SUPREME COURT OF MISSOURI en banc STATE OF MISSOURI, ) Opinion issued April 30, 2024, ) and modified on the Court’s own Respondent, ) motion July 9, 2024 ) v. ) No. SC100188 ) TROY JACKSON-BEY, ) ) Appellant. )
APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ST. LOUIS The Honorable Paula P. Bryant, Judge
Troy Jackson-Bey appeals from a judgment convicting him of five counts,
including first-degree murder and first-degree assault. On appeal, Jackson-Bey
challenges the circuit court’s admission of surveillance video, the submission of the
verdict director for first-degree assault, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting his
convictions. The circuit court did not err in admitting the surveillance video, submitting
the first-degree assault verdict director, and in finding there was sufficient evidence
supporting Jackson-Bey’s convictions. The judgment is affirmed.
Background
A jury found Jackson-Bey guilty of five counts, including first-degree murder and
first-degree assault, stemming from an altercation occurring in June 2020 at Husband and Wife’s residence. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the evidence adduced
at trial included: Jackson-Bey and Husband got into an argument after Husband asked a
woman to move her parked car forward so he could park his car in front of Husband and
Wife’s residence. The woman moved her car. Jackson-Bey, who was angry at Husband’s
request, approached Husband, who was exiting his car. The two argued. The argument
appeared to end, and Jackson-Bey turned to walk away but then drew his gun and shot
Husband.
Wife, who had been watching from the window, screamed and ran toward the door.
Jackson-Bey forced his way through the door and fired his weapon. A struggle for control
of the gun ensued between Wife and Jackson-Bey, during which Jackson-Bey fired his gun.
Jackson-Bey again fired the gun between Wife’s legs and then exited the residence. 1 Wife
was not shot. Husband, who sustained six gunshot wounds, died.
Prior to trial, Jackson-Bey filed a motion in limine, seeking to exclude surveillance
video taken from Husband and Wife’s residence, arguing, under the rule of completeness,
he was entitled to present the entire surveillance video of which the State had offered
only portions. Opposing the motion, the State explained the video clips were created
from a motion-detection system, such that the cameras did not record continuously but,
instead, recorded in 30-second intervals. 2 The circuit court overruled the motion in
limine. At trial, Wife testified she and Husband had a security system at their residence
1 At trial, the State offered ballistic evidence, which included a bullet casing found in the residence and gunfire damage to the living room wall. 2 The State sought to introduce five video clips, which were combined into one exhibit. 2 that included three cameras. She testified the system used a motion-detecting sensor, and
the camera recorded in 30-second increments. She testified the security system recorded
some of the incidents involved in the case. The circuit court, over Jackson-Bey’s
objection, admitted into evidence the surveillance video, which was shown to the jury.
The State submitted five counts to the jury. Relevant here, the verdict director for
first-degree assault authorized the jury to convict Jackson-Bey of first-degree assault if it
found, in part: “That on or about June 16, 2020, in the State of Missouri, [Jackson-Bey]
attempted to kill or cause serious physical injury to [Wife] by shooting her.” 3 (Emphasis
added). Jackson-Bey did not object to the verdict director’s language. During closing
argument, Jackson-Bey argued the jury could not convict him of first-degree assault
because there was no evidence he shot Wife. Also during closing argument, Jackson-Bey
stated the first-degree murder instruction included: “The defendant was 18 years of age or
older at the time of the offense.” 4 He argued the State had not presented any evidence as
to his age and the State had to prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt.
The jury found Jackson-Bey guilty of all five counts. Jackson-Bey appealed. This
Court granted transfer after opinion by the court of appeals. Mo. Const. art. V, sec. 10.
I. Surveillance Video
The first issue before this Court is whether the circuit court erred in admitting the
surveillance video into evidence.
3 Also relevant here, the indictment charged Jackson-Bey with first-degree assault in that: “on or about June 16, 2020, … [he] shot at … [Wife] ….” (Emphasis added). 4 The first-degree murder instruction was patterned after MAI-CR 4th 414.02. 3 Standard of Review
This Court reviews a circuit court’s admission or exclusion of evidence for abuse
of discretion. State v. Minor, 648 S.W.3d 721, 735 (Mo. banc 2022). A circuit court
abuses its discretion if its decision is “clearly against the logic of the circumstances then
before the court and is so unreasonable and arbitrary that it shocks the sense of justice
and indicates a lack of careful, deliberate consideration.” State v. Carpenter, 605 S.W.3d
355, 359 (Mo. banc 2020) (internal quotations omitted). This Court will reverse only if
the alleged circuit court error was so prejudicial it deprived the defendant of a fair trial.
