State of New Jersey v. Daryel L. Rawls

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: A-3279-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3279-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DARYEL L. RAWLS,

Defendant-Appellant. __________________________

Submitted September 29, 2025 – Decided October 29, 2025

Before Judges Natali and Walcott-Henderson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Ocean County, Indictment No. 11-06-1109.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Frank M. Gennaro, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Bradley D. Billhimer, Ocean County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Samuel Marzarella, Chief Appellate Attorney, of counsel; Shiraz Deen, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant appeals from the court's March 6, 2024 denial of his petition

for post-conviction relief ("PCR") based on ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel, without an evidentiary hearing. Defendant argues the PCR

court erred by: (1) improperly invoking the Rule 3:22-5 procedural bar, finding

his claims were previously adjudicated; (2) rejecting his claim he was prejudiced

by trial counsel's failure to object to the court's evidentiary rulings, resulting in

the review of his direct appeal claims under the plain error standard; (3)

overlooking trial counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to retain an expert witness

on coded drug language to rebut the testimony of the State's detective; (4)

rejecting his claim appellate counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing

to challenge trial counsel's fitness based on counsel's stated mental and physical

limitations; and (5) denying his claims without an evidentiary hearing. We

affirm in part and remand in part.

I.

Following his indictment on various controlled dangerous substance

("CDS") related offenses, defendant fled the State prior to trial after he was

erroneously released from State prison. 1 Defendant was tried in absentia and

1 Defendant had been in custody at Bayside Prison on a separate indictment and had maxed out his sentence. He was released from custody in error despite the State's detainer on these first and second-degree charges. A-3279-23 2 convicted of a first-degree leader of a narcotics trafficking network, N.J.S.A.

2C:35-3, second-degree possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute,

N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(2), and second-degree possession of

heroin with intent to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and 2C:35-5(b)(2). The

court sentenced him to life in prison on the first-degree conviction with a twenty-

five-year period of parole disqualification under the No Early Release Act

("NERA"), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, and a ten-year term with five years of parole

ineligibility under NERA on each of the remaining charges to be served

consecutive to his life sentence.

On direct appeal, defendant argued the trial court committed plain error

by: allowing the alleged trafficking network to be proven by investigative

hearsay; admitting Detective Casey Long's expert opinion regarding the coded

language (the Supreme alphabet and mathematics) used by himself and his co-

conspirators; admitting out of court statements of non-testifying co-defendants;

and permitting the "kingpin" jury instructions which were confusing. We further

addressed defendant's argument that the sentence imposed was excessive and

constituted an abuse of discretion.

We affirmed defendant's conviction and remanded for clarification on the

consecutive sentences imposed. State v. Rawls, No. A-4838-18 (App. Div. Feb.

A-3279-23 3 2, 2023). Defendant then sought certification from our Supreme Court, which

was denied on May 16, 2023. See State v. Rawls, 254 N.J. 66 (2023). On

October 16, 2023, defendant was resentenced and his consecutive sentences

were amended to be concurrent, resulting in an aggregate sentence of life

imprisonment with a twenty-five-year period of parole ineligibility.

Defendant next filed a pro se PCR petition, arguing ineffective assistance

of trial counsel. The State argued the petition was procedurally barred, as it

contended the issues raised had previously been adjudicated on the merits in

defendant's direct appeal.

On March 11, 2024, pursuant to a joint motion, defendant was resentenced

with the State's consent, to life in prison with a twenty-year period of parole

ineligibility pursuant to NERA. His overall term of imprisonment remained the

same.

The PCR court issued a written opinion denying defendant's petition. The

court summarized the pertinent facts from our prior opinion affirming

defendant's conviction, including the circumstances surrounding defendant's

arrest, indictment, and rejection of the plea offer. The court discussed

defendant's stated intent to proceed to trial and the trial court's verbal and written

notice of trial dates and his subsequent erroneous release from prison. The court

A-3279-23 4 also discussed trial counsel's application to be relieved as counsel based on

defendant's nonappearance and counsel's health issues and the reasons the

motion was denied.

The PCR court next addressed defendant's substantive arguments,

referencing our prior opinion. Specifically, the PCR court addressed defendant's

claim counsel failed to object to the admission of testimony from Detectives

Long and Anthony Sgro on whether defendant was a kingpin, which he argued

constituted inadmissible hearsay evidence; the use of the chart illustrating

defendant's connection to the drug network; and whether the jury instructions

constituted plain error.

The PCR court concluded, "[p]ursuant to R[ule] 3:22-5, 'prior

adjudication upon the merits of any ground for relief is conclusive whether made

in the proceedings resulting in the conviction or in any post-conviction

proceeding.'" Relying on State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 484 (1997), the PCR

court stated, "PCR is not intended to be another avenue for a defendant to submit

the same arguments already asserted on direct appeal." The PCR court further

noted that "[defendant] concedes that the substantive issues 'parallel' the matters

previously raised before [us]" while denying that his present arguments on PCR

are substantially equivalent to those previous claims.

