NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3351-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
IMAM S. SEARS, a/k/a SEARS SHARIEF, and IMAM SEARS,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted October 22, 2025 – Decided November 18, 2025
Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 21-05-0679.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shep A. Gerszberg, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Imam S. Sears appeals the denial of his motion for post-
conviction relief (PCR). Sears alleges ineffective assistance of counsel that
resulted in a guilty plea for a carjacking on September 2, 2020, in East Orange,
New Jersey. We affirm.
I.
On September 2, 2020, East Orange police responded to a reported
carjacking on Rhode Island Avenue. The victim informed police he was pistol
whipped in the left cheek with a brown handgun, and two men stole his 2006
Honda Odyssey. The victim described the first assailant as a tall African-
American male with shoulder length blonde dreadlocks wearing a dark-colored
hooded sweatshirt. The victim described the second assailant as a tall African-
American male with long dreadlocks or braids. Dispatch simultaneously
received a call from two witnesses who witnessed the carjacking and were in
pursuit of the suspects driving the stolen vehicle. Witnesses observed the
suspects park and ditch the car, then jump over the fence into adjacent
backyards. One witness observed that one of the suspect's sweatpants had red
on them.
East Orange police officers canvassed the area around the stolen car and
found a large brass-colored handgun near the fence, among other items. After a
A-3351-23 2 foot chase, police apprehended and arrested defendant, whom they believed to
be the second suspect. Police conducted a show-up where the victim positively
identified defendant as one of the assailants. Another man was arrested shortly
after the incident occurred and the victim positively identified him as the other
assailant. That man was later released and had all charges dismissed as
surveillance video from the area showed he had been misidentified.
After investigation, police discovered the first suspect of the carjacking
was defendant's nephew, Yashadeek Sears. Surveillance video also showed
defendant and Yashadeek watching and following the victim and fleeing through
several backyards near the area where the stolen car was parked.
An Essex County grand jury charged defendant and Yashadeek with six
counts: second-degree conspiracy to commit carjacking/robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1); first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1);
first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second-degree possession of a weapon for
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and second-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). The grand jury also charged defendant with second-
degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).
A-3351-23 3 On January 24, 2022, Yashadeek entered a guilty plea to first-degree
robbery. As part of that guilty plea, he agreed to testify against defendant at
trial. Yashadeek testified in his plea colloquy that defendant came up with the
plan to commit the carjacking and participated in the crime, laying out the events
of the crime as they happened. This was contrary to Yashadeek's earlier letter
to the court, dated January 23, 2021, in which he exculpated defendant.
During jury selection for defendant's trial approximately six months later,
defendant informed counsel that he wished to plead guilty and no longer wished
to proceed to trial. On June 30, 2022, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to
commit carjacking. Defendant was sentenced to seven years, subject to the No
Early Release Act 1, and the remaining charges were dismissed. Defendant did
not file a direct appeal.
On January 11, 2023, defendant filed a motion for PCR alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant argued he would not have pled
guilty if: plea counsel filed a motion to suppress the identification; informed
him of Yashadeek's exculpatory letter; and provided and reviewed all discovery
with him. The PCR court held an evidentiary hearing with testimony from plea
counsel and defendant.
1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. A-3351-23 4 Plea counsel testified that she did not recall why she decided against filing
the motion to suppress. Instead, she attested to her routine practices when
reviewing a case. These practices included: her trial strategy decision-making
process when the evidence against her client was overwhelming; her taking
down handwritten notes when reviewing defendant's case; and her identification
of potential motions. Plea counsel recalled making a note to file a
Wade/Henderson2 motion to suppress the identification, writing that "show-ups
are inherently prejudicial." She recalled later seeing surveillance video
implicating defendant in the carjacking. Plea counsel also testified defendant
informed her that Yashadeek planned to exculpate him. She recalled
investigating further and speaking with Yashadeek's attorney, who informed her
that Yashadeek had instead inculpated defendant in his plea colloquy.
