State of New Jersey v. Devonta J. Wylie

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: February 23, 2026
• Docket: A-3818-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3818-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DEVONTA J. WYLIE, a/k/a DEVONTA J. MONTAGUE- WYLIE, DEVONTA MONTAGUE, DEVONTA MONTAGUEWYLIE, and DEVONTA WYLIE,

Defendant-Appellant. __________________________

Submitted January 20, 2026 – Decided February 23, 2026

Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment Nos. 17-04-1060, 17-12-3694, and 18-05-1623.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Paul F. Darakjian, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Theodore N. Stephens II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Margaret Myaskovskaya, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendant Devonta J. Wylie appeals from an order denying his petition

for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. Having

reviewed the record and applicable legal standards, we are unpersuaded by

defendant's arguments and affirm.

The relevant facts are undisputed. Charged with a total of twenty-one

counts involving mostly controlled dangerous substance (CDS) offenses across

three separate Essex County indictments, including first-degree possession with

intent to distribute CDS (MDMA/Ecstasy), N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1), (b)(1); third-

degree possession of CDS (MDMA/Ecstasy) with intent to distribute within a

school zone, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7A; and second-degree possession of a firearm

while committing a drug offense, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4.1(a), defendant agreed to a

plea offer to resolve all charges contained in the various indictments.

More particularly, defendant pleaded guilty to one count of possession of

CDS with intent to distribute (MDMA/Ecstasy) and two counts of possession

with intent to distribute within 1,000 ft. of a school (Indictment 17-04-1060);

possession of CDS with intent to distribute within 1,000 ft. of a school (Ecstasy)

A-3818-23 2 (Indictment 17-12-3694); and second-degree possession of firearm with

committing CDS crime (Indictment 18-05-1623).

The record shows that at the time of the plea hearing, defendant reviewed

and signed plea forms that memorialized these precise terms as recounted by the

State at the hearing. During the plea allocution, defendant admitted to the

factual predicates of the crimes to which he was pleading guilty and advised the

judge that he: understood the plea offer; was not promised anything other than

the plea offer; was not under the influence of any substance at the time; his

attorney fully advised him of the indictments, discovery and the plea offer, and

had answered all of his questions; made the decision to plead guilty; and knew

his actions were unlawful. Pursuant to the plea agreement, the State

recommended dismissal of all remaining charges.

Thereafter, in accordance with the terms of the plea agreement, the court

sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of eight-years incarceration with a

four-year period of parole ineligibility pursuant to the No Early Release Act

(NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. More particularly, on Indictment 17-04-1060, the

court sentenced defendant to eight years in prison with a period of forty-two

months of parole ineligibility; on Indictment 18-05-1623, the court sentenced

defendant to a seven-year term of incarceration, with forty-two months of parole

A-3818-23 3 ineligibility; and on Indictment 17-12-3694, the court sentenced defendant to a

three-years' incarceration with one year of parole ineligibility, to run concurrent

with Indictments 18-05-1623 and 17-04-1060.

Almost four years later to the day, defendant filed a timely pro se PCR

petition, alleging ineffective assistance of plea counsel. Defendant did not

appeal his convictions or sentences and did not move to withdraw his guilty

pleas.1 In his pro se petition, defendant asserted he was "hoping to find whatever

relief is appropriate for [his] situation. [He] was sentenced and [is] currently

serving time for a term[] [he] never agreed to plead guilty to." In his subsequent

counseled brief, defendant argued that he was entitled to PCR relief because he

received ineffective assistance of counsel, rendering his plea unknowing and

involuntary, and that he was therefore entitled to an evidentiary hearing to

develop a thorough record.

