State of New Jersey v. Clarence Williams

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: July 21, 2025
• Docket: A-0941-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0941-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CLARENCE WILLIAMS,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted March 25, 2025 – Decided July 21, 2025

Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Indictment No. 17-09-0893.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Brian Plunkett, Designated Counsel, on the brief).

Matthew J. Platkin, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (David M. Galemba, Deputy Attorney General, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM Defendant Clarence Williams appeals from an October 20, 2023 Law

Division order denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) from two

convictions for first-degree manslaughter, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-4(a)(1). We affirm.

I.

On March 17, 2017, defendant and codefendant Gerry Thomas were

arrested for participating in a robbery that resulted in the murder of two victims

and the destruction of their remains through the torching of their car in Paterson.

Initially, Thomas denied being with defendant that night and claimed he was

unaware of what had occurred because he was not present. The interrogating

detectives allowed Thomas to leave without filing any charges.

Later that day, Thomas returned to the police station to retrieve his cell

phone, and the detectives conducted a second interview. During this interview,

Thomas admitted he kept calling defendant that night to buy marijuana from

him. Thomas claimed defendant provided his location. Thomas went to the

nearby location and got into the minivan with defendant and other males.

According to Thomas, he later asked defendant to let him out of the minivan

because he was concerned that they were planning on "bust[ing] a custy"—

robbing a customer. Thomas claimed that he was eventually dropped off and

then went to a Walgreens.

A-0941-23 2 Thereafter, in May 2017, a grand jury returned an indictment, charging

defendant and co-defendant Thomas with two counts of first-degree felony

murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3); second-degree aggravated arson, N.J.S.A.

2C:17-1(a)(1) and (2); second-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful

purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a)(1); second-degree unlawful possession of a

weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b)(1); and first-degree attempted robbery, N.J.S.A.

2C:5-1(a)(3), N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1(a)(1). In a subsequent indictment issued in

September 2017, defendant and Thomas were charged with two counts of first-

degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) or (2), N.J.S.A. 2C:2-6.

Following a three-day hearing, on December 22, 2017, the trial court

granted the State's application to admit Thomas's two recorded statements at

trial. Thomas opposed the application, but defendant did not file any opposition

to the State's motion.

Thereafter, the trial court granted the State's motion to sever the cases

against defendant and Thomas. A jury convicted Thomas of two counts of first-

degree felony murder, second-degree arson, and first-degree attempted robbery.

He was sentenced to consecutive forty-years' incarceration for the two felony-

murder convictions, resulting in an aggregate sentence of eighty years'

imprisonment.

A-0941-23 3 On direct appeal, we reversed Thomas's conviction, suppressed the second

recorded statement, and remanded the matter for a new trial. State v. Thomas,

No. A-5678-17 (App. Div. May 24, 2021) (slip op. at 4). We concluded

Thomas's "statement was obtained after the interrogating detectives repeatedly

and persistently [told Thomas] that the only way he could help himself was by

admitting his role in the subject robberies and murders." Id. at 31. We reasoned

"[t]hese statements effectively 'contradicted the Miranda1 warnings provided to

[Thomas]: that anything [he] said in the interview could be used against [him]

in a court of law.'" Ibid. (alterations in original) (quoting State in the Int. of

A.S., 203 N.J. 131, 150 (2010)).

Defendant elected to plead guilty to two counts of aggravated

manslaughter. At the plea hearing conducted on August 16, 2018, the assistant

prosecutor placed the terms of the plea agreement on the record, which was

confirmed by defendant's plea counsel. Defendant testified that he reviewed the

plea forms with his plea counsel prior to initialing each page and understood the

terms of the negotiated plea agreement.

1 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

A-0941-23 4 Before accepting defendant's plea, defendant responded to the trial court's

question that he was satisfied with the services of his plea counsel. He also

testified that he did not have any questions of "any kind" regarding the aspect

of his plea. Satisfied defendant had provided an adequate factual basis for his

guilty plea, the court accepted defendant's guilty plea to two counts of

aggravated manslaughter, which had been amended from murder.

Three months later on October 4, 2018, pursuant to the terms of the

negotiated plea agreement, defendant was sentenced to an aggregate eighteen-

year term of imprisonment for both aggravated manslaughter convictions under

the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We affirmed his sentence in an

unpublished order. State v. Williams, No. A-3427-18 (App. Div. Jan. 6, 2021).

On April 19, 2021, defendant, then self-represented, filed a PCR petition,

alleging that he was "compelled" to accept the plea and sentence because

Thomas had provided written statements to the detectives against him.2

Defendant further asserted Thomas's written statements were subsequently

found to be "impermissible" and were suppressed, which led to the vacatur of

Thomas' convictions. Defendant therefore sought to withdraw his guilty plea.

2 We discern from the record that the "written statements" referenced by defendant are the transcripts of the recorded statements of Thomas's interrogation. A-0941-23 5 Assigned PCR counsel filed an amended PCR petition and supplemental

brief incorporating the issues raised in defendant's self-represented PCR

petition. In his counsel's brief, defendant argues plea counsel failed to

"explicitly" preserve a right to withdraw his plea if Thomas's Miranda motion

was reversed on appeal. Defendant also argued that he provided prima facie

proof of ineffective assistance of counsel and an evidentiary hearing was

warranted. Lastly, defendant argued his PCR claims were not time-barred under

Rules 3:22-4, -5, and -12.

