State of New Jersey v. Allan Mattocks

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: September 2, 2025
• Docket: A-2191-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-2191-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALLAN MATTOCKS, a/k/a ALLAN D. MATTOCKS, ALLEN MATTOCK, and ALLEN MATTOCKS,

Defendant-Appellant. __________________________

Submitted June 3, 2025 – Decided September 2, 2025

Before Judges Firko and Bishop-Thompson.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 15-06-1698.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Andrew R. Burroughs, Designated Counsel, on the briefs).

Grace C. MacAulay, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Rachel Lamb, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM

This post-conviction relief (PCR) appeal returns to us following further

consideration on remand. Defendant Allan Mattocks appeals from the February

7, 2024 order denying his PCR petition without an evidentiary hearing. He

argued that his trial counsel failed to call an exculpatory witness at trial . Having

reviewed the record in light of applicable law, we affirm.

I.

The procedural history and trial evidence are detailed in our unpublished

decisions affirming defendant's convictions on direct appeal and remanded for

resentencing. State v. Mattocks (Mattocks I), No. A-4341-15 (App. Div. Apr.

12, 2018), certif. denied, 236 N.J. 31 (2018); State v. Mattocks (Mattocks II),

No. A-2244-20 (App. Div. May 24, 2022), certif. denied, 252 N.J. 236 (2022).

Thus, we provide only a brief summary of the facts and prior procedural history

relevant to this appeal.

On April 10, 2012, defendant violently assaulted and beat S.B.W.,1

believing that she had stolen his trash cans. Defendant was later arrested and

charged in connection with the assault.

1 We use initials to protect the identity of the victim. R. 1:38-3(c)(12). A-2191-23 2 On the evening of April 12, 2013, defendant, assisted by Joshua Sloan and

Jonathan Kearney, kidnapped S.B.W. in a van, then shot her in the head at an

abandoned lot to silence her. She survived but remains severely and

permanently disabled.

In 2016, a jury trial was held. At trial, Kearney's mother, Sharon Busan,

testified on behalf of the State. She stated that she lived two houses away from

the abandoned lot where defendant shot the victim. She recalled seeing

defendant on the night of April 12, 2013, along with Kearney and Sloan sitting

in defendant's van parked near her house. Later that night, she heard a loud

noise sounding like a "firecracker." Busan also recounted that defendant later

instructed her at a wedding to "keep her mouth shut," and that she "knew what

he was talking about."

Elmis Mateo testified that he was walking his dog on the night of the

shooting, he explained that he saw a " gray or silver van" parked on Rand Street

near the abandoned lot. He heard a gunshot, saw the van drive away, and then

walked to the back of the abandoned house where the shot had originated. Mateo

approached S.B.W., who was lying on the ground with a head wound, called 9-

1-1, and provided a statement to the police.

A-2191-23 3 Pursuant to a plea agreement Sloan agreed to testify at defendant's trial.

Sloan testified that on April 12, 2023, defendant picked him up along with

Kearney. After driving around "for a couple of hours," the van stopped, and

defendant got out and "forced" S.B.W. into the vehicle.

In March 2016, defendant was found guilty of third-degree criminal

restraint, N.J.S.A. 2C:13-2(a); third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-

1(b)(7); first-degree kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:13- 1(b)(2); first-degree attempted

murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5- 1, 2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); first-degree witness

tampering, N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a); second-degree retaliation against a witness,

N.J.S.A. 2C:25-5(b); second-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(1);

third-degree aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(2); fourth-degree

aggravated assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1(b)(4); second-degree possession of a

weapon (handgun) for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(a); conspiracy to

commit first-degree murder, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1); first-

degree conspiracy to commit kidnapping, N.J.S.A. 2C:5-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:13-

1(b)(1); and second-degree certain persons not to have a handgun, N.J.S.A.

2C:39-7(b). Defendant was ultimately sentenced to a seventy-year custodial

term with forty-seven years of parole ineligibility.

A-2191-23 4 In February 2019, defendant filed his first PCR petition. Defendant

asserted trial counsel was ineffective for failing to call Ramon Rivera, Sharon

Busan's brother, as a witness at trial even though he was on the defense witness

list and had been subpoenaed by counsel. Defendant contended that Rivera had

informed him Busan had lied to the police about his involvement, and contended

that Rivera's testimony should have been presented to impeach Busan's

credibility.

In its February 25, 2021 decision, the PCR court denied the petition

without an evidentiary hearing, finding defendant failed to establish a prima

facie claim under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); State v. Fritz,

105 N.J. 42 (1987) (adopting the Strickland test in New Jersey). In regard to

Rivera, the court found the decision not to call him was strategic, and defendant

had provided no certification or other proof from Rivera.

