State of New Jersey v. Gerald Sigmon, Jr.

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: March 20, 2025
• Docket: A-3005-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3005-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

GERALD E. SIGMON, JR.,

Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________

Argued March 11, 2025 – Decided March 20, 2025

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Chase.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Municipal Appeal No. 23-18.

John Menzel argued the cause for appellant.

Cheryl L. Hammel, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney; Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Counsel, of counsel; Cheryl L. Hammel, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Gerald E. Sigmon, Jr. was convicted in Point Pleasant Beach

Municipal Court of driving while intoxicated ("DWI"), N.J.S.A. 39:4-50. He

appealed to the Law Division and was convicted again. We affirm.

I.

This is a summary of the State's proofs. Officer David Marchetti of the

Point Pleasant Beach Police Department ("PPBPD") testified that at around 9:00

p.m. on December 8, 2021, he was on patrol. Marchetti observed defendant

make a left turn against a red light. Marchetti briefly followed defendant before

effectuating a motor vehicle stop. The exchange was captured by Marchetti's

patrol car equipped with audio and mobile video recording ("MVR") which was

moved into evidence at defendant's trial.

Marchetti had been a PPBPD officer since 2018, issued more than ten

DWI charges in his career, and received training about administering standard

field sobriety tests ("SFST").

Upon approaching the vehicle, Marchetti smelled an odor of alcohol.

Defendant denied going through the red light and asserted that the light was

"going green." Defendant also stated that he had consumed two beers. After

observing defendant's conduct, which he described as delayed, Marchetti asked

defendant to step out of the car to undergo SFSTs. Marchetti described

A-3005-23 2 defendant as "a little rigid" and "swaying." When asked, defendant failed to

produce a license. Marchetti administered the horizontal gaze nystagmus

("HGN") test, the one-leg-stand ("OLS") test, and the walk-and-turn ("W&T")

test. After administering these tests, Marchetti concluded defendant was

intoxicated, and arrested defendant. Defendant was given two breath tests at the

police station.1 Defendant received four summonses for traffic violations: DWI,

N.J.S.A. 39:4-50; reckless driving, N.J.S.A. 39:4-96; failure to observe a traffic

signal, N.J.S.A. 39:4-81; and failure to exhibit documents, N.J.S.A. 39:3-29.

Defendant retained an attorney who entered his appearance in the middle

of January 2022 and appeared in court in the beginning of March where he

requested an adjournment to obtain discovery. In April, defendant once again

appeared with counsel and requested an adjournment to allow the State to review

his discovery request. In June, defendant requested another adjournment to

allow time to determine whether to file a formal discovery motion. When the

parties returned to court in September, defendant's counsel advised the court that

he filed a motion for additional discovery and, as a result, requested another

adjournment. In October, defendant's motion was denied. In the beginning of

1 The State later excluded the two breath samples based on "an issue with the 20-minute observation period."

A-3005-23 3 December, defense counsel advised the court he had filed a motion to suppress,

and as a result, another adjournment occurred. On August 3, 2023, the court

heard the suppression motion, and it was denied. Defendant also moved to have

the case dismissed for violation of the right to a speedy trial, but this motion was

denied as well. Trial was held the same day. Marchetti was the sole witness for

the State.

After defendant successfully moved to dismiss the charge of failure to

exhibit documents, he was convicted of failure to observe a traffic signal and

DWI. The reckless charge was dismissed as it merged into the DWI charge. As

this was defendant's first DWI, he was sentenced to a three-month interlock on

his vehicle and his license was suspended until the interlock was installed. The

court also ordered defendant to pay all applicable fines and penalties, mandatory

surcharges, and to attend twelve hours in the intoxicated drivers resource center.

The municipal court judge stayed the execution of defendant's sentence pending

his appeal to the Superior Court, Law Division.

On March 6, 2024, the Law Division judge heard argument on defendant's

municipal appeal. In a sixteen-page written opinion the court upheld the denial

of defendant's speedy trial motion, and, after a de novo review, found the

defendant guilty of DWI.

A-3005-23 4 Regarding defendant's speedy trial motion, the Law Division judge

applied the factors in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530 (1972), and found the

twenty-month delay was reasonable and mostly attributable to defendant and his

discovery motions. The judge also noted, and defendant conceded, he cannot

point to any specific prejudice from the delay.

