State of New Jersey v. Carlton T. James

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: August 25, 2025
• Docket: A-2549-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2549-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

CARLTON T. JAMES,

Defendant-Appellant. _______________________

Submitted May 6, 2025 – Decided August 25, 2025

Before Judges Gilson and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 13-08-2362.

Hegge & Confusione, LLC, attorneys for appellant (Michael Confusione, of counsel and on the brief).

Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Rachel M. Lamb, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM A jury convicted defendant Carlton James of second-, third-, and fourth-

degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1), (2), and (4); and second-

degree weapons offenses, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a), -5(b). In a subsequent trial, the

jury convicted defendant of second-degree certain persons not to have a weapon,

N.J.S.A. 2C:39-7(b). Defendant was sentenced as a persistent offender, under

N.J.S.A. 2C:44-3(a), to an aggregate twenty-two-year prison term, which

include a fifteen-year prison term on the second-degree aggravated assault

conviction, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. We

affirmed defendants' convictions but remanded to correct the judgment of

conviction to reflect the aggregate period of parole ineligibility of sixteen years

and three months for the second-degree aggravated assault conviction. State v.

James, No. A-3475-16 (App. Div. June 4, 2019) (slip op. at 20-21). Our

Supreme Court denied certification. State v. James, 240 N.J. 195 (2019).

Defendant now appeals from the February 22, 2023 Law Division order

denying his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary

hearing. After considering the record in light of the parties' arguments and the

applicable law, we affirm the denial of defendant's PCR without a hearing

substantially for the reasons expressed in the comprehensive oral opinion

rendered by Judge Thomas T. Booth Jr..

A-2549-23 2 I.

We incorporate the procedural and factual history from our opinion on

defendant's direct appeal. James, slip op. at 2-4. We cite only the facts relevant

to this appeal. Defendant's convictions stemmed from an incident that resulted

in a shooting. In December 2012, Gregory Graham1 received a call from his

brother, Anthony, to pick him up in Camden. Anthony stated that he was struck

in the head with a bottle by Devon Williams. Gregory drove from Philadelphia

with another brother, Jermaine, and picked up Anthony. They went to a bar to

look for Williams. When they found Williams at the bar, they asked if he would

step outside to speak with them. Williams went outside, walked down the street,

and encountered a group of people. Williams walked away from the group and

over to the three brothers, followed by the group.

The atmosphere turned hostile, as the brothers attempted to speak to

Williams. The group pulled Williams aside and told him not to listen to the

brothers. At that point, Gregory's attention was drawn to "a short dude" with

"dark skin" and "a long kind of beard," who kept walking behind one of

Gregory's brothers with his hand in his waistband. Gregory heard Williams tell

1 Multiple parties share a common surname. For clarity, we refer to these parties by their first name. No disrespect is intended.

A-2549-23 3 the short dude, "Chill, Cool." The brothers decided to leave and walked toward

Jermaine's car parked nearby. About five seconds later, gun shots were heard

from behind them. Gregory sustained gunshot wounds to his thigh, knee, and

arm, and was immediately transported to the hospital. Gregory was unable to

identify the shooter when interviewed by police at the hospital.

When interviewed at the hospital, Jermaine told Camden police officers

that he heard Williams refer to the individual talking to Gregory as "Cool" and

"C." A few days later, Jermaine identified defendant from a photo array. At

trial, Jermaine made an in-court identification that defendant spoke with

Williams on the night of the shooting.

At trial, the key issue of the State's case was the identity of the shooter.

The State's theory presented to the jury was that defendant was the shooter, and

he was the individual identified as "Cool." During the prosecutor's opening

statement at trial, she remarked that "you will hear from Devon who had the

altercation with Anthony earlier that day and was present in front of the bar . . .

that night." However, the State never called Williams to testify at trial.

The State listed Camden Police Detective Shawn Donlon on its witness

list to testify regarding defendant's nickname. While in the midst of Donlon's

testimony and outside of the jury's presence, the State revealed that Donlon

A-2549-23 4 lacked personal knowledge that defendant's nickname was "Cool C." However,

Donlon learned this information from Lieutenant William Frampton, who knew

defendant by his nickname from a prior arrest. Accordingly, the trial court ruled

Donlon's testimony regarding defendant's nickname was hearsay and, therefore,

barred.