A-3279-23 5 The PCR court further rejected defendant's substantive arguments that had

trial counsel objected to the admission of challenged testimony, evidence and

jury instructions, we would have reviewed his appeal under the harmless error

rather than plain error standard. In addressing this point, the PCR court

concluded, defendant "does not assert any new errors by the trial court that were

not already reviewed on direct appeal. . . . [Defendant] now seeks to reassert

these claims under the argument that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to

object to these admissions, maintaining that he had done so, the standard o f

[a]ppellate review on the issues would have been harmless error rather than plain

error." The PCR court found this argument unavailing "because the outcome

would have been the same regardless of whether the defendant objected at trial

. . ., the application of the plain error standard on direct appeal rather than the

harmless error standard did not result in any prejudice to the [defendant]. "

The PCR court further explained:

[U]nder the plain error standard used on direct appeal, [defendant] bore the burden of demonstrating the alleged error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." . . . In reviewing each of the alleged errors on direct appeal, [we] previously determined that the alleged errors of trial counsel raised in the present PCR petition were not "clearly capable of producing an unjust result" based upon the strong evidence against the [defendant]. As a result, none of these alleged errors, even if they are found to be errors, can now be

A-3279-23 6 found on the current PCR petition to satisfy the second prong of Strickland that they deprived the defendant of a fair trial a trial whose result is reliable.

The PCR court concluded the issues raised in defendant's PCR implicate

the same substantive claims of trial court error previously raised and rejected on

direct appeal. "[T]hese challenged admissions of evidence, testimony, and jury

instructions were not 'clearly capable of producing an unjust result' and

[defendant] suffered no prejudice" from the admission of the challenged

evidence to prevail under the second prong of Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984).

Before us, defendant argues:

I. DEFENDANT DEMONSTRATED PRIMA FACIE CLAIMS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF, ENTITLING HIM TO AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS POST-CONVICTION RELIEF CLAIMS.

A. PREVAILING LEGAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING CLAIMS OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL AND PETITIONS FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF.

B. THE PCR COURT IMPROPERLY INVOKED THE PROCEDURAL BAR OF R. 3:22-5.

C. THE PCR COURT IMPROPERLY REJECTED DEFENDANT'S CLAIM THAT HE WAS PREJUDICED BY TRIAL COUNSEL'S FAILURES TO OBJECT, WHICH RESULTED IN THE REVIEW

A-3279-23 7 OF HIS DIRECT APPEAL CLAIMS UNDER THE PLAIN ERROR STANDARD.

D. APPELLATE COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO RAISE THE ISSUE OF TRIAL COUNSEL'S FITNESS TO REPRESENT DEFENDANT CONSTITUTED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL.

E. TRIAL COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RETAIN AN EXPERT WITNESS ON CODED DRUG LANGUAGE TO REBUT THE TESTIMONY OF THE STATE'S EXPERT.

II.

We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. We may "conduct a de novo review" of

the court's "factual findings and legal conclusions" where the PCR court has not

conducted an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 421; see also State v. Lawrence, 463

N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020).

When petitioning for PCR, a defendant must establish entitlement to

"'PCR by a preponderance of the evidence,'" meaning that it is rooted in a

cognizable claim. State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 624 (App. Div. 2023)

(quoting State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 370 (App. Div. 2014)). "A

PCR petition is cognizable if it is based upon a '[s]ubstantial denial in the

A-3279-23 8 conviction proceedings of defendant's rights under the Constitution of the

United States or the Constitution or laws of the State of New Jersey.'" State v.

Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 549 (2021) (alterations in original) (quoting Rule 3:22-

2(a)). "The court shall not bar a defendant's claim in a first PCR proceeding if

it 'would result in fundamental injustice.'" State v. Rose, 458 N.J. Super. 610,

625 (App. Div. 2019) (quoting R. 3:22-4(a)(2)). The court also shall not bar a

defendant's first PCR claim where "'the ground for relief not previously[-

]asserted could not reasonably have been raised in any prior proceeding.'" State

v. Reevey, 417 N.J. Super. 134, 147 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Rule 3:22-

4(a)(1)).

In our analysis of an order denying a PCR petition asserting ineffective

assistance of counsel, we apply the two-part standard established in Strickland,

to determine whether a defendant has been deprived of the effective assistance

of counsel. 466 U.S. at 687. To satisfy the standard's first prong, a petitioner

must show counsel's performance was deficient by demonstrating counsel's

handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and

that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the

'counsel' guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Strickland,

466 U.S. at 687-88.

A-3279-23 9 Under the "second, and far more difficult prong" of the Strickland

standard, State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,

129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "'must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense[,]'" State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611

(2014) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). That is, "'[t]he defendant must

show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional

errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.'"

Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550-51 (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S.

at 694). Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "'is an exacting

standard.'" Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). A

defendant seeking PCR "must 'affirmatively prove prejudice'" to satisfy the

second prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must establish both prongs of the Strickland standard. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

687; see also State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013). A failure to satisfy either

prong requires the denial of a PCR petition founded on an ineffective assistance

of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. "With respect to both prongs of

A-3279-23 10 the Strickland test, a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on

PCR bears the burden of proving his or her right to relief by a preponderance of

the evidence." State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citations omitted).

We reject defendant's contentions in Point I.C and are persuaded by the

PCR court's overall conclusion that defendant failed to establish Strickland's

"second, and far more difficult prong," as he has failed to establish he was

prejudiced by counsel's alleged deficient performance. Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550

(quoting Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463). Having failed to establish a prima facie

case of ineffective assistance, defendant is not entitled to an evidentiary hearing

on these claims. See Preciose, 129 N.J. at 463. We remand, however, with

regard to defendant's arguments in Points I.D and I.E for Rule 1:7-4 findings of

fact and conclusions of law.

On direct appeal, we held Detective Sgro’s testimony about other

participants in the trafficking network did not constitute reversible error, as any

arguable hearsay concerns were harmless in light of the substantial admissible

evidence supporting defendant’s convictions, including wiretapped

communications, physical evidence from his home and car, and testimony from

four former co-defendants. We further held the challenged chart was not

admitted and not provided to the jury during deliberations, and the court gave

A-3279-23 11 an appropriate limiting instruction. And, we also concluded the recorded

conversations were properly admitted as co-conspirator statements. In regard to

defendant's claim of improper jury instructions, we held the kingpin jury

instructions were clear, preserved unanimity, and warranted no relief.

With respect to defendant's argument trial counsel's failure to object to the

court's evidentiary ruling is indicative of his constitutionally deficient

performance, the court properly noted that even if it had reached defendant's

substantive arguments, defendant cannot satisfy Strickland's prejudice prong as

he cannot establish any error by trial counsel would have resulted in a different

outcome. Stated differently, defendant cannot establish that counsel's deficient

performance, as alleged in Point I.C resulted in any prejudice to his defense.

Here, the evidence against defendant, including the wiretapped phone calls, text

messages, the testimony of four former co-defendants, and corroborating

evidence from law enforcement, overwhelmingly weighed in favor of a

conviction as to the charges in the indictment.

III.

In Point I.D, defendant argues appellate counsel erred by failing to raise

the issue of trial counsel’s fitness to represent him. Specifically, defendant

contends that appellate counsel should have challenged the trial court’s denial

A-3279-23 12 of trial counsel motion to be relieved from representation due to counsel's

physical and mental health concerns. The State disputes defendant’s contention

the PCR court failed to address the issue of trial counsel’s fitness, noting that

defendant originally raised the matter in the context of claiming trial counsel

was ineffective, not appellate counsel. The State emphasizes that defendant did

not allege appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the trial

court’s denial of the motion to withdraw and suggests that defendant is now re-

characterizing his prior argument as a claim of ineffective appellate counsel on

appeal.

The record shows that, shortly before trial, trial counsel sought to

withdraw, stating he was suffering from depression and taking prescribed

medication that caused significant side effects, which impacted his ability to

adequately defend his client. Despite these representations, the trial court

denied counsel’s motion, noting that no medical proof of incapacity was

provided, counsel had competently appeared throughout the case, and the

request was made too close to trial.

In Point I.E, defendant further contends trial counsel was ineffective for

failing to retain an expert witness to testify about the coded languages of

Supreme Alphabet and Supreme Mathematics. Defendant asserts Detective

A-3279-23 13 Long's testimony was the "principal evidence" against the defendant, so it was

"incumbent upon trial counsel to prepare to rebut this testimony with a defense

expert on the coded language at issue."

Rule 1:7-4(a) provides that "[t]he court shall, by an opinion or

memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state its

conclusions of law thereon . . . on every motion decided by a written order that

is appealable as of right." "Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of

[Rule] 1:7-4. Rather, the trial court must state clearly its factual findings and

correlate them with the relevant legal conclusions." Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J.

563, 570 (1980). "Meaningful appellate review is inhibited unless the judge sets

forth the reasons for his or her opinion." Strahan v. Strahan, 402 N.J. Super.

298, 310 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Salch v. Salch, 240 N.J. Super. 441, 443

(App. Div. 1990)).

As noted, defendant contends his appellate counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise the issue of trial counsel's fitness. He also contends trial counsel

was ineffective for failing to retain an expert witness on the coded languages to

rebut the State's expert testimony. The PCR judge, however, did not address

these claims. As such, we are convinced a remand is necessary for the PCR

court to address these arguments in the first instance under the two-part

A-3279-23 14 Strickland test and issue appropriate Rule 1:7-4 findings. The PCR court should

also address the need for an evidentiary hearing with regard to these claims.

Affirmed in part and remanded in part. We do not retain jurisdiction.

A-3279-23 15