NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1457-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DASHAWN T. CARRILLO,
Defendant-Appellant. _____________________________
Submitted December 8, 2025 – Decided March 12, 2026
Before Judges Natali and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 22-12-3643.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Michael Denny, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Jason Magid, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Dashawn Carrillo appeals from his Judgment of Conviction
(JOC) entered after he pled guilty to second-degree unlawful possession of a
handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5b(1), which was seized from his vehicle pursuant to
a search warrant after the police stopped defendant's minivan based on their
belief it was involved in a shooting in Camden the day before. Defendant moved
to suppress the weapon and argued, as he does before us, that the police did not
possess reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the motor vehicle stop.
The court held a suppression hearing where the State primarily relied upon
the following evidence to support the stop: (1) a ShotSpotter report indicating
a shooting occurred; (2) testimony from Detective Ellisha Peatross of the
Camden County Shooting Response Team stating she reviewed a surveillance
video showing defendant's car driving in the area of the shooting and ,
significantly, viewed muzzle flashes from defendant's vehicle on that
surveillance video; and (3) Detective Peatross's testimony that a license plate
reader had scanned defendant's license plate in the vicinity of the shooting. As
we discuss in greater detail later in our opinion, the critical video, however, was
never admitted into evidence, nor reviewed by the court, and the State later
conceded it did not contain images of any muzzle shots from defendant's vehicle,
A-1457-23 2 or any vehicle, for that matter. Nonetheless, the court relied, in part, on
Detective Peatross's testimony to deny defendant's motion to suppress.
Significantly, after the hearing, the State admitted that Peatross had
"misspoke[n]" and the critical video did not show the shooting or any muzzle
flashes—only defendant's vehicle driving on Tenth and Budd, an intersection
approximately a block and a half away from the location of the shooting. The
proofs from the suppression hearing also did not establish: (1) the timing of
when defendant's vehicle was present relative to the timing of the shooting, or
(2) the location of the license plate reader that scanned defendant's plate in
relation to the location of the shooting.
Given the State's concession that the video did not depict what it
previously presented at the suppression hearing, defendant moved for
reconsideration. Defendant, however, pled guilty to the single weapons count
in the multi-count indictment and withdrew the application before the court
could resolve it. Defendant appealed after he was sentenced and, on the State's
motion, we remanded for the court to decide the motion for reconsideration.
On remand, following a brief hearing and without issuing any factual
findings or legal conclusions—either orally or in a written opinion—the trial
court issued an order summarily denying defendant's application. The matter
A-1457-23 3 returns to us, and defendant argues, again, that the court erred in denying his
motion to suppress because the police did not have reasonable suspicion to stop
his minivan. We agree with defendant's arguments and reverse the court's orders
denying his suppression motion and his reconsideration application and remand
for further proceedings consistent with our opinion.
I.
On September 24, 2022, at approximately 3:07 a.m., a ShotSpotter system
detected numerous shots fired at 1050 Budd Street, near the intersection of Tioga
Street in Camden. There were no eyewitnesses, descriptions of potential
suspects, reports or 911 calls regarding shots fired, nor evidence of injured
victims or damaged property. Detective Peatross testified at the suppression
hearing and stated that she was "sure there were officers" investigating the scene
after the shooting, but because she "wasn't on the scene," she did not know
whether any physical evidence was collected.
Detective Peatross stated she first learned of the shooting from another
officer, Detective Reveron, 1 after the start of her shift at 3:00 p.m. on September
24th. Detective Reveron told her an "illegal discharge . . . happened at Tenth
and Budd at the intersection involving a Navy[-]blue dark-in-colored minivan
1 The detective's first name does not appear in the record before us. A-1457-23 4 and . . . was also captured in its entirety on video." Detective Peatross testified
that she personally observed a surveillance video showing a dark blue Dodge
Caravan "that came off of" the intersection of Tenth and Budd and "fled down
Tenth Street" and police were able to use a license plate reader to determine the
license plate number. She stated the minivan's "windows were tinted" and
"[t]hrough further video, it was observed that there were muzzle flashes that
came out of the van," but she could not recall how many.
When asked if the surveillance video put the minivan in the area at the
time of the illegal discharge, Detective Peatross responded, "[y]es, sir." She did
not know, however, where the license plate reader that captured the minivan was
located. She also testified she did not know what time the surveillance video
captured defendant's vehicle and that "[i]t could have" occurred before the
ShotSpotter activation. When the court questioned Detective Peatross if she
knew of "the time period between when the ShotSpotter went off and when the
vehicle was seen operating in the vicinity," Detective Peatross responded, "I
don't offhand. . . ."
