte's instructions
A-2169-23 17 contradicted each other, we are convinced defendant's decision to actively
ignore both instructions and continue to reach across the vehicle, as supported
by the officers' testimony, confirms the jury was presented sufficient evidence
that supported the conclusion that defendant's failure to comply with the officers'
instructions was not on account of any confusion but rather accountable to her
purposeful decision.
We also reject defendant's reliance on State v. Fede, 237 N.J. 138 (2019),
and Camillo, 382 N.J. Super. at 118, for the proposition that her actions did not
constitute sufficient physical conduct to support her conviction. In Fede, our
Supreme Court concluded the defendant's failure to unchain his apartment door's
lock did not constitute obstruction. 237 N.J. at 148. In Camillo, our court held
the defendant's refusal to give an officer his contact information without any
further physical conduct was not obstruction. 382 N.J. Super. at 118. Unlike
the defendants' conduct in Fede and Camillo, defendant's actions here, as
corroborated by the officers' and her testimony, support the conclusion that she
took affirmative and physical steps to actively obstruct the officers, specifically
locking herself into the steering wheel such that two officers struggled to remove
her. Accordingly, we are convinced the record demonstrates defendant's
physical conduct supports his obstruction conviction.
A-2169-23 18 IV.
Defendant next contends the State failed to present sufficient evidence
that she possessed her "[boyfriend]'s pocketknife" under circumstances not
manifestly appropriate for lawful use, the third element required to sustain a
conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d). Defendant does not challenge the other
elements required under such a conviction, namely that: (1) the folding
pocketknife was a weapon, and (2) she possessed the weapon knowingly. See
Telebright Corp. v. Dir., N.J. Div. of Tax'n, 424 N.J. Super. 384, 393 (App. Div.
2012) (deeming a contention waived when the party failed to include any
arguments supporting the contention in its brief); Pressler & Verniero, Current
N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 5 on R. 2:6-2 (2026) ("[A]n issue not briefed is deemed
waived.").
Specifically, defendant argues State v. Blaine, 221 N.J. Super. 66, 67
(App. Div. 1987) supports the position that her possession of the knife was
appropriate given the circumstances because she did not "pose any reasonable
threat," especially given the context that she was "simply driving a friend, who
she believed was overdosing, to the hospital." She contends the "pocketknife"
has a myriad of perfectly proper uses and was stored in the car's center console,
a "perfectly ordinary place to store a knife." She further maintains the evidence
A-2169-23 19 supports the conclusion that she was merely trying to look for her cellphone and
was "under no obligation to prove a lawful purpose." In any event, she argues
her alleged possession of the knife "lack[s] any of the sinister implications found
in other cases where there was sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction."
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) provides, "any person who knowingly has in his
possession any other weapon under circumstances not manifestly appropriate for
such lawful uses as it may have is guilty of a crime of the fourth degree." The
statute addresses "'the situation in which someone who has not yet formed an
intent to use an object as a weapon possesses it under circumstances in which it
is likely to be so used,'" namely "circumstances not manifestly appropriate for
such lawful uses as those objects may have." Blaine, 221 N.J. Super. at 69-70
(quoting State v. Lee, 96 N.J. 156, 161 (1984)). The "'surrounding
circumstances, such as the size, shape and condition of the knife, the nature of
its concealment, the time, place and actions of the carrier when found in his
possession'" can "indicate that possession of a knife may be 'not manifestly
appropriate' for its lawful use." Lee, 96 N.J. at 162 (quoting State v. Green, 62
N.J. 547, 560 (1973)).
To sustain a conviction for N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d), the State must prove that
the folding knife was possessed under such circumstances that a reasonable
A-2169-23 20 person would recognize beyond a reasonable doubt that it was likely to be used
as a weapon; in other words, under circumstances where it posed a likely threat
of harm to others or a likely threat of damage to property. State ex rel. G.C.,
179 N.J. 475, 483-84 (2004). Knives, however, are not inherently unlawful and
can have legitimate uses. Lee, 96 N.J. at 162 ("a steak knife is appropriate at
the dinner table, but sinister when concealed in a car with a BB gun."); State v.
Brown, 325 N.J. Super. 447, 458 (App. Div. 1999) ("while a pocketknife belongs
in one's pocket, a kitchen knife belongs at home[,]" and its presence in
defendant's pocket during the commission of a crime satisfies N.J.S.A. 2C:39 -
5(d)). In this regard, "if the implement is a weapon, the question of whether
defendant intends to use it lawfully or unlawfully is immaterial." State v. Riley,
306 N.J. Super. 141, 150 (App. Div. 1997); G.C., 179 N.J. at 482 ("Section
2C:39-5(d) does not require proof of such explicit intent.").
We are convinced defendant's repeated and continuous grabbing and
reaching toward the specific area where the knife was located, which was open
and visible to the responding officers, consistent with their testimony, during
the commission of a separate crime, supports the jury's reasonable conclusion
that her possession of the knife was not manifestly appropriate given the
circumstances. See Brown, 325 N.J. Super. at 459 (upholding conviction where
A-2169-23 21 the defendant possessed a "kitchen knife with a five-inch long blade," during the
commission of a robbery and assault); State v. Wright, 96 N.J. 170 (1984)
(upholding conviction where the defendant possessed "an Exacto knife, with an
eight-inch handle and a one-inch razor-like blade," during arrest for outstanding
warrants); Lee, 96 N.J. at 160-61 (upholding conviction where the defendant
possessed "scissors with blades taped together," during the commission of
burglary); Riley, 306 N.J. Super. at 150 (overturning conviction where the
defendant possessed a pocketknife during the commission of a robbery because
trial court had found the pocketknife was not "intended to be used as a weapon").
Again, based on the officers' testimony, defendant repeatedly reached toward
the center console, where both Officers Mezzanotte and McGavin observed the
pocketknife, as she yelled and aggressively refused to comply with their
instructions.
We reject defendant's argument that her conviction should be reversed
because she testified that she was not reaching for the knife, but rather her phone
or her dog, and that her boyfriend used the knife to repair the car. The jury was
free to consider that competing testimony, but it, in of itself, does not compel
we disregard the jury's verdict, particularly in light of the State's competing
proofs, including the officers' direct testimony that she was reaching for the
A-2169-23 22 knife while obstructing. To the extent that defendant contends her subjective
intent mandates reversal, we disagree. State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 317
(2017) (citing State v. Kelly, 118 N.J. 370, 380 (1990)) ("intent is not an element
of unlawful possession of a weapon").
Further, we reject defendant's reliance on Blaine as factually
distinguishable. In Blaine, our court held that the mere fact that defendant
possessed a "four-inch folding knife," which officers discovered after his arrest
pursuant to an outstanding warrant, was insufficient to support his conviction
for unlawful possession. 221 N.J. Super. at 70. Unlike the arrest in Blaine
where there was no indication the defendant ever reached for the knife or
attempted to obstruct the officers during the arrest, the jury was here entirely
within its province to conclude defendant's possession of the knife was unlawful
based on the trial proofs that she repeatedly attempted to grab the knife while
actively obstructing the officers' investigation. Accordingly, we are satisfied
there is sufficient evidence to support her conviction for unlawful possession.
To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendant's
arguments, it is because we have concluded they are without sufficient merit to
warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-2169-23 23