NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4060-24
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
D.S.,
Defendant-Respondent. ________________________
Argued January 21, 2026 – Decided February 27, 2026
Before Judges Gilson and Firko.
On appeal from an interlocutory order of the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 24-04-0166.
Emily M. M. Pirro, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for appellant (John P. McDonald, Somerset County Prosecutor, attorney; Emily M. M. Pirro, of counsel and on the brief).
Shannon M. Dolan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, argued the cause for respondent (Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney; Shannon M. Dolan, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM
On leave granted, the State appeals from an April 10, 2025 order, which
found defendant D.S. not competent to proceed to trial at this time. 1 In
accordance with the governing statute, the order also directed that defendant be
confined and reevaluated after several months of treatment. The State also
appeals from a July 25, 2025 order, which denied its motion for reconsideration.
Having reviewed the record and law, we affirm both orders because the trial
court made its competency factual findings based on substantial credible
evidence, including two opinions of qualified medical experts, correctly applied
the law, and did not abuse its discretion. We also note that defendant is
confined, will be periodically reevaluated, and will not be released from
confinement without further court order.
1 Because we discuss confidential medical and mental health issues and diagnoses, we use initials for defendant. R. 1:38-3(a)(2). To protect the privacy rights of the victim and her family, we also use initials for the victim. See R. 1:38-3(c)(12).
A-4060-24 2 I.
The issues on this appeal arise out of the tragic and brutal murder of a
woman. For purposes of this appeal, we accept the facts alleged by the State,
which are based on the investigation of the murder. 2
Late in the evening of January 30, 2024, the Somerville Police Department
received a call concerning an unresponsive woman outside a home. When the
police officers responded, they found a woman lying face up on the ground next
to her car. The woman, later identified as M.R.F., had approximately forty stab
wounds to various parts of her body. The victim's car door was open, and her
personal belongings were scattered around her body. The victim was later
pronounced dead.
Law enforcement personnel conducted investigations, during which they
interviewed various witnesses, obtained video footage, and executed a search
warrant. Witnesses reported that in the weeks before the murder, the victim had
told them she was being followed from a gym she regularly used. The victim
described the person following her as a tall, skinny, white man, who wore
glasses and a COVID-19 mask. The victim's mother reported that the victim
2 The State did not include any of its investigative reports or materials. Therefore, we summarize the facts from the State's brief and the trial court's opinion. A-4060-24 3 recognized the person following her as someone who had stalked her when she
was younger. One of the victim's friends told law enforcement personnel that
she believed the stalker may be defendant or another person.
Investigators obtained information that defendant had been at the gym at
approximately the same time as the victim on January 30, 2024. Dash cam era
surveillance video footage depicted a man matching defendant's description in
the area of the murder at approximately the time of the stabbing. The man was
wearing a black gaiter, which is an article of clothing that is normally used to
protect against mud splashes. A few days later, an individual looked into
defendant's car and saw a black gaiter, duct tape, and a white trash bag.
On February 4, 2024, the police observed defendant standing by his car in
a parking lot. Defendant's car trunk was open, and he was taking off a pair of
plastic gloves. The police believed defendant had been washing his car . After
he left they inspected the area and found a puddle that had a strong odor of
bleach.
That same day, law enforcement personnel executed a search warrant at
defendant's apartment. The search revealed a large quantity of bleach
containers, a strong odor of bleach, blood residue in the entrance way and
A-4060-24 4 bathroom, and a "manifesto." The manifesto detailed defendant's plans to kill
M.R.F. Defendant was arrested the next day, on February 5, 2024.
A grand jury indicted defendant for five crimes related to M.R.F.'s death:
(1) first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2) and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
3(b)(4)(c); (2) third-degree hindering apprehension or prosecution, N.J.S.A.
2C:29-3(b)(1); (3) third-degree possession of a weapon for unlawful purpose,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); (4) fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon,
N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d); and (5) fourth-degree stalking, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b).
Following defendant's arrest, defense counsel raised concerns with the
court about defendant's competency. Accordingly, the court directed defendant
to undergo a psychological evaluation to determine if he was competent to stand
trial in accordance with N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4.
