STATE OF MISSOURI v. TIFFANY ANNE LUKASIEWICZ

• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals
• Decided: January 28, 2025
• Docket: SD38194
• Status: Published

Opinion

In Division

STATE OF MISSOURI, ) ) Respondent, ) ) No. SD38194 vs. ) ) Filed: January 28, 2025 TIFFANY ANNE LUKASIEWICZ, ) ) Appellant. )

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF JASPER COUNTY

Honorable Gayle L. Crane, Judge

AFFIRMED

Tiffany Anne Lukasiewicz (“Defendant”) appeals the decision of the trial court

sentencing her to three consecutive life terms of imprisonment after a jury convicted her of

second-degree murder under section 565.021, 1 first-degree arson under section 569.040, and

first-degree domestic assault under section 565.072. In two points on appeal, Defendant argues

that (1) the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s interview with law enforcement because it

violated her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment because she had

invoked her right to remain silent, and (2) the trial court erred in admitting Defendant’s

1 All statutory citations are to RSMo 2016, including, as applicable, statutory changes effective January 1, 2017. subsequent interviews with law enforcement because her Miranda 2 warnings were rendered

ineffective when law enforcement violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination

in her first interview.

Finding no merit in Defendant’s arguments, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Factual Background and Procedural History

Defendant resided with her stepmother (Stepmother) and father (Father). On December

3, 2020, after seeing Father with a cut on his face, Defendant accused Stepmother of beating

Father. Defendant then called the police, who spoke with all three individuals and subsequently

left without making an arrest. Around 3:30 a.m. on December 4, Stepmother woke up and saw

that her chair in the living room was on fire. She yelled “fire” and went to where she normally

kept the fire extinguisher, but it was no longer there. She then retrieved water from the kitchen

and threw it on the fire but the fire had “gotten a lot bigger.” As Stepmother was going to her

bedroom to get her phone to call 911, she saw Defendant and Father standing in the hallway.

Stepmother then heard Defendant and her twin sister (Twin Sister) outside, yelling for Father.

Stepmother had “no idea” why Twin Sister would be at the house at such an early hour. The

house had gotten “very smoky” and Stepmother tried to crawl toward Father, who was still in the

hallway, but the fire prevented her from reaching him. She found herself by the kitchen side

door, at which point a police officer grabbed her and carried her out of the house. Stepmother

suffered severe injuries from the fire. Father died in the fire.

An investigation of the home after the fire led the fire marshal to believe the fire was not

accidental, but rather set intentionally under suspicious circumstances. Outside of the home, law

enforcement found a backpack and a laptop case containing various personal items belonging to

2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

2 Defendant located under Defendant’s open bedroom window.

On December 8, Defendant voluntarily went to the Joplin police department to pick up

her personal belongings. Officer Wes Massey requested an interview and she agreed. When

Defendant returned the next day, December 9, to pick up more of her personal belongings,

Officer Massey administered Miranda warnings and recorded his interview with Defendant. 3

Officer Massey informed Defendant that she could “decide at any time to exercise these rights,

not answer any questions or make any statements.”

Defendant stated that the night of the fire Twin Sister told her that Stepmother had an

“ass whooping coming to her.” After Officer Luke Stahl joined the interview and asked

Defendant some questions, Defendant told the officers she was “overwhelmed.” The following

conversation took place between Officer Stahl and Defendant:

Officer Stahl: I have a feeling you know exactly what happened. Defendant: Listen, [Stepmother] was supposed to have her butt beat. Officer Stahl: And somehow that was going to affect the garage? Defendant: No, will you please stop? Officer Stahl: As long as it’s the truth I’ll let you tell it to me. Defendant: Will you stop. Officer Stahl: As long as you tell me the truth, I’ll stop. Defendant: [Stepmother] was supposed to have her ass beat and I guess they were, yeah, setting a fire in the back. I don’t know who they are, they were going to set a fire in the alley to cause a diversion to get [Stepmother] out so she can get her ass beat and [Father] wouldn’t get hurt.