Following oral argument, the court denied defendant's PCR petition and

issued a well-reasoned oral decision. The court explained the applicable legal

standard necessary for defendant to establish a PCR claim based on ineffective

1 By the time of the PCR hearing, defendant was already on parole. Defendant was therefore seeking a "remolding [of] his sentence on the JOC," which we glean would give defendant one year off of his parole. A-3818-23 4 assistance of plea counsel. Thereafter, in rejecting defendant's arguments, the

court concluded:

[t]he record does not reflect that defendant's [plea] counsel assured him that he would get [seven] years, nor is there evidence that, had the petitioner known he would be sentenced to [eight] years, he would not have pled guilty. Moreover, there are two plea forms that were used for the global resolution of petitioner's matters. Defendant had multiple opportunities to go over the plea negotiations with counsel and voice his concerns about counsel's representations during and prior to signing the forms.

The defendant did not sustain his burden under Strickland [v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)]'s first prong, that trial counsel's performance outlined in his PCR briefs were deficient. Defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement, as the sentence he received was explained to him during his plea allocution.

The court further concluded defendant was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant appealed, arguing the following points for our consideration:

POINT I

[DEFENDANT] WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN TRIAL COUNSEL MISLED HIM AS TO TERMS OF THE PLEA AGREEMENT.

POINT II

THIS COURT MUST REMAND FOR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

A-3818-23 5 When a defendant claims ineffective assistance of counsel as the basis for

relief, he must satisfy the two-pronged test formulated in Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 687, which was adopted by our Court in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987).

"First, the defendant must show that counsel's performance was deficient. . . .

Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the

defense." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687.

To meet the first prong of the Strickland test, a defendant must show "that

counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment." Ibid. Reviewing courts must make "a

strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of

reasonable professional assistance." Id. at 689; see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J.

518, 542 (2013).

The second prong of the Strickland test requires a defendant to show "that

counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial

whose result is reliable." 466 U.S. at 687. A defendant must show by a

"reasonable probability" that the deficient performance affected the outcome.

Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. "A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to

undermine confidence in the outcome." State v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 583 (2015)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52). "[A] conviction is

A-3818-23 6 more readily attributable to deficiencies in defense counsel's performance when

the State has a relatively weak case than when the State has presented

overwhelming evidence of guilt." State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 557 (2021).

"With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test, a defendant asserting

ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden of proving his or her

right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J.

339, 350 (2012). A failure to satisfy either prong of the Strickland test requires

the denial of a PCR petition. 466 U.S. at 700.

A defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel extends to the plea

negotiation process. Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012); see also State

v. Chau, 473 N.J. Super. 430, 445 (App. Div. 2022). When a defendant seeks

"[t]o set aside a guilty plea based on ineffective assistance of counsel, a

defendant must show . . . 'that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's errors, [he or she] would not have pled guilty and would have insisted

on going to trial.'" State v. Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (quoting

State v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994) (alterations in original)); Lafler, 566

U.S. at 163 (citing Missouri v. Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012)) (holding a

defendant claiming ineffective assistance at the plea stage must show that "the

outcome of the plea process would have been different with competent advice").

A-3818-23 7 A defendant also "must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea

bargain would have been rational under the circumstances." Padilla v.

Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010); see also State v. Aburoumi, 464 N.J. Super.

326, 339 (App. Div. 2020).

"A prima facie case is established when a defendant demonstrates 'a

reasonable likelihood that his or her claim, viewing the facts alleged in the light

most favorable to the defendant, will ultimately succeed on the merits.'" State

v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013); (quoting R. 3:22-10(b)). "[T]o establish a

prima facie claim, a [defendant] must do more than make bald assertions that he

was denied effective assistance of counsel." Ibid. (quoting State v. Cummings,

321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999)). PCR petitions must be

"accompanied by an affidavit or certification by defendant, or by others, setting

forth with particularity[,]" State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014), "facts

sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance,"

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. "[F]actual assertions in a [PCR must] be

made by affidavit or certification in order to secure an evidentiary hearing."

Jones, 219 N.J. at 312 (citing R. 3:22-10(c)).