Defendant testified that he was initially pleased with plea counsel's
representation, but his perception later changed believing she had not provided
him with all the discovery. He also testified he is unfamiliar with how plea
escalations and negotiations work and that he lied multiple times during his
guilty plea. Defendant testified he was not made aware of Yashadeek's letter
2 U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1972); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011). A-3351-23 5 until after his pre-sentencing report was completed and that would have changed
his decision to plead guilty.
The PCR court found plea counsel testimony credible, noting she made
decisions strategically and her representation was not ineffective. The PCR
court did not find defendant credible and found defendant failed to demonstrate
both elements of the Strickland 3 test. Consequently, the court denied defendant's
PCR motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues the PCR court erred in: (1) finding plea
counsel's representation was not ineffective when she elected not to file a motion
to suppress; (2) finding plea counsel's representation was not ineffective when
she failed to inform defendant of Yashadeek's exculpatory letter; and (3) failing
to address defendant's argument that plea counsel did not provide and review all
discovery with him.
II.
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3351-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
IMAM S. SEARS, a/k/a SEARS SHARIEF, and IMAM SEARS,
Defendant-Appellant. ________________________
Submitted October 22, 2025 – Decided November 18, 2025
Before Judges Smith and Jablonski.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 21-05-0679.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on the brief).
Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Shep A. Gerszberg, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Imam S. Sears appeals the denial of his motion for post-
conviction relief (PCR). Sears alleges ineffective assistance of counsel that
resulted in a guilty plea for a carjacking on September 2, 2020, in East Orange,
New Jersey. We affirm.
I.
On September 2, 2020, East Orange police responded to a reported
carjacking on Rhode Island Avenue. The victim informed police he was pistol
whipped in the left cheek with a brown handgun, and two men stole his 2006
Honda Odyssey. The victim described the first assailant as a tall African-
American male with shoulder length blonde dreadlocks wearing a dark-colored
hooded sweatshirt. The victim described the second assailant as a tall African-
American male with long dreadlocks or braids. Dispatch simultaneously
received a call from two witnesses who witnessed the carjacking and were in
pursuit of the suspects driving the stolen vehicle. Witnesses observed the
suspects park and ditch the car, then jump over the fence into adjacent
backyards. One witness observed that one of the suspect's sweatpants had red
on them.
East Orange police officers canvassed the area around the stolen car and
found a large brass-colored handgun near the fence, among other items. After a
A-3351-23 2 foot chase, police apprehended and arrested defendant, whom they believed to
be the second suspect. Police conducted a show-up where the victim positively
identified defendant as one of the assailants. Another man was arrested shortly
after the incident occurred and the victim positively identified him as the other
assailant. That man was later released and had all charges dismissed as
surveillance video from the area showed he had been misidentified.
After investigation, police discovered the first suspect of the carjacking
was defendant's nephew, Yashadeek Sears. Surveillance video also showed
defendant and Yashadeek watching and following the victim and fleeing through
several backyards near the area where the stolen car was parked.
An Essex County grand jury charged defendant and Yashadeek with six
counts: second-degree conspiracy to commit carjacking/robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-
2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1); first-degree carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2(a)(1);
first-degree robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degree unlawful possession of a
weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b); second-degree possession of a weapon for
unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); and second-degree aggravated assault,
N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1). The grand jury also charged defendant with second-
degree certain persons not to have weapons, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b).
A-3351-23 3 On January 24, 2022, Yashadeek entered a guilty plea to first-degree
robbery. As part of that guilty plea, he agreed to testify against defendant at
trial. Yashadeek testified in his plea colloquy that defendant came up with the
plan to commit the carjacking and participated in the crime, laying out the events
of the crime as they happened. This was contrary to Yashadeek's earlier letter
to the court, dated January 23, 2021, in which he exculpated defendant.
During jury selection for defendant's trial approximately six months later,
defendant informed counsel that he wished to plead guilty and no longer wished
to proceed to trial. On June 30, 2022, defendant pled guilty to conspiracy to
commit carjacking. Defendant was sentenced to seven years, subject to the No
Early Release Act 1, and the remaining charges were dismissed. Defendant did
not file a direct appeal.
On January 11, 2023, defendant filed a motion for PCR alleging
ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant argued he would not have pled
guilty if: plea counsel filed a motion to suppress the identification; informed
him of Yashadeek's exculpatory letter; and provided and reviewed all discovery
with him. The PCR court held an evidentiary hearing with testimony from plea
counsel and defendant.