On appeal, we affirmed the PCR court's denial on defendant's ineffective

assistance of counsel claims that trial counsel failed to (1) diligently investigate

his case; (2) effectively cross-examine Sharon Busan; and (3) provide accurate

information for defendant to make an informed decision on whether to accept

the State's plea offer. Mattocks II, slip op. at 14-20.

A-2191-23 5 On appeal, defendant produced, for the first time, a certification from

Rivera dated December 12, 2019, disputing Busan's account of events. Rivera

certified that:

he, Busan, and other family members were drinking in the basement of their parents' apartment on April 12, 2013, and from that location in the home, there "was no way that [Busan] saw anyone parked in the front of the building between 9:30 p.m. and 10:00 p.m." He further denied that Busan could have heard the gunshot because he heard "a loud pop sound," and asked whether anyone had also heard it, to which Busan allegedly responded, "hear what?"

[Id. at 20-21.]

Rivera further certified that defendant's trial counsel subpoenaed him and that

he came to court prepared to testify, but during the lunch break was told by

counsel that he "was no longer needed." Id. at 21. Thus, we remanded the matter

to the PCR court to address the single, discrete issue related to trial counsel's

decision not to call Rivera as a potential defense witness.

Following the limited remand hearing, the second PCR court again denied

relief in a February 7, 2024 order. At the hearing, PCR counsel addressed the

basis for Rivera's testimony. PCR counsel maintained that Rivera was a "critical

witness" who could have "neutralized" Busan's testimony. He further argued

A-2191-23 6 that Rivera's testimony would have effectively "diluted" Busan's testimony,

thereby creating reasonable doubt.

At the hearing, PCR counsel submitted a letter from defendant's trial

counsel dated September 6, 2018, that stated:

I must confess that at this time I do not remember why [Rivera] was not called, and I do not recall receiving a statement from him in regard to Sharon Busan lying. I have to look at the statement to refresh my recollection, so if you have it, please forward a copy. 2

The court analyzed defendant's claim under the two-prong test articulated

in Strickland, 466 U.S. at 685-87, and Fritz, 105 N.J. at 58. The court explained:

The [c]ourt does not find that trial counsel's failure to call Ramon Rivera as a witness fell below the level of reasonable professional judgment. The facts alleged demonstrate a clear possibility that the testimony may have impeached the State's witnesses; however, due to the preparation done beforehand, counsel's readiness to call Rivera as a witness and the available factors which support the finding that the decision not to call Rivera was a knowing strategic decision, the [c]ourt does not find that the alleged facts demonstrate . . . substandard performance by trial counsel. To the contrary, . . . the level of preparation provides strong circumstantial evidence the decision was [a] knowing trial strategy.

2 This letter is not in the record before us on appeal, and we rely on the recitation by the PCR court at the remand hearing. A-2191-23 7 The court determined defendant's trial counsel called "strong witnesses"

for the defense. He noted "to call a weak witness to impeach what was

effectively cumulative testimony could have weakened the appearance of . . .

[d]efendant's otherwise strong defenses." In regard to Busan's testimony, the

second PCR judge characterized it as "weak" in comparison to the State's

"exceedingly strong" case overall.

The court concluded that even if trial counsel's decision not to call Rivera

was in error, defendant failed to show a reasonable probability of a different

outcome, as required under prong two of the Strickland/Fritz standard.

Accordingly, the second PCR judge ruled that defendant was not entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. This appeal followed.

II.

On appeal, defendant presents one argument:

POINT I

AS DEFENDANT HAD SHOWN BY THE PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THAT HIS ATTORNEY WAS INEFFECTIVE BY FAILING TO CALL RAMON RIVERA AS AN EXCULPATORY WITNESS AND THERE WERE MATERIAL FACTS IN DISPUTE, THE PCR COURT ERRED ONCE AGAIN WHEN IT DENIED THIS CLAIM WITHOUT AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING.

A-2191-23 8 The factual and legal determinations made by a PCR court are reviewed

de novo when an evidentiary hearing is not held. State v. Harris, 181 N.J. 391,

420-21 (2004); State v. Lawrence, 463 N.J. Super. 518, 522 (App. Div. 2020).

A PCR court's decision to proceed without an evidentiary hearing is reviewed

for an abuse of discretion. State v. Vanness, 474 N.J. Super. 609, 623 (App.