Dr. Ashley Strathern, a psychiatrist employed at the Ann Klein Forensic
Center, evaluated defendant in May and June 2024. The evaluation included
reviewing various records and interviewing defendant twice. Dr. Strathern then
issued a report dated July 15, 2024. She noted that defendant had been
diagnosed with autistic disorder and adjustment disorder with mixed anxiety and
depression. Based on her review, Dr. Strathern agreed with defendant's autistic
disorder diagnosis. The doctor also diagnosed defendant with schizophrenia
A-4060-24 5 because he exhibited illogical and delusional thoughts and paranoia. Ultimately,
Dr. Strathern concluded that defendant was incompetent to stand trial because
his delusions and his illogical and paranoid thoughts would impair his ability to
rationally appreciate the charges against him and his ability to work with his
attorneys.
The State then retained its own psychiatric expert, Dr. Howard Gilman.
Dr. Gilman conducted his evaluation of defendant in October and November
2024, and produced a report dated November 8, 2024. Like Dr. Strathern, Dr.
Gilman reviewed various records, including Dr. Strathern's report. Dr. Gilman
agreed that defendant suffered from schizophrenia and autistic spectrum
disorder. Dr. Gilman, however, disagreed with Dr. Strathern on defendant's
ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense. Instead, Dr.
Gilman concluded that defendant's paranoia and delusions would not keep him
from participating adequately in the presentation of his defense and opined
defendant was competent to stand trial.
Defense counsel retained a third expert, Dr. Joel Nunez, who has a
doctorate in psychology. Dr. Nunez reviewed various records, including the
reports prepared by Dr. Gilman and Dr. Strathern. Like the other doctors, Dr.
Nunez agreed that defendant suffered from schizophrenia and autistic spectrum
A-4060-24 6 disorder. Like Dr. Strathern, Dr. Nunez opined that defendant's paranoia and
delusional thought processes would impede his ability to assist in his own
defense. Accordingly, Dr. Nunez agreed with the opinion of Dr. Strathern that
defendant was incompetent to stand trial at that time.
On April 3, 2025, the trial court conducted a competency hearing. At that
hearing, all three experts testified and their reports were admitted into evidence.
The court also heard arguments by counsel.
On April 10, 2025, the trial court issued an order finding defendant
incompetent to proceed to trial at that time. The court then directed defendant
to be committed under the custody of the Commissioner of the Department of
Health, that he receive treatment, and he be reevaluated within three months to
determine if he was competent and fit to stand trial. The court supported its
order with a twenty-page written opinion, which made detailed findings of facts
and conclusions of law.
In its written opinion, the trial court noted all the experts agreed that
defendant was oriented as to time, place, and things. The court also pointed out
that all the experts agreed defendant was aware of his constitutional rights and
the nature of the criminal proceedings against him. The court then focused on
where the experts disagreed, which was on defendant's ability to participate in
A-4060-24 7 an adequate presentation of his defense. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2)(g). The
court pointed out that two of the experts found defendant was not competent to
stand trial at this time because of his inability to adequately participate in his
defense, but Dr. Gilman had a different view.
The court then evaluated the three experts' testimony. The court noted
that Dr. Gilman had been retained by the State, Dr. Nunez had been retained by
defendant's counsel, and Dr. Strathern was a "neutral voice" because she was a
court-appointed expert and was the first to conduct her evaluation. The court
found Dr. Strathern's testimony and report to be "well-reasoned and credible."
The court found that the combined opinions of Dr. Strathern and Dr. Nunez were
not outweighed by Dr. Gilman's differing opinion. Thus, the court found
defendant was not competent to proceed to trial at that time.
In making its finding, the court noted that the State bore the burden of
proving that defendant was competent to proceed and had not carried that
burden. The court also reasoned that defendant's paranoia and delusions
"prevented him from having meaningful interactions with counsel" because he
could not "accurately provid[e] information," obtain advice from his attorneys,
and those inabilities would impede his participation in his defense.
A-4060-24 8 The State moved for reconsideration. After further briefing and additional
oral arguments, the trial court denied that motion in an order entered on July 25,
2025. The trial court again supported its decision with a written opinion.
The State then moved for leave to appeal, which we granted. In January
2026, the State informed us that defendant had been transferred to the Ann Klein
Forensic Center for further evaluation. At oral argument, counsel informed us
that a further competency evaluation report had not been conducted because
defendant was refusing to participate in treatment.
II.
On appeal, the State contends that the trial court erred in finding defendant
was not competent and not granting its motion for reconsideration. In that
regard, the State argues the trial court misapplied the law and failed to consider
certain facts. The State also asserts that the trial court erred in its analysis of
the experts' opinions.
