RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0954-25
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
G.J.,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Argued May 11, 2026 – Decided June 30, 2026
Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 25-05-0111.
Brooke M. Barnett argued the cause for appellant (Brooke M. Barnett & Associates PC, attorneys; Brooke M. Barnett and Morgan Mahler, on the brief).
Leslie-Ann M. Justus, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney; Leslie-Ann M. Justus, of counsel and on the brief).
On leave granted, defendant G.J. 1 appeals from a September 30, 2025
order denying his motion to sever several counts in the State's superseding
indictment against him after another judge decided certain counts could be
severed in a prior indictment. Discerning no abuse of discretion by the court in
its denial of defendant's motion, we affirm.
I.
The relevant facts are undisputed. Eleven women, ten of whom are former
patients of defendant, a medical doctor at various urgent care facilities, accused
defendant of various forms of inappropriate nonconsensual sexual touching
during their medical examination and treatment.
As part of the initial investigation, ten victims provided sworn statements
to law enforcement, describing defendant's alleged wrongful acts against them.
Following the investigation, defendant was indicted on various counts of
criminal sexual contact and related offenses in three separate counties: Essex,
Middlesex, and Monmouth.
Because the issue before us is whether the court erred in denying
defendant's motion to sever the counts of the State's indictment by victim and
1 We use initials are to protect the privacy of the alleged victims, pursuant to Rule 1:38-3(a). A-0954-25 2 require separate trials, we decline to recount the specific details of the
allegations against defendant. We note only that the three county indictments
arise from allegations that defendant inappropriately touched patients' breasts
and vaginas, inserted his fingers into the mouth and vagina of at least one
patient, and forcibly penetrated another patient by placing his penis in her
vagina. An employee at one facility in which defendant worked reported that
patients told her that defendant touched them inappropriately, and that every day
from October 2022 to February 2023, defendant touched her breasts and back
and often told her to pull up her shirt so he could see her breasts. The employee
stated that defendant often touched her when her co-worker would leave to get
lunch. According to the State, there were six alleged victims in Middlesex, three
in Essex, and two in Monmouth Counties.
Defendant was also indicted on two counts of hindering apprehension or
prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(5), for directing his then-assistant, R.P., to
fabricate medical reports that a "female [medical assistant]" was present during
each examination of a female patient.
On March 8, 2023, defendant agreed to a temporary surrender of his
license to practice medicine and surgery, pending the disposition of the criminal
charges against him.
A-0954-25 3 County Criminal Indictments
On June 22, 2023, an Essex County Grand Jury returned an indictment,
charging defendant with three counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact,
N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b), and one count of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:14-2(c)(1). On December 18, 2023, a Monmouth County Grand Jury
returned an indictment, charging defendant with two counts of fourth degree
criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b). And, on March 5, 2024, a
Middlesex County Grand Jury returned an indictment, charging defendant with
six counts of fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b), and
one count of second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1).
In Essex County, defendant first moved to sever the counts pertaining to
one of his alleged victims from the remaining charges in that indictment. The
motion judge denied in part and granted in part the motion on September 13,
2024, resulting in the severance of two of four counts related to one of the three
alleged victim.2
2 The court held:
The offenses contained in [c]ounts 1 and 2 of the indictment are not reasonably close in time to the offenses contained in [c]ounts 3 and 4 of the indictment, as they are alleged to have occurred
A-0954-25 4 In Middlesex County, where there were six alleged victims, defendant also
moved to sever certain counts involving one alleged victim from the other counts
in that indictment. The court denied the motion and defendant's subsequent
motion for reconsideration, which had been reassigned to a different judge, was
eventually withdrawn.
The State's Superseding Indictment
On May 21, 2025, a State Grand Jury returned a superseding indictment,
under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107(a)(1), charging defendant with: eleven counts of
fourth-degree criminal sexual contact, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-3(b); two counts of
second-degree sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(c)(1); and two counts of fourth
degree falsification/tampering charges, N.J.S.A. 2C:21-4 to -4.1.
At some point following the superseding indictment, R.P. pleaded guilty
to third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, giving false information
to law enforcement officers or an investigator in the Office of the Insurance
approximately five weeks later. There is a danger that the jury could conclude the [d]efendant is a bad person and convict him because it is alleged that he committed offenses against three victims over a five-week period . . . . [T]he [m]otion to Sever Counts 1 and 2 from [c]ounts 3 and 4 is GRANTED. A-0954-25 5 Fraud Prosecutor, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(7), in exchange for her cooperation in the
State's case against defendant.
