NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1214-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALONZO HILL, a/k/a ALONZO E. HILL, and LONNIE,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted December 19, 2024 – Decided January 6, 2025
Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 95-03-1221.
Alonzo Hill, appellant pro se.
Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Alonzo Hill appeals from the December 1, 2023 order denying
his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.
We previously discussed the underlying facts of the case on direct appeal.
State v. Hill, No. A-6583-95 (App. Div. Mar. 23, 1999) (slip op. at 3-5). We
provide a summary of the facts for purposes of addressing defendant's
arguments.
On July 29, 1994, defendant, who was twenty-four years old, and two co-
conspirators, Tony Frazier and James Lomack, stole a car from the driveway of
a home in East Orange, while its owner, Sandra McKnight, was unloading
groceries. After forcing McKnight into the back seat, defendant got behind the
wheel and began to drive away. Before he could, McKnight's husband arrived
from the backyard, and defendant twice ran over him with the car. The three
then drove away with McKnight held captive.
Defendant claimed McKnight started "bugging" as they drove, and his
fifteen-year-old co-defendant, Frazier, threatened her with a gun and suggested
they throw her out of the car. McKnight begged them to release her, but
defendant declined to do so because he feared she would call the police.
Defendant claimed he intended to steal another car and then leave McKnight in
her car without the keys.
A-1214-23 2 The three came upon a Saab in a driveway in Roselle with its engine
running. Lomack got into the Saab and both cars drove off. The owner of the
Saab, an off-duty Linden police officer, and his cousin gave chase in another
car. During the ensuing high-speed pursuit, Lomack drew a gun and repeatedly
shot at his pursuers. One of the bullets fired by Lomack grazed the officer's
cousin and several hit their car. The chase ended when the officer lost the Saab
as it turned onto the Garden State Parkway.
Defendant and Frazier drove to Newark to find Lomack. They killed
McKnight approximately two hours after they abducted her and abandoned her
car with her body in it. She died as a result of a single gunshot from a "[t]ech
[n]ine assault weapon" that was held against her head when fired. Defendant
and Frazier each claimed the other was the shooter. Several weeks later, Lomack
was killed in a shoot-out with police in an unrelated matter. While investigating
that incident, police linked Lomack to the McKnight murder, and then
uncovered the role played by defendant and Frazier. When the police arrested
defendant, he was in possession of the keys to the stolen Saab and a nine-
millimeter handgun that was not linked to McKnight's murder.
In 1996, defendant was tried before a jury and convicted of second-degree
conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2; first-
A-1214-23 3 degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1); two counts of first-degree
carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2; second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(1); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(d); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); third-degree conspiracy to commit
theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a); three counts of first-degree
attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1; two counts of third-
degree possession of a firearm without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) and (f);
two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); and
felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3). After appropriate mergers, the judge
sentenced defendant to five consecutive life terms with one hundred and thirty-
five years of parole ineligibility.
On direct appeal, defendant argued the imposition of five consecutive life
terms was manifestly excessive. Defendant asserted the court failed to properly
analyze the factors set forth in State v. Yarbough,1 and misapplied its discretion
by imposing consecutive sentences. He also claimed "[t]he aggregate sentence
[was] . . . excessive and unjustified" because "instead of applying the Yarbough
1 100 N.J. 627 (1985). A-1214-23 4 criteria and considering the related nature of the offenses and overall fairness of
the sentence, the judge fractionalized the incident and imposed multiple
consecutive terms."
We affirmed defendant's conviction on direct appeal but remanded for
resentencing because the trial court erred in imposing an extended term for
McKnight's murder pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(6), which did not become
effective until several months after her death. Also, we concluded the court
erred by imposing a mandatory extended term for carjacking, which is not an
offense included in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). We determined defendant's sentences
for attempted murder of the officer and his cousin should have been run
concurrently instead of consecutively. Our Supreme Court denied certification.
State v. Hill, 161 N.J. 147 (1999).
On August 27, 1999, defendant was re-sentenced in accordance with our
instructions to four consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the: (1)
kidnapping and carjacking of McKnight; (2) attempted murder of McKnight's
husband; (3) carjacking and attempted murder of the police officer and his
cousin; and (4) murder of McKnight. Defendant did not appeal from that
judgment of conviction. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR),
A-1214-23 5 which the court denied. We affirmed the denial of PCR. State v. Hill, A-1798-
12 (App. Div. Mar. 30, 2015), certif. denied, 222 N.J. 18 (2015).
On June 1, 2023, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). On December 1, 2023, the trial court entered
an order denying the motion supported by a written opinion dated November 2,
2023. The court found defendant's argument that "consecutive sentences and
periods of parole ineligibility constituted abuse of discretion by the sentencing
judge" was expressly raised and rejected on direct appeal. It also determined
resentencing was not required based on State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021),
because that case was decided more than twenty years after defendant was
sentenced and does not apply retroactively. The court denied the motion because
defendant's sentence "is not an illegal sentence."
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal.