The Legislature, consistent with a defendant's constitutional rights, has
declared: "No person who lacks capacity to understand the proceedings against
him [or her] or to assist in his [or her] own defense shall be tried, convicted or
sentenced for the commission of an offense so long as such incapacity endures."
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(a). The statute then sets forth findings a court must make in
A-4060-24 9 determining if a defendant is mentally competent. In that regard, the statute
states:
b. A person shall be considered mentally competent to stand trial on criminal charges if the proofs shall establish:
(1) That the defendant has the mental capacity to appreciate his presence in relation to time, place and things; and
(2) That his elementary mental processes are such that he comprehends:
(a) That he is in a court of justice charged with a criminal offense;
(b) That there is a judge on the bench;
(c) That there is a prosecutor present who will try to convict him of a criminal charge;
(d) That he has a lawyer who will undertake to defend him against that charge;
(e) That he will be expected to tell to the best of his mental ability the facts surrounding him at the time and place where the alleged violation was committed if he chooses to testify and understands the right not to testify;
(f) That there is or may be a jury present to pass upon evidence adduced as to guilt or innocence of such charge or, that if he should choose to enter into plea negotiations or to plead guilty, that he comprehend the consequences of a guilty plea and that he be able to knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waive those
A-4060-24 10 rights which are waived upon such entry of a guilty plea; and
(g) That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense.
[N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b).]
The New Jersey Supreme Court has explained: "An important component
of the inquiry is the question of whether the defendant has the capacity to assist
in his or her own defense." State v. Gorthy, 226 N.J. 516, 531 (2016). The
Court has also pointed out: "The question of a defendant's ability to assist in his
or her defense turns on whether his or her mental condition precludes
meaningful interaction with his or her attorney with respect to the pending
charges and the trial." Id. at 531-32.
Where, as here, the court conducts a competency hearing, the State has
the burden to prove by a preponderance of evidence that defendant's mental
condition "does not render him or her incompetent to stand trial." Id. at 530.
The State need not prove the defendant "is capable of formulating legal strategy"
or is able to "communicate with his counsel using complex language." Id. at
531. Instead, the focus turns on the extent the defendant's mental condition
"precludes meaningful interaction with his or her attorney." Id. at 532.
A-4060-24 11 Consistent with N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4, the trial court made detailed findings
concerning defendant's mental competency. The court carefully evaluated the
testimony and reports of the three experts. In doing so, the court found that the
three experts all agreed defendant had mental disorders, which included
schizophrenia and autistic disorder. The court also found the three experts all
agreed that defendant's elementary mental processes could comprehend the
factors listed in subsections (a) through (f) of N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2). The court
determined that the experts diverged on defendant's ability under subsection (g):
"That he has the ability to participate in an adequate presentation of his defense."
N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4(b)(2)(g).
In analyzing defendant's ability to participate in his defense, the court
found that all the experts had noted defendant had delusions. The court then
found that during his evaluation with Dr. Strathern, defendant had "directly
contradicted his claims of non-involvement on many occasions by implying that
this might be a self-defense case." The court ultimately found that "defendant's
ability to provide information and obtain advice from his defense counsel is
significantly impaired." In that regard, the court found: "The evidence suggests
that defendant would experience the same paranoid delusions in conversations
with counsel, significantly impairing his ability to provide them with important
A-4060-24 12 information in the case. In turn, it is likely that his attorneys cannot prepare an
informed strategy for the case and advise him accordingly." Relying on the
testimony and opinions of Dr. Strathern and Dr. Nunez, the court ultimately
found that defendant was unfit and incompetent to proceed to trial at this time.
A. The State's Arguments.
The State first argues that the trial court misapplied the law by incorrectly
analyzing case law, and in particular the cases of Gorthy and State v. Snell, 136
N.J. Super. 506 (App. Div. 1975). The trial court's careful and thoughtful
written opinions rebut the State's contentions.
The trial court cited to and properly analyzed Gorthy and Snell. In Gorthy,
the Court addressed the issue of "whether a trial court that has found the
defendant competent may compel that defendant to assert the insanity defense,
notwithstanding the defendant's decision not to raise that defense." 226 N.J. at
521. The Court held that the trial court cannot overrule defendant's decision and
must respect the defendant's autonomy not to assert an insanity defense to a
charge of stalking. Id. at 530, 536.
So, Gorthy did not address whether a defendant was or was not competent.