The police determined defendant was the registered owner of the vehicle
and disseminated a flier to all Camden County police personnel. Defendant's
vehicle was spotted two days later on September 26th, and officers conducted a
A-1457-23 5 motor vehicle stop in the area of Chapel Avenue and Route 130 in Cherry Hill.
Sergeant Rivera provided backup to the motor vehicle stop and a portion of his
body-worn camera footage was played before the court during the suppression
hearing.
Detective Peatross requested a search warrant and initially testified that
because defendant denied consent to search his vehicle, "a narcotics sniff by a
K-9 was conducted where it yielded a positive indication." She later testified,
however, that she requested the search warrant application based upon a positive
indication "for a bomb dog, I would assume."
When asked if she could "dispute" that the search warrant application
stated that the license plate reader recorded defendant's vehicle at 3:07 a.m.,
Detective Peatross stated that she could not dispute it. Upon receiving the search
warrant, the police searched defendant's vehicle and found a gun in a cross-body
bag. Peatross testified that further forensic testing of the seized firearm
"connected . . . defendant to the illegal discharge" through the bullet casings that
had been recovered earlier. She did not, however, elaborate further on the
specific manner in which the casings and seized firearm were connected nor was
there further testimony or other evidence regarding any casings found at the
scene of the shooting. She also testified that police also searched the "GPS
A-1457-23 6 location" history for defendant's ankle monitor, which yielded a positive
indication that he was "in the area during the time of the ShotSpotter" incident
at "Tenth and Budd Street."
During the hearing, defendant's counsel objected to not being provided the
video referenced by Detective Peatross during her testimony. Defense counsel
conceded that he received the surveillance video "that shows the vehicle go
past," but it did not have a time stamp. He argued, however, that a video that
showed "muzzle flashes coming from the car" was never produced, and no
muzzle flashes were mentioned in Detective Peatross's report or in her search
warrant application. The State requested a continuance to produce the video
that Detective Peatross referred to, which the court denied.
In denying the motion to suppress, the court found Detective Peatross to
be credible. As the court found, "[c]ertainly there was muzzle fire," "[c]ertainly
. . . this van . . . ha[d] gunfire going off related to [defendant's] license plate and
ownership of the vehicle, certainly in this court's mind causes an analysis as to
whether there was reasonable suspicion which led to a stop in Cherry Hill."
The court found the ShotSpotter "did go off between approximately 3 a.m.
to 3:10 a.m.," and found the "evidence of the ShotSpotter, the license plate
reading coming back to [defendant], and the fact that [the] vehicle, . . . was in
A-1457-23 7 the area where the six muzzles went—the six casings were eventually found
though that wasn't presented to [the court] . . . but where the shooting occurred,
in the Court's opinion, almost simultaneously." The judge acknowledged
defendant's "argument regarding the time period" but dismissed it as "somewhat
a minor technical dysfunction" and found it was "crystal clear" that defendant
"was in the area in the middle of the night and shots were fired from that
vehicle." This evidence was "enough to lead to that flier" and "enough to show
reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle."
The court relied upon State v. Wanczyk, 201 N.J. Super. 258 (App. Div.
1985), and State v. Anderson, 198 N.J. Super. 340 (App. Div. 1985), which,
according to the court, "speak to whether the State can detain someone when it's
identified as a possible suspect for a previously[]committed crime." The court
found "there's [not] the slightest doubt that these officers should have stopped
the vehicle" because "there clearly is overwhelmingly reasonable suspicion" that
defendant "left the area after [the] ShotSpotter identified it, caught on camera."
Further, the court determined the warrant was justified, the officers "did the
proper thing of impounding the vehicle," and the dog sniff was not
"unreasonable or prolonged the stop to investigate the evidence—for evidence
of the shooting."
A-1457-23 8 Defendant was subsequently indicted by a Camden County grand jury
with two counts of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, and three
counts of second-degree certain persons not to possess a weapon, N.J.S.A.
2C:39-7b(1). At the initial disposition conference defendant pled guilty to a
single count of second-degree unlawful possession of a weapon. 2 Defendant
also raised the fact that he filed a motion for reconsideration and argued the
court should reconsider its decision because the ruling was based significantly
upon its credibility findings with respect to Detective Peatross, the sole witness.