The State then proffered Frampton's testimony as a witness with direct

knowledge, noting he had known defendant for at least eight years and had

provided defendant's nickname to Donlon. However, Frampton had not been

included in the State's witness list. The State consented to a mistrial in the event

the court barred Frampton's testimony.

Defense counsel objected to Frampton's testimony and moved for a

mistrial, arguing that permitting Frampton to testify would "completely

undermine[] the defense in this case[.]" She further argued defendant would be

deprived of a fair trial. Defense counsel then withdrew her request for a mistrial,

and in the alternative, asked that the trial proceed without any reference to the

photo array, which she argued would be less onerous than a mistrial. Counsel

further argued that "[defendant] shouldn't have to suffer through another trial

because of the State's mistake or error in preparation." In the event the trial

A-2549-23 5 court did not preclude the photo array, defense counsel stated that the "only

other solution [was] a mistrial."

After hearing the parties' arguments, the court denied defendant's request

for a mistrial, finding the defense's theory of the case would not be undermined

if the State proved defendant's nickname through Frampton. The trial court also

afforded defendant the opportunity to interview Frampton regarding his

proposed testimony. The court reiterated its ruling that Donlon was barred from

testifying about defendant's nickname; however, the State was permitted to call

Frampton to give limited, "simple and straightforward" testimony regarding

defendant's nickname.

After the State rested its case, defendant sought a mistrial based on the

alleged discovery violation and the testimony of Frampton. The trial court again

denied defendant's motion. Defendant neither testified nor produced any

witnesses at trial.

II.

Defendant, represented by counsel, timely filed his PCR petition alleging

ineffective assistance of counsel of both his trial and appellate counsel. 2 He

2 We note defendant's merits brief fails to address the argument regarding ineffective assistance of appellate counsel; therefore, this argument is waived.

A-2549-23 6 argued that his trial counsel was ineffective for two reasons. Defendant first

argued that his trial counsel failed to request a mistrial because of the

prosecutor's remark during opening statement concerning Williams's proposed

testimony. He contended that the State did not call Williams to testify at trial,

which prevented his trial counsel from cross-examining Williams and dispelling

the suggestion to the jury that he provided information to the police that led to

defendant's identification as a suspect.

The PCR court rejected defendant's argument and explained the only

statement made by the State directly relating to Williams's testimony did not

"constitute particularized or extensive detail as to the anticipated testimony , let

alone testimony which allegedly implicated defendant." The court concluded

defendant "failed to show that the statement made by the prosecutor during

opening had any effect on the outcome of the trial."

Defendant next argued that his trial attorney failed to "protect [his] right

to a fair trial" because she failed to object to Frampton's testimony, subsequently

withdrew the request for a mistrial, and permitted the continuation of the trial.

The PCR court explained that defendant's PCR theory failed, "as there was no

See Arsenis v. Borough of Bernardsville, 476 N.J. Super. 195, 204 n.3 (App. Div. 2023) (noting an issue not briefed is deemed waived). A-2549-23 7 materialization of the State's express condition"—the State's consent to a

mistrial if Frampton's testimony was barred. The court further explained that

even if the State consented to a mistrial in the absence of a court ruling regarding

Frampton's testimony, defendant's trial counsel foresaw a new trial with

Frampton added as a witness to the State's list. Lastly, the court rejected

defendant's argument that a Strickland3 violation occurs whenever a defendant's

trial counsel fails to agree to the State's offer of a mistrial, reasoning that it

"removes from a defendant's trial counsel the ability to use their professional

judgment, which Strickland expressly sought to protect."

Citing the governing law, the PCR court determined defendant's trial

counsel "forcefully advocated for her client and presented the [c]ourt with

multiple options that were rejected by the trial court." The court concluded trial

counsel's "forceful advocacy [could] not be said to have so undermined the

proper functioning of the adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied upon

as having produced a just result." The court further reasoned that his trial

counsel's "consistent" reference to aspects of discovery in the transcripts

demonstrated a familiarity with the evidence. Nor did defendant establish

prejudice because Jermaine's testimony linked defendant to the Cool C

3 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). A-2549-23 8 nickname and multiple witnesses heard Williams state, "Chill, Cool." The court

ultimately concluded defendant failed to satisfy the two-prong Strickland test

and denied defendant's application.

