State of New Jersey v. Clyde Gayle

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: November 22, 2023
• Docket: A-3080-21
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3080-21

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CLYDE GAYLE,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted November 1, 2023 – Decided November 22, 2023

Before Judges Firko and Vanek.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 12-08-2273.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (James D. O'Kelly, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Natalie A. Schmid Drummond, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

Defendant Clyde Gayle appeals from an order entered by the Law Division

on April 29, 2022, denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR)

following an evidentiary hearing. We affirm.

I.

The salient facts and procedural history were previously detailed in our

decisions on defendant's direct appeal, State v. Gayle, No. A-0575-14 (App. Div.

Mar. 17, 2017), and defendant's first PCR appeal, State v. Gayle, No. A-1332-

18 (App. Div. May 1, 2020). We briefly set forth the facts material to our

determination of defendant's second PCR appeal.

On August 30, 2012, defendant was charged with second-degree unlawful

possession of a weapon, specifically, a .38 caliber handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)

(count one); fourth-degree possession of hollow-nose bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-

3(f) (count two); and second-degree certain persons not to possess weapons,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b) (count three). On April 24, 2014, a jury convicted

defendant of all three counts following a two-day trial. Defendant was

extended-term eligible and the court sentenced him to an aggregate term of

fourteen years of incarceration, with a seven-year period of parole ineligibility.

A-3080-21 2 Defendant appealed his conviction and sentence. On March 17, 2017, we

affirmed both.

Defendant filed a pro se PCR petition arguing he had been denied effective

assistance of counsel because his trial counsel failed to advise him to accept a

plea offer. The court appointed counsel to represent defendant on the petition.

In a supplemental brief, defense counsel asserted an additional instance of

ineffectiveness of counsel. Counsel stated that while defendant was in the

hallway in the proximity of several jurors, a probation officer asked defendant,

"Didn't I have you before?" Counsel further stated that trial counsel was

deficient for failing to bring this encounter to the court's attention.

On August 27, 2018, the PCR court denied the petition. Defendant

appealed on several grounds, including arguing the PCR court abused its

discretion in denying his petition without an evidentiary hearing. On May 1,

2020, we affirmed. On November 17, 2020, the Supreme Court reversed this

court's decision and remanded back to the Law Division for an evidentiary

hearing. State v. Gayle, 244 N.J. 430 (2020).

A-3080-21 3 On October 26 and November 16, 2021, 1 the second PCR court held the

evidentiary hearing. At the time of the hearing, defendant was no longer

incarcerated and testified he was seeking to be resentenced to expeditiously

expunge his criminal record.

Defendant's sister, Hanifah Edwards-Lattie, testified she did not

personally observe any interaction between defendant and his trial attorneys.

She stated she only became aware of the plea offer of a three-year sentence with

a one-year parole disqualifier on the first day of trial. Overall, the court

determined Edwards-Lattie lacked underlying knowledge or recollection as to

relevant events and afforded little credibility to her testimony.

Defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing he was not told of the State's

lowest plea offer until after trial commenced. However, the trial court found the

transcript demonstrated defendant was present when the plea offer was

discussed on the record six months prior to trial.

The court found other significant aspects of defendant's testimony at the

evidentiary hearing were contradicted by facts in trial record. For example,

defendant testified at the evidentiary hearing he did not know what extended-

1 The written decision states the hearing was November 18, 2021. We reference the date on the transcript certifying the date of the hearing as November 16, 2021. A-3080-21 4 term eligible meant before trial. However, the transcript of a pretrial conference

reflects the trial judge told defendant he was extended-term eligible and

defendant responded he understood.

The court also found defendant's testimony that he would have accepted

the plea offer if he had been aware of his possible exposure was unsupported in

the record. At a pretrial hearing, the trial judge explicitly told defendant he was

facing twenty years in prison with ten years of parole ineligibility. On direct

examination during the evidentiary hearing, defendant was asked multiple times

whether his attorney reviewed sentencing exposure with him, to which he

consistently replied he did not recall. Defendant retained a private attorney for

the sentencing hearing but that attorney did not testify at the PCR evidentiary

hearing.

As to the probation officer's comment, defendant believed certain jurors

overheard a probation officer ask him, "Didn't I have you before?" Defendant

responded, "yeah." Defendant testified he brought this interaction to the

attention of his attorney. However, he could not recall asking his attorney why

the issue was not raised to the court. Overall, the court found defendant's

testimony lacked credibility and was not supported by the record.

