State of New Jersey v. Antoine J. Martin

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: March 21, 2025
• Docket: A-0331-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0331-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ANTOINE J. MARTIN, a/k/a BROOKLYN MARTIN,

Defendant-Appellant. _________________________

Submitted February 13, 2025 – Decided March 21, 2025

Before Judges Mawla and Walcott-Henderson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 14-12- 1340.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (David A. Gies, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Yolanda Ciccone, Middlesex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Nancy A. Hulett, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM A jury convicted defendant Antoine J. Martin of two counts of first-degree

robbery, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-1; second-degree burglary, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-2; two

counts of false imprisonment, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-3; second-degree theft by

extortion, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-5; and fourth-degree hindering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3. On

direct appeal, we affirmed defendant's conviction and remanded for

resentencing, State v. Martin, No. A-1224-17 (App. Div. May 28, 2019), and

our Supreme Court denied his petition for certification, State v. Martin, 240 N.J.

141 (2019).

Defendant appeals from an August 4, 2023 order denying his petition for

post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. He claims his trial

counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to call a co-defendant as a

witness and had a conflict of interest because he also represented the grandson

of the State's material witness in a separate criminal matter. Unpersuaded by

these arguments, we affirm.

I.

The relevant facts are taken primarily from our prior opinion. Defendant,

Brooke Hoffman, and Robert Peterson drove to the home of Clara and Steven

Lawrence intending to rob the couple. The Lawrences are the grandparents of

the father of Hoffman's child.

A-0331-23 2 Peterson testified at trial that Hoffman suggested on multiple occasions

that he help her rob the Lawrences. Peterson and Hoffman called defendant,

who picked them up in his car. Peterson and Hoffman agreed to pay defendant

fifty dollars to fill up his car with gas. Defendant transported Peterson and

Hoffman to the Lawrences' home where they encountered Clara and Steven.1

Clara testified defendant entered her home and Peterson held her to a chair

in the kitchen while Hoffman and defendant searched other parts of the house

for money. Defendant and Hoffman frequently returned to the kitchen

demanding to know where the Lawrences kept their money. Clara recounted

defendant grabbed an antique clock from an adjoining room and smashed it to

scare them while asking where they kept their money. After breaking the clock,

defendant took a knife from the kitchen and gestured with it at Steven while

walking towards him and demanding the money.

Defendant and Hoffman found a gun under a mattress in a bedroom and

brought it to the kitchen. Defendant pointed the gun at the Lawrences and

continued to demand the location of money, while threatening, "things are gonna

get bloody in here." Hoffman found stun guns in the home and brought those

1 We utilize the victims' first names because they share a common surname. We intend no disrespect. A-0331-23 3 into the kitchen, where Peterson put down the knife he had been holding and

took possession of a stun gun. At this point, Clara grabbed the knife and

attempted to escape. Peterson chased after her, causing her to fall. He hovered

over her and threatened her with the stun gun until he realized defendant and

Hoffman had abandoned him, causing Peterson to flee out the back door. Steven

then went next door to call 9-1-1. South Plainfield police quickly responded to

the call and located Peterson in a nearby salon. Peterson surrendered and

described defendant's red Cadillac to police.2

Police located defendant's car nearby and went to the home address listed

on the registration. When police arrived at the home, defendant agreed to open

his apartment door, and his wife consented to a search of the apartment and the

Cadillac. Police found Hoffman hiding in the closet with various items

belonging to the Lawrences in her possession, including: the .22 caliber

handgun; jewelry; Steven's Korean War dog tags; military medals; and foreign

currency. Police also found a jewelry box containing a receipt from Steven

dated June 22, 1977.

2 He later testified as the State's witness against defendant at trial.

A-0331-23 4 Defendant waived his Miranda3 rights by signing the consent form and

gave two statements to police, which were recorded and played for the jury, with

some redactions. In his statements, defendant maintained he had not known or

participated in the robbery but simply agreed to give Peterson and Hoffman a

ride in exchange for fifty dollars of gas money. Defendant said he followed

Peterson and Hoffman to the back door of the house and described what his co-

defendants did during the robbery, which was consistent with both the

Lawrences' and Peterson's accounts. He maintained he did not participate in the

robbery. At trial, defendant testified his second statement to police was false

and included details from Peterson.

A Middlesex County grand jury indicted defendant, Hoffman, and

Peterson. Peterson entered into a plea agreement and pleaded guilty to one count

of first-degree robbery and testified against defendant. Defendant and Hoffman

were tried separately. Defendant was convicted and sentenced to an aggregate

prison term of twenty-one and one-half years with seventeen years of parole

ineligibility.

On March 12, 2021, pursuant to our remand of defendant's sentence, the

court resentenced him to: twenty years on both counts of first-degree robbery,

3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). A-0331-23 5 subject to the No Early Release Act (NERA), N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2; ten-years on

his second-degree burglary count, subject to NERA; eighteen months in prison

on his fourth-degree hindering count; and six months in prison on his two counts

of false imprisonment.

