George W. Draper III, Judge
Thomas A. Ess (hereinafter, “Ess”) appeals from the circuit court’s judgment convicting him of two counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, section 566.062, RSMo 20001, two counts of second-degree statutory sodomy, section 566.064, and one count of attempted first-degree child molestation, section 566.067. Ess raises three points on appeal, alleging juror misconduct, instructional error, and insufficient evidence to support two of his convictions. This Court holds one juror committed misconduct through the intentional nondisclosure of a material fact related to the lawsuit, specifically that the juror formed an opinion about Ess’s guilt or innocence prior to deliberations in direct contravention of the circuit court’s instructions. This Court further holds there was insufficient evidence to convict Ess of attempted first-degree child molestation. The circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded.2
Factual and Procedural History
Ess was charged with multiple counts of first-degree statutory sodomy, second-degree statutory sodomy, and one count of first-degree child molestation for acts alleged to have occurred against his stepsons, W.L. and B.L., at various times between 1995 and 2003. W.L. and B.L. testified at trial, detailing various acts of sodomy. Ess testified and denied all of the allegations, explaining that his relationship with his stepsons was troubled and deteriorated during their teenaged years. The jury convicted Ess of five of the six counts submitted to the jury.3
In his motion for a new trial, Ess alleged, inter alia, that he was entitled to a new trial based on misconduct by Venire-person No. 3, who ultimately served on Ess’s jury as Juror No. 3. Ess alleged Juror No. 3 committed misconduct by announcing during a lunch recess during voir dire that “this is an open and shut case” after the circuit court instructed the panel members they were not to discuss the case or form an opinion before the case was submitted. Ess argued this comment revealed a bias existing at the outset of trial, which was not disclosed intentionally during voir dire and was communicated to others in violation of the circuit court’s order. Attached to Ess’s motion was an affidavit from Venireperson No. 26, stating, “[djuring a break taken before the end of jury selection, after the court admonished the panel not to discuss the case, I heard [Juror No.] 3 remark to other nearby jurors that ‘this is an open and shut [200]*200case,’ indicating to me that he believed [Ess] to be guilty.” Venireperson No. 26’s affidavit further indicated Juror No. 3 was told “shh” by another venireperson as if to admonish Juror No. 3 in accordance with the circuit court’s instructions not to discuss the case.
The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Ess’s motion.4 Venireperson No. 26 testified he was sitting in the hallway outside of the courtroom on a bench after lunch when Juror No. 3 stated it was a “cut-and-dry [sic]” case. Venireperson No. 26 then corrected himself to state Juror No. 3’s actual words were “open and shut.” Venireperson No. 26 further testified Juror No. 11 made a “shh” sound after Juror No. 3 made the comment. Defense counsel attempted to elicit evidence about Venireperson No. 26’s perceptions of Juror No. 3’s comment, specifically whether Juror No. 3 favored the state or the defense. However, the circuit court sustained the prosecutor’s objections, which were to a lack of foundation, speculation, and hearsay. Juror No. 11 also testified that he “shushed” Juror No. 3 and told him they were not to talk about the trial in the hall.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the circuit court overruled Ess’s motion for new trial. In its written judgment, the circuit court found Ess failed to present any evidence from Juror No. 3 or any evidence regarding the context of Juror No. 3’s statement, including any information about his mannerism, tone, or gestures when making the comment. The circuit court further found there was no evidence to show whether Juror No. 3 favored the state or the defendant. Ess appeals these convictions.
Juror Misconduct
Ess claims the circuit court erred in failing to grant him a new trial on his claim of juror misconduct. Ess argues Juror No. 3 was not impartial because he formed a clear opinion on the case prior to hearing any testimony or argument, and it was never established Juror No. 3 could set aside his prior opinions regarding Ess’s guilt and give him a fair trial. Ess claims Juror No. 3’s participation as a juror violated his right to a fair trial, his right to due process, and sections 494.470.2 and 547.020(2).5
[201]*201
Standard of Review
The parties disagree about the appropriate standard of review. Ess argues the circuit court’s judgment should be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. The state argues Ess’s claim is limited to plain error because his motion for a new trial was filed one day after the deadline set forth in Rule 29.11(b).6
Ess’s motion for new trial was due on January 9, 2014. Defense counsel’s secretary attempted to file the motion that day; however, the circuit clerk’s office informed her that the motion could not be accepted because the accompanying affidavit did not include a notary’s stamp. This issue could not be rectified until the following morning, January 10, 2014. At the evidentiary hearing on Ess’s motion for new trial, defense counsel apprised the circuit court of what happened and asked that the new trial motion be deemed to have been filed on January 9th. The state took no position on the matter, stating that even if it were considered timely filed, it would not change the outcome. The circuit court sustained Ess’s motion to reflect that his new trial motion was filed timely on January 9, 2014.