He argued Detective Peatross's testimony describing the surveillance video she
reviewed showing shots were fired from defendant's vehicle was "not accurate"
because the State later admitted the video "does not exist and never existed" in
the form to which she testified.
The court accepted defendant's plea and imposed the negotiated plea
agreement and sentenced defendant to a three-year term of imprisonment with
one year of parole ineligibility, and dismissed the remaining counts. The court
2 We note an error that seemingly exists in the JOC based on the record before us. Specifically, the JOC states defendant was charged with third-degree absconding from parole in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:29-5(b), an offense for which defendant was not indicted. A-1457-23 9 also credited defendant with 444 days of jail credit. Defendant also advised the
court that he withdrew his reconsideration application.
After defendant filed his notice of appeal, the State moved for a limited
remand, pursuant to Rule 2:9-1, arguing the trial court was precluded from
addressing defendant's motion for reconsideration due to defendant's withdrawal
of the motion and acceptance of the plea. We granted the State's motion and
remanded for the trial court to "consider defendant's motion for
reconsideration," and directed a hearing "within 45 days." Pursuant to our order,
the court conducted a hearing on January 24, 2025 where the court stated it
would "probably . . . just issue something on the record and e-mail you in regards
to that." The court issued a written order denying defendant's motion for
reconsideration "for reasons set forth on the record," but as noted, the record
before us contains neither a written nor an oral explanation providing the court's
reasoning.
Before us, defendant argues the court erred in denying his motion to
suppress and denying his reconsideration application because the State failed to
demonstrate the police had sufficient reasonable suspicion to conduct a motor
vehicle stop. Specifically, defendant claims the mere fact that his vehicle was
A-1457-23 10 in the vicinity of a shooting, did not, without more, tie him to that alleged
shooting.
Further, defendant contends the trial court erred in relying on Detective
Peatross's testimony that a video showed muzzle flashes coming from
defendant's vehicle, as no such video exists. Although the State concedes that
Detective Peatross misspoke, the State argues the trial court's ruling "was not
anchored to the muzzle flash," but rather, also focused on other evidence which
showed defendant's vehicle in the vicinity during "early morning hours when
vehicular traffic would be light if not nonexistent" thereby providing officers
with reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop defendant's car. We agree with
defendant's arguments and reject the State's.
Our review of the denial of a motion to suppress is limited. State v.
Ahmad, 246 N.J. 592, 609 (2021). We "review with substantial deference to the
trial court's factual findings, which we 'must uphold . . . so long as those findings
are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Hinton,
216 N.J. 211, 228 (2013) (quoting State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 44 (2011)). We
"owe no deference" to conclusions of law made by the trial court, which is
reviewed de novo. State v. Brown, 456 N.J. Super. 352, 358-59 (App. Div.
2018) (citing State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015)).
A-1457-23 11 The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, and Article I,
Paragraph 7 of the New Jersey State Constitution, provide "[t]he right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated." U.S. Const. amend.
IV; N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 7. Although warrantless searches or seizures are
"presumptively invalid," State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19 (2004), "[n]ot all
police-citizen encounters constitute searches or seizures for purposes of the
warrant requirement," State v. Rosario, 229 N.J. 263, 271 (2017) (alteration in
original) (citation omitted) (quoting State v. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. 117, 125
(2002)).
One such exception to the warrant requirement is an investigative stop,
also known as a Terry3 stop. Rodriguez, 172 N.J. at 126-27. See Rosario, 229
N.J. at 272 (describing an investigative stop as a police encounter during which
an objectively reasonable person would not feel free to leave). An investigative
stop, such as an automobile stop, is "permissible 'if it is based on specific and
articulable facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts,
give rise to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.'" State v. Chisum, 236
N.J. 530, 545-46 (2019) (quoting Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 20); see also State v.
3 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). A-1457-23 12 Golotta, 178 N.J. 205, 213 (2003) ("Reasonable suspicion necessary to justify
an investigatory stop is a lower standard than the probable cause necessary to
sustain an arrest.").
"Although reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than
probable cause, '[n]either 'inarticulate hunches' nor an arresting officer's
subjective good faith can justify infringement of a citizen's constitutionally
guaranteed rights.'" State v. Goldsmith, 251 N.J. 384, 399 (2022) (quoting State
v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346, 372 (2002)); see also State v. Gibson, 218 N.J. 277,
291-92 (2014) (explaining an officer's hunch, even if later proven correct, does
not justify an investigatory stop). The State bears the burden to prove that a
warrantless stop was valid. State v. Atwood, 232 N.J. 433, 444 (2018).
