State of New Jersey in the Interest of J.M.H., a Juvenile

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: January 27, 2026
• Docket: A-3456-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3456-23

STATE OF NEW JERSEY IN THE INTEREST OF J.M.H., a juvenile.1 ________________________

Submitted January 13, 2026 – Decided January 27, 2026

Before Judges Perez Friscia and Vinci.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County, Docket Nos. FJ-04-0430-24 and FJ-04-0777-24.

Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant J.M.H. (Rachel A. Neckes, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).

Grace C. MacAuley, Camden County Prosecutor, attorney for respondent State of New Jersey (Jason Magid, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the juvenile. R. 1:38-3(d)(5). J.M.H. appeals from the Family Part adjudication of delinquency entered

after a bench trial for conduct which, if committed by an adult, would constitute

third-degree arson, N.J.S.A. 2C:17-1(b)(5). Having reviewed the record, parties'

arguments, and applicable law, we affirm.

I.

We summarize the facts and procedural history from the one-day trial.

During the trial, the State presented the testimony of Detective Michael

Matkowski and a juvenile, J.S. Defendant also testified.

Matkowski testified that he had worked in law enforcement for over ten

years and was employed by the Monroe Township Police Department (MTPD)

for the last eight years. On May 29, 2023, Matkowski learned of "fires that were

taking place" in an area known as the Old American Training Center from

MTPD patrol officers. He was familiar with the area and described it as "a vast

tract of woods with pine trees." Matkowski learned fire personnel had to

extinguish "three separate fires" in that area. He went to the area to view the

"scene of the fire."

On May 31, Matkowski met with J.S. and his mother. Matkowski

interviewed J.S. in his mother's presence regarding the fires. J.S. forwarded

Matkowski a video recording J.S. had taken on May 29 at the scene of a fire,

A-3456-23 2 which J.S. maintained showed J.M.H. involved in an arson. Matkowski

authenticated the video recording he received, which was played in court, and

the State moved it into evidence without objection.

On the video, the person filming is seen wearing purple Crocs and other

individuals are filmed at the scene of a spreading fire in a wooded area. One

individual in the video is seen from behind, throwing liquid from a gas can

toward a grassy area with trees that was already on fire. That individual's stature

and attire were discernible in the video. The State also introduced a screenshot

picture of the individual with the gas can. The video had limited audio.

Matkowski maintained that J.S. came to the MTPD to give a statement

because his mother required him to. He commented that J.S. appeared "very

open and honest," "knew . . . he was going to be getting into trouble," and

"[explained] everyone's involvement." Matkowski testified that J.S.

"incriminat[ed] himself" and J.M.H. After the prosecutor asked Matkowski if

he found J.S.'s testimony "trustworthy," defense counsel objected, and the

question was withdrawn. Defense counsel thereafter asked Matkowski on cross-

examination whether J.S. was viewed as "trustworthy," and Matkowski

responded, "Yes." Defense counsel then asked questions highlighting that

Matkowski had at times left the interview room and J.S. had indicated to his

A-3456-23 3 mother outside of Matkowski's presence that he had become "good friends" with

J.M.H. since "last week."

During cross-examination, Matkowski admitted the picture showed the

"body type" and "hair" of the individual with the gas can, but it did not "100

percent" show that it was J.M.H. On redirect, Matkowski testified that J.S.'s

video was corroborated because it depicted the area of one of the fires, J.S.

owned purple Crocs similar to those viewed in the video, and J.S.'s voice was

heard on the video.

J.S. testified he was fourteen years old and in middle school. He had

known J.M.H. for two to three years and J.M.H. was "dating [his] cousin at the

time" of the fire. J.S. confirmed he recorded the video and was wearing the

purple Crocs. He identified the individual "in the video holding the gas can" at

the fire as J.M.H.

On cross-examination, J.S. was asked if he told Matkowski he was "good

friends" with J.M.H. and J.S explained "[he] never said that" but they "were

chill." When asked if he lied, J.S. stated, "I did[ not]" and explained he did not

remember Matkowski asking him if he and J.M.H. were "good friends."

J.M.H. testified he was not at the fire and had "no involvement at all." He

explained there was "hate" between him and J.S. because he was dating J.S.'s

A-3456-23 4 cousin. J.M.H. did not recall what he did on May 29, 2023. He further relayed

he was "[n]ot close friends" with J.S.