1 N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. A-3351-23 4 Plea counsel testified that she did not recall why she decided against filing
the motion to suppress. Instead, she attested to her routine practices when
reviewing a case. These practices included: her trial strategy decision-making
process when the evidence against her client was overwhelming; her taking
down handwritten notes when reviewing defendant's case; and her identification
of potential motions. Plea counsel recalled making a note to file a
Wade/Henderson2 motion to suppress the identification, writing that "show-ups
are inherently prejudicial." She recalled later seeing surveillance video
implicating defendant in the carjacking. Plea counsel also testified defendant
informed her that Yashadeek planned to exculpate him. She recalled
investigating further and speaking with Yashadeek's attorney, who informed her
that Yashadeek had instead inculpated defendant in his plea colloquy.
Defendant testified that he was initially pleased with plea counsel's
representation, but his perception later changed believing she had not provided
him with all the discovery. He also testified he is unfamiliar with how plea
escalations and negotiations work and that he lied multiple times during his
guilty plea. Defendant testified he was not made aware of Yashadeek's letter
2 U.S. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1972); State v. Henderson, 208 N.J. 208 (2011). A-3351-23 5 until after his pre-sentencing report was completed and that would have changed
his decision to plead guilty.
The PCR court found plea counsel testimony credible, noting she made
decisions strategically and her representation was not ineffective. The PCR
court did not find defendant credible and found defendant failed to demonstrate
both elements of the Strickland 3 test. Consequently, the court denied defendant's
PCR motion. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant argues the PCR court erred in: (1) finding plea
counsel's representation was not ineffective when she elected not to file a motion
to suppress; (2) finding plea counsel's representation was not ineffective when
she failed to inform defendant of Yashadeek's exculpatory letter; and (3) failing
to address defendant's argument that plea counsel did not provide and review all
discovery with him.
II.
We review the PCR court's legal findings de novo. State v. Hernandez-
Peralta, 261 N.J. 231, 246 (2025) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 419
(2004)). "Our review of a PCR court's factual findings is 'necessarily
deferential.'" Ibid. (citing State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540 (2013)). The PCR
3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697-88, 694 (1984). A-3351-23 6 court's factual findings based on its review of live witness testimony at an
evidentiary hearing will be upheld when supported by sufficient credible
evidence in the record. Nash, 212 N.J. at 540.
III.
Defendant raises several claims of ineffective assistance by plea counsel.
We address each in turn.
When addressing ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claims, we
follow the two-prong standard formulated by the United States Supreme Court
in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 697-88, 694 (1984) and adopted by
the New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).
To prove IAC, the defendant must establish two things. "First, the
defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient." Hernandez-
Peralta, 261 N.J. at 247 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). Under this prong,
the analysis is whether "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard
of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. "Second, the defendant must
show that counsel's 'deficient performance prejudiced the defense.'" Hernandez-
Peralta, 261 N.J. at 247 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To prove this
element, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been
A-3351-23 7 different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694. Failure to meet either prong of the
Strickland/Fritz test will result in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v.
Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280 (2012).
The defendant must establish, by a preponderance of credible evidence,
that he is entitled to the requested relief. Nash, 212 N.J. at 541. To sustain that
burden, the defendant must allege and articulate specific facts that "provide the
court with an adequate basis on which to rest its decision." State v. D.D.M., 140
N.J. 83, 101 (1995). The defendant must do more than present "bald or
conclusory assertions" of ineffective assistance. State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J.
Super. 351, 376 (App. Div. 2014). There is a strong presumption that counsel
"rendered adequate assistance and made all significant decisions in the exercise
of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690.
"Complaints 'merely of matters of trial strategy' will not serve to ground
a constitutional claim of inadequacy [of counsel]." Fritz, 105 N.J. at 54 (quoting
State v. Williams, 39 N.J. 471, 489 (1963)). Courts must apply a "highly
deferential" standard when reviewing counsel's strategic decisions. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 689.
A-3351-23 8 A.