POINT I
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NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1214-23
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
ALONZO HILL, a/k/a ALONZO E. HILL, and LONNIE,
Defendant-Appellant. _______________________
Submitted December 19, 2024 – Decided January 6, 2025
Before Judges Mawla and Vinci.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Indictment No. 95-03-1221.
Alonzo Hill, appellant pro se.
Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Frank J. Ducoat, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM Defendant Alonzo Hill appeals from the December 1, 2023 order denying
his motion to correct an illegal sentence. We affirm.
We previously discussed the underlying facts of the case on direct appeal.
State v. Hill, No. A-6583-95 (App. Div. Mar. 23, 1999) (slip op. at 3-5). We
provide a summary of the facts for purposes of addressing defendant's
arguments.
On July 29, 1994, defendant, who was twenty-four years old, and two co-
conspirators, Tony Frazier and James Lomack, stole a car from the driveway of
a home in East Orange, while its owner, Sandra McKnight, was unloading
groceries. After forcing McKnight into the back seat, defendant got behind the
wheel and began to drive away. Before he could, McKnight's husband arrived
from the backyard, and defendant twice ran over him with the car. The three
then drove away with McKnight held captive.
Defendant claimed McKnight started "bugging" as they drove, and his
fifteen-year-old co-defendant, Frazier, threatened her with a gun and suggested
they throw her out of the car. McKnight begged them to release her, but
defendant declined to do so because he feared she would call the police.
Defendant claimed he intended to steal another car and then leave McKnight in
her car without the keys.
A-1214-23 2 The three came upon a Saab in a driveway in Roselle with its engine
running. Lomack got into the Saab and both cars drove off. The owner of the
Saab, an off-duty Linden police officer, and his cousin gave chase in another
car. During the ensuing high-speed pursuit, Lomack drew a gun and repeatedly
shot at his pursuers. One of the bullets fired by Lomack grazed the officer's
cousin and several hit their car. The chase ended when the officer lost the Saab
as it turned onto the Garden State Parkway.
Defendant and Frazier drove to Newark to find Lomack. They killed
McKnight approximately two hours after they abducted her and abandoned her
car with her body in it. She died as a result of a single gunshot from a "[t]ech
[n]ine assault weapon" that was held against her head when fired. Defendant
and Frazier each claimed the other was the shooter. Several weeks later, Lomack
was killed in a shoot-out with police in an unrelated matter. While investigating
that incident, police linked Lomack to the McKnight murder, and then
uncovered the role played by defendant and Frazier. When the police arrested
defendant, he was in possession of the keys to the stolen Saab and a nine-
millimeter handgun that was not linked to McKnight's murder.
In 1996, defendant was tried before a jury and convicted of second-degree
conspiracy to commit carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2; first-
A-1214-23 3 degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-1(b)(1); two counts of first-degree
carjacking, N.J.S.A. 2C:15-2; second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A.
2C:12-1(b)(1); fourth-degree unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-
5(d); third-degree possession of a weapon for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d); third-degree conspiracy to commit
theft, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3(a); three counts of first-degree
attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3 and N.J.S.A. 2C:5-1; two counts of third-
degree possession of a firearm without a permit, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b) and (f);
two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful
purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) and (2); and
felony murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(3). After appropriate mergers, the judge
sentenced defendant to five consecutive life terms with one hundred and thirty-
five years of parole ineligibility.
On direct appeal, defendant argued the imposition of five consecutive life
terms was manifestly excessive. Defendant asserted the court failed to properly
analyze the factors set forth in State v. Yarbough,1 and misapplied its discretion
by imposing consecutive sentences. He also claimed "[t]he aggregate sentence
[was] . . . excessive and unjustified" because "instead of applying the Yarbough
1 100 N.J. 627 (1985). A-1214-23 4 criteria and considering the related nature of the offenses and overall fairness of
the sentence, the judge fractionalized the incident and imposed multiple
consecutive terms."
We affirmed defendant's conviction on direct appeal but remanded for
resentencing because the trial court erred in imposing an extended term for
McKnight's murder pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7(a)(6), which did not become
effective until several months after her death. Also, we concluded the court
erred by imposing a mandatory extended term for carjacking, which is not an
offense included in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-6(c). We determined defendant's sentences
for attempted murder of the officer and his cousin should have been run
concurrently instead of consecutively. Our Supreme Court denied certification.
State v. Hill, 161 N.J. 147 (1999).
On August 27, 1999, defendant was re-sentenced in accordance with our
instructions to four consecutive terms of life imprisonment for the: (1)
kidnapping and carjacking of McKnight; (2) attempted murder of McKnight's
husband; (3) carjacking and attempted murder of the police officer and his
cousin; and (4) murder of McKnight. Defendant did not appeal from that
judgment of conviction. He filed a petition for post-conviction relief (PCR),
A-1214-23 5 which the court denied. We affirmed the denial of PCR. State v. Hill, A-1798-
12 (App. Div. Mar. 30, 2015), certif. denied, 222 N.J. 18 (2015).