After the testimony, the court issued an order accompanied by an oral

decision. The court found J.M.H. purposefully started a fire in the forest of the

Old American Training Center and adjudicated J.M.H. delinquent for conduct

which if committed by an adult would constitute third-degree arson, N.J.S.A.

2C:17-1(b)(5). The court found the State proved each arson element beyond a

reasonable doubt based on the credible evidence, including Matkowski and J.S.'s

testimony. The court made specific credibility findings as to their individual

demeanors while testifying. Regarding J.S.'s inconsistent statement regarding

his friendship with J.M.H, the court found it was not material. It reasoned that

"closeness . . . as it relates to young people, is something that . . . chang[es]."

The court emphasized that it gave "a lot of consideration to" J.S.'s "statements

on two separate occasions, first to law enforcement and then . . . in court, . . .

that incriminated himself" and "identif[ied]" J.M.H. in the arson. Conversely,

the court found J.M.H. lacked credibility, explaining he "was smiling

throughout" and "divert[ed] his eyes . . . when answering the question about his

presence at the scene."

A-3456-23 5 Regarding Matkowski's testimony, the court determined the video he

authenticated was highly relevant. The court noted that while the picture and

video did not show the individual's face holding the gas can, "there [wa]s a

distinctive hair that can be witnessed" in the picture. Additionally, the court

found it relevant that J.S. wore purple Crocs and the "person filming the video

was wearing purple Crocs." Based primarily on J.S.'s credible identification of

J.M.H. as the individual at the fire and in the video holding the gas can, the court

found the State had proven each element of third-degree arson under N.J.S.A.

2C:17-1(b)(5) beyond a reasonable doubt.

After the court's trial decision adjudicating J.M.H. delinquent, J.M.H. pled

guilty to an amended charge of petty disorderly persons simple assault, N.J.S.A.

2C:12-1(a)(1), in an unrelated matter. J.M.H. admitted that on March 6, 2024,

he sent text messages to another individual, agreeing to mutually "engage in a

fight" and the altercation occurred. After finding J.M.H. provided a sufficient

factual basis, the court adjudicated him delinquent of the petty disorderly

persons offense of mutual fighting.

The court imposed on J.M.H. two years' probation with community

service and other conditions on the arson adjudication. On the simple assault

A-3456-23 6 adjudication, the court imposed a hybrid twelve-month probationary period to

be served concurrently.

On appeal, J.M.H. raises the following point:

J.M.H. WAS DEPRIVED OF A FAIR TRIAL BECAUSE THE DETECTIVE PROVIDED INADMISSABLE LAY OPINION ABOUT THE CREDIBILITY OF THE STATE'S KEY WITNESS.

II.

Our standard of review in juvenile delinquency bench trials "is narrow and

is limited to evaluation of whether the trial [court's] findings are supported by

substantial, credible evidence in the record as a whole." State in the Int. of

J.P.F., 368 N.J. Super. 24, 31 (App. Div. 2004). We do not engage in an

independent assessment of the evidence as if "[we] were the court of first

instance." State v. Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964). "We must give deference

to those findings of the trial [court] which are substantially influenced by his or

her opportunity to hear and see the witnesses and have the 'feel' of the case,

which we do not enjoy upon appellate review." State in the Int. of S.B., 333

N.J. Super. 236, 241 (App. Div. 2000). "The standard is whether there is

sufficient credible evidence in the record to support the [court's] determination."

State in the Int. of R.V., 280 N.J. Super. 118, 121 (App. Div. 1995). However,

A-3456-23 7 we need not defer to the trial court's interpretation of the law. State in the Int.

of M.P., 476 N.J. Super. 242, 288 (App. Div. 2023).

Lay opinion testimony is permitted when it is "rationally based on the

witness' perception" and "will assist in understanding the witness' testimony or

determining a fact in issue." N.J.R.E. 701. However, lay opinion testimony "is

not a vehicle for offering the view of the witness about a series of facts that the

[court] can evaluate for itself or an opportunity to express a view on guilt or

innocence." State v. McLean, 205 N.J. 438, 462 (2011). "[T]estimony in the

form of an opinion, whether offered by a lay or an expert witness, is only

permitted if it will assist the [court] in performing its function." Ibid.