Defendant filed a timely PCR petition, which was initially dismissed

without prejudice. He refiled his petition with several supporting certifications,

including a sworn certification from Hoffman stating that when she left the

Lawrences' home, she saw defendant inside the car they had driven to the home.

However, Hoffman's certification is written in the style of a report from an

investigating officer, and her signature is on a separate, undated page.

The court denied defendant's PCR petition. It first addressed defendant's

argument trial counsel had a conflict of interest stemming from his

representation of defendant and the Lawrences' grandson in a separate matter.

Defendant's trial counsel informed the court he and his supervisors at the Office

of the Public Defender "did not see this dual representation as a conflict."

The court concluded the representation of the Lawrences' grandson was

remote and disqualification was not required under the circumstances. The court

had considered the issue at the time of the trial and concluded no conflict existed.

The claim was also barred under Rule 3:22-4 and Rule 3:22-5.

A-0331-23 6 As to the defendant's second claim—trial counsel's alleged failure to call

witnesses—the court concluded defendant did not demonstrate prejudice in trial

counsel's decision not to call Hoffman or a character witness, and therefore did

not meet his burden under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984).

The court reasoned, defendant did not offer any strategic analysis "to his

asserted position" and "[l]acking any . . . substantive information, [defendant]

fails to demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel calling

such individuals, the result of that trial would have been different." Further,

trial counsel's strategic decisions were successful as defendant was initially

indicted on twenty counts, but two counts were dismissed prior to trial by

counsel's motion, and defendant was only convicted of six of the remaining

counts.

Defendant presents the following arguments for our consideration.

POINT I

THE PCR JUDGE ERRED WHERE HE DENIED DEFENDANT'S INEFFECTIVENESS CLAIM BY REJECTING THE PROFFERED TESTIMONY OF AN ABSENT WITNESS WITHOUT EVALUATING ITS CREDIBILITY ON DIRECT AND CROSS- EXAMINATION.

POINT II

THE PCR JUDGE ERRED WHERE HE DISMISSED

A-0331-23 7 DEFENDANT'S CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST CLAIM ON THE GROUNDS IT WAS PROCEDURALLY BARRED.

POINT III

APPELLATE COUNSEL ERRED WHERE SHE DID NOT RAISE THE CONFLICT-OF-INTEREST CLAIM ON DIRECT APPEAL.

II.

We review the legal conclusions of a PCR court de novo. State v. Harris,

181 N.J. 391, 419 (2004). The de novo standard of review also applies to mixed

questions of fact and law. Id. at 420. Where, as here, an evidentiary hearing

has not been held, it is within our authority "to conduct a de novo review of both

the factual findings and legal conclusions of the PCR court." Id. at 421.

In Strickland, the United States Supreme Court established a two-part

standard to determine a claim that a defendant is entitled to PCR because the

defendant had been deprived of the effective assistance of counsel. 466 U.S. at

687. Under Strickland's first prong, a petitioner must show counsel's

performance was deficient by demonstrating counsel's handling of the matter

"fell below an objective standard of reasonableness" and that "counsel made

errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed

[to] the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Id. at 687-88.

A-0331-23 8 Under the "'second, and far more difficult prong of the' Strickland

standard," State v. Gideon, 244 N.J. 538, 550 (2021) (quoting State v. Preciose,

129 N.J. 451, 463 (1992)), a defendant "must show that the deficient

performance prejudiced the defense," State v. O'Neil, 219 N.J. 598, 611 (2014)

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687). To establish prejudice, "[t]he defendant

must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's

unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A

reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the

outcome." Gideon, 244 N.J. at 550-51 (alteration in original) (quoting

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).

Proof of prejudice under Strickland's second prong "is an exacting

standard." Id. at 551 (quoting State v. Allegro, 193 N.J. 352, 367 (2008)). A

defendant seeking PCR "must 'affirmatively prove prejudice'" to satisfy the

second prong of the Strickland standard. Ibid. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at

693). A failure to satisfy either prong requires the denial of a PCR petition

founded on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim. Strickland, 466 U.S. at

700. "[C]ourts are permitted leeway to choose to examine first whether a

defendant has been prejudiced, and if not, to dismiss the claim without

A-0331-23 9 determining whether counsel's performance was constitutionally deficient."

State v. Gaitan, 209 N.J. 339, 350 (2012) (internal citation omitted).

"[T]o establish a prima facie claim, a [defendant] must do more than make

bald assertions that [they were] denied the effective assistance of counsel." State

v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). PCR petitions must

be "accompanied by an affidavit or certification by defendant, or by others,

setting forth with particularity," State v. Jones, 219 N.J. 298, 312 (2014), "facts

sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged substandard performance."

