NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3876-21
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FENTON J. CARSTARPHEN, a/k/a FENTON JU CARSTARPHEN, FENTON J. CARSTARPHEN, JR., GERALD CARSTARPHEN, MICHAEL WATERS, MIKE FINNEY, FENNY HOLLINGSWORTH, and FINNY HOLLINGSWORTH,
Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________
Submitted November 28, 2023 – Decided March 14, 2024
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 16-04-1087.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Susan Brody, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Fenton Carstarphen appeals from the August 11, 2022, Law
Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
Following a 2016 jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree
attempted murder, second- and third-degree aggravated assault, second-degree
burglary, and related weapons offenses stemming from his brutal attack of his
estranged wife. He was sentenced to an aggregate extended term of fifty years'
imprisonment, subject to the eighty-five percent parole ineligibility provisions
of the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In an unpublished
decision, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, and the Supreme
Court subsequently denied certification. State v. Carstarphen, No. A-2950-16
(App. Div. Mar. 11, 2019) (slip op. at 20, 22), certif. denied, 239 N.J. 393
(2019).
In our unpublished opinion, we stressed that "the evidence adduced at the
trial . . . demonstrate[d] overwhelming proof of guilt." Id. at 4. We recounted
the pertinent facts as follows:
A-3876-21 2 On the morning of December 11, 2014, the victim opened the door to the mudroom attached to her house when she unexpectedly saw defendant standing there with a meat cleaver in his hand. He said to her, "[o]h, so you want a divorce?" The victim attempted to go to the back door, but she felt "heavy blows" to the back of her head, and fell to the ground. She was able to get outside to the backyard where she screamed for help. As the attack continued outside, defendant put the meat cle[a]ver in his pocket and took out a folding knife and cut the victim's thigh and attempted to cut her calf. Defendant told the victim they had to go back inside the house; the victim said she could not move, and as defendant went toward her, pretending to help her, he reached down and slit her throat and continued up her face, cutting her lip, nose, and across her left eye.
The victim's neighbor heard the screams, saw the attack, and called 9-1-1. Police arrived and found defendant standing over the victim, who was yelling for help with her hands up and blood coming down her face. The police detained defendant and found the meat cleaver and folding knife. They found a glove and wet pajamas near where the victim was on the ground; the wet pajamas had the odor of lighter fluid. When the police entered the victim's house, they detected the odor of flammable gas, and they noticed it was most potent in the mudroom.
[Id. at 4-5 (first alteration in original).]
Defendant filed a timely pro se PCR petition, which was later
supplemented by counsel. In his submissions, among other things, defendant
asserted his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to the admission
of N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence and failing to request a limiting instruction once the
A-3876-21 3 evidence was admitted. Defendant also asserted that counsel's cumulative errors
prejudiced him. The evidence at issue were three statements attributed to
defendant by the victim. The statements provided background information
about the parties' tumultuous relationship and defendant's prior threats.
Specifically, the victim testified that defendant had stated: (1) he would burn
the house down if he was not living in it; (2) he would assault her if she rejected
his 2012 marriage proposal; and (3) he would kick her down a flight of steps.
On the State's pre-trial motion, the trial judge had admitted the prior
threats as intrinsic evidence. 1 In his direct appeal, defendant had "assert[ed] that
the prior threats were not intrinsic to the crime of attempted murder, and thus,
the judge should have undertaken a Cofield[2] analysis and should have provided
a limit[ing] instruction." Carstarphen, slip op. at 13. In our decision, we
"perform[ed] a Cofield analysis de novo" and concluded that the evidence was
admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). Carstarphen, slip op. at 14, 20.