Defendant first argues the PCR court erred in finding plea counsel's
assistance was not rendered ineffective when she decided against filing a motion
to suppress the identification. We are not persuaded.
To satisfy the first prong of the Strickland test, defendant must "identify
specific acts or omissions that are outside the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance." State v. Young, 474 N.J. Super. 507, 515 (App. Div.
2023) (citing State v. Jack, 144 N.J. 240, 249 (1996)).
"The inquiry at a Wade[/Henderson] hearing is whether the identification
procedure presented a 'very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification' to undermine the reliability of the result as a genuine product
of the eyewitness's memory rather than improper influence." State v. Arteaga,
476 N.J. Super. 36, 60 (App. Div. 2023) (quoting State v. Henderson, 208 N.J.
208, 289 (2011)). A court shall allow this pre-trial hearing when the rules
governing show-up procedure "are not followed and no electronic or
contemporaneous, verbatim written recording of the identification procedure is
prepared." State v. Guerino, 464 N.J. Super. 589, 610-11 (App. Div. 2020).
Defendant cites Henderson, where our Supreme Court held that show-ups
are "inherently suggestive," to support his contention that plea counsel's failure
A-3351-23 9 to file this motion was outside the range of reasonable professional assistance.
208 N.J. at 259. In support of this argument, defendant points to: (1) an absence
of evidence that the police offered the victim neutral, pre-identification
warnings that the assailant may not be present in the lineup and he should not
feel compelled to make an identification; and (2) the victim's stress levels so
soon after the incident that may have impacted his ability to make an impartial
identification. Both reflect factors outlined in Henderson to determine if a show-
up was inherently suggestive. 208 N.J. at 261, 290. The Henderson Court,
however, also concluded "'the risk of misidentification is not heightened if a
show[-]up is conducted immediately after the witnessed event, ideally within
two hours' because 'the benefits of a fresh memory seem to balance the risks of
undue suggestion.'" 208 N.J. at 259.
Here, the show-up was conducted within two hours of the carjacking.
Even so, defendant argues the victim's stress levels so soon after the incident
influenced his ability to impartially identify the assailant. While Henderson
confirms that high levels of stress decrease a victim's ability to identify the
perpetrator impartially and accurately, the Court also found that "moderate
levels of stress improve cognitive processing and might improve accuracy." 208
N.J. at 261. Because defendant offers no evidence to suggest that the victim
A-3351-23 10 suffered from high or moderate levels of stress, this factor alone cannot prove
the show-up was impermissibly suggestive to warrant filing this motion.
Defendant also argues plea counsel should have filed this motion because
the probable cause statement included in the complaint warrant after the show-
up did not state whether the pre-identification warnings were given. Given this
potential procedural misstep and the victim's previous misidentification of
another individual, defendant's argument has some merit. However, the trial
court found plea counsel's reasons for not filing the motion more persuasive, as
other evidence in the record implicated defendant. This evidence included:
surveillance video of defendant and Yashadeek committing the crime; witness
statements; and the gun found near the abandoned vehicle. This corroborating
evidence strengthens the reliability of the victim's identification. It was
appropriate trial strategy for plea counsel to decide not to file a motion to
suppress in the face of other overwhelming evidence. Such a filing may have,
as plea counsel testified, thwarted plea negotiations. We are satisfied that plea
counsel's representation did not fall below an objective standard of
reasonableness.
Even if defendant provided sufficient evidence for this prong, he has
failed to present sufficient evidence for the second prong of the Strickland test.
A-3351-23 11 To satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test, defendant must
"demonstrate 'how specific errors of counsel undermined the reliability of the
finding of guilt.'" Young, 474 N.J. Super. at 516 (quoting U.S. v. Cronic, 466
U.S. 648, 659 (1984)).
Defendant argues he would not have pled guilty if plea counsel filed the
motion and potentially had this evidence excluded. While defendant considers
the victim's identification the "most damning evidence," defendant fails to
address the impact of the remaining evidence that implicated him in the same
way. Defendant cannot establish that plea counsel's decision not to file a
Wade/Henderson motion carried a reasonable probability of changing his
decision to plead guilty. Defendant has failed to meet both prongs of the
Strickland test, and we affirm the PCR court's order denying relief on this
theory.
