State of New Jersey v. Darius D. Bridges

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: March 13, 2024
• Docket: A-2532-21
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2532-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

DARIUS D. BRIDGES, a/k/a SANTANA SIMMIE,

Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________

Argued December 13, 2023 – Decided March 13, 2024

Before Judges Accurso and Walcott-Henderson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 17-03-0317.

Kelly Anderson Smith argued the cause for appellant.

Regina M. Oberholzer, Deputy Attorney General, argued the cause for respondent (Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney; Regina M. Oberholzer, of counsel and the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Darius Bridges appeals from an order denying his post-

conviction relief (PCR) petition without an evidentiary hearing based on

ineffective assistance of counsel. Having considered the record and the parties'

arguments in light of the applicable legal principles, we affirm.

Following his conviction for first-degree murder and weapons offenses

for which he was sentenced to life in prison, defendant filed a direct appeal. We

affirmed defendant's conviction and sentence, and the Supreme Court denied

certification. State v. Bridges, No. A-3146-17 (App. Div. 2019), cert. denied,

240 N.J. 409 (2020).

Defendant subsequently filed a pro se PCR petition which was later

supplemented by PCR counsel, alleging ineffective assistance of trial and

appellate counsel. Following oral argument on the PCR petition—there was no

evidentiary hearing—Judge Mark P. Tarantino issued a written opinion denying

the petition in its entirety. Defendant appeals.

I.

We previously summarized the facts underlying defendant's conviction in

our decision on his direct appeal. Bridges, No. A-3146-17, slip op. at 2-6. We

restate only those facts pertinent to the issues raised in this appeal.

A-2532-21 2 On November 25, 2016, defendant drove his 1999 Honda Accord to the

intersection of York and East Federal Streets in Burlington City to sell drugs to

Timothy Stevens. Stevens testified at trial that the murder victim, Howard

Young, was known to defendant as How or Howie. On the day of the murder,

Young approached defendant and Stevens and told Stevens to "get out of [the

area] because it was gonna be a problem there." Defendant later told police

detectives in a videotaped statement that Young had warned him not to sell drugs

in Burlington City and that if defendant did not leave, "he would get some

smoke," meaning he would be shot. After Young left, defendant and Stevens

returned to their respective vehicles and drove away. This exchange was

captured on Burlington City surveillance video cameras.

Approximately forty minutes later, a different surveillance video camera

captured a vehicle similar in color and style to defendant's Honda Accord

returning to the area. That same video footage showed a male driver exit the

car, raise the hood of his sweatshirt, walk towards the intersection of York and

East Federal Streets where he drew a handgun and fired in the direction of the

same building that Young had been walking towards after meeting with

defendant and Stevens.

A-2532-21 3 During the police investigation, defendant viewed the surveillance video

and positively identified the Honda Accord as his. At his interrogation,

defendant "began threatening to physically harm the officers," which he now

avers was because he "perceived that law enforcement were manipulating

questions."

At trial, several witnesses testified, including Terrance Johnson, James

Chambers, Davon Jones, and Kamiyah Hicks—the victim's cousin. Johnson

testified he heard a man shout, "Yo, How" from across the street and when he

turned toward the voice, he saw a "guy standing there, raise his arm and start

firing . . . [a] gun." After hearing the seven shots, Johnson ran across the street

in the direction of the shooter. He observed the shooter jump in a black Nissan

or a Kia with a spoiler and drive away. Howard Young was found lying on the

ground with a gunshot wound to his back.

Chambers testified he also heard gunshots while inside a nearby auto-

repair shop located a block-and-a-half away from the shooting. This witness

testified that on hearing the shots, he ran to the front of the shop and observed a

male running toward him wearing all black and carrying a silver handgun.

Chambers watched the male run to a 2000 black two-door Honda Accord or

Prelude with a spoiler. He did not see the shooter's face but was able to identify

A-2532-21 4 defendant's car from the surveillance video as the same car he observed the

shooter get into after the shooting.