Defendant's Motion to Sever
Defendant next moved to sever the counts in the superseding indictment
by victim, essentially to require eleven separate trials, arguing other crimes,
wrongs, or acts evidence presented to the jury could be prejudicial. Defendant
likewise argued that the superseding indictment included counts previously
severed from other counts in the Essex County indictment, and invoked the law
of the case doctrine. 3
On October 1, 2025, the motion court issued a comprehensive fifty-nine-
page written decision, denying defendant's motion to sever the counts in the
State's superseding indictment. The court conducted a thorough analysis of the
relevant statutory authority and legal precedent, and concluded:
[t]he proffered use of the other crimes evidence in this case (intent) cannot adequately be served by other evidence. I cannot determine the existence of more important, less prejudicial evidence that proves the same point. Therefore, I find the State has met its burden and established that the probative value of the evidence is not outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
3 The law of the case doctrine is a non-binding rule which states that during the pendency of a case, a legal decision made in a particular matter should be respected by all other lower or equal courts to avoid relitigation of a previously resolved issue. See Lombardi v. Masso, 207 N.J. 517, 538 (2011). A-0954-25 6 Defendant also asserted that the Essex County judge's decision to partially
sever counts in that indictment should be treated as controlling under the law of
the case doctrine, the court, however, determined that in this instance, there were
"new and significant circumstances [to] justify a flexible application of the 'law
of the case' doctrine in the interest of justice," as "the State has consolidated all
matters from three counties into a single superseding indictment, thereby
creating a new case." The court concluded that it "must treat the superseding
indictment as a distinct case."
The court next examined the allegations in detail and arguments of the
parties to determine whether the evidence from one offense would be admissible
under N.J.R.E. 404(b) and relevant case law, including applying the State v.
Cofield, 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992) factors, discussed infra. The court reasoned
that "[d]efendant does not deny having physical contact with the alleged victims;
rather, he argues that the victims misinterpreted his medical examinations as
sexual contact or assault." The court stated:
When evaluating whether prejudice arises from the joinder of multiple offenses, a key consideration is whether the evidence relating to the offenses proposed for severance would qualify for admission under [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) at the trial of the remaining charges. State v. Sterling, 215 N.J. 65, 73 (2013). Trial courts are granted substantial discretion in deciding whether to grant severance based on potential prejudice
A-0954-25 7 resulting from joinder. State v. Pitts, 116 N.J. 580, 601 (1989).
The court further stated that in this case, "there is a clear and strong
connection in both the method and uniqueness of the [d]efendant's selection of
his alleged victims, the nature of the alleged nonconsensual conduct, the
locations, the specific acts of nonconsensual touching, and the [d]efendant's role
as a medical professional." The court found,
the testimony of each alleged victim, along with evidence concerning the alteration of medical records related to one victim's claims, is necessary to address the [d]efendant’s motives regarding the alleged sexual conduct and the motives of both [d]efendants concerning the purported alteration of medical records for a specific alleged victim. This evidence is also essential to counter the [d]efendant's assertion that the allegations of sexual misconduct were motivated by efforts to attract public attention.
The court next concluded "appropriate limiting instructions can be given
to the jury to minimize the risk of their interpreting the testimonies as evidence
of the [d]efendant’s propensity to assault the alleged victims." The court
concluded, stating that it was "satisfied that the apparent prejudice is not
outweighed by the probative value of the evidence of other bad acts reflected in
the indictment," thus satisfying the final prong of Cofield.
A-0954-25 8 After the court issued its order, defendant filed an application seeking
interlocutory appeal, which we granted. Defendant argues:
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL MUST BE GRANTED IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING THE STATE TO JOIN PREVIOUSLY SEVERED COUNTS AND BY DENYING THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SEVER.
II.
Before us, defendant raises three principal challenges to the court's denial
of his motion: (1) the court ignored the rule that "[w]hen there are multiple
unrelated victims who allege sexual assault against the same defendant, the cases
must be severed to avoid undue prejudice" (citing State v. Smith, 471 N.J. Super.
548 (App. Div. 2022)); (2) the court's "justification for distinguishing this case
from Smith was misplaced and premised upon numerous improper
considerations"; and (3) "the trial court's ruling[s] were unreasonable and
unconscionable, and . . . should be reversed on appeal."