The court also determined that through Marchetti's testimony the State had

proven beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had consumed enough alcohol

to have an effect on his mental faculties and physical coordination such that h is

driving would be impaired. The court relied on the following factors: defendant

had made a left turn against a red traffic light; believed the light was "turning"

when he went through; told the police officer he was on his way home from a

bar; smelled of alcohol; admitted he had consumed alcohol; had delayed

responses; and performed poorly on the field sobriety tests. In a March 8, 2021

order, the Law Division judge imposed the same sentence and monetary

penalties as the municipal court judge.

On appeal, defendant raises the following arguments:

POINT I

THIS COURT SHOULD DISMISS THIS MATTER BECAUSE [DEFENDANT]'S RIGHT TO A SPEEDY TRIAL WAS VIOLATED.

A-3005-23 5 POINT II

THIS COURT SHOULD ACQUIT [DEFENDANT] OF DWI BECAUSE THE PROOFS FAIL TO ESTABLISH THAT HE WAS UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

On appeal from a municipal court to the Law Division, the standard of

review is de novo on the record. Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court

Rules, cmt. 1.1 on R. 3:23-8 (2025). The Law Division makes a new decision

on its own, although it gives due regard to the municipal judge's opportunity to

view the witnesses. State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 157 (1964). Because the Law

Division judge is not in a position to judge the credibility of witnesses, deference

is due to the credibility findings of the municipal court judge. State v. Locurto,

157 N.J. 463, 472 (1999). See R. 3:23-8(a) governing de novo criminal trials.

Our scope of review is both narrow and deferential. State v. Stas, 212 N.J.

37, 48-49 (2012). We will "uphold the factual findings underlying the trial

court's decision, provided that those findings are 'supported by sufficient

credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Boone, 232 N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017)

(quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 40 (2016)). However, our review is

limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible evidence present in

the record to uphold the findings of the Law Division, not the municipal court.

A-3005-23 6 Johnson, 42 N.J. at 162. But like the Law Division, we are not in a good position

to make findings. Locurto, 157 N.J. at 471. We may not "weigh the evidence,

assess the credibility of witnesses, or make conclusions about the evidence."

State v. Barone, 147 N.J. 599, 615 (1997). We also must defer to the trial court's

credibility findings. State v. Cerefice, 335 N.J. Super. 374, 383 (App. Div.

2000).

Moreover, when the Law Division agrees with the municipal court, the

two-court rule must be considered. "Under the two-court rule, appellate courts

ordinarily should not undertake to alter concurrent findings of facts and

credibility determinations made by two lower courts absent a very obvious and

exceptional showing of error." 157 N.J. at 474. "However, no such deference

is owed to the Law Division or the municipal court with respect to legal

determinations or conclusions reached on the basis of the facts." Stas, 212 N.J.

at 49.

A determination by a trial judge whether defendant was deprived of his

right to a speedy trial should not be overturned unless the decision is clearly

erroneous. State v. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. 1, 10 (App. Div. 2009). We

afford deference to the trial court's factual findings as to the assessment and

balancing of the Barker factors. State v. Fulford, 349 N.J. Super. 183, 195 (App.

A-3005-23 7 Div. 2002). Thus, we will reverse only if the decision is shown to be so

erroneous that no reasonable analysis could have produced it.

III.

We first consider defendant's argument the Law Division judge erred in

denying his motion to dismiss based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial.

A defendant's right to a speedy trial is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment to

the United States Constitution and Article I of the New Jersey Constitution. U.S.

Const. amend. VI; N.J. Const. art. I, PP1,10. This right attaches at the time of

a defendant's arrest. Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super at 8.

In determining whether a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial

has been violated, courts consider the four-factor balancing test set forth in

Barker, which focuses on: (1) the length of the delay before trial; (2) the reason

for the delay and, specifically, whether the government or the defendant is more

to blame; (3) the extent to which the defendant asserted his speedy trial right;

and (4) the prejudice to the defendant. Barker 407 U.S. at 530-32. In State v.

Cahill, our Supreme Court embraced the Barker four-factor test. 213 N.J. 253,

258 (2013). The Cahill Court added, "[n]one of the Barker factors [are]

determinative, and the absence of one or some of the factors is not conclusive

of the ultimate determination of whether the right has been violated." Id. at 267

A-3005-23 8 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533). "[T]he factors are interrelated, and each must

be considered in light of the relevant circumstances of each particular case."

Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super. at 10 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 533).

We have previously cautioned, however, against deciding "how long is

too long . . . 'by sole reference to the lapse of a specified amount of time.'" State

v. Detrick, 192 N.J. Super. 424, 426 (App. Div. 1983) (quoting State v. Smith,

131 N.J. Super. 354, 360 (App. Div. 1974)). Legitimate delays, "however

great," will not violate the defendant's right to a speedy trial if it does not

specifically prejudice defendant's defense. Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S.