III.

Defendant makes one argument on appeal:

The trial court erred in denying defendant’s petition for post-conviction relief – at least by denying the claims without holding an evidentiary hearing.

In advancing this argument, defendant renews the argument previously

presented to the PCR court. Defendant reiterates that trial counsel failed to (1)

protect his rights to a fair trial; (2) request a mistrial based on the prosecutor's

remarks during opening statement; and (3) request a mistrial based on

Frampton's testimony. He further contends the trial court erred in denying an

evidentiary hearing because it would have clarified trial counsel's familiarity

with the evidence and whether the prosecutor's statement concerning William's

statement did not constitute particularized or extensive detail. We reject these

arguments.

We apply a de novo standard of review when a PCR court does not conduct

an evidentiary hearing. State v. Walker, 478 N.J. Super. 553, 560 (App. Div.

2024). A PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing is

A-2549-23 9 reviewed for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623

(App. Div. 2023) (citing State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div.

2013)).

When petitioning for PCR, a defendant must establish he is entitled "to

PCR by a preponderance of the evidence." State v. O'Donnell, 435 N.J. Super.

351, 370 (App. Div. 2014) (citing State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 459 (1992)).

To establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, defendant must satisfy

the two-prong Strickland test: (1) that "counsel made errors so serious that

counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment," and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 42, 58 (1987) (adopting the

two-prong Strickland test in New Jersey).

Defendant may not rely on "bald assertions that he was denied the

effective assistance of counsel." State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170

(App. Div. 1999). Rather, defendant is required to allege and articulate specific

facts, "which, if believed, would provide the court with an adequate basis on

which to rest its decision." State v. Mitchell, 126 N.J. 565, 579 (1992).

Therefore, a PCR court must reject a claim if it rests on allegations that "are too

vague, conclusory, or speculative to warrant an evidentiary hearing." State v.

A-2549-23 10 Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013) (quoting State v. Marshall, 148 N.J. 89, 158

(1997)).

Applying these principles, we discern no error in the PCR court's

determination that defendant failed to present a prima facie case for ineffective

assistance of counsel. Defendant failed to rebut the "strong presumption that

[trial] counsel's conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable professional

assistance[,]" and that his counsel "exercise[d] reasonable professional

judgment." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689-90; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.

We note the prosecutor was "afforded reasonable leeway during opening

statement" in making the single remark concerning Williams's proposed

testimony that he had an altercation with Anthony and was present in front of

the bar prior to the shooting. State v. Land, 435 N.J. Super. 249, 272 (App. Div.

2014) (quoting State v. Williams, 113 N.J. 393, 447 (1988)). Notwithstanding

defendant's contrary argument, the prosecutor provided no other details as

evidenced by the trial transcript. Therefore, a mistrial would not have been

appropriate because Williams's testimony was "not touted to the jury as a crucial

part of the prosecution's case." State v. Walden, 370 N.J. Super. 549, 559 (App.

Div.), certif. denied, 182 N.J. 148 (2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

A-2549-23 11 As to Frampton's testimony, we agree with the PCR's court reasoning that

trial counsel "foreshadowed" that in the event of a mistrial, the State would have

added Frampton on the witness list for a subsequent trial. The State's omission

of Frampton from its witness list did not automatically entitle defendant to a

mistrial. State v. Smith, 224 N.J. 36, 47 (2016). Moreover, the trial counsel

presented several options to the court so that defendant would not have to

"suffer" through another trial. Regardless of the arguments presented, defendant

failed to prove "[trial] counsel's representation fell below an objective standard

of reasonableness . . . ." State v. Alvarez, 473 N.J. Super. 448, 455 (App. Div.

2022) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688) (internal quotation marks omitted).

For the sake of completeness, we note defendant failed to satisfy the

second prong of Strickland. Defendant failed to demonstrate that the trial would

have been different but for the errors he alleged. Prejudice cannot be presumed.

For the reasons stated in Judge Booth's decision, we discern no abuse of

discretion in his decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing.

Affirmed.

A-2549-23 12