Before us, the threshold question turns on whether the court erred in
finding the officers had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop defendant 's
vehicle. Determining whether reasonable articulable suspicion exists is a
"highly fact-intensive inquiry," which requires a reviewing court to "evaluate
'the totality of circumstances surrounding the police-citizen encounter,
balancing the State's interest in effective law enforcement against the
individual's right to be protected from unwarranted [or] overbearing police
intrusions.'" State v. Nyema, 249 N.J. 509, 527 (2022) (quoting State v. Privott,
A-1457-23 13 203 N.J. 16, 25-26 (2010)). Our case law has recognized that "the proximity of
the stop in time and place to the crime in question" can be "critical to the
resolution of the existence of a reasonable and articulable suspicion." State v.
Gavazzi, 332 N.J. Super. 348, 357 (App. Div. 2000).
Here, one critical fact remains undisputed: the State conceded the video
purportedly showing muzzle flashes emanating from defendant's vehicle does
not, in fact, exist. Yet, the trial court relied on Detective Peatross's testimony
about this non-existent video evidence, finding her "credible," and relying upon
her testimony to find "[c]ertainly there was muzzle fire," "[c]ertainly . . . this
van . . . ha[d] gunfire going off" and further determined the stop was valid
because it was "just overwhelmingly crystal clear" that the vehicle owned by
defendant "was in the area where the six muzzles went," that the "shots were
fired from that vehicle," which was "enough to lead to that flier" and "enough
to show reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle." In light of the State's
concession, and other evidence elicited at the suppression hearing, we conclude
the trial court's findings are not based on competent, credible evidence in the
record and thus not entitled to our deference. See Goldsmith, 251 N.J. at 403.
Simply put, the court's findings are fundamentally flawed because they
are based on, at best, incorrect information. Detective Peatross, who testified
A-1457-23 14 that her knowledge was only based on reviewing an alleged video and not her
personal observations, obviously could not have seen any "muzzle flashes that
came out of the van," because there is no proof that any such muzzle shots were
actually captured on video. Thus, there was no evidence that shots were fired
from defendant's vehicle. Although the court found Detective Peatross
"credible," her testimony about the video was unsupported by any fact.
The video that does exist, which defense counsel conceded shows
defendant's "vehicle go past" but did not have a time stamp, was never admitted
into evidence, shown to the court, or provided to us in the appellate record. As
a result, our ability to assess what the video actually depicts is limited. Again,
the only testimony describing its contents was provided by Detective Peatross
who, as noted, provided an inaccurate description of that video.4
Setting aside Detective Peatross's incorrect testimony and relying solely
on the credible evidence in the record, "what this record does not show is more
persuasive than what it does reveal." State v. Richards, 351 N.J. Super. 289,
4 We have previously disapproved of the practice of not admitting referenced video evidence into the formal record. See State v. Boston, 469 N.J. Super. 223, 232 n.1 (App. Div. 2021) (criticizing the practice of not admitting videos in evidence during a suppression motion while still making them available to the court for review "if necessary" reasoning that it "leaves the record open and unsettled, inappropriately so") (citing R. 1:2-3 (stating "[t]he verbatim record of the proceedings shall include references to all exhibits")). A-1457-23 15 307 (App. Div. 2002) (citing State v. Tucker, 136 N.J. 158, 169 (1994)). The
record reflects that on September 24, 2022, at approximately 3:07 a.m., a
ShotSpotter system activated and reported a shooting near the intersection of
Budd and Tioga. There was no testimony or evidence presented at the
suppression hearing that physical evidence was recovered from the scene,
despite the court's reference to "casings found."
Rather, after learning of the incident from a colleague, Detective Peatross
obtained a surveillance video capturing Tenth and Budd, an intersection
approximately a block and a half from where the shooting occurred. The
surveillance video showed defendant's vehicle driving on Tenth and Budd, but
there was no evidence as to the time that occurred. Indeed, it is unclear as to
how the trial court concluded defendant's vehicle "left the area after [the]
ShotSpotter identified it" as Detective Peatross testified that she did not know
when defendant's vehicle was shown in the video and admitted it could have
occurred before the activation.