Id. at 370.
Analysis
Jackson-Bey contends the circuit court erred in admitting the surveillance video
because, pursuant to the rule of completeness, he was entitled to introduce the entire
surveillance video. Jackson-Bey’s argument fails, however, because the rule of
completeness does not apply.
The rule of completeness provides that, when “either party introduces part of an
act, occurrence, or transaction, the opposing party is entitled to introduce or to inquire
into other parts of the whole thereof in order to explain or rebut adverse inferences which
might arise from the fragmentary or incomplete character of the evidence introduced by
his adversary ….” State ex rel. Kemper v. Vincent, 191 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Mo. banc 2006)
(internal quotations omitted). “The rule of completeness only applies when the item
sought to be introduced is part of a greater whole” and the “parts introduced to complete
4 the whole … relate to the same subject matter” as that previously admitted. State v. Ellis,
512 S.W.3d 816, 826 (Mo. App. 2016) (alteration in original) (internal quotations
omitted).
Jackson-Bey has not shown the admitted video was “part of a greater whole.” At
trial, Wife testified the surveillance system recorded in 30-second increments upon
motion detection. The record supports there was no single, continuous video, but, rather,
each 30-second clip, itself, was a complete video, triggered by motion detection.
Jackson-Bey relies on United States v. Yevakpor, 419 F. Supp. 2d 242 (N.D.N.Y.
2006), in which the district court excluded the government’s proffered evidence of three,
one-minute video segments taken from surveillance recording of a border stop and
search. Id. at 244-45. Relying on the rule of completeness, the district court observed
that customs had failed to preserve the entire video and, in fact, gave an affirmative order
to “only preserve the selected three minutes of tape ….” Id. at 246. Jackson-Bey’s
reliance on Yevakpor is misplaced. It was undisputed in Yevakpor that the security
system recorded continuously, such that the three video segments were fragments of a
whole. Id. at 244. To the contrary, here, the evidence showed Husband and Wife’s
surveillance system did not record continuously. Consequently, there was no “greater
whole” video of which the 30-second increments were a part. The rule of completeness
does not apply, and the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
surveillance video. Jackson-Bey’s claim fails.
5 II. Verdict Director for First-Degree Assault
The next three issues involve the verdict director for first-degree assault. Each of
Jackson-Bey’s arguments hinges on the verdict director’s language, which authorized the
jury to find Jackson-Bey guilty of first-degree assault for shooting Wife, compared with
the indictment’s language, which charged him with first-degree assault when he shot at
Wife.
A. Sufficiency of Evidence for First-Degree Assault
Jackson-Bey argues the circuit court erred in overruling his motion for judgment
of acquittal because there was insufficient evidence to convict him of first-degree assault.
Standard of Review
When reviewing sufficiency of evidence claims, this Court does “not weigh the
evidence but accept[s] as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all
reasonable inferences that support the verdict and ignore all contrary evidence and
inferences.” State v. Collins, 648 S.W.3d 711, 718 (Mo. banc 2022) (internal quotations
omitted). This Court considers “only whether there was sufficient evidence from which
the trier of fact reasonably could have found the defendant guilty.” Id. (internal
quotations omitted).
Section 565.050.1, RSMo 2016, provides: “A person commits the offense of
assault in the first degree if he or she attempts to kill or knowingly causes or attempts to
cause serious physical injury to another person.” Jackson-Bey does not argue there was
insufficient evidence to permit a reasonable juror to find he attempted to kill or cause
6 serious physical injury to Wife. Rather, his “sufficiency” argument seizes on the verdict
director’s language, which asked the jury to find he shot Wife, compared with the
indictment, which alleged he shot at Wife. Jackson-Bey argues the State failed to carry
its burden to show he actually shot Wife, as she testified at trial she was not shot and
there was no evidence she suffered a gunshot wound.
Sufficiency of evidence review, however, “does not rest on how the jury was
instructed.” State v. Zetina-Torres, 482 S.W.3d 801, 809 (Mo. banc 2016) (quoting
Musacchio v. United States, 577 U.S. 237, 243 (2016)). Instead, this Court reviews
“whether there is sufficient evidence to support the charged crime, based on the elements
of the crime as set forth by statute and common law and the evidence adduced at trial.”
