In the Missouri Court of Appeals Western District
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) WD86735 ) v. ) OPINION FILED: ) JULY 1, 2025 ROSENDO PALMA, ) ) Appellant. )
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Jackson County, Missouri The Honorable S. Margene Burnett, Judge
Before Division Two: Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge, Gary D. Witt, Judge and W. Douglas Thomson, Judge
Rosendo Palma ("Palma") appeals from the trial court's judgment convicting him
of one count of attempted statutory rape in the first degree in violation of section
566.032,1 one count of statutory sodomy in the first degree in violation of section
566.062, and one count of attempted statutory sodomy in the first degree in violation of
section 566.062. Palma asserts that the trial court plainly erred in failing to instruct the
jury that, when evaluating Palma's guilt, it should only consider the court interpreter's
official translation of evidence from Spanish to English and disregard its own knowledge
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016, as supplemented through the dates of Palma's offenses unless otherwise indicated. of Spanish. Palma also challenges the trial court's exclusion of a social media post,
arguing that the post was admissible to impeach a witness's credibility. Finding no error,
we affirm.
Factual and Procedural Background
Palma does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support his
convictions. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the following evidence
was adduced at trial.2
H.G. ("Mother") and S.G. ("Victim") immigrated to the United States from
Guatemala in 2017, and have lived in Kansas City, Missouri since their arrival in the
country. Mother met Palma shortly after arriving in Kansas City. Palma is married to
Mother's cousin J.L. ("Cousin"). Cousin babysat Victim at the home she shared with
Palma while Mother worked. Palma was almost always present when Mother picked
Victim up at the end of the day. Mother would occasionally find Victim and Palma in a
bedroom with the door closed. According to Mother, Palma and Victim would be on the
bed and underneath the covers, while Victim watched television or played with Palma's
phone. Mother thought such circumstances were normal because she never imagined
Palma hurting Victim.
On May 25, 2021, Mother picked Victim up from Cousin's home after work.
After returning home, Victim told Mother that "her part where she pees from was
burning." Mother looked at Victim's genitals and noticed redness that appeared to be a
2 When reviewing a jury-tried case, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict. State v. Warren, 702 S.W.3d 48, 50 n.2 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). 2 rash, so she asked Victim what happened. Victim told Mother that Palma had touched
her "pucha" with his fingers and began crying. Mother explained during her trial
testimony that "pucha" is the word they used for vagina.
Mother took Victim to Children's Mercy Hospital, where Victim was examined by
a sexual assault nurse examiner. The examination revealed no injuries and did not detect
the presence of male DNA. A physician specializing in child abuse explained that the
absence of injury was not unusual because female genital tissue is stretchy and heals
quickly. Children's Mercy personnel notified the police of Victim's report that Palma
touched her genitals with his fingers.
Victim was interviewed at the Child Protection Center ("CPC") by T.A., a forensic
interviewer ("CPC Interviewer"), on June 7, 2021. Because Victim speaks Spanish, an
interpreter was present during the interview to translate the CPC Interviewer's questions
into Spanish and the Victim's answers into English. Victim told the CPC Interviewer that
she would go upstairs with Palma, who Victim referred to as "Chindo," at the home he
shared with Cousin. Victim explained that, while they were upstairs, Palma would touch
her "pucha" "very hard" with his hands on both the inside and the outside of her body.
Victim also told the CPC Interviewer that Palma removed his pants and went "on top" of
her. When the CPC Interviewer gave Victim anatomically correct dolls and asked Victim
to show what happened, Victim used the dolls to pantomime the male doll thrusting on
top of the female doll. Victim told the CPC Interviewer that Palma's penis touched the
inside of her "pucha." Victim described an instance in which Palma told her to put her
mouth on his penis, but she refused. But, later during the interview, Victim recalled a
3 time when Palma made her put her mouth on his penis while he watched videos on his
phone. Victim informed the CPC Interviewer that she was four years old when each of
the instances occurred.