Div. 2023) (citing State v. Brewster, 429 N.J. Super. 387, 401 (App. Div. 2013)).

To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must

satisfy the two-prong Strickland/Fritz test: (1) "counsel made errors so serious

that counsel was not functioning as the 'counsel' guaranteed the defendant by the

Sixth Amendment," and (2) "the deficient performance prejudiced the defense."

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. Under prong one, a defendant

must establish that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

reasonableness." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52. Under prong

two, a defendant must demonstrate "a reasonable probability that, but for

counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been

different." Id. at 694; Fritz, 105 N.J. at 52.

A defendant filing a PCR petition is not automatically entitled to an

evidentiary hearing. State v. Porter, 216 N.J. 343, 355 (2013); State v.

Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div. 1999). The PCR court should

A-2191-23 9 grant an evidentiary hearing only when: "(1) the defendant establishes a prima

facie case in support of PCR; (2) the court determines that there are disputed

issues of material fact that cannot be resolved by review of the existing record;

and (3) the court determines that an evidentiary hearing is required to resolve

the claims asserted." Vanness, 474 N.J. at 623 (citing Porter, 216 N.J. at 354).

When reviewing such claims, courts apply a strong presumption that

defense counsel "rendered adequate assistance and made all significant

decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Strickland, 466

U.S. at 690. "Given that presumption, 'complaints "merely of matters of trial

strategy" will not serve to ground a constitutional claim of inadequacy[.]'" State

v. Kearney, 479 N.J. Super. 539, 547 (App. Div. 2024) (quoting Fritz, 105 N.J.

at 54). "To rebut that presumption, a defendant must establish that trial counsel's

actions did not equate to sound trial strategy." Id. at 547-48 (quoting State v.

Chew, 179 N.J. 186, 203 (2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted).

"[A] defense attorney's decision concerning which witnesses to call to the

stand is 'an art,' and a court's review of such a decision should be 'highly

deferential.'" State v. Arthur, 184 N.J. 307, 321 (2005) (quoting Strickland, 466

U.S. at 689). Moreover, when a defendant asserts that his trial counsel failed to

call certain witnesses, we consider "whether there is a reasonable probability

A-2191-23 10 that, but for the attorney's failure to call the witness, the result would have been

different[;] that is, there would have been reasonable doubt about the defendant 's

guilt." State v. L.A., 433 N.J. Super. 1, 16 (App. Div. 2013).

At the outset, we first address the limited scope of our remand in Mattocks

II. On remand, defendant sought to expand his ineffective assistance of counsel

claim. Defendant advanced the claim that Rivera's testimony could have

potentially impeached two other witnesses: Mateo—by casting doubt on details

such as the van's color or its location—and Sloan—by challenging the credibility

of his testimony given under a plea agreement. Both arguments exceeded the

scope of the remand hearing.

Nevertheless, the second PCR court analyzed defendant's new arguments

and found that even if his trial counsel's failure to call Rivera to be substandard

performance, the totality of the State's case was "exceedingly strong." The court

explained that Rivera's testimony would not have undermined the direct and

"stronger testimony" offered by Mateo and Sloan. The court further explained

that "nothing that would have been testified [to] by Sharon Busan would have

contradicted any portion of Sloan's testimony, nor would the jury's disregard

[of] her testimony [have] impacted any of the testimony from Mateo."

A-2191-23 11 The court noted defendant's trial counsel called other "strong" witnesses

for the defense. The court reasoned "to call a weak witness to impeach what

was effectively cumulative testimony could have weakened the appearance of

the [d]efendant's otherwise strong defenses." Notwithstanding, the court

concluded that the evidence presented by defendant that directly contradicted

the State's proofs, the jury rejected defendant's "strongest arguments and

strongest testimony." Accordingly, the court concluded that defendant had not

established a prima facie showing of ineffective assistance of counsel.

Having conducted a de novo review, we agree with the second PCR court

that counsel's trial preparation and subsequent decision not to call Rivera as a

witness did not fall below the objective standard of reasonableness. We,

therefore, affirm the denial of defendant's PCR petition without an evidentiary

hearing.

Having conducted a de novo review, we affirm substantially for the

reasons explained by Judge Kurt Kramer in his thorough and well-reasoned

opinion. Further, the record supports that even if Rivera had testified at

defendant's trial, it was likely that defendant would still have been convicted

based on the overwhelming evidence the State had presented at trial, including

A-2191-23 12 two key witnesses that Rivera's testimony would not have impeached—Sloan

and Mateo.

To the extent we have not discussed them expressly, all other arguments

raised by defendant lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

A-2191-23 13