Opinion of the Court
this appeal is now moot and does not fall within any exception to the mootness
doctrine. We therefore dismiss this portion of the appeal as no longer justiciable.
Shkut cross-appealed the denial of a motion for sanctions and that issue is not
moot. But, for the reasons explained below, the trial court properly determined that
it could not grant the relief Shkut sought. Accordingly, we affirm the order denying
Shkut’s motion for sanctions.
Facts and Procedural History
The Village of Marvin is a municipal corporation in Union County and is
governed by the Marvin Village Council, which consists of four members and the
mayor. During a council meeting in 2018, council member Ron Salimao moved to
suspend the procedural rules for council meetings so he could tender his resignation
from office and have the council vote to appoint Defendant Mary Shkut as his
replacement. Plaintiffs Joseph Pollino, mayor of Marvin, and Kimberly Vandenberg,
a council member at the time, objected to Salimao’s motion and to Shkut’s
appointment. Nevertheless, the council, by majority vote, accepted Salimao’s
resignation and appointed Shkut.
Plaintiffs then filed a quo warranto action pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-516
challenging the lawfulness of Shkut’s appointment. Several months later, the trial
court dismissed Plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to timely effect service. Plaintiffs
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moved to reconsider the dismissal and to alter or amend the judgment under Rule 59
of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, but the court denied the motion.
Plaintiffs then filed their first appeal to this Court, challenging the dismissal
of their complaint. Shkut moved to dismiss that appeal as untimely. That same day,
Shkut also filed a motion for sanctions against the law firm representing Plaintiffs.
The trial court granted Shkut’s motion to dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal as
untimely. The court denied Shkut’s motion for sanctions. Both Plaintiffs and Shkut
then appealed to this Court and filed various procedural motions and petitions.
Analysis
I. Plaintiffs’ Appeal - Mootness
While this appeal was pending, Plaintiffs filed a “Notice of Mootness and
Motion for Hearing” informing the Court that Shkut’s term of office on the Village
Council ended when new council members were sworn in on 18 December 2019.
Plaintiffs thus acknowledge that “portions of the appeals” are now moot. We agree.
“Whenever, during the course of litigation it develops that the relief sought has
been granted or that the questions originally in controversy between the parties are
no longer at issue, the case should be dismissed” as moot. Dickerson Carolina, Inc. v.
Harrelson, 114 N.C. App. 693, 697, 443 S.E.2d 127, 131 (1994).
Here, the only relief Plaintiffs seek in their complaint is a declaration that
Shkut’s appointment to the Village Council was unlawful. As Plaintiffs concede in
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their notice, “[g]iven that [Shkut] no longer holds office and given that neither party
has challenged the validity of actions taken by the Council during [Shkut’s] term in
office, the portions of the appeals challenging her right to hold office are now moot.”
Nevertheless, Plaintiffs contend that, although otherwise moot, this dispute
remains justiciable because it satisfies the “public importance” exception to mootness.
Under this exception, we may adjudicate an appeal, despite mootness issues, if it
“involves a matter of public interest, is of general importance, and deserves prompt
resolution.” North Carolina State Bar v. Randolph, 325 N.C. 699, 701, 386 S.E.2d
185, 186 (1989). But “this is a very limited exception that our appellate courts have
applied only in those cases involving clear and significant issues of public interest.”
Anderson v. North Carolina State Bd. of Elections, 248 N.C. App. 1, 13, 788 S.E.2d
179, 188 (2016).
This case does not meet the high standard for application of the public interest
exception. First, although one might argue that a lawsuit addressing whether a
public official properly holds her office is a matter of significant public importance,
that is not what this appeal is about. The trial court dismissed Plaintiffs’ suit for
failure to timely serve the summons and complaint. All of the issues raised in this
appeal are procedural in nature and address rather mundane aspects of litigation
that are not of any particular public importance.
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Plaintiffs contend that resolution of this appeal will aid “future litigants” in
understanding the law that applies to “service of the summons and complaint in a
quo warranto action.” But we see nothing in our jurisprudence on this question that
is either so urgent or so important that we must answer this question now. In our
view, Plaintiffs seek “to fish in judicial ponds for legal advice.” Id. at 13, 788 S.E.2d
at 189. We therefore hold that this appeal is not sufficiently exceptional to warrant
application of the public interest exception to mootness. Accordingly, we dismiss
Plaintiffs’ appeal as moot and no longer justiciable.
II. Shkut’s Appeal - Motion for Sanctions
Shkut cross-appealed in this case, arguing that the trial court erred by denying
her motion for sanctions against the law firm that represented Plaintiffs in the trial
court.
In her motion, Shkut alleged that the law firm representing Plaintiffs
impermissibly billed the Village of Marvin for legal services as part of this quo
warranto suit. Shkut contends that these attorneys’ fees violated a statutory
provision governing quo warranto suits, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-521, which states that
“[i]t is unlawful to appropriate any public funds to the payment of counsel fees in any
such action.” Shkut argues that the trial court had authority to grant her motion, and
to sanction the law firm and its counsel, based on the trial court’s “inherent authority
to govern the conduct of attorneys that practice before” the court.
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This argument is meritless for several reasons. First, although trial courts
have authority to impose sanctions on attorneys in certain circumstances and under
certain rules, none of those rules or circumstances are implicated here. See, e.g., N.C.
R. Civ. P. 11 and 37(g). Shkut’s motion is, in effect, a request for a declaratory
judgment that the Village of Marvin violated N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-521 by appropriating
public funds for counsel fees in a quo warranto action, and a corresponding
mandatory injunction forcing the law firm to repay the money.
A request for a declaratory judgment that a municipality violated our General
Statutes cannot be made in a motion for sanctions against a private party in a
separate legal action. Conner v. North Carolina Council of State, 365 N.C. 242, 258–
59, 716 S.E.2d 836, 846–47 (2011). To obtain this sort of declaratory and injunctive
relief, Shkut must bring her own civil action or bring a counterclaim or crossclaim
against the proper parties in an appropriate, pending proceeding.
Second, although there are circumstances in which a trial court may discipline
counsel for unethical conduct, Shkut did not identify any ethical rules that the law
firm and its lawyers violated. See generally Boyce v. North Carolina State Bar, 258
N.C. App. 567, 575–76, 814 S.E.2d 127, 133 (2018). Indeed, Shkut’s motion for
sanctions did not seek ethical discipline—it instead requested declaratory and
injunctive relief to force a law firm to repay funds to the Village of Marvin.
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Accordingly, the trial court properly determined that it could not grant Shkut the
relief she sought in her unusual motion for sanctions.
Conclusion
We dismiss Plaintiffs’ appeal as moot and affirm the trial court’s denial of
Shkut’s motion for sanctions.
DISMISSED IN PART; AFFIRMED IN PART.
Judges TYSON and INMAN concur.
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