State of Missouri v. Victor L. Kates
This text of State of Missouri v. Victor L. Kates (State of Missouri v. Victor L. Kates) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Missouri Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FOUR
STATE OF MISSOURI, ) No. ED111457 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court of ) the City of St. Louis vs. ) 2222-CR01581-01 ) VICTOR L. KATES, ) Honorable Scott A. Millikan ) Appellant. ) Filed: April 30, 2024
Before John P. Torbitzky, P.J., James M. Dowd, J., and Michael S. Wright, J.
Opinion
On October 19, 2021, appellant Victor Kates was arrested in the City of St. Louis and
charged with unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon in violation of section 571.070, 1
unlawful use of a firearm while in possession of methamphetamine in violation of section
571.030, possession of methamphetamine in violation of section 579.015, tampering with a
motor vehicle without the owner’s consent in violation of section 569.080.1(2), and resisting
arrest by fleeing in violation of section 575.150.
On February 10, 2023, Kates pleaded guilty to these charges pursuant to a negotiated plea
agreement with the State. Finding that sufficient factual bases supported the pleas, the court
1 All statutory references are to RSMo 2016. accepted them and sentenced Kates in accordance with the plea agreement to a total of three
years in prison. 2
After the court accepted his pleas but before sentencing, Kates objected to being
sentenced on the possession of a controlled substance charge because that conduct is the same
conduct underlying the unlawful use of a weapon charge under section 571.030 and thus is
merely a lesser included offense to that weapon charge and should not have been charged or
sentenced separately.
While in point one of his brief and later at oral argument, Kates sought to avoid
characterizing his argument as raising a double jeopardy violation - instead couching it in terms
of a due process violation – his argument nonetheless seeks to raise a constitutional challenge to
what the court did. In his remaining points, Kates relies on the recent Supreme Court decision in
N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) for his argument that
the statutes upon which the unlawful possession of a firearm and the unlawful use of a weapon
charges are based are unconstitutional under the U.S. and Missouri constitutions because neither
is a “regulation consistent or analogous with the Nation’s historical tradition of firearm
regulation.”
Because Kates entered into unconditional guilty pleas to the charges without raising any
of these arguments and obtained the benefit of concurrent sentencing pursuant to a plea
agreement that reduced his jail time from fifteen years to three years, we hold that Kates waived
his right to raise any of these issues on appeal.
2 The court sentenced Kates to three years on each charge and ordered the sentences to run concurrently to one another.
2 Waiver of Point I
We turn first to our holding with respect to point one that by pleading guilty
unconditionally to the two crimes that included drug possession as an element, Kates waived the
right to raise his lesser-included-offense due process argument on appeal.
“[A] guilty plea serves as a waiver of most non-jurisdictional errors that occurred prior to
its entry, including constitutional challenges.” State v. Russell, 598 S.W.3d 133, 138 (Mo. banc
2020). “When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty
of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating
to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea.”
Hampton v. State, 495 S.W.2d 638, 642 (Mo. 1973).
But Russell taught us that guilty pleas waive a lot, but not everything, and since both
parties rely on Russell, we take a closer look. The Russell Court found “that whether an
excessive sentence can be raised on appeal is not determined by the general principles of waiver
inherent in a guilty plea.” Russell, 598 S.W.3d at 138. The State claims Russell’s holding was
limited and only stands for the proposition that challenging an excessive sentence after a guilty
plea is permitted. For his part, Kates seeks to extend Russell beyond this limited holding and
argues instead that Russell held that a guilty plea does not waive a defendant’s right to appeal
constitutional issues such as Kates attempts to do here. But we do not read Russell that broadly
or as altering the longstanding principle in Missouri law that a guilty plea waives most non-
jurisdictional errors especially when that principle was reiterated in Russell itself. Id. at 138.
And we agree that Russell’s holding concerned excessive sentences only which is not at issue
here.
3 It is apparent from this record that the constitutional claims Kates alleges here, to the
extent they occurred at all, occurred prior to the entry of his guilty plea. Kates knew he was
charged with violating both statutes. He knew that possession of a controlled substance was the
predicate conduct with respect to each crime. Yet, he admitted to the court that he was guilty of
each crime under each statute. And he acknowledged during the plea colloquy that by pleading
guilty he was waiving his right to appeal. Thus, Kates cannot now raise these claims on appeal.
Hampton, 495 S.W.2d at 642.
Further, we reject Kates’ assertion that we are required to transfer this case to the
Missouri Supreme Court because he has presented a “real and substantial” constitutional claim.
In light of State v. Onyejiaka, 671 S.W.3d 796 (Mo. banc 2023), Kates’ argument at most
presents a colorable constitutional claim that this Court may properly retain and decide. See In
re Arnold, 292 S.W.3d 393, 396 (Mo. App. E.D. 2009).
The defendant in Onyejiaka was tried and found guilty by a jury of both possessing a
controlled substance and unlawfully using a weapon while in possession of a controlled
substance. Id. at 797. On appeal, Onyejiaka claimed this violated his constitutional right against
double jeopardy. Id. The Supreme Court disagreed finding that “[b]ased upon the plain
language of section 571.030.1(11) and this Court’s rules of statutory interpretation, therefore, the
only outcome the legislature could have intended by enacting section 571.030.1(11) is to
authorize multiple punishments for violations of sections 579.015 and 571.030.1(11).” Id. at
800. Inasmuch as our Supreme Court in Onyejiaka rejected the same premise upon which Kates’
argument is based here, we conclude that he presents at most a colorable constitutional claim.
4 Waiver of Points II-V
In Points II-V, Kates challenges pursuant to N.Y. State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v.
Bruen, 142 S.Ct. 2111 (2022) the constitutionality of sections 571.070(1) and 571.030.1(11), the
statutes upon which his two gun-related charges were premised.
“In order to preserve a constitutional issue for appellate review, a party must (1) raise the
issue at the first available opportunity, (2) note the constitutional provision claimed to be
violated by specifically referencing the article and section of the constitution or by quoting the
constitutional provision itself, (3) state the facts that constitute the constitutional violation, and
(4) preserve the constitutional issue throughout the proceeding.” State v.
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