In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION FIVE
STATE OF MISSOURI ) ED112252 ) Respondent, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of the City of St. Louis vs. ) 2222-CR01334 ) TYRONE WILLIAMS, ) Honorable Theresa C. Burke ) Appellant. ) Filed: May 27, 2025
Before Thomas C. Clark II, C.J., Philip M. Hess, J., and James M. Dowd, J.
OPINION
On September 8, 2021, Tyrone Williams shot and killed Victim. The two men had
fought earlier that day over their respective relationships with Tarez Campbell, with whom each
had a child. The State charged Williams with first-degree murder and armed criminal action. A
jury convicted Williams of those crimes, and the court sentenced him to life in prison without the
possibility of parole for the murder conviction and a consecutive term of three years for the
armed criminal action conviction.
Williams asserts four points on appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in denying his motion
to dismiss on the basis of improper prosecutorial vindictiveness after the prosecutor threatened
Williams’ counsel that he would upgrade the second-degree murder charge to first-degree
murder if Williams did not make a plea offer, (2) that the court erred in allowing the State to publish to the jury a demonstrative exhibit, which consisted of a slowed-down video of the
shooting, because it was unduly prejudicial, (3) that the court erred in failing to intervene sua
sponte and issue a curative instruction when the State, in its closing argument, made an improper
acquittal-first argument by telling the jury they could only consider second-degree murder if they
first found Williams not guilty of first-degree murder beyond a reasonable doubt, and (4) that the
trial court erred in failing to dismiss the case because the State violated his right to a speedy trial
in that he spent 741 days in jail awaiting trial and most of the delays were attributable to the
State and to the court.
We affirm. As to point I, we find that while the prosecutor’s tone was coarse, he had the
discretion and an adequate factual basis to increase the charge from second-degree murder to
first-degree murder. As to point II, we find that the conditions the trial court put on the
demonstrative video’s use diminished any prejudicial impact it may have had. In point III, we
find the State’s acquittal-first argument, while improper, was not outcome determinative. As to
point IV, no speedy trial violation occurred because Williams did not show that the delay was
sufficiently prejudicial or that it was intended to disadvantage Williams’ defense.
Background
On November 23, 2021, the State charged Williams with second-degree murder and
armed criminal action for the September 8, 2021, shooting death of Victim on Whittier Street in
the City of St. Louis. Two weeks before the first trial setting on September 6, 2022, the
prosecutor texted Williams’ counsel, “Maybe you should make an offer on Murder-Two before
he’s reindicted on Murder-One. I don’t bluff. You have a week.” No plea negotiations occurred
and on the morning of trial the State nolle prosequied the charges and then reindicted Williams,
this time for first-degree murder, the lesser-included charge of second-degree murder, and armed
2 criminal action. The State based its first-degree murder and associated armed criminal action
charges on witness Campbell’s deposition testimony that Williams told Campbell he was going
to murder Victim hours before doing so.
The record relevant to Williams’ claim of a speedy trial violation includes the following:
From his arrest to trial, 741 days elapsed. Of those 741 days, forty-one are attributable to
Williams with the remainder attributable to the State and to the court’s normal operations. 417
of the 741 days transpired after the State indicted Williams for first-degree murder.
Williams made four speedy trial requests. The first request was on February 23, 2022,
another on August 24, 2022, in his motion to dismiss, another on May 1, 2023, and the last one
on September 5, 2023. On May 9, 2023, the trial court granted the State’s continuance request
over Williams’ objection which moved the trial date to September 5, 2023, and added 115 days
to the overall delay. A week before the September 5 trial, and after two new assistant circuit
attorneys entered their appearances, the State again moved to continue the case to October 30,
2023, which added an additional 55 days. Williams’ trial took place from October 30 to
November 2, 2023.
Williams does not contest the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions and
viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the following evidence was adduced at trial:
Williams and Victim each had a child with Campbell and Victim lived across the street from
Campbell. Though they no longer maintained a romantic relationship, Williams and Campbell
stayed in contact regarding their child. On September 8, 2021, Williams brought the child to
Campbell’s home and then borrowed Campbell’s car to run an errand. Upon his return, Williams
fell asleep on Campbell’s living-room couch.
3 While Williams slept, Victim arrived at house during his work break. Before leaving,
Victim told Campbell he was unhappy that Williams was there. Williams then awoke and
Campbell told him that Victim was annoyed he was there sleeping.
Later that afternoon, Victim returned to Campbell’s home to find Williams still there.
The men exchanged words which led to a physical altercation. Williams left. He then phoned
Campbell and told her that when he returned he was going to kill Victim. The record does not
reflect that Campbell reported this threat to the police.