On June 1, 2023, defendant filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence
pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5). On December 1, 2023, the trial court entered
an order denying the motion supported by a written opinion dated November 2,
2023. The court found defendant's argument that "consecutive sentences and
periods of parole ineligibility constituted abuse of discretion by the sentencing
judge" was expressly raised and rejected on direct appeal. It also determined
resentencing was not required based on State v. Torres, 246 N.J. 246 (2021),
because that case was decided more than twenty years after defendant was
sentenced and does not apply retroactively. The court denied the motion because
defendant's sentence "is not an illegal sentence."
Defendant raises the following arguments on appeal.
POINT I
THE [COURT] ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT [DEFENDANT'S] SENTENCE WAS PREVIOUSLY ADJUDICATED ON THE MATTER, AND THAT THE SENTENCE WAS NOT ILLEGAL NOR RETROACTIVELY APPLICABLE.
POINT II
THE [COURT] ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO ADDRESS AND MAKE A FACTUAL
A-1214-23 6 CONCLUSION WITH APPELLANT'S REMAINING ILLEGAL SENTENCING CLAIMS.
POINT III
THE COURT'S FAILURE TO ADDRESS THE DEFENDANT'S DISPARITY ARGUMENT THAT HIS CONSECUTIVE SENTENCE FOR THE MURDER COUNT IS DISPARATE TO HIS CODEFENDANT'S CONCURRENT SENTENCE FOR THE SAME COUNT AND THE FAILURE TO PROVIDE A REASON FOR THE DISPARITY OR AN OVERALL FAIRNESS ASSESSMENT REQUIRES THE MATTER TO BE VACATED FOR RE- SENTENCING.
Having reviewed the record, we affirm substantially for the reasons set
forth in the court's written opinion. We add the following comments.
Whether a defendant's sentence is illegal is an issue of law subject to de
novo review. See State v. Drake, 444 N.J. Super. 265, 271 (App. Div. 2016).
"[A]n illegal sentence is one that 'exceeds the maximum penalty provided in the
Code [of Criminal Justice] for a particular offense' or a sentence 'not imposed in
accordance with the law.'" State v. Acevedo, 205 N.J. 40, 45 (2011) (quoting
State v. Murray, 162 N.J. 240, 247 (2000)). Pursuant to Rule 3:21-10(b)(5), a
motion to correct an illegal sentence may be filed at any time. However, "[a]
defendant's contentions regarding consecutive sentences . . . do not relate to the
A-1214-23 7 issue of sentence 'legality' and are not cognizable . . . under the present Rule
3:21-10(b)(5)." Id. at 47.
The court correctly determined defendant's sentence is not illegal. All the
custodial terms, fines, and penalties that were imposed fall squarely within the
applicable sentencing guidelines. Defendant failed to set forth a meritorious
claim of illegality.
Defendant primarily reiterates arguments with respect to the sentencing
court's imposition of consecutive sentences and alleged misapplication of the
Yarbough factors that were raised and rejected on direct appeal. Those
arguments cannot be relitigated on a motion to correct an illegal sentence. See
State v. Trantino, 60 N.J. 176, 180 (1972) (recognizing a prior adjudication on
the merits of an issue on direct appeal is conclusive and cannot be relitigated,
even if of constitutional dimension). As we previously held, the consecutive
sentences for the independent acts of kidnapping, carjacking, attempted murder,
and murder, which resulted in the death of McKnight and injuries to two other
victims, were imposed correctly based on the sentencing court's careful
consideration of the record and applicable law. Defendant's contention that the
A-1214-23 8 sentencing court failed to appropriately consider the imposition of consecutive
sentences and the "overall fairness" of his sentence lacks merit.2
Defendant's contention that the sentencing court failed to consider his age
at the time of the offenses and sentencing lacks merit. It specifically
acknowledged his age during the sentencing hearing. Defendant's claim that the
sentencing court "should have found mitigating factor[] fourteen, N.J.S.A.
2C:44-1(b)(14)" is incorrect. That mitigating factor was adopted effective
October 19, 2020.
Defendant's argument that he is entitled to be resentenced because the
sentencing court did not order a new adult presentence report (PSR) when he
was resentenced following remand in 1999 is not persuasive. He does not offer
any evidence to support this claim. Even if true, our review of the record does
not reveal any basis to conclude the original PSR was incomplete or incorrect,
or that a PSR ordered in 1999 would have included information that might have
affected the sentence imposed.
2 Defendant concedes the court determined correctly Torres did not announce a new rule of law and does not apply retroactively. Instead, he contends he must be resentenced because the sentencing court did not appropriately consider the "overall fairness" of the sentence as required prior to Torres. A-1214-23 9 The claim that his sentence is disproportionate to the sentence imposed on
Frazier, who was fifteen years old at the time of the offenses, is an excessive
sentencing argument not properly raised on a motion to correct an illegal
sentence. Moreover, the argument was expressly addressed on direct appeal
when we noted "[t]he distinction between [defendant's] and Frazier's sentences
can be partially attributed to the fact that [defendant] had one more conviction
for attempted murder than did Frazier" in addition to Frazier's youth.
Defendant's remaining argument regarding the sufficiency of the court's
findings and other arguments we may not have addressed lack sufficient merit
to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).
Affirmed.
A-1214-23 10