State of New Jersey v. Gregory Torres

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 15, 2025
• Docket: A-2063-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2063-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GREGORY TORRES,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted September 24, 2025 – Decided October 15, 2025

Before Judges Smith and Berdote Byrne.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Union County, Indictment No. 15-06-0468.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Steven M. Gilson, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

James O. Tansey, First Assistant Prosecutor of Union County, Designated Prosecutor for purpose of this appeal, attorney for respondent (Michele C. Buckley, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Gregory Torres appeals from a November 17, 2023 order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary

hearing. Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder and related weapons

charges. He was tried with two co-defendants, Firicin Augustin and Jamar

Mosby. In his PCR petition, he alleges trial counsel was ineffective for failing

to consult with him or request a self-defense charge, and claims counsel

misadvised him regarding his right to testify and pressured him not to testify.

After de novo review of all applicable legal principles, we affirm.

I.

We derive the following facts from the record and our October 26, 2021

unpublished opinion affirming the conviction. See State v. Torres, No. A-2506-

18 (App. Div. Oct. 26, 2021) (slip op. at 3-20). The crimes with which

defendants were charged took place on December 12, 2014, at an Elizabeth

apartment building known as Pierce Manor—a place, according to the testimony

of several witnesses, where residents and others "hung out" in the building's

hallways and lobby, often smoking and "doing drugs." Some witnesses also said

that dealers, including Bilal Fullman, the victim, regularly sold drugs at Pierce

Manor.

A-2063-23 2 Tyrone Dozier, a Pierce Manor regular, testified Fullman was "like

family" to him. Even though they were competitors, Dozier explained people at

Pierce Manor "[stuck] together" and did not report each other's illegal dealings

to police. Dozier said "strangers" didn't usually hang around the building and

would not have been welcome because they were not "from there."

Zumirah Brockington was the mother of Fullman's child. She and her

child lived in Cherry Hill but regularly traveled to Elizabeth to visit Fullman.

On December 12, 2014, when Fullman picked up Brockington at the train station

around noon, he told her he was not feeling well. After going to the doctor,

Fullman, Brockington, and the child took a cab to Pierce Manor. Once there, at

approximately 5:30 to 6:00 p.m., they visited Fullman's grandmother, who lived

in the building, and later went to the apartment of Stephanie Dozier, a friend of

Fullman's. Stephanie Dozier 1 testified they arrived around 6:30 p.m.

About forty-five minutes later, Stephanie and Fullman left the apartment

to take Stephanie's cat outside; Stephanie returned upstairs while Fullman

remained outside. Stephanie testified she did not see anyone else in front of the

1 We refer to all witnesses by their last names with the exception of Stephanie Dozier, who we refer to as Stephanie to avoid confusion with Tyrone Dozier . We intend no disrespect. A-2063-23 3 building when she and Fullman parted. She also saw between ten and twenty

people she did not recognize in the downstairs hallway.

Around that same time, Raheem Wilkins, a Pierce Manor resident, spoke

with Fullman outside the building as Wilkins left with his girlfriend, Belinda

Best. Wilkins testified that on his way out, he saw and greeted several people

in the downstairs hallway of Pierce Manor, including Mosby, Augustin, Jumani

Terrell, and Dozier. Best testified she talked to Fullman and saw Mosby,

Mosby's brother Sutton West, Dozier, and others. Another Pierce Manor

resident, Shamal Lee, passed through the lobby of the building on his way

upstairs and saw several people there including Fullman, Augustin, West,

Terrell, Michael Thompkins, and possibly Dozier.

Later, Fullman went upstairs and briefly talked to Brockington; he

declined to go with her to a Chinese restaurant and went outside again.

Brockington returned twenty minutes later and saw Fullman standing outside

Pierce Manor. Brockington testified Augustin was standing about ten feet away

from Fullman, and the two were arguing as she approached. She heard Augustin

tell Fullman to "look at his gun" as he lifted his shirt; Brockington saw the

handle of a "black and silver" gun sticking out of Augustin's waistband.

According to Brockington, Fullman said, "I don't care, I don't want to see [that]

A-2063-23 4 little shit anyway," and asked Augustin what kind of gun it was. Augustin

replied that it was "a .40," and said, "but it kick up, though." Brockington

explained she thought Augustin meant the gun "work[ed]."