In the context of police testimony, an officer may provide testimony about

facts observed firsthand but may not "convey information about what the officer

'believed,' 'thought[,]' or 'suspected.'" Id. at 460. Our Supreme Court has held

that it is improper for a police officer to give a lay opinion "bolstering" another

witness's "credibility." State v. Frisby, 174 N.J. 583, 592 (2002). The Court in

State v. R.K., 220 N.J. 444, 460 (2015), noted that as a general rule, "other

witnesses are prohibited from giving their opinions about [another witness's]

credibility." Further, a police officer's testimony cannot imply that he or she

A-3456-23 8 "possesses superior knowledge, outside the record, that incriminates the

defendant." State v. Branch, 182 N.J. 338, 351 (2005).

Plain errors are those "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R.

2:10-2. Demonstrating plain error "is a 'high bar,' . . . requiring reversal only

where the possibility of an injustice is 'real' and 'sufficient to raise a reasonable

doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might not have

reached.'" State v. Alessi, 240 N.J. 501, 527 (2020) (first quoting State v.

Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 404 (2019); and then quoting State v. Macon, 57 N.J.

325, 336 (1971)). "To determine whether an alleged error rises to the level of

plain error, it 'must be evaluated "in light of the overall strength of the State's

case."'" State v. Clark, 251 N.J. 266, 287 (2022) (quoting State v. Sanchez-

Medina, 231 N.J. 452, 468 (2018)). "The 'high standard' used in plain error

analysis 'provides a strong incentive for counsel to interpose a timely objection,

enabling the trial court to forestall or correct a potential error.'" State v.

Burnham, 474 N.J. Super. 226, 230 (App. Div. 2022) (quoting Santamaria, 236

N.J. at 404).

III.

J.M.H. contends reversal and a remand of the court's adjudication is

warranted because it impermissibly considered Matkowski's inadmissible lay

A-3456-23 9 opinion testimony and its reliance on the testimony was clearly capable of

producing an unjust result. J.M.H. also argues, "if reversal is ordered, [he]

should be allowed to withdraw his subsequent guilty plea to [petty disorderly

persons] simple assault" for fighting by mutual consent. After our review of the

record and court's decision, we are convinced the adjudication is substantially

supported by the evidence and any inadmissible testimony considered was

harmless.

While we agree with J.M.H. that Matkowski's testimony regarding his

belief that J.S. was "up front and honest [about] everything" was inadmissible

lay opinion, the court's limited consideration of the improper testimony was not

"clearly capable of producing an unjust result" nor did it deprive J.M.H. of a fair

trial. R. 2:10-2. A review of the court's decision shows it heavily relied on the

"credible identification in th[e] case by [J.S.] that th[e] person in the video was,

in fact, [J.M.H.]." Notably, the court found J.S.'s in-court identification of

J.M.H. and testimony that he participated in causing the fire was credible. The

court specifically credited J.S.'s testimony because of his courtroom demeanor,

including his "consistent tone and look[ing] at both counsel during their

questioning." The court also reasoned that J.S. "made statements that

incriminated himself in identifying [J.M.H.]." It further found relevant that J.S.

A-3456-23 10 provided a video on which he identified himself and J.M.H. at the fire.

Conversely, the court found J.M.H. was not credible in stating he was not at the

fire. We conclude substantial credible evidence supports the court's

adjudication of J.M.H. as delinquent for committing arson.

We also add that after defense counsel objected to the prosecutor's

question to Matkowski about J.S.'s trustworthiness, the prosecutor withdrew the

question. Then during cross-examination, defense counsel asked Matkowski

about J.S.'s statements being trustworthy. Defense counsel highlighted J.S.'s

conflicting statements regarding his friendship with J.M.H., seeking to discredit

J.S. The court's observation that Matkowski assessed that J.S. was honest was

shortly before it addressed that defense counsel successfully elicited on cross-

examination that Matkowski admitted "he may have stepped out of the room"

and J.S. provided a conflicting statement regarding the closeness of his

friendship with J.M.H. Therefore, we are further convinced that under either

harmless or plain error, Matkowski's inadmissible statements were not "clearly

capable of producing an unjust result," warranting reversal of judgment. R.

2:10-2. The court's adjudication is supported by substantial credible evidence,

and J.M.H. was not deprived of a fair trial.

Affirmed.

A-3456-23 11