Generally, the circuit court has no authority to waive or extend the time for filing a motion for new trial beyond the time set forth in Rule 29.11(b). State v. Bartlik, 363 S.W.3d 388, 391 (Mo.App.E.D.2012). Here, however, the circuit clerk refused Ess’s filing in the absence of some clear prohibition in law, court rule, or specific court order. The circuit clerk was obligated to accept the filing, see Vogl v. State, 437 S.W.3d 218, 225-26 (Mo. banc 2014); Rule 43.02(b), and a party could move to have the pleading stricken if the defect, which was the missing stamp on the accompanying affidavit, was not cured. Here, Ess’s counsel cured the defect, filed the motion as soon as possible, and sought relief from the circuit court after explaining the circuit clerk’s actions. Accordingly, this Court finds the circuit court’s order ruling Ess’s motion for new trial was filed timely was not an abuse of discretion. Ess’s juror nondisclosure claim will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 410 S.W.3d 623, 644 (Mo. banc 2013).
Quantum of Proof
The state argues that éven if this Court reviews Ess’s claim for an abuse of discretion, it believes Ess failed to assert his juror misconduct claim properly because he did not present an affidavit or testimony from Juror No. 3. The state relies on the following statement from this Court’s decision in State v. Mayes, 63 5.W.3d 615 (Mo. banc 2001): “In order to prove intentional concealment by a juror, the defendant must, at a minimum, allege intentional concealment in his motion for new trial and file an affidavit from the juror setting forth the facts surrounding the alleged concealment which reveals prejudice to the defendant.” Id. at 626. The state contends that because Ess adduced testimony from Venireperson No. 26, and not from Juror No. 3, his claim must fail. The state’s argument misinter[202]*202prets this Court’s holding in Mayes. In Mayes, the defendant failed to preserve the juror nondisclosure issue for review and was untimely in raising his claim. Id. at 624-25. The defendant failed to present testimony or an affidavit from the juror whose conduct was at issue; rather, he presented her jury questionnaire, which he contended impeached her voir dire testimony, thus demonstrating she committed misconduct. Id. This Court conducted plain error review and stated that even if the defendant’s claims were raised timely, “a defendant alleging juror misconduct during voir dire must present ‘evidence through testimony or affidavits of any juror, or other witness either at trial or at the hearing on his motion for new trial.’ ” Id. at 625-26 (emphasis added). This Court went on to hold that the circuit court did not err in overruling the defendant’s new trial motion because he “failed to offer either an affidavit or testimony of [the juror], or other evidence” of intentional nondisclosure and he failed to “call the juror or otherwise establish ” sufficient facts to merit relief. Id. at 626 (emphasis added).
Here, neither party presented an affidavit or testimony from Juror No. 8 at the evidentiary hearing. While Juror No. 3’s participation in the proceeding could have aided the circuit court in its fact-finding function and could have provided context to his comment, this Court’s holding in Mayes does not foreclose a defendant from proving his or her claim in the absence of this evidence. The circuit court misapplied the law when it relied on language in Mayes taken out of context and overruled Ess’s motion partially due to determining that he was required to file an affidavit from Juror No. 3 setting forth facts surrounding the alleged concealment to support his claim and prove prejudice.7
The state next contends Ess failed to present evidence that Juror No. 3 made the alleged comment at all. The circuit court found Ess failed to present any evidence from Juror No. 3 and, ultimately, held Juror No 3 held no bias against Ess. This holding is not supported by the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing. While Venireperson No. 26 first stated Juror No. 3 said the case was “cut-and-dry [sic],” he then corrected himself, stating the comment was “open and shut.” Both phrases convey the same sentiment: Juror No. 3 believed there was no dispute about how the case should be resolved. Moreover, Juror No. 11 testified that while he did not hear what Juror No. 3 said, he knew it was related to the case, which is the reason he admonished Juror No. 3 to not talk about the case in the hall. The state presented no evidence whatsoever and did not impeach either witness’s credibility in any meaningful way.