A grand jury indicted Palma on three charges: (1) statutory rape in the first degree
"in that between June 11, 2020, and May 25, 2021, . . . [Palma] knowingly had sexual
intercourse with [Victim], a child less than twelve years old" ("Count I"); (2) statutory
sodomy in the first degree "in that between June 11, 2020, and May 25, 2021, . . . [Palma]
for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of [Palma] knowingly had
deviate sexual intercourse with [Victim], who was then a child less than twelve years old,
by touching her vagina with his hand" ("Count II"); and (3) statutory sodomy in the first
degree "in that between June 11, 2020, and May 25, 2021, . . . [Palma] for the purpose of
arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of [Palma] knowingly had deviate sexual
intercourse with [Victim], who was then a child less than twelve years old, by placing his
penis in her mouth" ("Count III").
Palma's jury trial was initially set to begin on July 24, 2023, but upon completing
voir dire, a jury of twelve jurors and two alternates could not be seated. The case was
continued until July 31, 2023. A jury was seated from the second venire panel, and the
presentation of evidence began the next day. The State's evidence included testimony
from Mother and Victim, both of whom testified in Spanish. An official court interpreter
translated Mother's and Victim's testimony to English. The CPC Interviewer also
testified, and a video of Victim's interview was entered into evidence and played for the
jury. The video of the interview included both Victim's statements and the interpreter's
4 translation of the Victim's statements into English. Palma elected to testify during the
trial, and his testimony was translated by an official court interpreter from Spanish to
English.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court noted on the record that the trial
court had been informed by a judicial administrative assistant who speaks Spanish that
she believed she heard Palma testify about Victim engaging in sexual acts with a pillow.
The official court interpreter denied that Palma gave such testimony and clarified that
Palma's testimony concerned Mother's boyfriends, a topic that the trial court had ruled
was inadmissible. The official court interpreter stopped translating when told to do so by
defense counsel, so Palma's testimony regarding Mother's boyfriends was not translated
into English. The trial court determined that the best course of action would be to first
determine whether any of the jurors spoke Spanish, and if any raised their hands, to
instruct the jury that it should only consider evidence that was translated into English.
Before the trial court read the jury instructions, the trial court first asked the jury
whether anyone speaks Spanish. Two jurors raised their hands. The trial court then
instructed the jury as follows:
I want to remind you or say--and I didn't say this to begin with--when someone is speaking another language and we have an interpreter, sometimes there is an objection made or there's a stop. If it has not been translated by the interpreter, it's not to be considered. So in case you heard something when someone kept talking and it didn't get translated, put that out of your mind.
The trial court then had a bench conference and asked defense counsel whether he would
prefer for the trial court to speak privately with the two jurors who indicated they speak
5 Spanish. Defense counsel declined and informed the trial court that the defense "[is] not
asking for anything further."
The jury found Palma guilty as follows: (1) with respect to Count I, guilty of
attempt to commit statutory rape in the first degree; (2) with respect to Count II, guilty of
statutory sodomy in the first degree; and (3) with respect to Count III, guilty of attempt to
commit statutory sodomy in the first degree. The jury recommended that Palma be
sentenced to ten years' imprisonment for Count I, to fifteen years' imprisonment for
Count II, and to ten years' imprisonment for Count III. The trial court held a sentencing
hearing on November 17, 2023, and entered a judgment of conviction and sentence
("Judgment"). The Judgment reflected the jury's verdicts, sentenced Palma as the jury
recommended, and ordered the sentences to run consecutively.
Palma appeals. Additional facts will be addressed as relevant to the discussion of
Palma's points on appeal.