Fullman and Brockington walked into the vestibule. Augustin followed

and continued to argue with Fullman. Brockington testified she saw Torres and

Mosby in the hallway, along with several others. She said Fullman took off his

jacket and asked her to "hold his stuff" because Augustin "[kept] fucking with

[him]" and he "want[ed] to fight." Augustin backed away, saying, "I'm not going

to fight you" and then asked Brockington, who was still holding her purchase

from the Chinese restaurant, for "a piece of [her] chicken." When Brockington

acceded, Fullman "got mad" and told her to go back upstairs. Fullman and

Augustin were still arguing when Brockington got to the elevator. Brockington

waited upstairs but called Fullman at 8:17 p.m. to tell him she wanted to leave

Pierce Manor. Fullman said he was "still waiting on a person to bring him the

money" and once that happened, they could leave.

Dozier testified that at around 8:00 p.m. on December 12, 2014, he was in

the lobby of Pierce Manor "counting [his] drugs." He saw Fullman standing by

the front door looking outside, and he saw Torres, Augustin, Mosby, and a few

others "hanging out" in the vestibule and lobby area. Dozier said he was

A-2063-23 5 standing across the lobby from Fullman and defendants, a little way down the

first-floor hallway, but he could see into the lobby when he looked up from his

counting.

Dozier said defendants were wearing black clothing and ski masks, but

the masks weren't covering their faces. He knew them from "around the

neighborhood" and did not think their presence at Pierce Manor was odd

"because they [were] from there," meaning they often hung around at the

building. Dozier said while he was initially watching, he did not see defendants

acting "strange," and did not see them talk or argue with Fullman.

Dozier testified he suddenly heard "shots go off" and looked up to see

"which direction [they were] coming from." He said, "[t]hat's when I saw them,

the three people with the guns." When asked to clarify, he said he saw all three

defendants holding guns, and Fullman "on the ground." He said he could clearly

see defendants' faces. According to Dozier, everyone else in the lobby ran away,

and he "heard more shots" as he "took off."

Dozier went outside through a nearby "side door," ran in a circle around

two other apartment buildings in the complex and then stopped to look "down"

at Pierce Manor. He noticed the door he had exited through was "still open,"

and he "went down there to see like what was up." He found Fullman on the

A-2063-23 6 floor in the vestibule between the two sets of entry doors to the building. Two

men, Thompkins and Terrell, were "checking [Fullman's] pockets." Dozier saw

the two take a gun and drugs out of Fullman's pocket and run away. After that,

Dozier "closed [Fullman's] eyes" and waited by the body until police arrived a

few minutes later.

Brockington testified Thompkins knocked on the door of Stephanie

Dozier's apartment "ten minutes" after her 8:17 p.m. phone call with Fullman.

Stephanie went to the living room, where she saw Brockington, the children,

Thompkins, and Thompkins's mother, Crystal Harvey. When Thompkins said

Fullman "got shot," Stephanie, Brockington, and Harvey went downstairs,

where they saw Fullman's body in a pool of blood in the vestibule. Brockington

and Stephanie testified they saw no other "civilians" in the hallway area. Police

ordered the women to stay back to avoid touching evidence. Brockington and

Stephanie returned to the latter's apartment.

Twenty or thirty minutes later, officers came upstairs and asked

Brockington to bring her child and come with them. An officer took

Brockington and her son to Fullman's grandmother's apartment, where they

stayed until her mother arrived to get the child and a detective came to take her

to the Union County Prosecutor's Office to give a statement. Stephanie said "a

A-2063-23 7 little while later," someone came to her door and took her to the Prosecutor's

Office, where she also gave a statement.

On June 26, 2015, a Union County grand jury indicted defendant and two

co-defendants, Firicin Augustin and Jamar Mosby on three counts: first-degree

murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) (count one); second-degree unlawful

possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) (count two); and second-degree

possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a) (count

three). At trial, a jury found defendant guilty of all three counts. Augustin was

acquitted of counts one and three but was convicted of count two. Mosby was

acquitted on all counts.

Defendant was sentenced to fifty years in prison with forty years of parole

ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43 -7.2,

to be served consecutively with a sentence from an earlier, unrelated conviction.

We affirmed on direct appeal, but remanded for resentencing pursuant to State

v. Yarbough, 100 N.J. 627, 643-44 (1985). Torres, slip op. at 68. Defendant

petitioned for certification, which the Supreme Court denied. State v. Torres,

249 N.J. 445 (2022).

On March 16, 2022, defendant filed a pro se verified petition for post -

conviction relief. After being assigned representation, defense counsel filed an

A-2063-23 8 amended verified petition and supplemental certification. The PCR court denied

relief without an evidentiary hearing. This appeal ensued.

Defendant raises the following points on appeal:

THIS MATTER MUST BE REMANDED FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE CASE OF TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS.