On October 10, 2023, the PCR court denied defendant's PCR petition

without an evidentiary hearing. Citing to the two-prong test articulated in

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42,

58 (1987) (adopting the Strickland two-prong test in New Jersey), the PCR court

concluded that "even if there was [ineffective assistance of counsel], there would

have been no difference in the result in this case." The court explained

"defendant [did] not have or [could] not assert the privilege against self-

incrimination that [Thomas] had when he gave a statement," which was

ultimately suppressed.

A-0941-23 6 II.

Defendant filed an appeal from this order, presenting the following

argument for our consideration:

THE COURT BELOW ERRED IN DENYING POST- CONVICTION RELIEF OR AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING BECAUSE TRIAL COUNSEL RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN COUNSEL DID NOT PRESERVE A REVERSAL OF CODEFENDANT'S MIRANDA MOTION AS A CONDITIONAL PLEA WHILE KNOWING THE IMPORTANCE OF THIS STATEMENT TO [DEFENDANT'S] DECISION TO PLEAD GUILTY.

After a review of the record and consideration of the relevant legal

principles, we reject defendant's arguments and affirm; however, we affirm the

denial of his PCR petition for different reasons than expressed by the PCR court.

See State v. Heisler, 422 N.J. Super. 399, 416 (App. Div. 2011) (stating an

appellate court is "free to affirm the trial court's decision on grounds different

from those relied upon by the trial court"). In doing so, we apply a de novo

standard of review because the PCR court did not conduct an evidentiary

hearing. State v. Blake, 444 N.J. Super. 285, 294 (App. Div. 2016) (citing State

v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391, 420-21 (2004)).

"A petitioner is generally barred from presenting a claim on PCR that

could have been raised at trial or on direct appeal, [Rule] 3:22-4(a), or that has

A-0941-23 7 been previously litigated, [Rule] 3:22-5." State v. Nash, 212 N.J. 518, 546

(2013); see also R. 3:22-4(a) and R. 3:22-5. PCR "is not a substitute for direct

appeal; nor is it an opportunity to relitigate a case on the merits." State v.

Szemple, 247 N.J. 82, 97 (2021).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, defendant must

satisfy a two-part test: (1) "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not

functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment,"

and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense." Fritz, 105 N.J. at

52 (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). A failure to satisfy either prong of the

Strickland standard requires the denial of a PCR petition. Ibid. (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). A defendant must establish entitlement to "PCR

by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super. 351,

370 (App. Div. 2014) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)).

The primary issue on this appeal is whether defendant's plea counsel

should have negotiated a conditional plea, allowing defendant to withdraw his

guilty plea if Thomas prevailed on his appeal of the order admitting his recorded

statements. We, therefore, evaluate defendant's argument within the context of

a guilty plea. Defendant must show: "counsel's assistance was not 'within the

range of competence demanded of attorneys in criminal cases'; and . . . 'that

A-0941-23 8 there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, [the defendant]

would not have pled guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.'" State v.

Nunez-Valdez, 200 N.J. 129, 139 (2009) (alteration in original) (quoting State

v. DiFrisco, 137 N.J. 434, 457 (1994)).

The plea form established that defendant understood he was waiving his

right to appeal the denial of all pretrial motions by pleading guilty, as evidenced

by his initials on the form. Moreover, during the plea hearing, defendant did

not express any questions regarding his plea, or the services provided by his plea

counsel. Thus, defendant's "guilty plea constitute[d] a waiver of all issues which

were or could have been addressed by the trial judge before the guilty plea."

State v. Davila, 443 N.J. Super. 577, 585 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting State v.

Robinson, 224 N.J. Super. 495, 498 (App. Div. 1988)).

Defendant, however, argues that his plea counsel should have expressly

negotiated a conditional plea premised on the outcome of Thomas's appeal.

Defendant has cited to no authority for this proposition. Rather, defendant

makes only bald assertions that "[i]t was clear that a central issue in Thomas's

appeal would be the trial court's decision to allow his statement in evidence."

Defendant further argues that plea counsel knew or should have known that

A-0941-23 9 Thomas filed an appeal before defendant pleaded guilty. Defended presented

no evidence that he was prejudiced by his inability to enter a conditional plea.

In fact, the record contradicts defendant's contention. The record reflects

plea counsel negotiated a favorable agreement that significantly reduced

defendant's period of incarceration, particularly in light of the ten-to-thirty-year

sentencing range applicable to an aggravated manslaughter conviction.

Furthermore, when defendant pled guilty he did not preserve an issue for

appellate review with the approval of the court and the consent of the assistant

prosecutor pursuant to Rule 3:9-3(f). In that regard, the record does not support

the prosecutor or court would have agreed to or accepted a conditional plea.

Accordingly, defendant did not satisfy any of the exceptions to Rule 3:5-7(d),

which preserves a defendant's right to appeal from an order denying a motion to

suppress.

Moreover, defendant misconstrues the reasoning articulated in Thomas.

Our decision in Thomas was based on the repeated and persistent statements to

Thomas by the interrogating detectives, which contradicted the Miranda

warnings given to him. In contrast, defendant did not raise or assert an alleged

Miranda violation before the trial court. Thus, we discern no grounds to hold

that plea counsel was ineffective for failing to make defendant's plea conditional

A-0941-23 10 upon the outcome of his codefendant's motion to suppress his recorded

statements.

We also affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition without an

evidentiary hearing. We are satisfied that plea counsel's performance was not

deficient, and defendant failed to satisfy his burden under the Strickland/Fritz

test. To the extent we have not expressly addressed any arguments made in

support of defendant's appeal, we have determined they are without sufficient

merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-0941-23 11