Analysis
Palma presents three points on appeal. Palma's first point on appeal asserts that
the trial court committed plain error in failing to generally instruct the jury prior to the
admission of any evidence that it should only consider testimony translated by the official
court interpreter and should not consider any testimony that was not translated from
Spanish to English ("Point One"). Palma's second point on appeal argues that the trial
court's instruction to the jury after the close of the evidence limiting consideration of
testimony to that which was translated from Spanish to English was plain error because it
only addressed testimony that had been subject to an objection ("Point Two"). Palma's
6 third point on appeal contends that the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to allow
the defense to cross-examine the CPC Interviewer about her online statement that child
abuse should equal the death penalty ("Point Three").
Points One and Two: Instructional Error
Points One and Two are closely related, and will be addressed together. Palma's
first point on appeal claims it was plain error for the trial court to fail to sua sponte read
an instruction to the jury prior to the admission of evidence limiting its consideration of
testimony to that translated by the official court interpreter from Spanish to English.
Palma's second point on appeal claims that the instruction given to the jury after the close
of the evidence limiting consideration of testimony to that which had been translated was
plain error because it only addressed testimony that had been subject to an objection.3
Rule 30.204 describes the framework for plain error review as follows: "Whether
briefed or not, plain errors affecting substantial rights may be considered in the discretion
of the court when the court finds that manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice has
3 Palma acknowledges that he did not preserve Points One and Two for appeal and requests plain error review. There is authority for affording plain error review to the failure to give MAI instructions even when a defendant fails to object to an instruction and affirmatively states it has no objection, if manifest injustice would otherwise occur." State v. Irby, 693 S.W.3d 204, 207 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (citing State v. Wurtzberger, 40 S.W.3d 893, 898 (Mo. banc 2001)). However, we are aware of no authority for affording plain error review to a trial court's failure to anticipate the need for and give unrequested non-MAI instructions. Even were we to grant plain error review here, we would not find evident, obvious and clear error, or manifest injustice warranting relief, for the reasons we explain. 4 All Rule references are to Missouri Court Rules, Volume I--State, 2025 unless otherwise noted. 7 resulted therefrom." Plain error review is a two-step process. State v. Love, 700 S.W.3d
288, 292 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). We must first determine whether the trial court
committed error affecting a substantial right that is "evident, obvious, and clear." State v.
Royal, 703 S.W.3d 650, 665 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). The second step requires us to
determine "whether the claimed error resulted in manifest injustice or a miscarriage of
justice." Love, 700 S.W.3d at 293 (quoting State v. Mills, 687 S.W.3d 668, 675 (Mo.
banc 2024)). As applied to alleged instructional error, plain error review requires the
defendant to "show more than mere prejudice and [instead demonstrate] that the trial
court has so misdirected or failed to instruct the jury that it is apparent to the appellate
court that the instructional error affected the jury's verdict." State v. Denham, 686
S.W.3d 357, 368 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Gannan, 658 S.W.3d 103, 111-
12 (Mo. App. W.D. 2022)).
Missouri courts are required to "appoint qualified interpreters and translators in all
legal proceedings in which the non-English speaking person is a party or a witness."
Section 476.803.1; see also Supreme Court Operating Rule 19.04. The interpreter must
"take an oath that he or she will make a true interpretation to the party or witness in a
language that the party or witness understands and that he or she will make a true
interpretation of the party or witness' answers to questions to counsel, court, or jury, in
the English language, with his or her best skill and judgment." Section 476.803.5; see
also Supreme Court Operating Rule 19.04(d).
The Missouri Approved Instructions-Criminal ("MAI-CR") do not include a
pattern instruction addressing interpreted testimony. Even though there is no applicable
8 pattern instruction, Palma argues that the trial court should have sua sponte given an
instruction before evidence was presented admonishing the jury to rely solely on
evidence translated from Spanish to English and to not rely on any evidence that was not
translated, but that had been heard and understood based on a juror's personal knowledge
of Spanish. Palma argues that in the absence of such an instruction, his rights to due
process, a fair trial, and a trial by jury with a unanimous verdict derived from the same
evidence were violated.