We explained:
The evidence provided "background" and helped to "complete[] the story" between the victim and defendant. See [State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 180
1 The judge had barred the admission of other evidence, including defendant's prior physical assaults of the victim. 2 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992). A-3876-21 4 (2011)] (quoting [United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2010)]) (concluding that these are other proper purposes for admitting evidence of other prior bad acts under Rule 404(b)). Defendant's threat to burn the house down was especially relevant in light of the lighter fluid-doused pajamas that defendant threw on the victim and the odor of lighter fluid in the house noted by the police officers. Moreover, these threats help prove defendant's motive and intent in attempting to murder the victim.
[Carstarphen, slip op. at 16 (first alteration in original).]
As to the judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction, we noted "[e]ven
if the past threats were not intrinsic, they would have been admissible under a
Cofield analysis, to which defense counsel consented to their admissibility
without the need for a limiting instruction." Carstarphen, slip op. at 20. Thus,
we determined there was
no plain error. We reach that conclusion especially because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. See State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 571-72 (2018) (holding that defendant's convictions would be affirmed despite absence of limiting instruction, use of bad act evidence during summations, and admission of hearsay because errors "were not capable of producing an unjust result because of the overwhelming weight and quality of the evidence against defendant").
[Carstarphen, slip op. at 20.]
Following oral argument, the PCR judge entered an order on August 11,
2022, denying defendant's petition. In a supporting oral decision placed on the
A-3876-21 5 record on the same date, the judge reviewed the factual background and
procedural history of the case, applied the governing legal principles, and
concluded defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC). The judge also determined defendant was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3876-21
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FENTON J. CARSTARPHEN, a/k/a FENTON JU CARSTARPHEN, FENTON J. CARSTARPHEN, JR., GERALD CARSTARPHEN, MICHAEL WATERS, MIKE FINNEY, FENNY HOLLINGSWORTH, and FINNY HOLLINGSWORTH,
Defendant-Appellant. ______________________________
Submitted November 28, 2023 – Decided March 14, 2024
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Natali.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 16-04-1087.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Susan Brody, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Fenton Carstarphen appeals from the August 11, 2022, Law
Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an
evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
Following a 2016 jury trial, defendant was convicted of first-degree
attempted murder, second- and third-degree aggravated assault, second-degree
burglary, and related weapons offenses stemming from his brutal attack of his
estranged wife. He was sentenced to an aggregate extended term of fifty years'
imprisonment, subject to the eighty-five percent parole ineligibility provisions
of the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. In an unpublished
decision, we affirmed defendant's convictions and sentence, and the Supreme
Court subsequently denied certification. State v. Carstarphen, No. A-2950-16
(App. Div. Mar. 11, 2019) (slip op. at 20, 22), certif. denied, 239 N.J. 393
(2019).
In our unpublished opinion, we stressed that "the evidence adduced at the
trial . . . demonstrate[d] overwhelming proof of guilt." Id. at 4. We recounted
the pertinent facts as follows:
A-3876-21 2 On the morning of December 11, 2014, the victim opened the door to the mudroom attached to her house when she unexpectedly saw defendant standing there with a meat cleaver in his hand. He said to her, "[o]h, so you want a divorce?" The victim attempted to go to the back door, but she felt "heavy blows" to the back of her head, and fell to the ground. She was able to get outside to the backyard where she screamed for help. As the attack continued outside, defendant put the meat cle[a]ver in his pocket and took out a folding knife and cut the victim's thigh and attempted to cut her calf. Defendant told the victim they had to go back inside the house; the victim said she could not move, and as defendant went toward her, pretending to help her, he reached down and slit her throat and continued up her face, cutting her lip, nose, and across her left eye.
The victim's neighbor heard the screams, saw the attack, and called 9-1-1. Police arrived and found defendant standing over the victim, who was yelling for help with her hands up and blood coming down her face. The police detained defendant and found the meat cleaver and folding knife. They found a glove and wet pajamas near where the victim was on the ground; the wet pajamas had the odor of lighter fluid. When the police entered the victim's house, they detected the odor of flammable gas, and they noticed it was most potent in the mudroom.
[Id. at 4-5 (first alteration in original).]