Upon his return, Williams and Victim argued again outside Campbell’s residence before
Williams shot Victim several times at close range. Victim was alive when police arrived but
died later that day.
A neighbor’s security camera captured the shooting. Prior to trial, the State created a
slowed-down version of the video which extended the 23-second encounter into approximately
three minutes of slow-motion video footage. This enhanced video included at one point the on-
screen phrase “apparent muzzle flash” near Williams’ firearm. Williams moved in limine to
exclude this demonstrative exhibit entirely because it was not a fair and accurate depiction of the
shooting. The court disagreed but required the State (1) to remove the phrase “apparent muzzle
flash,” (2) to show the jury the original video first, and (3) to establish the expert qualifications
of the officer who edited the video. The State complied with these conditions and exhibited the
enhanced video to the jury.
For his part, Williams testified at trial and admitted he shot Victim but claimed he did so
in self-defense because he saw Victim reach behind his back and pull out a gun.
The jury found Williams guilty of first-degree murder and armed criminal action.
Williams waived jury sentencing and the court sentenced him to life without parole for first-
4 degree murder and a consecutive sentence of three years for the armed criminal action
conviction.
This appeal follows.
Discussion
Point One: Vindictive Prosecution
Williams claims the trial court abused its discretion in denying his motion to dismiss
because the State vindictively increased its charges from second-degree murder to first-degree
murder after Williams failed to make a plea offer and instead insisted on a jury trial on the
second-degree murder charge. We disagree because Williams did not demonstrate the State’s
sole purpose for the increased charge was to penalize Williams for exercising his constitutional
right to a trial by jury. Rather, the record shows that the State had a sound evidentiary basis that
Williams deliberated well in advance of the murder, and the jury agreed.
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss a charging instrument for an abuse
of discretion. State v. Turner, 683 S.W.3d 709, 717 (Mo. App. W.D. 2023). “The due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevents a prosecuting attorney from acting vindictively to
punish a criminal defendant for exercising a right.” State v. McWilliams, 698 S.W.3d 783, 788-
89 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). The defendant has the initial burden to show that there is a likelihood
of vindictiveness. Id. at 789. “A presumption of vindictiveness is established when ‘the facts
show a realistic likelihood of vindictiveness in the prosecutor’s augmentation of charges.’” State
ex rel. Becker v. Wood, 611 S.W.3d 510, 514 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting State v. Gardner, 8
S.W.3d 66, 70 (Mo. banc 1999)).
Courts weigh two factors to determine whether a realistic likelihood of prosecutorial
vindictiveness exists: “(1) the prosecutor’s stake in deterring the exercise of some right, and (2)
5 the prosecutor’s conduct.” Id. “In order for the defendant to prove an allegation of prosecutorial
vindictiveness, he must show that the additional charges were brought solely to penalize the
defendant for exercising his constitutional rights and cannot be justified as a proper exercise of
prosecutorial discretion.” State v. Molinett, 876 S.W.2d 806, 809 (Mo. App. W.D. 1994). Once
established, the State then must defend the charge with objective explanations of its rationale.
Id. at 514-515 (quoting State ex rel. Patterson v. Randall, 637 S.W.2d 16, 18 (Mo. banc 1982)
(further citation omitted)). A presumption of vindictiveness is rarely found at the pretrial stage.
See Wood, 611 S.W.3d at 515 n. 7.
Here, Williams confuses the prosecutor’s juvenile belligerence with vindictiveness. The
prosecutor could have gotten to the same place by simply alerting Williams’ counsel that if the
then-current charges were not resolved by way of a plea agreement before the September 6 trial,
then the prosecutor would nolle prosequi the charges and refile the case with the first-degree
murder charge, something the prosecutor had the discretion and factual basis to do. See Wood,
611 S.W.3d at 514 (A prosecuting attorney has broad, almost unfettered discretion in deciding
what charge and what punishment to seek.). Thus, Williams has failed to carry his burden on
this issue.
Point denied.
Point Two: The Slow-Motion Demonstrative Video of the Murder
We reject Williams’ claim that the slow-motion version of the video of the murder was
inadmissibly misleading and prejudicial. Rather, the court adroitly imposed conditions on the
State’s use of the demonstrative video so that the video was relevant, not misleading, and served
a legitimate purpose.
6 We review a trial court’s decision regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence for
an abuse of discretion. State v. Wood, 580 S.W.3d 566, 574 (Mo. banc 2019). As such, we will
uphold a trial court’s ruling in this context if it is sustainable under any theory. State v. Black,
666 S.W.3d 205, 208 (Mo. App. E.D. 2023). Demonstrative evidence may be admissible so long
as it is both logically and legally relevant. State v. Brown, 337 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Mo. banc 2011).