Generally speaking, the circuit court is free to believe all, part, or none of the testimony presented by the witnesses at the evidentiary hearing. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 410 S.W.3d at 639. Hence, even if this Court found the circuit [203]*203court completely disregarded the unim-peached testimony presented at the evi-dentiary hearing, the circuit court nevertheless misapplied the holding in Mayes that Ess was required to file an affidavit from Juror No. 3.
Further, the circuit court did not find the witnesses not credible, nor did the circuit court find the “open and shut” comment was not said at all.8 Rather, the circuit court’s express findings in its judgment make clear that its ruling was not based on such findings. The circuit court found that there was no information about the mannerism, tone, or gestures of Juror No. 3 that indicated an undisclosed bias and the testimony from Venireperson No. 26 and Juror No. 11 did not show that Juror No. 3 indicated whether he favored the state or the defendant.9 These findings show that the circuit court did not believe that no statement was made by Juror No. 3 but, rather, that it found that the statement alone was “not sufficient evidence to support [Ess’s] contention that [Juror No. 3] intentionally concealed a bias or prejudice against defendant.” (Emphasis added.) The question to be resolved then is whether Juror No. 3’s comment that the case was “open and shut” is sufficient evidence of intentional juror nondisclosure to warrant a new trial.
Intentional Juror Nondisclosure
When a criminal defendant invokes his or her right to a jury trial, the Sixth and Fourteenth amendments entitle that defendant to a panel of impartial, indifferent jurors whose verdict must be based upon evidence developed at the trial. Johnson v. State, 406 S.W.3d 892, 910 (Mo. banc 2013). The parties are entitled to ask questions to “help determine whether a venire member holds prejudices or biases that would impair the performance of his or her duties. If prejudices are discovered, an inquiry should take place to reveal whether a juror can set aside prejudices and impartially fulfill his or her obligations as a juror.” State v. Edwards, 116 S.W.3d 511, 529 (Mo. banc 2003).
Venirepersons must have an “open mind, free from bias and prejudice.” Mayes, 63 S.W.3d at 624 (quoting State v. Wheat, 775 S.W.2d 155, 158 (Mo. banc 1989), overruled on other grounds by Joy v. Morrison, 254 S.W.3d 885, 888-89 (Mo. banc 2008)). Venirepersons have a duty to answer all questions fully, fairly, and truthfully during voir dire. Id. Failure to respond fully, fairly, and truthfully can deprive the parties of information needed to exercise peremptory challenges or challenges for cause to ensure an impartial jury is empaneled. Id. at 625.
Ess maintains he is entitled to a new trial due to intentional juror nondisclosure. “In determining whether to grant a new trial for juror nondisclosure, the court first must determine whether a nondisclosure occurred at all” and, if so, whether the nondisclosure was intentional or unintentional. Saint Louis University v. Geary, 321 S.W.3d 282, 295 (Mo. banc 2009). Nondisclosure can occur only after a clear question is asked during voir dire. State v. McFadden, 391 S.W.3d 408, 418 [204]*204(Mo. banc 2013). An unequivocal question triggers a venireperson’s duty to disclose information. Saint Louis University, 321 S.W.3d at 295. A venireperson’s silence to an unequivocal question establishes juror nondisclosure, if the information is known to the juror. Id.
A prospective juror’s qualifications are not determined from a single response but rather from the entire voir dire examination. State v. Deck, 303 S.W.3d 527, 535 (Mo. banc 2010). Upon complete consideration of the entire voir dire examination, the record clearly demonstrates Juror No. 3 intentionally failed to disclose material information. Specifically, Juror No. 3 formed an opinion concerning the outcome of the trial that would have disqualified him from serving on the jury before hearing any evidence.
At the outset of voir dire, the circuit court instructed the venire panel pursuant to MAI-CR3d 300.0210 that a criminal trial “begins with the selection of a jury of qualified and impartial people.” This instruction directed the venire panel that each venirepersons’ answers must be truthful, full, and complete and admonished the venire that the failure to be truthful could force the parties to retry the case. The prosecutor specifically asked if the venire panel would be “willing to listen to what everybody’s got to say before you make up your mind.” Juror No. 3 did not respond. The prosecutor directly asked Juror No. 3 whether there was any reason he would not be a good juror in this case, to which he responded, “Not really.” At the conclusion of the prosecutor’s voir dire, he asked if anyone needed to clarify or add anything about the ability to be a juror in the case. Again, Juror No. 3 did not respond.