Defendant filed a timely pro se PCR petition, which was later
supplemented by counsel. In his submissions, among other things, defendant
asserted his trial attorney was ineffective by failing to object to the admission
of N.J.R.E. 404(b) evidence and failing to request a limiting instruction once the
A-3876-21 3 evidence was admitted. Defendant also asserted that counsel's cumulative errors
prejudiced him. The evidence at issue were three statements attributed to
defendant by the victim. The statements provided background information
about the parties' tumultuous relationship and defendant's prior threats.
Specifically, the victim testified that defendant had stated: (1) he would burn
the house down if he was not living in it; (2) he would assault her if she rejected
his 2012 marriage proposal; and (3) he would kick her down a flight of steps.
On the State's pre-trial motion, the trial judge had admitted the prior
threats as intrinsic evidence. 1 In his direct appeal, defendant had "assert[ed] that
the prior threats were not intrinsic to the crime of attempted murder, and thus,
the judge should have undertaken a Cofield[2] analysis and should have provided
a limit[ing] instruction." Carstarphen, slip op. at 13. In our decision, we
"perform[ed] a Cofield analysis de novo" and concluded that the evidence was
admissible under N.J.R.E. 404(b). Carstarphen, slip op. at 14, 20.
We explained:
The evidence provided "background" and helped to "complete[] the story" between the victim and defendant. See [State v. Rose, 206 N.J. 141, 180
1 The judge had barred the admission of other evidence, including defendant's prior physical assaults of the victim. 2 State v. Cofield, 127 N.J. 328 (1992). A-3876-21 4 (2011)] (quoting [United States v. Green, 617 F.3d 233, 248-49 (3d Cir. 2010)]) (concluding that these are other proper purposes for admitting evidence of other prior bad acts under Rule 404(b)). Defendant's threat to burn the house down was especially relevant in light of the lighter fluid-doused pajamas that defendant threw on the victim and the odor of lighter fluid in the house noted by the police officers. Moreover, these threats help prove defendant's motive and intent in attempting to murder the victim.
[Carstarphen, slip op. at 16 (first alteration in original).]
As to the judge's failure to provide a limiting instruction, we noted "[e]ven
if the past threats were not intrinsic, they would have been admissible under a
Cofield analysis, to which defense counsel consented to their admissibility
without the need for a limiting instruction." Carstarphen, slip op. at 20. Thus,
we determined there was
no plain error. We reach that conclusion especially because of the overwhelming evidence of guilt. See State v. Prall, 231 N.J. 567, 571-72 (2018) (holding that defendant's convictions would be affirmed despite absence of limiting instruction, use of bad act evidence during summations, and admission of hearsay because errors "were not capable of producing an unjust result because of the overwhelming weight and quality of the evidence against defendant").
[Carstarphen, slip op. at 20.]
Following oral argument, the PCR judge entered an order on August 11,
2022, denying defendant's petition. In a supporting oral decision placed on the
A-3876-21 5 record on the same date, the judge reviewed the factual background and
procedural history of the case, applied the governing legal principles, and
concluded defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel (IAC). The judge also determined defendant was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.
On appeal, defendant raises the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS TRIAL ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO OBJECT TO THE ADMISSION OF HIGHLY INFLAMMATORY STATEMENTS MADE BY HIM ON PRIOR OCCASIONS.
POINT II
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST A LIMITING INSTRUCTION AS TO EVIDENCE OF HIS PRIOR INCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.
POINT III
[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT THE COMBINATION OF THE TWO ERRORS COMPLAINED OF IN POINTS ONE AND TWO
A-3876-21 6 CREATED CUMULATIVE ERROR CONSTITUTING INEFFECTIVENESS OF TRIAL COUNSEL.
We begin by setting out some guideposts that inform our review. "We
review the legal conclusions of a PCR judge de novo." State v. Reevey, 417
N.J. Super. 134, 146 (App. Div. 2010). "[W]e review under the abuse of
discretion standard the PCR court's determination to proceed without an
evidentiary hearing." State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div.