Logical relevance refers to the tendency to make the existence of a material fact more or less
probable, while legal relevance weighs the evidence’s probative value against unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, waste of time, or cumulativeness.
Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 902 (Mo. banc 2013). When assessing the relevance of
demonstrative evidence, a court must ensure that the evidence is a fair representation of what is
being depicted and that it is not inflammatory, deceptive, or misleading. Id.
The foregoing authorities lead us to conclude that this video was logically and legally
relevant and its publication to the jury was not an abuse of discretion. First, manifestly, a video
that depicts the crime at issue is logically relevant. See State v. Middleton, 995 S.W.2d 443, 462
(Mo. banc 1999). Second, the conditions the trial court imposed on the State’s use of the video
minimized any potential prejudice such that its probative value outweighed any prejudice.
Specifically, the court ordered the State to remove the phrase “apparent muzzle flash,” the jury
first saw the murder video at regular speed, and then heard the video-editing officer’s
explanations of the edits, all of which minimized the risk of misleading or deceiving the jury.
Accordingly, we deny Williams’ second point.
Point Three: Closing Argument
Williams claims the court plainly erred in failing to sua sponte issue a curative instruction
after the State made an acquittal-first argument in its closing. For its part, the State concedes that
7 its acquittal-first argument was improper and constituted clear error. Thus, under our plain error
standards, we review whether the error resulted in a manifest injustice or a miscarriage of justice
for which Williams must show the error to be outcome determinative. State v. Teter, 665 S.W.3d
306, 312 (Mo. banc 2023). We find no outcome-determinative manifest injustice or miscarriage
of justice here because there is ample evidence that Williams murdered Victim after deliberating
on it.
“[A]n acquittal first argument will be upheld if ‘the strength of the evidence of
deliberation precludes a finding of prejudice.” Id. (quoting Tisius v. State, 183 S.W.3d 207, 217
(Mo. banc 2006)). Here, the evidence of deliberation is strong. Williams announced his
intention to murder Victim before proceeding to shoot Victim at close range, and the murder was
videotaped. This evidence effectively precludes a finding of a miscarriage of justice.
For his part, Williams argues that the jury’s question to the court during its deliberations
regarding “reasonable doubt” in the context of Williams’ “deliberation” somehow demonstrates
manifest injustice or miscarriage of justice. We disagree because Williams fails to show how the
jury’s inquiry as to the deliberation element of first-degree murder was related to the State’s
acquittal-first argument. And the court instructed the jury that it could find Williams guilty of
the lesser included second-degree murder charge if it did not find him guilty of first-degree
murder. See State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 574 (Mo. 2009) (“[A] lesser included offense
may be considered when the jury is deadlocked on the greater offense.”)
Point Four: Speedy Trial
Lastly, we turn to Williams’ claim that the trial court should have dismissed this case
because the 741-day delay from arrest to trial violated his constitutional right to a speedy trial.
8 Unpersuaded, we reject Williams’ claim because although the 741-day delay is presumptively
prejudicial, he failed to show how the State’s continuance requests were a deliberate ploy to
delay the trial to hamper his defense or that he was otherwise prejudiced. Barker v. Wingo, 407
U.S. 514, 520 (1972).
We review de novo claims of a violation of a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a
speedy trial, but we defer to the trial court’s factual findings. State v. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d 304,
313 (Mo. banc 2015). The right to a speedy trial appears in both the United States and Missouri
constitutions. Id., U.S. Const. Amend. VI; Mo. Const., art. I, § 18(a). We apply a four-factor
analysis: (1) the length of the delay; (2) the cause of the delay; (3) the defendant’s assertion of
his right; and (4) the prejudice to the defendant resulting from the delay. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at
313 (citing Barker, 407 U.S. at 520). The existence of any one of these factors is neither
necessary nor sufficient to find a speedy trial deprivation. Id.
First, the length of the delay. Missouri courts find any delay longer than eight months to
be presumptively prejudicial. State ex rel. McKee v. Riley, 240 S.W.3d 720, 731 (Mo. banc
2007). The delay is measured from the formal indictment or arrest, to the beginning of trial.
State v. Ausler, 697 S.W3d 24, 31 (Mo. App. E.D. 2024). Delays the defendant caused are
subtracted from the total delay when considering this factor. Id. Thus, the 700 days attributable
to the State is presumptively prejudicial and triggers continued analysis.