Before us, defendant argues the PCR court erred in concluding that no

evidence was presented to dispute counsel's advice, arguing instead that he was

A-3818-23 8 "advised that the State's offer of eight (8) years would shrink to seven (7) years

at sentencing," and "[plea] counsel effectively undercut what the plea agreement

said by making 'misleading, material' misinformation to [him] about trusting

trial counsel's representation as to what the ultimate term of incarceration

imposed would be."

Defendant's arguments, however, are belied by the record, which clearly

shows that he accepted the State's plea offer, including an eight-year term of

incarceration to resolve over twenty charges contained in the three indictments.

Moreover, defendant's assertion that plea counsel misled him with assurances of

a lighter sentence, notwithstanding the plea forms and plea information on the

record bearing his signature, is further contradicted by his sworn statements

during the plea allocution, including his confirmation that he understood he was

not required to plead guilty and his acceptance of the terms of the plea, including

the aggregate eight-year sentence. Defendant's assertions against plea counsel

therefore amount to mere allegations, unsupported by the record, which are

insufficient to establish his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170 (App. Div. 1999).

Additionally, we note that as the State averred, "[w]hile a defendant has

the right to argue for a sentence less than the sentence recommended by the

A-3818-23 9 State, it is ultimately up to the trial court to impose a sentence." Therefore, even

if plea counsel had advised defendant that he may receive a lower sentence,

"[e]rroneous sentencing predictions [] do not amount to constitutionally

deficient performance under Strickland," particularly in view of this record.

DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457.

Further, defendant has not demonstrated a reasonable probability that, but

for plea counsel's alleged error, he would not have accepted the State's plea offer

to resolve over twenty charges across the three indictments and would have

insisted on going to trial. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985); see also

DiFrisco, 137 N.J. at 457. We are further unconvinced that any decision by

defendant to reject the State's plea offer would have been rational under the

attending circumstances; given the plethora of second and third-degree charges

against him across the three indictments and his significant exposure to a

lengthier incarceration with possible consecutive sentences. Padilla, 559 U.S.

at 372. Accordingly, having failed to demonstrate that plea counsel's

representation was constitutionally deficient under Strickland, the PCR court

properly denied defendant's petition.

We are also not persuaded by defendant's assertion that an evidentiary

hearing is necessary to aid in his proofs and discern no abuse of discretion in the

A-3818-23 10 PCR judge's decision to forego an evidentiary hearing. See State v. L.G.-M.,

462 N.J. Super. 357, 365 (App. Div. 2020) (holding "[w]e review a trial court's

decision to grant or deny a defendant's request for a hearing under an abuse of

discretion standard"). We reach this conclusion based on the well-established

legal principle that a defendant is not automatically entitled to an evidentiary

hearing. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. at 355; see also State v. Peoples, 446 N.J.

Super. 245, 254 (App. Div. 2016) (holding "[t]he mere raising of a claim of

[ineffective assistance of counsel] does not entitle the defendant to an

evidentiary hearing").

Rather, a court should hold an evidentiary hearing on a PCR petition only

if the defendant establishes a prima facie case in support of PCR; meaning "there

are material issues of disputed fact that cannot be resolved by reference to the

existing record," and "an evidentiary hearing is necessary to resolve the claims

for relief." R. 3:22-10(b); see also Porter, 216 N.J. at 354 (same); State v.

Bringhurst, 401 N.J. Super. 421, 436-37 (App. Div. 2008) (holding a

"[d]efendant must demonstrate a prima facie case for relief before an evidentiary

hearing is required, and the court is not obligated to conduct an evidentiary

hearing to allow defendant to establish a prima facie case not contained within

the allegations in his PCR petition"). Moreover, we have consistently held that

A-3818-23 11 any such evidentiary hearing is not "for the purpose of permitting a defendant

to investigate whether additional claims for relief exist for which defendant has

not demonstrated a reasonable likelihood of success." R. 3:22-10(e)(3).

Because defendant has failed to establish plea counsel representation was

deficient under Strickland, the PCR court did not abuse its discretion by denying

his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J.

89, 158 (1997).

To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining

arguments, we conclude that is because they are without sufficient merit to

warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-3818-23 12