647, 656 (1992). Moreover, it bears emphasis that "any delay that defendant

caused or requested would not weigh in favor of finding a speedy trial violation."

State v. Long, 119 N.J. 439, 470 (1990) (quoting State v. Gallegan, 117 N.J.

345, 355 (1989)). When analyzing the first factor in a DWI case, it is important

to note that "'[t]he New Jersey judiciary is, as a matter of policy, committed to

the quick and thorough resolution of DWI cases.'" Tsetsekas, 411 N.J. Super.

at 11 (quoting Farrell, 320 N.J. Super. at 446-47).

In State v. Szima, our Supreme Court held that despite a twenty-two-

month delay between his arrest and trial, defendant was not denied his right to

a speedy trial. 70 N.J. 196, 202 (1976). The court stated

A-3005-23 9 Here defendant was not subjected to lengthy pretrial incarceration. He made no effort to assert his right to a speedy trial by moving to dismiss the pending complaint under R. 3:25-3. He claims no impairment of his ability to defend. Balancing these factors with the twenty-two-month delay and the State's failure to explain such delay we conclude that defendant was not denied his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See People v. Taranovich, 37 N.Y.2d 442, 373 N.Y.S.2d 79, 335 N.E.2d 303 (1975) (one year interval between arraignment and indictment). However, our holding should not be understood to put a stamp of approval on the delay here involved. It should not have happened.

[Szima, 70 N.J. at 202].

Here, a delay of twenty months occurred between defendant's arrest and

his trial. While this delay is significant, like in Szima, defendant was not denied

his right to a speedy trial when considering the remaining factors in the Barker

test.

Regarding the other three factors, the Law Division held these factors

weighed in favor of the State because the delays were attributable to defendant,

he was not ready to proceed to trial, and he could not prove any prejudice. The

Law Division noted that defense requested adjournments for discovery matters

on March 8, 2022; April 12, 2022; June 7, 2022; September 6, 2022; and then

on October 18, 2022, the municipal court denied defendant's discovery motion

and categorized the delays as part of the "ordinary course . . . of trial . . . ." The

A-3005-23 10 court also noted that the municipal court categorized the discovery motion as

turning into a "fishing expedition."

Having reviewed the record, we agree that the Barker factors weighed in

favor of the State and supported denial of defendant's speedy trial motion.

Considering the overall length of the delay (twenty months), the reasons for the

delay, when defendant was ready to proceed, and the minimal prejudice, there

was no violation of defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial.

We next address defendant's argument that the evidence did not prove

defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Following trial in municipal

court, Marchetti's testimony was found to be "credible and forthright" regarding

his interactions with appellant. The court further found:

The aggregate of the observations of the defendant's demeanor and physical appearance, as testified to by Officer Marchetti, . . . the defendant's admissions of alcohol consumption and a poor performance on the one-leg-stand and the walk-and-turn test, which were documented by the approximate[ly] twenty-minute video, were more than sufficient to sustain a finding of guilt.

The court continued stating "[c]learly, in the present matter, the field sobriety

testing and overall observations of Officer Marchetti, along with video, provided

ample evidence of the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt."

A-3005-23 11 The Law Division found substantially the same facts as the Municipal

Court. The court concluded that "the State, through the testimony of Officer

Marchetti, has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the amount of alcohol

defendant had consumed had an effect on his mental faculties and physical

coordination" and therefore "will convict defendant of the charge of DWI and

will deny defendant's motion for acquittal."

A defendant's guilt of DWI can be proved by either "proof of a defendant's

physical condition or proof of a defendant's blood alcohol level." State v. Kashi,

360 N.J. Super. 538, 545 (App. Div. 2003), aff'd, o.b. 180 N.J. 45 (2004).

Therefore, testimony of an officer who observes signs of a defendant's

intoxication is sufficient to prove guilt of DWI beyond a reasonable doubt. See

Johnson, 42 N.J. at 166; see also State v. Pichadou, 34 N.J. Super. 177, 180-81

(App. Div. 1955). Based on observational evidence, corroborated by the MVR,

the court found beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was under the

influence. As such, there is sufficient credible evidence present in the record to

uphold these findings.

To the extent we have not specifically addressed any other contentions

raised by defendant, they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in this

opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

A-3005-23 12 Affirmed.

A-3005-23 13