Second, the cause or causes of the delay. “Pretrial delay is often inevitable and wholly
justifiable.” State v. Davis, 903 S.W.2d 930, 936 (Mo. App. W.D. 1995). Deliberate delays by
the State to hamper the defense weigh heavily against the State. Ausler, 697 S.W.3d at 31 (Mo.
App. E.D. 2024). Delays caused by the regular functioning of the courts or the State’s
negligence but not shown to be a deliberate attempt to delay trial, are considered neutral and
9 weigh lightly against the State. Id. Delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic are justifiable
and unattributable. Id. Delays caused by defense-requested continuances weigh heavily against
the defendant. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 314; see State v. Henry, 696 S.W.3d 59, 71 (Mo. App. S.D.
2024) (where the delay due to a request for a change of judge weighed heavily against
defendant).
Since Williams effectively concedes that any delay before the September 6, 2022,
reindictment resulted from the normal functioning of the court, we turn our attention to the post-
reindictment delay. Of that 417-day delay, 214 days were attributable to normal court functions
which weigh lightly against the State, 162 days followed the State’s two continuance requests
and weigh lightly against the State, and 41 days resulted from Williams’ motions and those
weigh heavily against Williams.
Again, we weigh lightly against the State the delays caused by its two continuance
requests. See Ausler, 697 S.W.3d at 32. Although as to the first continuance request Williams
now claims negligence and bad faith on the State’s part, neither party, according to the record,
offered a reason for the continuance at the time. Without evidence that the State deliberately
delayed the trial to hamper the defense, we weigh the first delay lightly against the State. Id. As
to the second continuance, a scheduling conflict triggered the withdrawal of the prosecutor
assigned to the case and the State needed more time for the new prosecutor to prepare. This
delay is considered neutral and also weighs lightly against the State. Id. Conversely, the 41-day
delay Williams caused, including by his change of judge request, weighs heavily against him.
Henry, 696 S.W.3d at 71. On balance, we do not find the lightly-weighted State’s delays to be
outcome determinative. Ausler, 697 S.W.3d at 32.
10 Third, Williams’ assertion of his speedy trial rights. As we have noted, Williams did so
four times and these repeated speedy trial reclamations weigh in his favor. See Barker, 240
S.W.3d at 531-32.
Finally, we address the most serious factor – whether the delay prejudiced the defendant,
for which we invoke three primary considerations: (1) the prevention of oppressive pretrial
incarceration; (2) the minimization of anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) the limitation
of the possibility that the defense will be impaired. Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at 317. Any claimed
prejudice resulting from delay must be actual and apparent on the record or by reasonable
inference and speculative prejudice is not sufficient. State v. Newman, 256 S.W.3d 210, 217
(Mo. App. W.D. 2008). And the prejudice has to be more than the prejudice that normally
attends any criminal proceeding, i.e., that memories will dim, witnesses will become
inaccessible, and evidence will be lost. State v. Bell, 66 S.W.3d 157, 162, 165 (Mo. App. S.D.
2001). Finally, the defendant bears the burden of proving prejudice. State v. Howell, 628
S.W.3d 750, 759 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021).
Here, Williams does not specifically address whether he suffered oppressive pretrial
incarceration or anxiety and concern, but claims instead that the delay impaired his defense. In
so doing, Williams offers general research regarding the purported connection between pretrial
detention and the increased likelihood of a resulting conviction. While we agree with the basic
premise of the importance of speedy prosecution to the criminal justice system, this generic
research does nothing to prove any prejudice specific to Williams on this record. See Newman,
256 S.W.3d at 217.
Moreover, Williams was convicted and sentenced to life in prison without the possibility
of parole. He cannot claim, therefore, that he served additional, unwarranted jailtime because of
11 the delay in bringing him to trial. See State v. Lewis-Jones, 698 S.W.3d 507, 516 (Mo. App.
E.D. 2010).
For his part, Williams relies on Doggett v. United States, 505 U.S. 647, 655-8 (1992), for
the notion that a speedy trial violation may exist even when specific prejudice is not shown. Id.
Doggett is readily distinguishable and therefore unhelpful to Williams because of the
extraordinarily long delay – 8 ½ years – and the indication that in Doggett the State intentionally
held back its prosecution to “gain some impermissible advantage at trial.” Sisco, 458 S.W.3d at
315-16 (citing Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656). The delay in Doggett dwarfs the delay here and there
is no support in this record that the State intentionally delayed the trial to gain an advantage or
damage Williams’ defense.
While we are concerned about the length of time it took the State to try Williams, he has
not carried his burden to show that his speedy trial rights were violated. Point denied.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, we affirm.
____________________________________ James M. Dowd, Judge
Thomas C. Clark, II, C.J. and Philip M. Hess, J. concur.