Similarly, Detective Peatross testified she did not know when the license
plate reader logged defendant's vehicle and confirmed that she did not know if
it was before the ShotSpotter activation. According to defendant, Detective
Peatross's certification in conjunction with the warrant application provided that
A-1457-23 16 the license plate reader logged defendant's vehicle at 3:07 a.m. However,
Detective Peatross conceded that she did not know where the license plate reader
was located. Thus, even if the license plate reader scanned defendant's plate at
3:07 a.m., there is no credible evidence in the record establishing how close
defendant's vehicle was at that time to Budd and Tioga, the location of the
Aside from this information, there was no other competent credible
evidence in the record that supported the stop of defendant's vehicle. Because
this evidence demonstrates, at best, that defendant's vehicle was in the general
area with no specific connection to the shooting, we conclude such limited
evidence was insufficient to establish reasonable articulable suspicion to stay
this opinion.
The court relied upon Wanczyk, 201 N.J. Super. at 258, and Anderson,
198 N.J. Super. at 340, to find "there's [not] the slightest doubt that these officers
should have stopped the vehicle." Neither case is factually similar to the facts
here, where proximity to a crime scene, accompanied by additional
corroborating evidence, was held to justify an investigative detention.
In Anderson, the police "received a report that three black males armed
with handguns had committed an armed robbery" on Anderson Street at
A-1457-23 17 approximately 1:30 a.m. 198 N.J. Super. at 347. Responding to the scene, an
officer observed a car "occupied by two black males traveling in the opposite
direction[,] . . . several blocks away from the robbery scene." Id. at 347-48.
Because the windows were tinted, the officer was unable to determine whether
a third occupant was in the rear of the vehicle, but noted the car was the only
one on the road. Id. at 347. "[B]elieving the car's occupants fit the description
of the robbery suspects," the officer pulled the vehicle over, "only minutes" after
receiving the armed robbery report. Ibid. The Appellate Division found the
investigatory stop was lawful based on the "circumstances presented . . . ." Id.
at 351.
In Wanczyk, sometime between 10:15 and 10:30 p.m., officers responded
to the Watchung Reservation, where they found a historical landmark engulfed
in flames. 201 N.J. Super. at 260. After a firefighter provided a detailed
description of an individual who was observed leaving the area at the time of
the fire, as well as the direction he was headed, police were told that the
individual had gotten into a "brown or tan-colored Chevy with license plate
number 591–EIB" and drove away. Id. at 261. Shortly thereafter, police spotted
the vehicle and pulled it over. Ibid. The driver of the car was an elderly man,
defendant's father, and defendant, who fit the physical description of the suspect,
A-1457-23 18 was in the back seat. Id. at 262. We found the stop "passed constitutional
muster" reasoning that an "officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner approach for purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior." Id. at 264 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 22).
In each case, we permitted investigative stops when officers had both a
description of the individual suspects and additional corroborating evidence to
support a stop of the suspect's vehicle. Here, there was no description of the
shooting suspect and the only evidence before the court was that defendant's
vehicle was in the general vicinity of the shooting. Given the lack of clarity as
to the time defendant's vehicle was captured on video and the lack of any
evidence that defendant or his vehicle was, in fact, involved in the shooting, we
conclude the police did not have sufficient facts to justify the stop. See State v.
Kuhn, 213 N.J. Super. 275, 281 (App. Div. 1986) (finding defendant's presence
in a neighborhood frequented by drug users, by itself, is not a ground for
concluding that defendant himself was engaged in criminal activity) (citing
Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 52 (1979)).
Our Supreme Court confronted a similar situation in State v. Nyema, 249
N.J. at 514. In that case, around midnight, the arresting officer, Sergeant Mark
Horan, was alerted that an armed robbery "just occurred," with the dispatcher
A-1457-23 19 describing the suspects as "two Black males, one with a handgun." Id. at 514-
15. While driving to the robbed 7-Eleven, and approximately three-quarters of
a mile from the scene, Sergeant Horan used his spotlight to illuminate the inside
of a car approaching in the oncoming traffic lane, but observed the occupants
did not match the description, and appeared "annoyed" by the spotlight. Id. at
516-17. After letting them pass, a second car approached, whereby he again
illuminated the inside of the vehicle and observed three Black males who did
not react to the spotlight, which Sergeant Horan thought was "odd." Id. at 517.
Sergeant Horan stopped the second car and subsequently learned it was reported
stolen and arrested the three occupants. Id. at 518.