2013). "If the court perceives that holding an evidentiary hearing will not aid
the court's analysis of whether the defendant is entitled to [PCR], . . . then an
evidentiary hearing need not be granted." State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158
(1997) (citations omitted). "[W]here . . . no evidentiary hearing was conducted,"
as here, "we may review the factual inferences the [trial] court has drawn from
the documentary record de novo." State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294
(App. Div. 2016) (citing State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)).
An evidentiary hearing is only required when (1) a defendant establishes
"a prima facie case in support of [PCR]," (2) the court determines that there are
"material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the
existing record," and (3) the court determines that "an evidentiary hearing is
necessary to resolve the claims" asserted. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354
A-3876-21 7 (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)); see R. 3:22-10(e)(2)
(providing "[a] court shall not grant an evidentiary hearing . . . if the defendant's
allegations are too vague, conclusory or speculative"). "To establish a prima
facie case, defendant must demonstrate a reasonable likelihood that his or her
claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light most favorable to the defendant, will
ultimately succeed on the merits." R. 3:22-10(b).
To establish a prima facie IAC claim, a defendant must demonstrate "by
a preponderance of the credible evidence," State v. Echols, 199 N.J. 344, 357
(2009), that his or her attorney's performance fell below the objective standard
of reasonableness set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984), and adopted in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 49-58 (1987), and that the
outcome would have been different without the purported deficient
performance. Stated differently, a defendant must show that: (1) counsel's
performance was deficient; and (2) the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58.
To satisfy the first prong, a defendant must "show[] that counsel made
errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the
defendant by the Sixth Amendment" and "that counsel's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.
A-3876-21 8 "[I]n making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that
counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional
assistance . . . ." Id. at 689. As such, a defendant "must overcome the
presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be
considered sound trial strategy.'" Ibid. (quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S.
91, 101 (1955)).
To satisfy the prejudice prong, "[t]he error committed must be so serious
as to undermine the court's confidence in the jury's verdict or result reached."
State v. Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 204 (2004) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
This prong generally requires that a defendant establish a "reasonable
probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Failure to meet either prong of the two-pronged Strickland/Fritz test
results in the denial of a petition for PCR. State v. Parker, 212 N.J. 269, 280
(2012) (citing Echols, 199 N.J. at 358). That said, "courts are permitted leeway
to choose to examine first whether a defendant has been prejudiced, and if not,
to dismiss the claim without determining whether counsel's performance was
constitutionally deficient." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citation
omitted) (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697).
A-3876-21 9 Applying these principles, we reject defendant's contentions based solely
on defendant's inability to establish the prejudice prong. We therefore dismiss
defendant's claims "without determining whether counsel's performance was
constitutionally deficient" in any respect. Ibid. As the PCR judge aptly stated:
[E]ven if trial counsel objected to the introduction of evidence, as [N.J.R.E.] 404(b) evidence and not intrinsic evidence, or sought [a ]limiting instruction, viewing the case under the harmful error standard, the overwhelming evidence against . . . defendant would still have resulted in his conviction, i.e., there is no reasonable probability that but for counsel's purported unprofessional errors the result of the proceeding would have been different; therefore, trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to object or otherwise request a limiting instruction under the Strickland standard . . . .
Indeed, the second prong of the Strickland/Fritz test "is an exacting
standard" and "'[t]he error committed must be so serious as to undermine the
court's confidence in the jury's verdict or the result reached.'" State v. Allegro,
193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Castagna, 187
N.J. 293, 315 (2006)). No such showing has been made here.
A-3876-21 10 To the extent we have not addressed a particular argument, it is because
either our disposition makes it unnecessary, or the argument was without
sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).3
Affirmed.
3 Because we conclude defendant was not prejudiced by any of his attorney's purported deficiencies, his cumulative error argument also fails.
A-3876-21 11