Nevertheless, in discussing defendant's right to make autonomous decisions, the
Court did discuss how trial courts should assess a defendant's competency under
A-4060-24 13 N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4. See Gorthy, 226 N.J. at 530-532. Contrary to the contentions
of the State, the trial court properly analyzed the general principles set forth in
Gorthy and recognized that a key part of the competency assessment is whether
defendant can "meaningful[ly] interact with his or her attorney with respect to
the pending charges and the trial." Id. at 532.
In Snell, we addressed whether a physician was incompetent because he
practiced medicine in a "bizarre" manner. 136 N.J. Super. at 508. We reversed
the trial court's finding of incompetency because the judge concluded defendant
could not adequately participate in his own defense based on how his practices
would be perceived by defense counsel. Ibid. We noted the facts supported the
trial judge's determination that Snell understood his position regarding the
criminal charges and determined the trial judge drew an incorrect legal
conclusion from those facts; that is, defendant could not adequately participate
in his own defense due to his counsel's inability to understand him. Ibid.
The State argues that Gorthy and Snell prohibit an "auditor-perception
focus," which looks at how other people will perceive a defendant's choices. In
this matter, however, the trial court did not violate any rule established in Gorthy
or Snell. To the contrary, Gorthy and Snell instruct that a competency
determination is fact specific. See Gorthy, 226 N.J. at 530-31; Snell, 136 N.J.
A-4060-24 14 Super. at 508. The trial court here carefully analyzed the specific facts related
to defendant's mental health and delusions. It then found that defendant was
incompetent at this time because he could not adequately assist in his own
defense and in communicating with his attorneys. We discern no error of law
in the trial court's careful legal analyses.
Next, the State contends that the trial court failed to consider and properly
analyze certain facts. Those facts include: (1) defendant's acts in attempting to
cover up his actions by carefully cleaning his car with bleach; (2) defendant's
response when he was initially approached by law enforcement personnel and
he asked: "Am I free to go?"; and (3) defendant's manifesto, which set out "'step-
by-step' instructions for carrying out the murder." The State asserts that those
facts demonstrate defendant's understanding of his legal rights and his ability to
defend the case against him.
The trial court, however, did not ignore those facts. Instead, the trial court
accepted the consistent testimony of the experts that defendant had an
understanding about the charges against him and the legal process that would be
involved in his prosecution and trial. Where the trial court diverged from the
State's position was on the issue of whether defendant could meaningfully
interact with his attorneys concerning the charges and trial. That focus is what
A-4060-24 15 the law requires. See N.J.S.A. 2C:4-4; Gorthy, 226 N.J. at 531-32. In short,
what the State is really complaining about is that the trial court analyzed all the
relevant factors but came to a different decision. The State's disagreements with
the findings the trial court made on substantial credible evidence is not a basis
on which we can reverse the trial court's decision.
Finally, the State alleges that the trial court erred in analyzing the three
expert opinions because it gave undue weight to the opinion of Dr. Strathern , as
a "neutral" expert. In other words, the State argues that the trial court did not
properly consider the opinion of Dr. Gilman and placed too much emphasis on
the opinion of Dr. Strathern. The trial court's analysis rebuts this argument. The
trial court properly considered all three expert opinions. After evaluating all the
proper factors, the trial court relied on the combined opinions of Dr. Strathern
and Dr. Nunez, both of whom found that defendant did not have the ability to
meaningfully interact with his attorneys. So, the trial court did not ignore Dr.
Gilman's contrary opinion; rather, the trial court appropriately weighed all the
opinions and then made an independent fact finding.
In summary, none of the State's arguments are supported by the record
and the law. Instead, the trial court's factual findings are supported by
substantial credible evidence, and it properly analyzed and applied the law.
A-4060-24 16 III.
Having determined defendant was incompetent at this time, the trial court
also appropriately directed that defendant should be confined and reevaluated.
In that regard, the New Jersey Supreme Court has explained: "If the defendant
is found unfit for trial, the proceedings against him or her are suspended, subject
to expectations identified in the statute, and the court decides whether the
defendant will be civilly committed or released, with or without conditions."
Gorthy, 226 N.J. at 532 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:4-6(b)).
Here, the trial court civilly committed defendant to the custody of the
Department of Health. The court also directed that defendant be reevaluated
within three months to see if he has become competent to stand trial. That
reevaluation process has been held up because defendant is not cooperating in
his treatment. The important point, however, is that defendant is confined and
will continue to be confined until further order of the trial court. Accordingly,
we remand this matter so the trial court can continue to monitor and periodically
assess defendant's competency.
Affirmed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-4060-24 17