Palma acknowledges that there is no Missouri authority requiring a jury
instruction addressing an official court interpreter's translation of the evidence. In the
absence of any authority mandating an instruction regarding the translation of evidence
into English, we cannot find that the trial court's failure to sua sponte give such an
instruction prior to the admission of evidence constituted evident, obvious, and clear
error.5 "Rule 28.02(c) mandates the exclusive use of the Missouri Approved Instructions-
Criminal whenever there is an instruction applicable under the law." State v. Clay, 533
S.W.3d 710, 715-16 (Mo. banc 2017) (quoting State v. Davis, 203 S.W.3d 796, 798 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2006)). Though Rule 28.02(d) contemplates that non-MAI instructions can
be requested and used if there is no "applicable" MAI, it defies logic to suggest that a trial
court is sua sponte obligated to forecast the need to craft or submit non-MAI instructions.
5 Palma does cite to pattern jury instructions in twenty-three states and six federal circuits to support his contention that the trial court's failure to instruct the jury about the translation of evidence constituted plain error. This persuasive authority does not establish that the trial court's failure to sua sponte give such an instruction constituted evident, obvious, and clear error. 9 Undeterred, Palma argues that the trial court should have been aware of the need
to instruct the jury prior to the admission of evidence about translated testimony because
of the unsuccessful attempt to seat a jury on his original trial date. On that occasion,
during voir dire, three potential jurors indicated that they speak Spanish conversationally,
and that they would have difficultly setting aside their own interpretation of the Spanish
testimony in favor of the English translation.6
Palma's contention is disingenuous. Despite the response received from three
potential jurors on his first scheduled trial date, Palma's attorney did not ask during voir
dire on his second trial date whether any of the potential jurors spoke Spanish. Instead,
Palma's attorney asked questions about the translators who would be interpreting
evidence from Spanish to English, including whether any of the potential jurors believed
that the interpreters favored the defense; whether any of the potential jurors thought that
Palma should be speaking English; and whether any of the potential jurors thought the
witnesses should be speaking English. Nobody answered affirmatively. A jury was
ultimately sworn with no indication in the record at that time that any of the seated jurors
were Spanish speaking. If Palma's counsel did not see any need under the circumstances
6 Palma's brief asserts that the trial court recognized that Spanish jurors' inability to set aside their own interpretation of Spanish statements posed a conundrum because the trial court stated during his first voir dire: "I have not had that happen. There is always a first time. I don't know. We'll deal with it whenever it happens." [Appellant's Brief, p. 27] Palma's brief misrepresents the context in which the trial court made this statement. One of the potential jurors during the first attempt to seat a jury asked whether, if he misheard the Spanish testimony or the interpretation of it, could he ask for the witness to repeat the answer and the certified court interpreter to reinterpret the testimony. The trial court made the above statement in response. 10 to request a non-MAI instruction that would admonish the jury to limit its consideration
of evidence to that expressly translated from Spanish to English, we cannot fault the trial
court for failing to sua sponte craft and submit an instruction to that effect prior to the
admission of evidence.
When the trial court did become aware at the conclusion of the evidence of a
specific potential concern that untranslated testimony had been provided by Palma after
an objection was made, it did sua sponte act to address the concern. The trial court
advised the parties that a Spanish-speaking judicial administrative assistant believed she
heard Palma make a statement about Victim engaging in sexual acts with a pillow. This
statement was not interpreted because Palma's counsel had directed the official court
interpreter to stop interpreting after an objection was made. The trial court stated it was
"worried," and that the jurors might need to be asked if they heard anything. Both
counsel acknowledged that neither knew if any of the persons seated for the jury spoke
Spanish. The trial court stated that it would ask the jurors the next day whether any of
the jurors speaks Spanish, and then would remind them to limit what they consider to the
testimony that was translated. Neither party expressed any objection to this plan. When
questioning the next day identified two jurors who spoke Spanish, the trial court
generally instructed that "[i]f it has not been translated by the interpreter, it's not to be
considered." Though the trial court prefaced this instruction by noting that sometimes
"there is an objection made or there's a stop" after which a witness might keep speaking,
we cannot say that the instruction, read as a whole, evidently, obviously, or clearly
11 limited the scope of the admonition therein contained to non-translated testimony given
after an objection.