State v. Brown, 558 S.W.3d 105, 109 (Mo. App. 2019) (internal quotations omitted).
Wife testified Jackson-Bey forced his way into the residence and then shot his
gun. She also testified Jackson-Bey again shot the gun as they struggled over the
weapon. He fired the gun a third time in between Wife’s legs. The State also introduced
ballistic evidence, which included a bullet casing found in the residence and gunfire
damage to the living room wall. Based on such evidence, the jury could have reasonably
found Jackson-Bey attempted to kill or cause serious physical injury to Wife.
Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support Jackson-Bey’s first-degree assault
conviction, and the circuit court did not err in overruling his motion for judgment of
acquittal.
7 B. Circuit Court’s Submission of First-Degree Assault Verdict Director
Jackson-Bey further argues the circuit court plainly erred in submitting the verdict
director for first-degree assault because the language required the jury to find he shot
Wife, which was unsupported by the evidence. Additionally, Jackson-Bey contends the
verdict-director language materially varied from the indictment thereby prejudicing him.
“Generally, this Court does not review unpreserved claims of error.” State v.
Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d 519, 525 (Mo. banc 2020). This Court, however, has discretion
to review plain errors. Rule 30.20. Not every allegation of plain error warrants review.
Brandolese, 601 S.W.3d at 526. This Court will decline plain error review “unless the
claimed error facially establishes substantial grounds for believing that manifest injustice
or miscarriage of justice has resulted.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). Jackson-Bey
bears the burden of showing manifest injustice entitling him to plain error review. Id.
Jackson-Bey seeks plain error review, as he did not object to the language in the
verdict director for first-degree assault at trial or in is his motion for a new trial. The
State contends Jackson-Bey waived plain error review, as, during closing argument, he
emphasized the first-degree assault verdict director required a finding he shot Wife, as
opposed to shot at Wife, and argued the State had not presented evidence Wife was shot.
The State argues, then, Jackson-Bey clearly understood the instruction required a finding
he shot Wife, as opposed to a finding he shot at her. The State posits Jackson-Bey
8 strategically did not object to the instruction so he could argue the evidence did not show
he actually shot Wife. This Court agrees.
Plain error review applies “when no objection is made due to inadvertence or
negligence.” State v. Johnson, 284 S.W.3d 561, 582 (Mo. banc 2009) (internal
quotations omitted). “Plain error review is waived when counsel has affirmatively acted
in a manner precluding a finding that the failure to object was a product of inadvertence
or negligence.” Id. (internal quotations omitted). During closing argument, Jackson-Bey
emphasized the issues with the language in the verdict director of which he now
complains. Such actions preclude this Court from finding his failure to object was truly a
product of inadvertence or negligence. Plain error review is waived.
III. Age Is Not an Element of the Offense of First-Degree Murder
Jackson-Bey further argues age is an element of the offense of first-degree murder
and, because the State failed to produce any evidence he was at least 18 years old when
the offense occurred, there was insufficient evidence to support his murder conviction.
For the reasons explained below, this Court concludes age is not an element of the
offense of first-degree murder.
To place the issue in context, a brief history of the offense of first-degree murder
is helpful. Currently, section 565.020.1, RSMo 2016, sets forth the offense of first-
degree murder:
A person commits the offense of murder in the first degree if he or she knowingly causes the death of another person after deliberation upon the matter.