A-3080-21 5 The State presented the testimony of the two public defenders who

represented defendant before and during trial. The court found defendant's

pretrial public defender was clear and credible. However, the court gave little

weight to the testimony because the attorney retired before defendant's case went

to trial, did not recall any specific interactions with defendant, spoke primarily

about his general customs and practices as a public defender, and most of his

knowledge came from a review of records.

The court found defendant's second public defender was the most credible

since her testimony was consistent with the record and was based on her own

independent recollection of the case. Counsel testified to successfully arguing

for a reduction in defendant's bail and for the State to reduce the plea offer f rom

three years with a three-year period of parole ineligibility to three years with a

one-year parole disqualifier.

Additionally, counsel testified to discussing the strengths and weaknesses

of the State's case with defendant, as well as his possible exposure of twenty

years in prison with a ten-year period of parole ineligibility if convicted.

Counsel testified she would not have pressured defendant but would have

relayed her recommendation to accept the plea offer under the circumstances.

A-3080-21 6 Counsel did not have a recollection of defendant telling her about the

comment allegedly made by a probation officer. Following the testimony, the

court found the preponderance of the evidence did not establish the probation

officer made the comment or defendant made counsel aware of it. Additionally,

the court found even if the comment was made, the preponderance of the

evidence did not show it influenced the outcome of the trial. Therefore, the

court found defendant had not established ineffective assistance of counsel as to

the alleged statement of the probation officer.

Next, the court considered defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of

counsel as to the plea offer. The court determined counsel met with defendant

more than once and explained the plea offers, potential counteroffers, and

possible sentencing exposure if convicted. At the conclusion of the evidentiary

hearing, the second PCR court found defendant had not proven he received

ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to the plea offer and again denied

defendant's PCR petition.

Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal:

POINT ONE [COUNSEL]'S REPRESENTATION OF DEFENDANT FELL BELOW AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD OF REASONABLENESS AND PREJUDICED DEFENDANT.

A-3080-21 7 POINT TWO THE PCR COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT DEFENDANT HAD NOT ESTABLISHED THAT A PROBATION OFFICER MADE A PREJUDICIAL COMMENT IN FRONT OF SOME MEMBERS OF THE JURY DURING A BREAK IN THE TRIAL.

II.

"Post-conviction relief is New Jersey's analogue to the federal writ of

habeas corpus." State v. Afanador, 151 N.J. 41, 49 (1997) (citing State v.

Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)). "It is a safeguard to ensure that a defendant

was not unjustly convicted." Ibid. (citing State v. McQuaid, 147 N.J. 464, 482

(1997)). PCR provides a final opportunity for a defendant to raise a legal error

or constitutional issue, including a violation of the right to effective assistance

of counsel as guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States. State v.

Hess, 207 N.J. 123, 144-46 (2011); see also Afanador, 151 N.J. at 49 (citing

McQuaid, 147 N.J. at 482-83) ("Ordinarily, PCR enables a defendant to

challenge the legality of a sentence or final judgment of conviction by presenting

contentions that could not have been raised on direct appeal.").

"In reviewing a PCR court's factual findings based on live testimony, an

appellate court applies a deferential standard; it 'will uphold the PCR court's

findings that are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State

A-3080-21 8 v. Pierre, 223 N.J. 560, 576 (2015) (quoting State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 540

(2013)). A PCR court's interpretation of the law is reviewed de novo. Nash,

212 N.J. at 540-41.

Claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are considered under the

standards enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984),

and adopted by our State in State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987). In order to

prevail, a defendant first must show his attorney's handling of the matter "fell

below an objective standard of reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688.

Then, a defendant must show there is a "reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Id. at 694. In seeking PCR under Rule 3:22-2, a defendant must

prove counsel was ineffective by a preponderance of the evidence. State v.

Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012).

III.

We first address defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel

predicated on failing to advise him to accept the State's plea offer. A defendant's

right to effective assistance of counsel "extends to the plea-bargaining process."

Lafler v. Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 162 (2012). "[A]n attorney's conduct is

incompetent when a plea offer is never communicated by the attorney to the

A-3080-21 9 client." State v. Powell, 294 N.J. Super. 557, 564 (App. Div. 1996) (quoting

United States v. Barber, 808 F. Supp. 361, 378 (D.N.J. 1992)).

Additionally, "an attorney's gross misadvice of sentencing exposure that

prevents defendant from making a fair evaluation of a plea offer and induces

him to reject a plea agreement he otherwise would likely have accepted

constitutes remediable ineffective assistance." State v. Taccetta, 351 N.J. Super.