We do not find, therefore, plain error. Even had we, however, we would not find
that Palma established a manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice. Palma has not
demonstrated how the trial court's failure to instruct the jury about translated testimony
prior to the admission of evidence affected the jury's verdict. Denham, 686 S.W.3d at
368. Palma broadly claims that, because the jury was not directed by the trial court to
limit its consideration of evidence to the English translation provided by the official court
interpreter, the jury's verdicts were not unanimous. Palma argues that, by not being
instructed to limit their consideration of the evidence to the English translation provided,
the two jurors who indicated they spoke Spanish "were free to reach a verdict on
evidence different from the evidence considered by other jurors," a "fundamentally
unfair" deprivation of "[Palma's] rights to due process, a fair trial, and trial by jury with a
unanimous verdict derived from the same evidence." [Appellant's Brief, p. 31] Palma
also asserts that, without an instruction limiting the jury's consideration of evidence to
English translation thereof, the Spanish-speaking jurors "were free to communicate their
own interpretation to the other jurors in deliberation," thereby risking that the jury would
reach verdicts based on evidence not presented in English and impeding the right to
meaningful appellate review. [Appellant's Brief, pp. 34-35]
Palma's hypothetical concerns are not self-proving. The only specific example of
testimony identified by Palma as susceptible to misinterpretation is Mother's testimony
that Victim used the word "pucha" to describe her vagina. Palma claims that the official
12 court interpreter was not able to provide a translation for "pucha," and that, as a result, the
Spanish-speaking jurors "could have interpreted the word differently than the other
jurors." [Appellant's Brief, p. 32] This claim, however, is not supported by any reference
to the transcript, and is purely speculative. A defendant's claim of prejudice cannot be
based on mere speculation and instead must be based on proof in the record. State v.
Taylor, 134 S.W.3d 21, 25 (Mo. banc 2004).
The trial court did not commit plain error in failing to sua sponte instruct the jury
prior to the admission of evidence about its consideration of testimony being limited to
that translated by the official court interpreter, or in referencing testimony offered after an
objection in so instructing the jury after the close of the evidence.
Points One and Two are denied.
Point Three: Exclusion of Evidence
In his third point on appeal, Palma argues that the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to allow Palma to ask the CPC Interviewer about "whether [she] made,
agreed, or agrees with the statement that child abuse should equal the death penalty."
[Appellant's Brief, p. 52] Palma asserts that such a question concerned both the CPC
Interviewer's credibility, and the CPC Interviewer's potential bias and prejudice against
Palma, because he had been accused of child abuse. Palma argues that, because the State
relied heavily on the video of the CPC Interviewer's interview with Victim in his closing
argument and because the jury asked for the video recording of the interview during its
deliberations, Palma suffered prejudice because he was unable to challenge key sources
of evidence on which the State heavily relied at trial.