Another witness, Jones, who grew up with defendant in Burlington

County, later identified the male seen in the surveillance video as defendant, "by

his walk" and "[t]he way he carrie[d] his leg, like it's injured. So he got a little

limp to it [] like galloping," Jones testified the Honda in the video was

"associated" with defendant. Defendant would later argue that Jones was the

"single most important witness offered by the State."

Hicks testified that while at defendant's New Year's Eve party after the

shooting, she heard defendant say, "smokin on that nigga Howie," which she

stated "[is] a form of disrespect, but I took it as though he did [the shooting]."

She also testified defendant's statement made her upset, causing defendant to

speak with her. According to Hicks, defendant told her "that he was in

Burlington and he was trying to serve his fiends and how [Young] told him that

if he not from Burlington that he can't bust his traps out there. And then when

he said that Howie pulled the gun out on him."

The PCR judge rejected defendant's arguments that trial counsel was

ineffective for failing to challenge Jones' identification of him from a

surveillance video and failing to raise alleged inconsistent statements regarding

A-2532-21 5 Jones' familiarity with defendant and his supposed knowledge of how he walked,

stating "[d]efendant's arguments in this regard are not entirely factually accurate

or persuasive. Trial counsel spent considerable time refuting this witness, by

his questioning and during his closing arguments to the jury." The court also

noted, "[t]here were actually no material inconsistencies in Jones' statements

and testimony." The PCR judge also found the argument that trial counsel was

ineffective by not presenting defendant's medical records, which defendant

argued would challenge Jones' testimony about defendant's gait or limp to be

unpersuasive.

Regarding defendant's argument that trial counsel erred by failing to

object to evidence that defendant was in the area prior to the shooting to sell

narcotics, the court noted "[m]ost important, the trial judge did not consider

Cofield1 factor two in his analysis, so not objecting to that factor being

considered did not make any difference," and the Appellate Division previously

upheld the trial court's decision, finding no error on the issue.

1 In State v. Cofield, the Court held the admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b) requires that: "1. The evidence of the other crime must be admissible as relevant to a material issue; 2. It must be similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged; 3. The evidence of the other crime must be clear and convincing; and 4. The probative value of the evidence must not be outweighed by its apparent prejudice." 127 N.J. 328, 338 (1992). A-2532-21 6 As to defendant's claim that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his

petition, the court concluded that defendant's allegations of inadequate

representation are too vague and speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing.

See State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158 (1997).

Defendant presents the following points and arguments for our

consideration:

POINT I THE TRIAL COURT DENIED DUE PROCESS BY FAILING TO PROPERLY CONDUCT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AS TO DEFENDANT'S ISSUES RAISED IN HIS PCR PETITION AND BRIEF

POINT II THE PCR COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO CONSIDER ALL OF DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENTS

POINT III COUNSEL'S CUMULATIVE ERRORS RESULTED IN A MANIFEST INJUSTICE

II.

We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. We may "conduct a de novo review" of

the court's "factual findings and legal conclusions" where the PCR court has not

A-2532-21 7 conducted an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 421; see also State v. Lawrence, 463

N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020).

In our analysis of an order denying a PCR petition asserting ineffective

assistance of counsel, we apply the two-part standard established in Strickland

v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 687 (1984), and later adopted by our Supreme Court

in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987), to determine whether a defendant has

been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. To satisfy the standard's

first prong, a petitioner must show counsel's performance was deficient by

demonstrating counsel's handling of the matter "fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness" and that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed [to] the defendant by the Sixth

Amendment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88.

Under the "second, and far more difficult prong," of the Strickland

standard, State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,

129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense[,]" State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). That is, "[t]he defendant must show that

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the

result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is

A-2532-21 8 a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." Gideon, 244

N.J. at 550-51 (alteration in original) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is an exacting standard."

Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). A defendant

seeking PCR "must affirmatively prove prejudice" to satisfy the second prong

of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693).

To prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant

must establish both prongs of the Strickland standard. 466 U.S. at 687; State v.

Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 542 (2013). A failure to satisfy either prong requires the

denial of a PCR petition founded on an ineffective assistance of couns el claim.

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 700. "With respect to both prongs of the Strickland test,

a defendant asserting ineffective assistance of counsel on PCR bears the burden

of proving his or her right to relief by a preponderance of the evidence." State

v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (citations omitted).

Defendant now argues—as he did about trial counsel on direct appeal—

that both trial and appellate counsels' performances were deficient as both

conceded that the second prong of the Cofield analysis2 was met; specifically,

2 In State v. Green, the Court held the application of the second Cofield factor for admissibility of evidence under Rule 404(b), that "[i]t must be similar in

A-2532-21 9 that the evidence related to defendant's interrupted drug transaction preceding

the shooting was similar in kind and reasonably close in time to the offense

charged. Although we found trial counsel's concession of the second prong of

Cofield analysis was not error on direct appeal, Bridges, No. A-3146-17, slip

op. at 9 n.4, defendant now asserts that trial and appellate counsel provided

ineffective assistance by not challenging the admissibility of the earlier drug

transaction which was offered to show motive for the murder.

Defendant argues the PCR court erred in denying his petition by failing to

consider his medical records that "evidenced no history of injury" to his leg to

contradict Jones' critical identification testimony that he recognized defendant

from the surveillance video as one who walked as though he had a limp.

Defendant maintains that Jones became the "single most important witness

offered by the State" because of the lack of other evidence, including

fingerprints, ballistics, DNA, eyewitnesses to the shooting, and the absence of a

weapon. Defendant asserts trial counsel's failure to attack the credibility of

kind and reasonably close in time to the offense charged," 127 N.J. at 338, is "limited to cases that replicate the circumstances in Cofield." 236 N.J. 71, 83, (2018) (citing State v. Williams, 190 N.J. 114, 131 (2007)).

A-2532-21 10 Jones' identification of him—as the individual on the surveillance video based

on his distinctive limp—"rose to the level of ineffectiveness."

As a related matter, defendant also argues counsel failed to "contact and

utilize available exculpatory witnesses" and "[t]he PCR court erred by not

affording [him] the opportunity to illicit testimonies." Lastly, defendant

contends the PCR court erred by failing to consider all of his arguments and by

denying him an evidentiary hearing, which he claims was warranted because of

the material disputed issues raised in his petition.

In its opposition brief, the State disputes defendant's arguments that the

introduction of his medical records would have changed the outcome of the trial

"[b]ecause the medical records would not have proven that defendant did not

have a limp, they would not have impeached Jones' credibility. Indeed,

presenting the records would likely have been detrimental to defendant's case."

In support of this argument, the State noted that "defendant provided no reason

to believe that the medical records would mention whether he walked with a

limp" and "did indicate that defendant did lacerate his lower right leg on a glass

table in 2009, requiring stitches."

Additionally, as to defendant's argument that trial counsel failed to call

three witnesses identified as Keedi, Jomo, and Morris—by a single name or

A-2532-21 11 nickname—the State contends that defendant "must assert the facts that an

investigation would have revealed, supported by affidavits, or certifications

based upon the personal knowledge of the affiant or the person making the

certification."3 And that without full names and other identifying information

for those yet unidentified witnesses along with affidavits or certifications,

defendant cannot satisfy Rule 1:6-6. Additionally, as the State correctly

contends even if these yet-to-be-identified witnesses did not hear defendant

make the statement to Hicks that he was "smoking on [] Howie" as Hicks—the

victim's cousin testified—it "does not establish that he did not make the

comment, much less that the content of it was untrue, but only that they did not

hear it."