Officer Massey testified that he did not threaten Defendant or promise her anything during the

interview, and nothing in the record indicates that law enforcement threatened or deceived

Defendant, or even raised their voices during the interview. Defendant voluntarily left the police

department at the end of the interview.

Defendant was arrested on December 10, placed in custody at the Newton County Jail

3 Officer Massey later testified that he Mirandized Defendant at the time of this additional interview because he had received additional information that led him to believe Defendant “knew more than she was divulging.”

3 and was interviewed by Officer Chip Root. After Officer Root re-administered Miranda

warnings to Defendant, she told him that Twin Sister was supposed to start the fire in the alley

and two other girls were supposed to start a fire in the basement. Defendant further told Officer

Root that she texted Twin Sister the night of December 3 and told her that she wanted

Stepmother’s “ass beat.” Defendant stated that Twin Sister formulated the plan to start a fire in

the alley to create a diversion to draw Stepmother out of the house.

On December 11, Officer Root received a message from Defendant indicating that she

wanted to speak with him again. Officer Root once again re-administered Miranda warnings to

Defendant and she told him that after she texted Twin Sister, Defendant snuck Twin Sister into

the house and Twin Sister eventually threw something towards the living room, catching the

living room on fire. Both the interviews on December 10 and December 11 were audio recorded.

Defendant was charged with second-degree murder under section 565.021, first-degree

arson under section 569.040, and first-degree domestic assault under section 565.072. Defendant

filed a motion to suppress, arguing that law enforcement violated Defendant’s Fifth Amendment

rights by continuing the interrogation after she asked them to stop. Defendant further argued that

the subsequent interrogations at the jail on December 10 and 11 should be suppressed because

they were the “fruit of the poisonous tree” and tainted by Defendant’s incriminating statements

on December 9.

At a pre-trial hearing on Defendant’s motion, Officer Stahl testified that law enforcement

administered Miranda warnings on December 9 “just out of an abundance of caution.” He

further testified he continued to question Defendant after she said “will you stop” because he

believed she was telling him to “stop the way [he] was asking the question in the interview” and

he had no reason to believe she was terminating the interview at that point or exercising her

4 Miranda rights. Officer Massey testified that although the interview room was “a secured area”

and locked from the outside, anyone could have exited the interview room without assistance

from the inside. He further testified that Defendant was free to leave and walk out of the

interview room at the police department at any time. After this testimony, the trial court took the

motion under consideration and later overruled the motion to suppress without entering written

findings of fact or conclusions of law.

At trial, Defendant’s December 9 interview was marked as State’s Exhibit 33, and

Defendant’s December 10 and 11 interviews were marked as State’s Exhibit 34. Officer Massey

testified concerning the statements Defendant made in the December 9 interview, and defense

counsel made no objection. When the State offered both exhibits into evidence, defense counsel

objected, raising the same arguments that he raised in his motion to suppress. The trial court in

both instances overruled the objections and admitted the exhibits into evidence.

The jury convicted Defendant on all counts. The trial court sentenced Defendant as a

prior and persistent offender to life in prison on each count, with each sentence running

consecutively to the other sentences. Defendant filed a motion for new trial, arguing that

admission of the statements Defendant made in all three interviews violated Defendant’s right to

be free from self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment. 4 Defendant appealed.

Discussion

Point One

Defendant argues that the trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibit 33 into evidence

because the exhibit contained Defendant’s interview with law enforcement on December 9 in

4 Because the record does not indicate whether the trial court denied the motion, in accordance with Supreme Court Rule 29.11(g) (2024), Defendant’s motion for new trial was overruled by operation of law. See State v. Rainey, 545 S.W.3d 916, 926 n.9 (Mo.App. 2018).

5 which they violated her privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amendment by

continuing the interrogation after she had told them to “please stop.” 5

“In reviewing the trial court’s decision denying a motion to suppress, our review of the

trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is limited to a determination of whether the

evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s ruling.” State v. Hines, 648 S.W.3d 822, 829

(Mo.App. 2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). “This Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on

a motion to suppress in the light most favorable to the ruling and defers to the trial court’s

determinations of credibility.” State v. Howland, 576 S.W.3d 619, 620 (Mo.App. 2019)

(internal quotation marks omitted).