196, 200 (App. Div. 2002). "No matter which way the defendant ultimately

chooses to plead, he should know the risk he faces." State v. Martin, 110 N.J.

10, 19 (1988).

In Lafler, the Court set forth the following as to defendant’s burden to

establish prejudice under Strickland:

In these circumstances a defendant must show that but for the ineffective advice of counsel there is a reasonable probability that the plea offer would have been presented to the court (i.e. that the defendant would have accepted the plea and the prosecution would not have withdrawn it in light of intervening circumstances), that the court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both, under the offer's terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and sentence that in fact were imposed.

[Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164.]

A-3080-21 10 After review of the record established at the PCR evidentiary hearing and

consideration of guiding legal principles, we find no error in the court's denial

of defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel relating to the plea

offer. We defer to the court's factual findings, establishing defense counsel met

with defendant more than once and explained the plea offer of incarceration for

three years including one year of parole ineligibility. Defense counsel then

requested an offer of incarceration for eighteen months without any period of

parole ineligibility.

Counsel explained to defendant he was eligible for an extended prison

term and his possible exposure of twenty-years' incarceration, including ten

years of parole ineligibility. Counsel estimated there was a fifty percent chance

of success at trial. Shortly before the trial commenced, defense counsel again

told defendant the State had re-offered a "three-do-one" plea agreement with the

understanding defendant had already served nearly two years.

Defendant asserts the court's findings following the evidentiary hearing

overstate the amount of information defense counsel conveyed to him.

Defendant also contends it was not reasonable for his attorney to believe there

was a chance he would lose at trial and receive an extended sentence but not

"aggressively" counsel defendant to take a plea offer.

A-3080-21 11 We conclude defendant has not met the burden under the first prong of the

Strickland test to establish counsel's handling of the matter "fell below an

objective standard of reasonableness" based upon our deferential review of the

court's factual findings. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. The court found counsel

had reviewed the range of potential outcomes and, if convicted, possible

sentences with defendant based upon the credible testimony proffered to the

court at the hearing.

Although trial counsel may have been incorrect in the prediction of the

percentage of defendant's likelihood of success, "[as] a general rule, strategic

miscalculations or trial mistakes are insufficient to warrant reversal 'except in

those rare instances where they are of such magnitude as to thwart the

fundamental guarantee of [a] fair trial.'" State v. Castagna, 187 N.J. 293, 314-

15 (2006) (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Buonadonna, 122 N.J. 22, 42

(1991)). Moreover, the decision to accept the plea offer ultimately rested

squarely with defendant. See RPC 1.2 (In a criminal case, the lawyer shall abide

by the client's decision, after consultation with the lawyer, as to the plea to be

entered, whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. ).

A-3080-21 12 IV.

Next, we consider defendant's claim that the second PCR court erred in

denying his petition based upon his attorney’s alleged failure to bring the issue

of the unidentified probation officer's alleged comment in the presence of some

jurors to the attention of the court. Defendant argues counsel should have moved

for a mistrial in light of the comment because he was prejudiced by not having

an impartial jury decide the case.

Our review of the facts is limited and deferential to the findings of the

court following the evidentiary hearing. See State v. Garcia, 245 N.J. 412, 430

(2021). Here, we will not disturb the court's factual finding that defendant did

not establish the unidentified probation officer's comment was made or defense

counsel was told of the comment. The court's factual findings were grounded

on defendant's failure to provide details such as the name of the probation officer

or any testimony from the officer. Defendant also failed to provide sufficient

proof defense counsel knew of the alleged statement. The court did not find

defendant's testimony on this issue to be persuasive.

We also conclude the court properly found, if the ambiguous comment

was made by the unidentified probation officer, defense counsel could have

asked for a limiting jury instruction or a mistrial, but neither option would have

A-3080-21 13 favored defendant. The court prudently concluded any limiting instruction

would have only brought defendant’s criminal record to the attention of the jury.

Additionally, "[i]t is not ineffective assistance of counsel for defense counsel

not to file a meritless motion . . . ." State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007).

Therefore, we conclude the court did not err in determining defendant had not

established the alleged comment was clearly capable of producing an unjust

result and reversal was necessary to prevent an obvious failure of justice.

The court was correct in determining defendant failed to establish the

required prongs under Strickland with regard to either of his claims of

ineffective assistance of counsel based upon the proofs at the evidentiary

hearing. To the extent we have not addressed any of defendant's remaining

arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-3080-21 14