After careful review of the record, we affirm the PCR court substantially

for the same reasons set forth in Judge Mark P. Tarantino's well-reasoned

decision. We are first and foremost persuaded defendant failed to set forth a

prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of trial and appellate counsel under

Strickland. As the PCR court stated, "[t]rial counsel extensively cross-examined

Jones—the key witness as argued by defendant. Jones was questioned about his

3 See State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 353 (2013) (quoting State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999) (citing R. 1:6-6)). A-2532-21 12 memory, supposed inconsistent statements, and his firing from the police

department." Moreover, we concur with the PCR court that "[t]here were no

material inconsistencies in Jones' statements and testimony; Jones may have

been vague or non-specific at times, but he did not contradict himself." Thus,

defendant's argument that trial counsel was deficient with respect to Jones'

cross-examination is not supported by the record, and he has not satisfied the

first prong of Strickland.

Similarly, we discern no error in the PCR court's determination that trial

counsel did not render ineffective assistance by not presenting defendant's

medical records during the trial to show that he did not have a limp. As the State

convincingly argues, the medical records referencing a prior right leg injury may

have been incomplete, and critically would not have answered the question

whether defendant had a limp at the time of the murder. Moreover, trial counsel

used the State's failure to introduce medical evidence showing defendant had a

limp to defendant's advantage, especially during closing argument when counsel

argued the State did not meet its burden on the identification of defendant as the

shooter seen on surveillance; thus, defendant's claim of ineffective assistance

based on the failure to introduce his medical records is unavailing.

A-2532-21 13 With respect to defendant's argument that trial counsel could have called

three other witnesses to refute Hick's testimony that defendant admitted to the

murder, we discern no basis to disturb the PCR court's finding on this claim as

well. We concur with the court's conclusion that through effective cross-

examination, trial counsel was able to elicit that defendant's words to Hicks were

not interpreted by her at the time to show that defendant had admitted to killing

the victim. We have consistently held that PCR claims must be supported by

"an affidavit or certification by defendant or by others setting forth with

particularity," the facts upon which they are based. State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298,

312 (2014).

As the PCR court found, defendant failed to satisfy the first prong of

Strickland by providing only partial information about potential witnesses and

even the certification from an investigator in the Office of the Public Defender

suffers from the same deficiency because it contained only partial names, or

nicknames of individuals and does not address what these individuals would

have testified to concerning defendant's culpability for these crimes. Thus, the

PCR court's rejection of defendant's argument does not constitute error under

Strickland as defendant must do more than make "bald assertions" in support of

A-2532-21 14 his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. See Cummings, 321 N.J. Super.

at 170.

We likewise reject defendant's claims of ineffective assistance of

appellate counsel, where he specifically argues "[a]ppellate [c]ounsel [was]

ineffective by 'conceding' that prong (2) two of the Cofield analysis was met,"

which defendant characterizes as "objectively unreasonable." He further argues

that counsel "permitted damaging 'violence' testimony into the case" from his

interrogation, where defendant lost his temper and threatened to physically harm

the officers.

We have considered many of these same arguments in the context of his

claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and determined they lack merit.

We reach the same conclusion with respect to defendant's claims against

appellate counsel substantially for the same reasons: defendant cannot show

that appellate counsel's performance was deficient or fell below the applicable

standard because, as we have previously noted,"[t]he failure to raise

unsuccessful legal arguments does not constitute ineffective assistance of

counsel." State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007); State v. Worlock, 117 N.J.

596, 625 (1990). As the Webster Court stated, "counsel should advance all of

the legitimate arguments that the record will support. If after investigation[,]

A-2532-21 15 counsel can formulate no fair legal argument in support of a particular claim

raised by defendant, no argument need be made on that point." State v. Webster,

187 N.J. 254, 257 (2006). Thus, appellate counsel was not ineffective by failing

to challenge the Cofield analysis or admission of the prior drug transaction as

motive evidence. Nor was appellate counsel deficient in failing to contest

defendant's statements "threatening to physically harm the officers."

Defendant failed to present competent evidence establishing a prima facie

PCR claim, and he points to no evidence establishing a dispute as to material

facts or a need to consider matters outside the existing record. The PCR court

therefore correctly denied the petition without an evidentiary hearing. See

Marshall, 148 N.J. at 158.

Any remaining arguments presented on defendant's behalf that we have

not expressly addressed are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-2532-21 16