The court found reasonable suspicion existed, reasoning the stop occurred
close to the robbery in terms of both time and space; Sergeant Horan observed
the vehicle approaching from the direction of the crime scene when there were
few vehicles on the road; the vehicle's occupants "gave no response whatsoever"
to the lights shone on them; and the racial makeup of the occupants of the vehicle
matched the description and were traveling away from the scene. Id. at 519.
The Supreme Court disagreed, finding that a "generic description that
encompasses every man belonging to a particular race cannot, without more,
meet the constitutional threshold of individualized reasonable suspicion." Id. at
A-1457-23 20 532. The Court further determined that a suspect's conduct may be a factor to
consider, "but when the conduct in question is an ambiguous indicator of
involvement in criminal activity and subject to many different interpretations,
that conduct cannot alone form the basis for reasonable suspicion." Id. at 534.
In consideration of the closeness of Sergeant Horan's encounter with defendants
in terms of spatial and temporal proximity to the robbery, the Court found it "did
not add significantly to the analysis of whether the stop was lawful. " Ibid.
Despite Sergeant Horan's testimony providing the robbery "just happened" when
he encountered defendants' vehicle three minutes after receiving the dispatch,
the Court determined the record was unclear as to the relation of events and
reasoned "a matter of minutes makes a difference given the area in which the
suspects could reasonably be expected to be after the commission of the
robbery." Ibid.
Here, in light of the parties' conflicting arguments regarding timing, along
with inconsistencies in Detective Peatross's testimony and credibility concerns
arising from her testimony that she saw incriminating events on the video the
State later conceded did not exist, the record does not establish the timeline of
events. See, e.g., Tucker, 136 N.J. at 173 (finding the court "must decide the
case on the record that is before [it]").
A-1457-23 21 Despite the fact that defendant's vehicle was shown driving on Tenth and
Budd, no evidence was offered to establish when this occurred in relation to
when the shooting happened. Similarly, notwithstanding the fact that
defendant's license plate was scanned, no evidence was offered to establish
where the license plate reader was located in relation to where the shooting
occurred. These facts, when taken together, are not enough to rise to the level
of reasonable suspicion. See Nyema, 249 N.J. at 533 ("[A] suspect's conduct
can be a factor, but when the conduct in question is an ambiguous indicator of
involvement in criminal activity and subject to many different interpretations,
that conduct cannot alone form the basis for reasonable suspicion.").
Additionally, we note that before us the State does not rely on other facts
to justify defendant was lawfully stopped, as it seemingly did at the suppression
hearing, such as the fact that the ankle monitor defendant was wearing at the
time of his arrest confirmed he was indeed in the general area at the time of the
shooting, and the fact that defendant had an outstanding warrant. Thus, we
consider those arguments waived. State v. L.D., 444 N.J. Super. 45, 56 n.7
(App. Div. 2016) ("[A]n issue not briefed is waived."); N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot.
v. Alloway Twp., 438 N.J. Super. 501, 506 n.2 (App. Div. 2015) ("An issue that
is not briefed is deemed waived upon appeal."). In any event, these facts cannot
A-1457-23 22 be considered as they were not known to police prior to the stop. See Nyema,
249 N.J. at 532 ("Information acquired after a stop cannot retroactively serve as
the basis for the stop.").
Further, because the State did not have reasonable articulable suspicion
for the motion vehicle stop, we also conclude the evidence found must be
suppressed. See State v. Herrerra, 211 N.J. 308, 330 (2012) (explaining
exclusionary rule barring introduction into evidence the "fruits" of illegal search
or seizure); State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20, 33-34, 38, 40 (2016) (finding handgun
properly suppressed where motor-vehicle stop was not justified); see also
Atwood, 232 N.J. at 438, 448-49 (holding drugs found pursuant to a search
warrant must be suppressed when the officer did not have reasonable suspicion
to justify the underlying motor vehicle stop). Accordingly, we conclude the
court erred when it denied defendant's motion to suppress and misapplied its
discretion when it denied defendant's reconsideration application.
Finally, we note that the court on remand failed to comply with Rule 1:7-
4 when it summarily denied defendant's reconsideration motion. We decline the
opportunity to order a further remand to correct this procedural error because:
1) neither party has requested such relief; 2) the record is sufficiently clear for
us to decide the matter; and 3) a remand would unnecessarily delay resolution
A-1457-23 23 of this appeal. See Price v. Himeji, LLC, 214 N.J. 263, 295 (2013) (affirming
Appellate Division's decision to resolve the matter through review of the
provided record rather than through remand).
Reversed and remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
A-1457-23 24