9 As reflected in the statute, the elements of first-degree murder are that a person:
“(1) knowingly (2) caus[ed] the death of another person (3) after deliberation on the
matter.” State v. Tisius, 92 S.W.3d 751, 764 (Mo. banc 2002). First-degree murder has
long been defined as any “willful, deliberate and premeditated killing.” 5 In 1983, the
legislature codified the present-day definition of first-degree murder in its current
location. Section 565.020.1, RSMo Supp. 1983. The penalty for first-degree murder is
found in section 565.020.2. Before 1990, it remained “either death or imprisonment
without eligibility for probation or parole.” Section 565.020.2, RSMo Supp. 1983. In
1990, without changing section 565.020.1, the legislature amended the statute such that
an individual younger than 16 years of age at the time of the offense was ineligible for
the death penalty. 6 Section 565.020.2, RSMo Supp. 1990. Then, in 2005 and 2012,
respectively, the Supreme Court of the United States held the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the execution of individuals who were younger than 18 years of age at the time
of the offense and also prohibits mandatory life-without-parole sentences for juvenile
offenders. Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460 (2012); Roper, 543 U.S. 55. Accordingly, in
2016, the legislature again amended section 565.020.2 to its current form:
The offense of murder in the first degree is a class A felony, and, if a person is eighteen years of age or older at the time of the offense, the punishment shall be either death or imprisonment for life without eligibility for probation
5 Sections 4448, 4450, RSMo 1909; sections 3230, 3232, RSMo 1919; sections 3982, 3984, RSMo 1929; sections 4376, 4378, RSMo 1939; sections 559.010, RSMo 1949; sections 559.010, 559.030, RSMo 1959; sections 559.010, 559.030, RSMo 1969. 6 This statutory amendment reflects a response to the United States Supreme Court decision that the Eighth Amendment does not prohibit capital punishment for those who committed murder at the age of 16 years or older. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989), abrogated by Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 10 or parole, or release except by act of the governor. If a person has not reached his or her eighteenth birthday at the time of the commission of the offense, the punishment shall be as provided under section 565.033.
In addition, the legislature passed section 565.033, which sets forth three possible
sentences for offenders younger than the age of 18 at the time of the offense: life without
eligibility for parole, life with eligibility for parole, and a term of 30 to 40 years.
Viewing Missouri’s first-degree murder statutory scheme in light of its historical context
evidences the legislature’s amendments did not change the crime of first-degree murder.
Instead, responding to Roper and Miller, the legislature declared particular punishments
are unavailable for juvenile offenders.
Nonetheless, Jackson-Bey, relying on Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99
(2013), argues age is an element of first-degree murder. In Alleyne, the Supreme Court of
the United States held: “Any fact that, by law, increases the penalty for a crime is an
‘element’ that must be submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt.” 7
Alleyne, 92 S.W.3d at 103. At issue in Alleyne was a defendant’s seven-year sentence for
having “brandished” a firearm while “us[ing] or carr[ying] a firearm” “during and in
relation to a crime of violence.” Id. at 103-04. The jury found the defendant used or
carried the firearm, which carried a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. Id. at 104.
At sentencing, however, the judge found the defendant had brandished the firearm, and
7 Alleyne expanded Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000), which held any fact increasing the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, Alleyne clarified that facts increasing a mandatory minimum sentence also must be submitted to the jury. Alleyne, 570 U.S. at 103. 11 thereby increased the defendant’s mandatory minimum sentence to seven years. Id. The
Supreme Court ultimately concluded: “because the fact of brandishing aggravates the
legally prescribed range of allowable sentences, it constitutes an element of a separate,
aggravated offense that must be found by the jury ….” Id. at 115.
Jackson-Bey posits that, because the mandatory minimum punishment for first-
degree murder increases if he was 18 at the time of the offense, his age must have been
submitted to the jury and found beyond a reasonable doubt. Importantly, however, the
Supreme Court has held “[p]roof of the nonexistence of all affirmative defenses has never
been constitutionally required.” Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197, 208-10 (1977).
Moreover, Apprendi, upon which Alleyne was based, specifically declined to overrule
Patterson. Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475. As Patterson set forth, a state may “choose[] to
recognize a factor that mitigates the degree of criminality or punishment” without being
required “to prove its nonexistence.” Patterson, 432 U.S. at 209 (allowing a state to
place the burden on the defendant to prove extreme emotional disturbance that would
reduce an offense from murder to manslaughter); see, e.g., State v. Meacham, 470
S.W.3d 744, 747-48 (Mo. banc 2015) (holding the defendant has the burden to prove the
affirmative defense of inability to provide support for good cause in criminal nonsupport
cases, and the state need not show the absence of the inability to provide support to
secure a conviction).
Instead, states may place the burden on a defendant to prove certain affirmative
defenses. Relevant here, intellectual disability is a categorical exception to the death
12 penalty. 8 Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). Intellectual disability, then, obviously
impacts the available punishment for the offense of first-degree murder. The Supreme
Court of the United States, however, has never held Alleyne and Apprendi require the
state to prove beyond a reasonable doubt the absence of intellectual disability as an
element of first-degree murder in securing a death sentence. So, this Court, citing 30
other states, has held the defendant has the burden to prove intellectual disability. 9 State
v. Johnson, 244 S.W.3d 144, 150 n.3 (Mo. banc 2008). In Johnson, this Court interpreted
section 565.030.4(1), which specified life imprisonment in lieu of death shall be assessed
“[i]f the trier finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant is [intellectually
disabled].” Id. at 150 (first alteration in original). The Missouri legislature enacted
section 565.030.4(1) in accordance with the standard set forth in Atkins, and this Court
held the statute “necessarily implies that it is the defendant’s burden, not the State’s, to
provide to a jury that he is [intellectually disabled].” Id.