13 Because trial courts are vested with broad discretion to admit or exclude evidence,
alleged error relating to the admission or exclusion of evidence is reviewed for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Karim, 685 S.W.3d 658, 662 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024). A trial court
has "broad discretion to limit the scope of cross-examination." State v. Lawson, 693
S.W.3d 82, 107 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023) (quoting State v. Raines, 118 S.W.3d 205, 213
(Mo. App. W.D. 2003)). "A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is clearly
against the logic of the circumstances and is so unreasonable as to indicate a lack of
careful consideration." State v. Fisher, 705 S.W.3d 664, 680 (Mo. App. W.D. 2024)
(quoting Denham, 686 S.W.3d at 371). "[I]f reasonable [persons] can differ about the
propriety of the action taken by the trial court, then it cannot be said that the trial court
abused its discretion." Lawson, 693 S.W.3d at 107 (quoting State v. Perkins, 656 S.W.3d
285, 295 (Mo. App. E.D. 2022)). We will only reverse the trial court's judgment on the
basis of an evidentiary ruling if the exclusion of evidence "was so prejudicial that it
deprived the defendant of a fair trial." Fisher, 705 S.W.3d at 680-81 (quoting Denham,
686 S.W.3d at 371). "The erroneous exclusion of evidence in a criminal case creates a
presumption of prejudice that the State may rebut by proving that the error was harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt." Lawson, 693 S.W.3d at 107.
Prior to trial, the State filed a motion in limine in which it asked the trial court to
exclude evidence of "bad acts, immorality, or arrests" of State witnesses, and in that
motion in limine, specifically asked the trial court to prohibit Palma from introducing
"decade[-]old 'tweets' that [the CPC Interviewer] either liked or 'retweeted,'" arguing that
14 those "tweets are wholly irrelevant to her testimony in this case." The trial court
sustained the motion.
Near the end of the cross-examination of the CPC Interviewer, Palma's attorney
asked the CPC Interviewer whether she "made a statement or . . . agreed with the
statement that child abuse . . . should equal the death penalty." The State immediately
asked for a bench conference, and the following exchange occurred:
State's attorney: That's a blatant violation of the motion in limine [ruling]. It's a reference to some Twitter comments that the witness made ten years ago. The court has already ruled that it's inadmissible. It was clearly made in violation of that. The State would ask that question be stricken.
Palma's attorney: I don't know that there ever was a motion in limine on that point.
State's attorney: When I filed my motion in limine--
....
Trial court: And your--what was your specific motion in limine? What was the--
States' attorney: It was--I'd have to look at it. But, it was essentially prior bad acts or immorality of witnesses. And, I specifically put that I suspected that he would try to introduce or discuss decade-old tweets from [the CPC Interviewer], and they should be inadmissible. That's a blatant violation to that. It would have been in the motion in limine that I filed which was--
State's attorney: It would have been number 7.
Trial court: Bad acts, immorality, or arrest of state witnesses. . . .
Palma's attorney: I do have something to add to that. . . . So bad acts or immorality has more to do with uncharged bad acts, not the credibility of a witness or interest or bias. And the court already--when we were talking about the immigration, which obviously has nothing to do with this witness--indicated that bias or interest of a witness is something that is admissible. And if she's saying she's a neutral party then . . . basically [the 15 CPC Interviewer has] already concluded that something--a particular outcome should happen. I think that's bias or interest that goes to the credibility of the witness.
Trial court: All right. And my ruling at the motion in limine because it was specifically directed to her old tweets and I am going to overrule the objection--or sustain the objection and direct that the jury disregard the question.