B.
Defendant next argues that plea counsel was ineffective when she failed
to inform defendant of Yashadeek's exculpatory letter. Again, we are not
persuaded.
The Rules of Professional Conduct impose a duty on attorneys to keep
clients "reasonably informed about the status of a matter and promptly comply
A-3351-23 12 with reasonable requests for information," and counsel "shall explain a matter
to the extent reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation." RPC 1.4(b)-(c). Regarding the decision
to plead guilty, exculpatory evidence is necessary to make an informed decision.
Applying the first prong of the Strickland test, failure to inform a defendant
about exculpatory evidence likely falls below the objective standard and is
outside the wide range of reasonable professional assistance. See Young, 474
N.J. Super. at 515. However, when an attorney considers all the evidence in
representing a client who decides to plead guilty, the presence of exculpatory
information may not overcome remaining inculpatory evidence or render
representation ineffective. See State v. McIlhenny, 357 N.J. Super. 380, 382
(App. Div. 2003). Further, to satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test,
defendant must also show a reasonable probability this information would have
changed his decision to plead guilty.
Defendant claimed he was not made aware of Yashadeek's letter until after
his pre-sentencing report was completed. However, plea counsel only learned
of the potential exculpatory evidence from defendant. Given that his own
knowledge spurred the investigation into Yashadeek's statements, defendant
cannot claim ignorance as to the result of that investigation, especially
A-3351-23 13 considering his sworn statements that he asked plea counsel all questions he had
and was satisfied with her representation. During his plea colloquy, the PCR
court asked defendant:
THE COURT: Have you had enough time to discuss this matter with your attorney?
MR. SEARS: Yes, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Has she answered all your questions?
MR. SEARS: Yes.
THE COURT: Are you satisfied with her representation?
....
THE COURT: Now, Mr. Sears, do you now have any questions for myself, for the prosecutor, or for your attorney about anything concerning this plea agreement?
MR. SEARS: Not at the moment.
THE COURT: And do you wish for the Court to accept your plea of guilty to this matter?
Sears was satisfied with plea counsel's representation and entered his guilty plea
aware of the evidence against him. Defendant can neither establish that plea
A-3351-23 14 counsel's failure to introduce a retracted letter in the face of other overwhelming
inculpatory evidence fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, nor a
reasonable probability that a retracted exculpatory letter would have changed
Based on our thorough review of the record, we conclude that the PCR
court's findings were supported by sufficient credible evidence. Defendant's
claims cannot establish that plea counsel's performance was deficient or that any
alleged deficiencies prejudiced his defense. The strategic decisions made by
plea counsel were reasonable under the circumstances and are entitled to our
deference.
C.
Finally, defendant argues the PCR court erred in failing to address the IAC
claim regarding plea counsel's alleged failure to provide and review all
discovery with him. Defendant seeks a remand so that the PCR court can
address this issue.
When a PCR court does not address an issue raised by the parties in
rendering its opinion, remand may be appropriate to allow all sides to argue their
positions, create a complete evidentiary record, and to allow the court to reach
A-3351-23 15 conclusions on questions of fact and law. Berg v. Christie, 436 N.J. Super. 220,
263 (App. Div. 2014).
We consider whether a remand is necessary on this record.
After the PCR hearing, the court found plea counsel's detailed testimony
about her general practice concerning review of discovery with her clients and
her specific review of defendant's discovery with him to be credible.
Conversely, the PCR court found defendant's testimony not credible. The court
would have been better served by creating a more complete record here. This
would have included considering defendant's claim that counsel failed to review
discovery with him and applying the facts to this question on the record. That
did not happen. However, the record is quite clear that the trial court found
counsel credible and gave significant weight to her testimony that she reviewed
all discovery, as well as salient trial strategy options, with her clients in general
and this defendant in particular.
The detailed nature of the record reveals substantial credible evidence
showing counsel reviewed discovery and trial strategy with defendant prior to
his decision to plead guilty, defendant's bald allegations notwithstanding. We
easily conclude that the record does not call for a remand on this question.
Affirmed.
A-3351-23 16