The parties took a break before defense counsel began questioning. At the break, the circuit court read MAI-CR3d 300.04, which must be given at the first recess and at adjournment. This instruction explicitly directs the venire:
Until this case is given to you to decide, you must not discuss any subject connected with the trial amongst yourselves, or form or express any opinion about it, and, until you are discharged as jurors, you must not talk with others about the case, or permit them to discuss it with you or in your hearing.
When voir dire resumed, defense counsel specifically asked whether any of the venirepersons held any preconceived notions about Ess’s guilt or innocence at this point of the questioning:
At this point I would ask you, how many of you have — well, how many of you have a preconceived notion about the guilt or innocence of ... Ess at this point? If you had to vote right now, how many people would vote guilty? Raise your hand if you would vote guilty at this point. That’s asking a bunch for a bunch of law-abiding citizens; isn’t it? You guys are doing good. That is— you — then you do understand that until we get to that point, beyond a reasonable doubt, that — that you have nothing to go on. You must get to that point. Okay. All right. Is there anyone here who can’t in effect look at ... Ess and basically take the position, I don’t believe you’re guilty and they have to prove it to me beyond a reasonable doubt before I’ll find you guilty? Is there anyone who has trouble with doing that, with truly applying the reasonable doubt standard and the presumption of [205]*205innocence? Everyone okay with that? All right.
These were clear, unequivocal questions. Juror No. 3 did not answer.
Shortly after this questioning occurred, the circuit court recessed for lunch and again read MAI-CR3d 300.04 to the venire panel. According to Venireperson No. 26, it was after lunch while sitting outside of the courtroom that Juror No. 3 commented, “this is an open-and-shut case.” Juror No. 11 hushed Juror No. 3 and told him they were not supposed to talk about the trial in the hall. Once voir dire resumed, the venire panel was questioned further. The record reflects Juror No. 3 listened to several discussions by both attorneys and other venirepersons throughout voir dire about their ability to be fair and impartial; yet, Juror No. 3 remained silent. Defense counsel concluded voir dire by asking if anyone had thought of anything they needed to say to respond to a question previously asked. Again, Juror No. 3 did not respond.
Juror No. 3 was asked clear, unequivocal questions about his ability to be fair and impartial to which he repeatedly failed to respond. Once nondisclosure is established, the question becomes whether the nondisclosure is intentional or unintentional. “Intentional nondisclosure occurs when: 1) there is no reasonable inability to comprehend the information solicited by the question asked of the prospective juror, and 2) the prospective juror remembers the experience or that it was of such significance that the juror’s purported forgetfulness is unreasonable.” McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 418.
Given the extensive record, this Court finds this is an instance in which there exists no reasonable inability of Juror No. 3 to comprehend the information solicited by the questions posed to him during voir dire. The venire was asked repeatedly whether anyone already formed an opinion or conclusion or held any bias against Ess concerning the case. The record renders it unreasonable that Juror No. 3 might fail to understand that the parties were probing for prejudice any venireper-son might hold for or against either side. Further, any purported forgetfulness by Juror No. 3 of his “open and shut” comment and its implication are unreasonable given that the comment was made after the state concluded its voir dire and defense counsel completed approximately two-thirds of its questioning. Juror No. 3’s failure to respond to these questions was an intentional nondisclosure. McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 418. This Court presumes bias and prejudice occurred if a juror intentionally withholds material information. Id. Accordingly, a finding of intentional nondisclosure of a material issue is tantamount to a per se rule mandating a new trial. Id.
With respect to materiality, the circuit court’s judgment found Ess presented no evidence to show whether Juror No. 3 favored the state or the defendant. Whether Juror No. 3 favored the state or the defendant is inconsequential because a predisposition toward either side material. See Section 494.470.1 (providing in pertinent part, “[N]o person who has formed or expressed an opinion concerning the matter or any material fact in controversy in any case that may influence the judgment of such person, ... shall be sworn as a juror in the same cause.”).
This Court recognizes the justice system presumes jurors, when properly instructed, will set aside any preconceived notions or premature conclusions about the case formed during the course of the trial until deliberations and then follow the court’s instructions. See McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 421. In this case, however, [206]*206Juror No. 3 was instructed no fewer than three times — once before voir dire commenced and twice during voir dire that he was to be truthful and he was prohibited from forming or expressing any opinion about the case — and he disregarded those instructions. It strains credulity that Juror No. 3, who had thrice ignored the circuit court’s instructions during voir dire, would change his mind and become free of any partiality after being seated as a juror and, after hearing the evidence, would comply with the instructions he had violated previously.