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. "[F]actual assertions in a [PCR petition

must] be made by affidavit or certification in order to secure an evidentiary

hearing." Jones, 219 N.J. at 312 (citing R. 3:22-10(c)).

III.

We first address defendant's argument the PCR court erred in failing to

find ineffective assistance of counsel based on trial counsel's failure to call

Hoffman to testify at trial. Particularly, defendant argues the court "rejected the

veracity of Hoffman's certification without evaluating her credibility on direct

or cross-examination while relying on the 'documentary and testimonial

evidence introduced at trial,'" and "it is not Hoffman's certification that is

inconsistent; it is Peterson's credibility, the State's witness, that is challenged ."

A-0331-23 10 Defendant further contends, the State "did not provide an affidavit from

defendant's trial attorney explaining his reasons for not calling Hoffman to

testify," and he has demonstrated a "reasonable likelihood he would succeed in

establishing prejudice."

Examining defendant's contentions under Strickland's second prong, we

remain unpersuaded Hoffman's testimony at trial—assuming it mirrored her

certification—would have altered the jury's verdict. Hoffman's certification

states, "the person that went inside the Lawrence[s'] house could not have been

[defendant]," while also containing Hoffman's admission that she was "out of

it" and "so emotional" that she did not notice who entered the house with her

and Peterson. The certification further states defendant was in the car as she

exited the victims' home.

To establish that trial counsel's failure to call Hoffman prejudiced

defendant, he must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different. Hoffman's certification establishes that defendant used his vehicle to

drive her and Peterson to the Lawrences and that he was waiting in the car to

drive them away from the scene. Critically, however, Hoffman also states that

she was "out of it" and "so emotional" that she did not notice who entered the

A-0331-23 11 house with her and Peterson. At best, Hoffman's recollection of defendant's

whereabouts at the time of the robbery was imprecise, and the statements in her

certification are inconsistent regarding whether defendant had entered the home

or remained in the getaway car during the robbery.

Defendant therefore cannot demonstrate the requisite prejudice based on

Hoffman's certification because he cannot establish that her testimony, if

presented at trial, would have led to his acquittal or a better result. Thus, he has

failed to demonstrate counsel's representation of him was ineffective.

We also reject defendant's claim the State was obliged to present evidence,

including any affidavits from trial counsel or any other witness. It is defendant,

not the State, who bears the burden to prove ineffective assistance of counsel by

a preponderance of the evidence. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 459.

We similarly reject defendant's contention appellate counsel provided

ineffective assistance by failing to raise on appeal the issues of: prosecutorial

misconduct; defense counsel's failure to call a character witness; and counsel's

failure to call Hoffman. There is no support for defendant's argument a character

witness would have aided his position at trial in the face of the evidence against

him.

A-0331-23 12 Appellate counsel is not required to raise every issue on appeal. State v.

Morrison, 215 N.J. Super. 540, 549 (App. Div. 1987) (citing Jones v. Barnes,

463 U.S. 745, 754 (1983)); see also State v. Gaither, 396 N.J. Super. 508, 516

(App. Div. 2007) (holding that appellate counsel is not "required to advance

every claim insisted upon by a client on appeal"). Defendant has failed to set

forth with particularity "facts sufficient to demonstrate counsel's alleged

substandard performance." Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170. Defendant may

not rely on "bald assertions that he was denied the effective assistance of

counsel." State v. Peoples, 446 N.J. Super. 245, 254 (App. Div. 2016) (quoting

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. at 170).

Regarding defendant's claim the PCR court erred by dismissing his

conflict-of-interest claim, defendant admits this claim was not raised on appeal.

Moreover, the PCR court found no conflict existed because defense counsel's

representation of the victim's grandson was a separate and unrelated proceeding,

with no relation or bearing on his representation in defendant's case. In

reviewing the trial record, the PCR court noted trial counsel had raised this issue

on the eve of trial when he first discovered he had another client who was related

to the victims in defendant's case. The PCR court examined the issue under the

Rules of Professional Conduct and the trial judge previously concluded the

A-0331-23 13 representation of the other litigant "was being conducted in a remote, separate,

and unrelated matter, and that defense counsel did not have information that

could have potentially been used against a witness or this defendant."

Based on this record, we see no basis to conclude the PCR court erred in

rejecting defendant's argument, which had been previously found to be without

merit. Counsel's representation can hardly be deemed ineffective when he

brought an issue before the court, which the court considered and decided based

on the applicable Court Rules. Appellate counsel did not have to raise this

meritless argument on appeal. See State v. O'Neal, 190 N.J. 601, 619 (2007)

(stating the failure to file a meritless motion is not ineffective assistance of

counsel).

Defendant failed to establish a prima facie case under the Strickland

standard. For these reasons, the PCR court properly denied defendant's request

for an evidentiary hearing. Preciose, 129 N.J. at 462-63.

Affirmed.

A-0331-23 14