The [trial] court’s ruling on a motion to suppress will not be reversed unless the decision was clearly erroneous. A ruling is clearly erroneous if the Court is left with a definite and firm belief a mistake has been made. Whether conduct violates the Fifth Amendment is a question of law and is given de novo review.

State v. Rice, 573 S.W.3d 53, 66 (Mo. banc 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). “Upon

review of a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress, the court will consider all evidence

presented at trial, as well as the evidence presented at the suppression hearing.” Hines, 648

S.W.3d at 829. “Where, as here, the trial court makes no findings of fact in ruling on the motion

to suppress, we presume the trial court found all facts in accordance with its ruling.” State v.

Selvy, 462 S.W.3d 756, 764 (Mo.App. 2015).

“The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in [relevant] part, that

no person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself. U.S.

Const. amend. V. This provision is applicable to the States in all criminal prosecutions.” State

5 The State argues that Defendant’s point is unpreserved for appeal because defense counsel failed to object when Officer Massey testified concerning some of the statements Defendant made in the December 9 interview. Defendant also raised the same arguments in her motion for new trial and this appeal. Defendant on appeal does not argue that Officer Massey’s testimony concerning Defendant’s statements was improperly admitted. Accordingly, Defendant’s point one is preserved for appeal.

6 v. Sardeson, 220 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Mo.App. 2005).

The privilege against self-incrimination includes the requirement that the police warn those taken into custody that they have the right to remain silent. Custodial interrogation occurs either when a suspect is formally arrested or under any other circumstances where the suspect is deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.

State v. Werner, 9 S.W.3d 590, 595 (Mo. banc 2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In

deciding whether a suspect is in custody at a particular time, courts examine the extent of the

restraints placed on the suspect during the interrogation in light of whether a reasonable person

in the suspect’s position would have understood the situation to be one of custody.”

“Courts must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation to determine

how a suspect would have gauged his freedom of movement.” State v. Stricklin, 558 S.W.3d 54,

62 (Mo.App. 2018). “Our Supreme Court has identified several factors relevant to determining

whether the totality of the circumstances establish that a suspect was in custody at the time of

questioning.” State v. Wright, 585 S.W.3d 360, 368 (Mo.App. 2019) (internal quotation marks

omitted). These factors include:

(1) whether the suspect was informed at the time of questioning that the questioning was voluntary, that the suspect was free to leave or request the officers to do so, or that the suspect was not under arrest;

(2) whether the suspect possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning;

(3) whether the suspect initiated contact with authorities or voluntarily acquiesced to official requests to answer questions;

(4) whether strong arm tactics or deceptive stratagems were employed during questioning;

(5) whether the atmosphere was police dominated; or,

(6) whether the suspect was placed under arrest at the termination of questioning.

7 Werner, 9 S.W.3d at 595. “The list of factors a court may consider is not exhaustive, and their

presence and absence merely guide courts in assessing the totality of the circumstances

surrounding interrogations.” Stricklin, 558 S.W.3d at 63. “The circumstances of each case

influence the custody determination, but the ultimate inquiry is whether there is a formal arrest or

a restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Id.

The State argues Defendant was not in custody so “she could not have effectively

invoked her constitutional right to silence.” The State also argues “even if Defendant could

invoke the constitutional right to silence outside of a custodial interrogation, she did not

unambiguously do so.” We need not address the State’s second argument as their first argument

is dispositive.

Defendant was not under formal arrest or deprived of her freedom of movement in any

significant way before or during the December 9 interview. Officer Massey, after delivering

cautionary Miranda warnings, assured Defendant that she could “decide at any time to exercise

these rights, not answer any questions or make any statements.” “The absence of police

advisement that . . . the suspect is at liberty to decline to answer questions has been identified as

an important indicium of the existence of a custodial setting. Where law enforcement officers

have issued such an advisement, custody has frequently been found not to exist.” Werner, 9

S.W.3d at 596 (internal quotation marks omitted). Before and during the interview, neither

Officer Massey nor Officer Stahl informed Defendant that she was under arrest or was required

to answer their questions.