A. Trial Counsel Failed to Raise the Issue of Self- Defense.

B. Trial Counsel Abridged Defendant’s Constitutional Right to Testify.

We reject these contentions and affirm.

II.

We review the denial of defendant's PCR petition de novo because there

was no evidentiary hearing. State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 (App.

Div. 2014). However, a PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary

hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super.

387, 401 (App. Div. 2013).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

satisfy the two-prong Strickland test: (1) "counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment," and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."

A-2063-23 9 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,

58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-prong test in New Jersey as the State

constitutional standard). With respect to prong one, a defendant must establish

that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Pursuant to prong two, a

defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different."

Id. at 694.

Additionally, a defendant may argue an evidentiary hearing is warranted

to develop the factual record in connection with an ineffective-assistance claim.

State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). However, the PCR court should

grant an evidentiary hearing only where: (1) a defendant is able to prove a prima

facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) there are material issues of

disputed fact that must be resolved with evidence outside of the record; and (3)

the hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief. See R. 3:22-10(b); State

v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013).

A. Self-Defense

Defendant claims his counsel was ineffective in failing to consult with

him regarding a potential self-defense argument and in failing to raise the issue

A-2063-23 10 of self-defense at trial. Defendant claims "[t]he record is replete with testimony

that Bilal Fullman not only possessed and used a gun that evening, but that he

may have fired the first shot." Specifically, he points to the testimony of Dozier,

the State's principal witness, who confirmed Fullman "had a number of different

guns"; "usually carried" a ".45."; and showed a gun to Dozier on the day Fullman

was shot. Further, Dozier testified he saw two men, Michael Thompkins and

Jumani Terrell, take a gun out of Fullman's pocket after he was shot.

There was no evidence in the trial record or in defendant's PCR petition

supporting a claim of self-defense, and trial counsel was not ineffective for not

pursuing the self-defense theory. Defendant's certification contains no

allegation or explanation that Fullman threatened him with the gun or that

defendant shot Fullman in self-defense. In fact, Dozier's testimony was that

Fullman's gun was in his pocket and only taken out of his pocket after he had

been shot. Defendant fails to meet either prong of Strickland.

The PCR court properly concluded defendant failed to demonstrate a

prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to request a self-

defense argument as the evidence presented did not show defendant would have

been justified in claiming self-defense. Moreover, trial counsel's strategy was

to challenge the State's witnesses by pointing out their inconsistent statements

A-2063-23 11 and bias. With this strategy, trial counsel sought to convince the jury defendant

was not involved in the crime. Requesting a self-defense charge would have

contradicted this theory of the case. Counsel's decision to forgo the charge was

a reasonable strategic decision and was not ineffective. See State v. Arthur, 184

N.J. 307, 322-23 (2005).

B. Defendant's Failure to Testify

Defendant additionally argues trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

advise defendant of his right to testify and pressuring him not to testify . A

review of the record reflects the trial court had substantial colloquy with

defendant regarding his right to testify and he knowingly waived his right.

Effective assistance of counsel requires trial counsel to "inform defendant

properly that the decision whether to testify [is] his" and "sufficiently consult"

with defendant about the decision to testify. State v. Bey, 161 N.J. 233, 271

(1999); State v. Savage, 120 N.J. 594, 631 (1990) ("Counsel's responsibility

includes advising a defendant of the benefits inherent in exercising that right

and the consequences inherent in waiving it. . . . Indeed, counsel's failure to do

so will give rise to a claim of ineffectiveness of counsel.").

Even if we accept defendant's allegations of counsel's pressure for the

purposes of this appeal, he did not establish prejudice pursuant to Strickland as

A-2063-23 12 he failed to offer any proposed testimony he would have given at trial that would

have affected his convictions. Instead, he offers only bald, unsubstantiated

assertions that the outcome would have been different. See Porter, 216 N.J. at

355 (holding a defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing where

allegations of ineffective assistance of counsel are "too vague, conclusory, or

speculative" and not supported by "specific facts and evidence." (quoting State

v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997))). Under the second Strickland prong, a

defendant must "affirmatively prove" "a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 551 (2021) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 693-94). "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

694). Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is an exacting

standard." Ibid. (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). We agree

with the PCR court the record demonstrates defendant was given the opportunity

to provide specifics about what his testimony would have included but did not

do so. Defendant has not demonstrated a prima facie case of ineffective

assistance of counsel pursuant to Strickland.

A-2063-23 13 Moreover, because defendant did not demonstrate a prima facie claim of

ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR court properly denied defendant an

evidentiary hearing. The court's findings are sound, and its legal conclusions

are correct.

Affirmed.

A-2063-23 14