NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1591-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAREN C. BLACK, a/k/a DARREN BLACK, MAKIK CARTER, ABDUL SMITH, SHAWN L. CARTER, JERRY CARTER, and TERRLL JONES,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted December 16, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2025
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 18-11-3789.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen A. Pogany, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Daren C. Black appeals from a November 15, 2023 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), arguing the PCR court
erred in finding he did not establish a prima facie case for relief and in failing
to provide him with an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I.
Following a homicide in 2020, defendant was charged with first-degree
murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2) ("count one"); second-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) ("count two"); second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) ("count
three"); and second-degree disturbing, desecrating human remains, N.J.S.A.
2C:22-1(a)(1) ("count four"). Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to an
amended count one, first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
4(a)(1); and count two. The remainder of defendant's charges were dismissed,
and defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to an
aggregate fifteen-year prison term, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2. Defendant filed a direct appeal of his sentence, arguing the trial
A-1591-23 2 judge improperly failed to find any mitigating factors. We affirmed defendant's
sentence, concluding the trial judge "gave detailed reasons to support the
sentence in accordance with the plea agreement" and "the sentence was not
manifestly excessive or unduly punitive and did not constitute an abuse of
discretion." State v. Black, No. A-0205-21 (App. Div. Jan. 10, 2022).
Defendant then filed the present PCR petition. The PCR court denied
defendant's petition, concluding defendant had failed to make a prima facie
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court also declined to
hold an evidentiary hearing, finding "[t]he transcripts of the plea hearing and
sentencing did not elucidate any issues that could not have been determined
through the submitted certifications and briefs." This appeal followed.
II.
Defendant argues the PCR court erred in concluding he had failed to
demonstrate a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and in
denying him an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, defendant argues defense
counsel failed to present any mitigating factors for the sentencing court to
A-1591-23 3 consider and, but for this alleged failure, he would have received a more
favorable sentence. 1
We review the denial of defendant's petition de novo because there was
no PCR evidentiary hearing. State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 (App.
Div. 2014). However, a PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super.
387, 401 (App. Div. 2013).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687 (1984).
He must demonstrate: (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment"
and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. see also State
v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-prong test in New
Jersey).
A defendant who entered a guilty plea satisfies the first Strickland prong
if he demonstrates counsel's representation fell short of the prevailing norms of
1 We note although defendant's PCR petition lists seven arguments challenging both his conviction and sentencing, defendant's appeal seeks relief only as to sentencing, and raises only the argument that defense counsel failed to present mitigating factors at sentencing. A-1591-23 4 the legal community. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010). The
defendant proves the second prong of Strickland by establishing "a reasonable
probability" the defendant "would not have [pleaded] guilty" but for counsel's
errors. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (quoting State v. Nun͂ ez-
Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)). Moreover, "[a] sentence imposed pursuant
to a plea agreement is presumed to be reasonable because a defendant
voluntarily '[waived] . . . his right to a trial in return for the reduction or
dismissal of certain charges, recommendations as to sentences and the like.'"
State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 71-72 (2014) (second alteration in original)
(omission in original) (quoting State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 140 (App.
Div. 1980)).
A defendant may argue an evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the
factual record in connection with an ineffective-assistance claim. State v.
Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). However, the PCR court should grant
an evidentiary hearing only where: (1) a defendant is able to prove a prima facie
case of ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) there are material issues of disputed
fact that must be resolved with evidence outside of the record, and (3) the
hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief. Id. at 462; see also R. 3:22-
10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013).
A-1591-23 5 Defendant argues defense counsel informed the court no mitigating
factors applied in this case. Defendant cites the following excerpt from defense
counsel's argument at the sentencing hearing to support this contention: "Your
Honor, none of this -- would even excuse or a definitive mitigating factor under
the statutory sections, 2C:44-1, but it is the factual backdrop under this case that
-- that apparently the weapon that was ultimately used was -- was produced by
[the decedent]." However, reading the language immediately preceding this
excerpt reveals defense counsel was discussing how the decedent initially had
produced the handgun used in the homicide. Thus, defense counsel's verbiage
is properly characterized not as stating to the court that no mitigating factors
existed. Instead, counsel simply explained that the decedent's initial production
of the handgun may not speak to any mitigating factor, but it provided a "factual
backdrop" to the case.
Defendant's argument that defense counsel failed to present and argue
mitigating factors is belied by the record. The sentencing court had in its
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1591-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
DAREN C. BLACK, a/k/a DARREN BLACK, MAKIK CARTER, ABDUL SMITH, SHAWN L. CARTER, JERRY CARTER, and TERRLL JONES,
Defendant-Appellant. ___________________________
Submitted December 16, 2024 – Decided April 16, 2025
Before Judges Berdote Byrne and Jacobs.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 18-11-3789.
Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Lee March Grayson, Designated Counsel, on the brief). Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Stephen A. Pogany, Assistant Prosecutor, on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Daren C. Black appeals from a November 15, 2023 order
denying his petition for post-conviction relief ("PCR"), arguing the PCR court
erred in finding he did not establish a prima facie case for relief and in failing
to provide him with an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.
I.
Following a homicide in 2020, defendant was charged with first-degree
murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)(2) ("count one"); second-degree unlawful
possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1) ("count two"); second-degree
possession of a weapon for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1) ("count
three"); and second-degree disturbing, desecrating human remains, N.J.S.A.