Defendant asserts the court abused its discretion when weighing factors
(2), (3), and (4) of the test outlined in Cofield, 127 N.J. at 328. As to the second
A-0954-25 9 factor, defendant contends that the evidence was not sufficiently similar in kind
or reasonably close in time to the charged offenses, asserting that:
Under prong [(2)], the trial court abused its discretion when it improperly claimed that one alleged victim, who is also an employee, was a witness to the alleged acts, and "based on the defense's own admission, the employee's testimony is relevant to all counts before the court." The defendant made no such admission because this is not a true fact. In fact, [d]efendant actually argued in his brief the opposite of this claim.
More particularly, defendant submits:
As to motive and mistake, the trial court abused its discretion when it relied on State v. Cusick, 219 N.J. Super. 452 (App. Div. 1987), which admitted evidence of a previous conviction resulting from a guilty plea, whereas here, the evidence the State wishes to present are allegations at this time.
III.
"A trial court's evidentiary ruling is . . . reviewed on appeal for abuse of
discretion," and "sensitive admissibility rulings regarding other-crimes evidence
made pursuant to Rule 404(b) are reversed '[o]nly where there is a clear error of
judgment.'" State v. Green, 236 N.J. 71, 80-81 (2018) (quoting State v. Rose,
206 N.J. 141, 157-58 (2011) (alteration in original). However, any pure
questions of law are reviewed de novo. Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. of
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995). "Although the ordinary 'abuse
A-0954-25 10 of discretion' standard defies precise definition, it arises when a decision is
'made without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established
policies, or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Flagg v. Essex Cnty. Prosecutor,
171 N.J. 561, 571 (2002) (quoting Achacoso-Sanchez v. I.N.S., 779 F.2d 1260,
1265 (7th Cir. 1985)).
The following rules and legal precedent inform our analysis of defendant's
entitlement to sever counts in the State's superseding indictment. Rule 3:7-6
permits the State to charge multiple offenses in a single indictment "if the
offenses charged are of the same or similar character or are based on the same
act or transaction or on [two] or more acts or transactions connected together."
While "joinder is favored, economy and efficiency interests do not override a
defendant's right to a fair trial." Smith, 471 N.J. Super. at 567 (quoting Sterling,
215 N.J. at 72-73).
Regarding severability, "Rule 3:15-2(b) vests a trial court with discretion
to order separate trials if joinder would prejudice unfairly a defendant." State
v. Chenique-Puey, 145 N.J. 334, 341 (1996). Critically, "[t]o avoid prejudicial
joinder, the court must conclude the proffered evidence for each set of charges
would be admissible in a separate trial on the other set of charges." Smith, 471
N.J. Super. at 567. The court must therefore consider whether the "N.J.R.E.
A-0954-25 11 404(b) requirements [are] met, and the evidence of other crimes or bad acts [is]
'relevant to prove a fact genuinely in dispute and the evidence is necessary as
proof of the disputed issue.'" Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting Sterling,
215 N.J. at 73). In other words, "[i]n determining whether joinder will result in
undue prejudice, '[t]he test is whether the jury could arrive at a decision on each
charge separately and irrespective of the evidence concerning guilt on the other
charges.'" State v. Ellison, 482 N.J. Super. 357, 380 (App. Div. 2025) (quoting
State v. Urcinoli, 321 N.J. Super. 519, 542 (App. Div. 1999)). "Central to
deciding whether joinder is prejudicial is 'whether, assuming the charges were
tried separately, evidence of the offense sought to be severed would be
admissible under [N.J.R.E. 404(b)] in the trial of the remaining charges." Ibid.;
see also State v. Oliver, 133 N.J. 141, 151 (1993) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Under Rule 404(b), other crimes evidence is inadmissible "to prove a
person's disposition in order to show that . . . the person acted in conformity
with such disposition." Rule 404(b). However, other-crime evidence is
admissible "for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when
such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute." Id. To determine when
A-0954-25 12 and in what circumstances "other crimes" evidence is admissible in a criminal
trial, we turn to examine the multi-factor test in our Court's opinion in Cofield,
which provides:
(1) The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue;
(2) It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 4
(3) The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and
(4) The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice.
[Ibid.]
Likewise, an essential determination in a Rule 404(b) analysis is "whether
the evidence relates to 'other crimes,' and thus is subject to continued analysis
under Rule 404(b), or whether it is evidence intrinsic to the charged crime, and
thus need only satisfy the evidence rules relating to relevancy, most importantly
Rule 403." Rose, 206 N.J. at 179. Evidence is "intrinsic" if it "'directly proves'
the charged offense," or "if the[] [uncharged acts] facilitate the commission of
4 "Note that the Supreme Court has held that the second prong of the Cofield formulation need not be applied in every case, unless the facts of the case replicate the circumstances of Cofield itself." Seddens, __ N.J. Super. at __ (slip op. at 34) (citing Green, 236 N.J. at 83); State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131- 34 (2007)). A-0954-25 13 the charged crime." Id. at 180 (quoting United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233,
248-49 (3d Cir. 2010)).