Neither party was aware of Juror No. 3’s statement, and both were deprived of an opportunity to flesh out his thoughts so as to rehabilitate him sufficiently and enable him to serve on the jury. Moreover, any bias or preconceived notion Juror No. 3 withheld from the parties during voir dire was both improper and violative of the circuit court’s instructions. Most importantly, prospective venirepersons and jurors who serve at trial who form either a premature conclusion or hold a bias work to serve an injustice to our criminal justice system that guarantees both the state and the defendant an impartial, indifferent jury.
For the foregoing reasons, this Court holds the record amply supports a finding that Juror No. 3 formed and expressed an opinion concerning the facts at issue during voir dire and intentionally failed to disclose this material information during voir dire when asked about it. Accordingly, this Court must presume bias and prejudice has occurred due to Juror No. 3’s intentional withholding of material information. McFadden, 391 S.W.3d at 418. Ess’s right to a fair trial was violated when Juror No. 3 served on the jury that ultimately convicted him after this intentional nondisclosure. The circuit court abused its discretion in overruling Ess’s motion for new trial.
Sufficiency of the Evidence
In his second and fifth points, Ess claims the circuit court erred in overruling his motions for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s evidence and at the close of all evidence regarding counts II and V. Ess challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to uphold his convictions for first-degree statutory sodomy of W.L. and attempted first-degree child molestation of B.L., respectively.
Standard of Review
To determine whether the evidence presented was sufficient to support a conviction and to withstand a motion for judgment of acquittal, this Court does not weigh the evidence but rather “accept[s] as true all evidence tending to prove guilt together with all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, and ignorefs] all contrary evidence and inferences.” State v. Holmes, 399 S.W.3d 809, 812 (Mo. banc 2013) (quoting State v. Latall, 271 S.W.3d 561, 566 (Mo. banc 2008)). “This Court’s review is limited to determining whether there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable juror might have found the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Letica, 356 S.W.3d 157, 166 (Mo. banc 2011). “This is not an assessment of whether this Court believes that the evidence at trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt but rather a question of whether, in light of the evidence most favorable to the State, any rational fact-finder could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Nash, 339 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Mo. banc 2011) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
First-Degree Statutory Sodomy of W.L.
In count II, the information charged Ess with first-degree statutory [207]*207sodomy alleging that, on or about January 1, 1995, and April 80, 1998, Ess, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying his own sexual desire, had deviate sexual intercourse with W.L., who was less than fourteen years of age, by having W.L. put his mouth on Ess’s genitals. Ess alleges the state failed to present any evidence at trial of W.L.’s age at the time the offense was alleged to have occurred. Ess also claims the state failed to present evidence that the alleged acts occurred within the time frame stated in the amended information and in the jury instruction submitted.
Section 566.062.1 provides that first-degree statutory sodomy occurs when a person has “deviate sexual intercourse with another person who is less than fourteen years old.” At the time in question, “deviate sexual intercourse” was defined as “any act involving the genitals of one person and the mouth, tongue, or anus of another person or a sexual act involving the penetration, however slight, of the male or female sex organ or the anus by a finger, instrument or object done for the purpose of arousing or gratifying the sexual desire of any person.” Section 566.010(1), RSMo 1994.
No witness testified about W.L.’s specific age or date that the offense charged in count II occurred. However, taking the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, this Court finds there was sufficient evidence to convict Ess of first-degree statutory sodomy. W.L. testified about how Ess’s sexual contact with him progressed from hugging and kissing, to masturbation, and “eventually progressed on to [Ess’s] mouth on my genitals and him wanting me to put my mouth on his [genitals].” W.L. testified the sexual contact started right after he turned twelve years old and “somewhere in the twelve range.” W.L. testified that he remembered only one specific instance where Ess placed his mouth on W.L.’s genitals, and this incident occurred in the large upstairs bedroom.