Further, neither officer subjected Defendant to arrest-like restraints. Defendant was not

handcuffed or otherwise restrained during the interview. Officer Massey testified that although

the interview room was a “secured area” and locked from the outside, anyone could have exited

8 the interview room without assistance from the inside. He further testified that Defendant was

free to leave and walk out of the interview room at the police department at any time. “If a

person is free to go at any time prior to the actual arrest, then the person is not under arrest.”

State v. Glass, 136 S.W.3d 496, 509 (Mo. banc 2004) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Defendant possessed unrestrained freedom of movement during questioning.

Defendant also initiated contact with authorities and voluntarily acquiesced to official

requests to answer questions. On December 8, Defendant voluntarily went to the Joplin police

department to pick up her personal belongings. Officer Wes Massey asked to interview her

while she was there, and she agreed. The next day, Defendant returned to pick up more of her

personal belongings, and Officer Massey again interviewed Defendant at the police department.

Law enforcement did not seek out Defendant or bring her in for questioning on December 9 –

rather, she went to the police department and voluntarily agreed to an interview with Officer

Massey, just like she did the day before.

During the interview, neither officer employed strong-arm tactics or deceptive

stratagems. Officer Massey testified that he did not threaten Defendant or promise Defendant

anything during the interview, and nothing in the record indicates that law enforcement

threatened or deceived Defendant, or even raised their voices during the interview. Finally,

while Defendant was arrested after the interview the next day, under these circumstances the

arrest “does not impact how a reasonable person would have viewed his opportunity to leave or

terminate the interview beforehand[,]” State v. Bruce, 503 S.W.3d 354, 358 (Mo.App. 2016), as

before, during, and immediately after the interview, Defendant was not arrested, otherwise

detained, or threatened with arrest or detention.

The circumstances surrounding Defendant’s December 9 interview indicate that

9 Defendant was not in custody, as Defendant was not subject to “a formal arrest or a restraint on

freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest.” Stricklin, 558 S.W.3d at

63. Accordingly, deferring to the trial court’s determinations of credibility, we are not “left with

a definite and firm belief a mistake has been made,” and the trial court did not clearly err in

denying Defendant’s motion to suppress. Rice, 573 S.W.3d at 66 (internal quotation marks

omitted).

Point one is denied.

Point Two

Defendant argues the trial court erred in admitting State’s Exhibit 34 into evidence

because the exhibit contained Defendant’s subsequent interviews with law enforcement on

December 10 and 11 in which Defendant’s Miranda warnings were rendered ineffective because

law enforcement violated her Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination in her December

9 interview.

The State argues that Defendant’s point is unpreserved for appeal, as Defendant in her

motion to suppress argued, not that the December 10 and 11 Miranda warnings were ineffective,

but that the subsequent interrogations at the jail should be suppressed because they were the

“fruit of the poisonous tree” and tainted by the incriminating statements Defendant made on

December 9. However, assuming without deciding that Defendant’s point two is preserved for

appeal, Defendant’s argument is unpersuasive.

Exclusion of subsequent statements, made either in the same or subsequent interview or

interrogation, based on a prior Miranda violation depends firstly upon whether a prior Miranda

violation has in fact occurred. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 318 (1985), State v. Seibert,

93 S.W.3d 700, 705 (Mo. banc 2002). Defendant was not in custody during her December 9

10 interview. Defendant does not argue that the Miranda warnings administered in her subsequent

December 10 and 11 interviews were otherwise ineffective. Accordingly, because no prior

Miranda violation occurred in Defendant’s December 9 interview, the trial court did not err in

determining the Miranda warnings administered in Defendant’s December 10 and 11 interviews

were effective.

Point two is denied.

Decision

The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.

BECKY J. WEST, J. – OPINION AUTHOR

JEFFREY W. BATES, J. – CONCURS

MARY W. SHEFFIELD, J. – CONCURS