2C:22-1(a)(1) ("count four"). Defendant subsequently pleaded guilty to an
amended count one, first-degree aggravated manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-
4(a)(1); and count two. The remainder of defendant's charges were dismissed,
and defendant was sentenced in accordance with the plea agreement to an
aggregate fifteen-year prison term, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A.
2C:43-7.2. Defendant filed a direct appeal of his sentence, arguing the trial
A-1591-23 2 judge improperly failed to find any mitigating factors. We affirmed defendant's
sentence, concluding the trial judge "gave detailed reasons to support the
sentence in accordance with the plea agreement" and "the sentence was not
manifestly excessive or unduly punitive and did not constitute an abuse of
discretion." State v. Black, No. A-0205-21 (App. Div. Jan. 10, 2022).
Defendant then filed the present PCR petition. The PCR court denied
defendant's petition, concluding defendant had failed to make a prima facie
showing of ineffective assistance of counsel. The PCR court also declined to
hold an evidentiary hearing, finding "[t]he transcripts of the plea hearing and
sentencing did not elucidate any issues that could not have been determined
through the submitted certifications and briefs." This appeal followed.
II.
Defendant argues the PCR court erred in concluding he had failed to
demonstrate a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel and in
denying him an evidentiary hearing. Specifically, defendant argues defense
counsel failed to present any mitigating factors for the sentencing court to
A-1591-23 3 consider and, but for this alleged failure, he would have received a more
favorable sentence. 1
We review the denial of defendant's petition de novo because there was
no PCR evidentiary hearing. State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351, 373 (App.
Div. 2014). However, a PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary
hearing is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super.
387, 401 (App. Div. 2013).
To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must
satisfy the two-part test from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 687 (1984).
He must demonstrate: (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment"
and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Ibid. see also State
v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-prong test in New
Jersey).
A defendant who entered a guilty plea satisfies the first Strickland prong
if he demonstrates counsel's representation fell short of the prevailing norms of
1 We note although defendant's PCR petition lists seven arguments challenging both his conviction and sentencing, defendant's appeal seeks relief only as to sentencing, and raises only the argument that defense counsel failed to present mitigating factors at sentencing. A-1591-23 4 the legal community. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 366-67 (2010). The
defendant proves the second prong of Strickland by establishing "a reasonable
probability" the defendant "would not have [pleaded] guilty" but for counsel's
errors. State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 351 (2012) (quoting State v. Nun͂ ez-
Valdéz, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009)). Moreover, "[a] sentence imposed pursuant
to a plea agreement is presumed to be reasonable because a defendant
voluntarily '[waived] . . . his right to a trial in return for the reduction or
dismissal of certain charges, recommendations as to sentences and the like.'"
State v. Fuentes, 217 N.J. 57, 71-72 (2014) (second alteration in original)
(omission in original) (quoting State v. Davis, 175 N.J. Super. 130, 140 (App.
Div. 1980)).
A defendant may argue an evidentiary hearing is warranted to develop the
factual record in connection with an ineffective-assistance claim. State v.
Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462-63 (1992). However, the PCR court should grant
an evidentiary hearing only where: (1) a defendant is able to prove a prima facie
case of ineffective assistance of counsel, (2) there are material issues of disputed
fact that must be resolved with evidence outside of the record, and (3) the
hearing is necessary to resolve the claims for relief. Id. at 462; see also R. 3:22-
10(b); State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 354 (2013).
A-1591-23 5 Defendant argues defense counsel informed the court no mitigating
factors applied in this case. Defendant cites the following excerpt from defense
counsel's argument at the sentencing hearing to support this contention: "Your
Honor, none of this -- would even excuse or a definitive mitigating factor under
the statutory sections, 2C:44-1, but it is the factual backdrop under this case that
-- that apparently the weapon that was ultimately used was -- was produced by
[the decedent]." However, reading the language immediately preceding this
excerpt reveals defense counsel was discussing how the decedent initially had
produced the handgun used in the homicide. Thus, defense counsel's verbiage
is properly characterized not as stating to the court that no mitigating factors
existed. Instead, counsel simply explained that the decedent's initial production
of the handgun may not speak to any mitigating factor, but it provided a "factual
backdrop" to the case.
Defendant's argument that defense counsel failed to present and argue
mitigating factors is belied by the record. The sentencing court had in its
possession sufficient information to adequately address any mitigating factors.
The sentencing court was aware decedent had been involved in a carjacking
against defendant, which had occurred a few days before the homicide, and the
Pre-Sentence Investigation Report provided information outlining the struggle
A-1591-23 6 between defendant and decedent over the handgun used in the homicide,
defendant's daily drug use, and defendant's familial status. Defense counsel
addressed defendant's drug use, which defendant then elaborated upon. The
PCR court correctly noted the sentencing court considered these factors and
ultimately decided no mitigating factors were present. Accordingly, defendant
failed to establish "a reasonable probability that but for counsel's unprofessional
errors"—which we conclude were not present—"the result of the proceeding
would have been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
Defendant also has not shown, that but for counsel's errors he would not
have pleaded guilty. Defendant was facing a maximum exposure of
approximately forty years of incarceration and his counsel negotiated a
recommendation for a fifteen-year term. He was sentenced in accordance with
that recommendation.
Moreover, because defendant did not demonstrate a prima facie showing
ineffective assistance of counsel, the PCR court properly denied defendant an
evidentiary hearing. The judge's findings are sound, and his legal conclusions
are correct.
A-1591-23 7 Pursuant to Strickland, defendant failed to satisfy his burden to show
defense counsel's performance was deficient or that he would not have pleaded
guilty but for counsel's error.
Affirmed.
A-1591-23 8