The proceedings returned to open court, and the trial court directed the jury "to disregard
the last question that was just asked." Palma asserted in his motion for new trial that the
trial court erred in preventing his attorney from asking the CPC Interviewer "about a
tweet or retweet from her Twitter account in which the writer opines that people who
abuse children deserve the death penalty."7
Evidence is admissible if it is both logically and legally relevant. Fisher, 705
S.W.3d at 681. "Evidence is logically relevant if it tends to make the existence of a
material fact more or less probable." Id. (quoting State v. Prince, 534 S.W.3d 813, 817
(Mo. banc 2017)). "A witness's credibility and bias in relation to a party are logically
7 The State argues that our review of Palma's third point on appeal is limited to plain error because Palma did not make an offer of proof regarding the excluded cross- examination of the CPC Interviewer. Palma acknowledges he did not make an offer of proof, but argues that doing so was unnecessary because the record demonstrates that the trial court and opposing counsel were sufficiently advised as to what the testimony of the witness would probably be, and the appellate court can determine from the record whether the excluded testimony was proper evidence. Under the circumstances in this case, we believe the record is sufficiently clear to have permitted the trial court and this court to understand what the excluded testimony would have been. "[A] party may be excused from the requirement of an offer of proof when there is a complete understanding from the record what the excluded testimony would have been, the objection relates to a category of evidence rather than specific testimony, and the record shows the evidence would have helped its proponent." State v. Tetmeyer, 699 S.W.3d 886, 889 (Mo. App. S.D. 2024) (quoting State v. Rieser, 569 S.W.3d 452, 455 (Mo. App. E.D. 2018)). 16 relevant." Lawson, 693 S.W.3d at 107. Nevertheless, the trial court may "limit inquiry
into bias and credibility in relation to its legal relevance." Id. Legal relevance requires
"weigh[ing] the probative value of the evidence against its costs--unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or
cumulativeness." Fisher, 705 S.W.3d at 681 (quoting Prince, S.W.3d at 818). In
weighing the probative value of evidence against its costs, "the trial court retains 'wide
latitude . . . to impose reasonable limits on . . . cross examination based on concerns
about, among other things, harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness'[s]
safety, or interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.'" Lawson, 693
S.W.3d at 108 (quoting Raines, 118 S.W.3d at 213-14).
Whether the CPC Interviewer harbored bias or prejudice against Palma, and the
CPC Interviewer's credibility as a witness, were logically relevant areas of inquiry.
However, the trial court had wide latitude to limit inquiry into a decade-old online
statement that the CPC Interviewer either made or liked from her Twitter account on the
basis of legal relevance. Palma argues that the trial court's decision to exclude cross-
examination about the CPC Interviewer's decade-old online statement was both against
the logic of the circumstances and was so unreasonable and arbitrary so as to shock the
sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration because the evidence suggests
the CPC Interviewer might have been motivated to exaggerate her testimony. We
disagree.
The CPC Interviewer's direct examination was limited in scope. She explained her
role as a forensic interviewer of children generally, confirmed that she conducted an
17 interview of Victim on June 7, 2021, and identified the video recording of the interview.
Then, the video recording was played for the jury. The CPC Interviewer's direct
examination ended by identifying the anatomically correct drawings that were used
during the interview of Victim, and those drawings were entered into evidence. At that
point, Palma's attorney cross-examined the CPC Interviewer and highlighted the
following: (1) that the CPC Interviewer does not hold a professional license, and is not a
social worker, phycologist, or a therapist; (2) that the CPC Interviewer is employed by
the Child Advocacy Center, which is a part of multidisciplinary team that includes law
enforcement, the prosecutor's office, and the Children's Division of the Missouri
Department of Social Services that works to investigate allegations of child abuse and
sexual abuse; (3) that the CPC Interviewer's job is to attempt to elicit information from a
child that investigators may want for their investigation of alleged crimes; and (4) the
discrepancies between the video recording of Victim's interview and the CPC
Interviewer's written report. Taken together, Palma's cross-examination suggested to the
jury that the CPC Interviewer was unqualified, harbored a bias toward the State due to
her participation on a multidisciplinary team responsible for investigating child abuse and
sexual abuse, and failed to make an accurate written record of her interview of Victim.
Given these circumstances, we cannot conclude that the trial court's exclusion of
evidence about a decade-old online statement that the CPC Interviewer either made or
liked from her Twitter account was against the logic of the circumstances or was so
arbitrary so as to shock our sense of justice and indicate a lack of careful consideration.
The CPC Interviewer's online statement was temporally remote, was not specifically
18 targeted at Palma, and was cumulative of other evidence of the CPC's Interviewer's bias
and prejudice that was directly related to the prosecution of Palma.
Point Three is denied.
Conclusion
The Judgment is affirmed.
__________________________________ Cynthia L. Martin, Presiding Judge
All concur