8 Intellectual disability is defined as:
[A] condition involving substantial limitations in general functioning characterized by significantly subaverage intellectual functioning with continual extensive related deficits and limitations in two or more adaptive behaviors such as communication, self-care, home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional academics, leisure and work, which conditions are manifested and documented before eighteen years of age.
Section 565.030.6. 9 See also State ex rel. Johnson v. Blair, 628 S.W.3d 375, 388 (Mo. banc 2021) (“Intellectual disability is neither an element of the underlying crime nor an aggravating factor. Rather, intellectual disability concerns whether an offender is eligible for the death penalty.”). 13 Age, as with intellectual disability, is a “characteristic[] of the offender” that
categorically prohibits the death penalty. Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010).
Indeed, the Supreme Court has equated youth and intellectual disability. Roper, 543 U.S.
at 567 (“As in Atkins, the objective indicia of consensus in this case—the rejection of the
juvenile death penalty in the majority of States; the infrequency of its use even where it
remains on the books; and the consistency in the trend toward abolition of the practice—
provide sufficient evidence that today our society views juveniles, in the words Atkins
used respecting the [intellectually disabled], as categorically less culpable than the
average criminal.” (internal quotation omitted)). Age, as a defendant’s characteristic
mitigating culpability, creates an exception with respect to punishment. Accordingly, the
legislature, as it did with intellectual disability, clearly never intended age to be an
element of the offense of first-degree murder and to treat this mitigating factor as an
aggravator that the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt. 10 C.f. State v. Agee,
364 P.3d 971, 994-95 (Or. 2015) (rejecting a defendant’s attempt to convert absence of
intellectual disability into element state must prove beyond a reasonable doubt); Franklin
v. State, 579 S.W.3d 382, 386-89 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019) (holding an age-based
ineligibility claim akin to an intellectual-disability claim and, accordingly, defendant’s
10 Although section 565.020.2 specifically mitigates culpability or punishment for first- degree murder, there is nothing limiting Jackson-Bey’s argument to this specific criminal offense. Age affects the culpability or punishment of every offense. See chapter 211. Had the legislature intended to make age an element of every offense, such a monumental change would have been both explicit and unmistakable. Accordingly, drawing such an inference from section 565.020.2 alone makes no sense, especially when the Court drew the opposite inference from section 565.030.4(1) with respect to intellectual disability. 14 age is not an element of capital murder); Commonwealth v. Batts, 163 A.3d 410, 478-79
(Pa. 2017) (holding a jury was not required to make a finding regarding a juvenile’s
eligibility to be sentenced to life without parole because a finding of a permanent
incorrigibility “cannot be said to be an element of the crime committed; it is instead an
immutable characteristic of the juvenile offender”).
Instead, if Jackson-Bey disputed his age—which he did not—he bore the burden
both to produce evidence and to convince the fact-finder by a preponderance of the
evidence that he was under the age of 18. Because the State did not bear the burden to
prove Jackson-Bey was 18 years or older, and Jackson-Bey did not produce any evidence
he was younger than 18 years of age, it is of no consequence whether there was sufficient
evidence of Jackson-Bey’s age, and this Court need not address Jackson-Bey’s
sufficiency of the evidence claim related to his murder conviction. Zetina-Torres, 482
S.W.3d at 809 (quoting Musacchio, 577 U.S. at 243) (The sufficiency of evidence “does
not rest on how the jury was instructed.”); White v. Dir. of Revenue, 321 S.W.3d 298, 305
(Mo. banc 2010) (“Generally, the party not having the burden of proof on an issue need
not offer any evidence concerning it.” (internal quotation omitted)). 11
11 To the extent MAI-CR 4th 414.02 conflicts with this Court’s holding, it is not binding and should no longer be followed. 15 Conclusion
The circuit court did not err in admitting the surveillance video or in submitting
the verdict director for first-degree assault. Finally, there was sufficient evidence to
support Jackson-Bey’s convictions. The judgment is affirmed.
______________________________ Mary R. Russell, Chief Justice
All concur.