W.L. could not recall when he moved into the large upstairs bedroom. W.L.’s grandmother testified W.L. was not living in the large upstairs bedroom when she visited on Christmas Eve in 1997. Ess argues this testimony demonstrates that the offense could not have occurred prior to W.L. turning fourteen. However, accepting all reasonable inferences that support the verdict, a rational trier of fact could conclude that the incident took place after Christmas Eve in 1997 and prior to W.L. turning fourteen in May 1998. Accordingly, the state presented sufficient evidence that would allow a reasonable juror to find Ess committed first-degree statutory sodomy of W.L. either when W.L. was approximately twelve years old or the four-month window prior to turning fourteen, which comported with the time frame charged in the information.
Attempted First-Degree Child Molestation
In count V, the information charged Ess with first-degree child molestation, alleging that, on or about January 1, 1995, and July 25, 1996, Ess, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying his own sexual desire, knowingly subjected B.L. to sexual contact by having B.L. place his hand on Ess’s genitals when B.L. was less than fourteen years of age. Ess filed a motion for judgment of acquittal at the close of the state’s evidence. During that hearing, the circuit court noted there was a change in the child molestation statute regarding whether touching could be through or underneath the clothing for purposes of demonstrating sexual contact. The state conceded this statutory change and offered to amend the information to charge Ess with attempted first-degree child molestation. This amended count [208]*208was submitted to the jury, although no amended information was filed with the circuit court.
Ess claims the state failed to present any evidence that he had the purpose of committing first-degree child molestation or that he committed a “substantial step” toward committing the offense. Specifically, Ess claims the state failed to present any evidence of any attempt or that Ess acted with the purpose of being touched by B.L. underneath Ess’s clothing. The state argues that placing B.L.’s hand so that it touched Ess’s penis through his clothing was a substantial step toward making B.L.’s hand have skin-to-skin contact with Ess’s penis.
Section 566.067.1 provides that a person commits the crime of first-degree child molestation when he or she subjects another person who is less than fourteen years old to sexual contact. In 1995, section 566.010(3) defined “sexual contact” as “any touching of another person with the genitals or any touching of the genitals or anus of another person, or the breast of a female person, for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual desire of any person.” “The definition of ‘sexual contact’ contained the phrase, ‘or any such touching through the clothing,’ from the time of its enactment in 1977 until January 1, 1995, when an amendment took effect removing that language.” State v. Kelso, 391 S.W.3d 515, 521 (Mo.App.W.D.2013). Accordingly, after the amendment, this “statute was interpreted to mean that evidence of touching through the clothing did not support a finding of sexual contact.” Id.11
Section 564.011 states that to prove an attempt, the person must, with the purpose of committing the offense, do any act that is a substantial step toward the commission of the offense. “A ‘substantial step’ is conduct which is strongly corroborative of the firmness of the actor’s purpose to complete the commission of the offense.” Id.
This Court holds the state failed to present sufficient evidence that Ess attempted to commit first-degree child molestation against B.L. as alleged in count V. The evidence adduced at trial demonstrated that, when B.L. was five years old, Ess came into B.L.’s bedroom, laid down behind him, and Ess placed B.L.’s hand on top of Ess’s penis ov°r his clothing. Ess instructed B.L. to “hold it between his legs while I slept.” B.L. did as instructed, despite stating he was uncomfortable, and later fell asleep. When he awoke, Ess had left the room. This evidence was not strongly corroborative of Ess’s purpose to complete the offense of first-degree child molestation, which at the time required skin-to-skin contact by touching underneath the clothing.
“The double jeopardy clause precludes remand for a second trial when a conviction is reversed because the evidence introduced at the first trial was legally insufficient.” Miller, 372 S.W.3d at 468 (quoting State v. Self, 155 S.W.3d 756, 764 (Mo. banc 2005)). Here, there was insufficient evidence presented that Ess attempted to commit first-degree child molestation against B.L.; accordingly, the circuit court erred in overruling Ess’s motion for judgment of acquittal on that count. Ess’s conviction under count V is reversed, and the cause is remanded for an entry of a judgment of acquittal on that count.12
[209]*209Conclusion
For the reasons set forth, the circuit court’s judgment is reversed, and the case is remanded. This Court need not review Ess’s remaining points but advises the circuit court to be mindful of this Court’s holding in State v. Celis-Garcia, 344 S.W.3d 150 (Mo. banc 2011), when crafting jury instructions on remand.
Russell, C.J., Breckenridge, Stith and Teitelman, JJ., concur; Wilson, J., concurs in part and dissents in part in separate opinion filed; Fischer, J., concurs in opinion of Wilson, J.