Guided by these legal principles, we reject defendant's contentions and
conclude the court properly found the State had the authority to obtain a
superseding indictment under N.J.S.A. 52:17B-107(a)(1), which expressly
authorizes the State to "supersede in county prosecutions and obtain a
superseding indictment," and that severance was not required under Rules 3:7-6
and 3:15-2(b). Moreover, we observe no abuse of discretion in the court's
conclusion the State's superseding indictment was not constrained by the prior
decision of the Essex County judge who had granted defendant partial severance
as to certain counts in the Essex County indictment. See Lombardi, 207 N.J. at
538 (holding "the law of the case doctrine is only triggered when one court is
faced with a ruling on the merits by a different and co-equal court on an identical
issue") (emphasis added). And, we note defendant's failure to address the State's
clear statutory authority constitutes a glaring omission. Thus, we affirm the
court's order, substantially for the reasons expressed in the motion judge's
decision, finding no abuse of discretion. We briefly add the following comments
to amplify our opinion.
A-0954-25 14 Based on this record, we are satisfied that the court properly examined
and addressed the evidence underlying each count of the State's superseding
indictment and found relevant and admissible the evidence of each offense
charged. The court next evaluated whether prejudice would arise from joinder
of these multiple offenses charged and concluded that it did not. The court
addressed this issue under N.J.R.E. 404(b)(1) and (2), which provides, in
pertinent part:
[E]vidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove a person's disposition in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in conformity with such disposition.
This evidence may be admitted for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident when such matters are relevant to a material issue in dispute.
In applying Cofield, the court concluded:
[t]here is ample evidence and established precedent supporting the [c]ourt's determination that the evidence underlying each count of the indictment is relevant to a material factual issue and must be deemed admissible. Furthermore, all counts in the indictment are similar in nature and occurred reasonably close in time to the charged offenses. The evidence presented by the State is clear and convincing, and its probative value is not outweighed by any perceived prejudice, which can be adequately addressed through formal limiting instructions.
A-0954-25 15 [(Emphasis added).]
In other words, the proffered evidence for each set of charges would be
admissible in a separate trial on the other set of charges, and thus, was not being
offered as other crimes evidence to establish propensity. Smith, 471 N.J. Super.
at 567.
As to defendant's claim the court relied on facts and evidence, which did
not meet the clear and convincing standard required under factor (3) of Cofield,
inclusive of medical investigator reports, codefendant R.P.'s statements to
police, statements of possible fresh complaint witnesses, and statements of
employees, all of which were not exhibits at the time of the motion hearing , we
disagree. Rule 1:6-6 provides that facts not appearing in the record may be
submitted through affidavits with personal knowledge, thus, the court did not
abuse its discretion by considering such proofs.
Defendant next argues the court abused its discretion when it relied on
irrelevant and distinguishable case law and unpublished opinions. Although the
court erred in discussing unpublished cases in its analysis, we discern the court 's
A-0954-25 16 limited reference to those cases was harmless error and the court amply
supported its findings and conclusion with binding legal authority. 5
Lastly, defendant's argument that reversal is warranted in the interest of
justice is wholly self-serving and unsupported by the record, and is thus
unavailing, as defendant merely disagrees with the court's decision.
Having clearly established that the court properly considered the
applicable law, we further reject defendant's contentions the court acted
unreasonably or unconscionably. In our view, the court carefully examined the
numerous and similar allegations of sexual assault against defendant, involving
several female patients and an employee across three counties, and determined
the proffered evidence for each set of charges would be admissible in eleven
separate trials as relevant to questions of opportunity, motive, and absence of
mistake, and thus did not offend Cofield. Under these circumstances, we are
satisfied the motion court appropriately exercised sound judgment in denying
5 Unpublished opinions shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." R. 1:36-3. An error is harmless and "shall be disregarded . . . unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.
A-0954-25 17 defendant's motion to sever the counts in the State's indictment. Green, 236 N.J.
at 80-81. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its discretion.
To the extent that we have not addressed all of defendant's ancillary
arguments, we conclude that they are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-0954-25 18